

A Commentary on Solon's Poems

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Doctor of Philosophy

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a Commentary on Solon's Poems (elegiacs and tetrameters; the iambic trimeters, though taken into consideration for the examination of the rest of the poems, are not given a detailed commentary). Solon's poetry is studied mainly from a literary point of view; it is compared with the language and vocabulary of his predecessors Homer, Hesiod, and the other lyric poets of his age. The study attests the influence of Solon's language, content, motives, and ethical / political ideas on his lyric successors, on Aristophanes and the tragedians (above all Euripides who specifically appears to share the ideology of the *polis* and the heightened consciousness about civic affairs which emerged in the Athenian community under Solon) as well as the coincidence between Solon's ethical statements and the *topoi* of the language of the inscriptions.

This is not a historical Commentary; the connections of Solon's poetry with his Laws as well as with the historical situation of his time and the reforms he sponsored are taken into consideration only when they are useful and rewarding in the answers they provide for the interpretation of the Solonian poetry.

The emphasis of this work is on Solon's poetry as a work of Literature and on Solon's poetic achievements. The close examination of his poems reveals his creativity, his artistry together with his view of the process of poetic composition as technical making and his focus on his craftsmanship as a tool for his profession as a politician and as a statesman.

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Preface

This dissertation on Solon's poetry is heavily indebted to a range of people: I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Prof. H.G.T. Maehler for his wise counsel and constant encouragement, his unfailing patience in reading and improving successive drafts of this Commentary, and, above all, for the sense of perspective he has provided me during the course of research and writing. I would like to thank Prof. S. Hornblower for his kind help and advice as well as for the criticism he generously provided which saved me from many errors.

I have also been exceptionally fortunate in receiving the constructive criticisms and perceptive analyses of Prof. M. Fantuzzi while I was at the University of Florence as an Erasmus-student, and also afterwards in the later stages of my research. My work has also greatly profited from the comments and suggestions of Dr. E. Magnelli. Finally, I wish to thank my family whose love and support have meant a great deal to me.

The Commentary is based on the text of Solon in Teubner *Poetae elegiaci* by B. Gentili and C. Prato, with some deviations. The editions of the ancient authors which have been followed are the standard ones, in most cases, (unless otherwise stated), the ones listed in L. Berkowitz and K.A. Squitier, *Canon of Greek Authors and Works*³ (but for the ancient elegiac authors Gentili-Prato's edition is followed). Most of the abbreviations used for ancient authors and collections of fragments or for the reference bibliography are the conventional ones, which can be found, for example, in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³. The abbreviations of the titles of journals are as in *L'Année philologique*.

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Introduction

It has been more than forty years since A. Masaracchia's book on Solon has appeared and eighty since I.M. Linforth's. Only one third of each book was devoted to a discussion of the Solonian poems: in spite of the wide range of material provided by Masaracchia and the generally good judgement shown by Linforth in relation to problems of interpretation arising out of Solon's poems, both books do not indeed focus enough on the literary features of Solon's text.

Much more recently, the studies by O. Vox (1984) and by E. Katz Anhalt (1993) offered more careful literary interpretations of some of Solon's fragments. Vox and Anhalt approach Solon's poetry with great sensitivity: far from considering Solon's language conventional, they well demonstrate how often Solon innovated within the archaic tradition to a remarkable degree, or resorted to refined forms of allusion to Homer or Hesiod. However, the good points of their contributions are overshadowed mainly by their limitations in structuring the material, as the selection and arrangement of it sometimes produces a sequential commentary on a single poem and sometimes a handling of a series of topics inside it. Neither are they interested in considering the specific context of each fragment or problems of their textual transmission.

There is still a need, therefore, for a commentary on Solon's poems and for a fuller re-examination of their literary features. In fact, these often tended to be overshadowed by the other aspects of Solon's admittedly remarkable personality (Solon the wise man, Solon the traveller, Solon the legislator, Solon the statesman, Solon the political thinker). However, a close examination of the main body of his poetry (elegiacs and tetrameters) will reveal his creativity and artistry in as much as his own view of poetic composition as technical making and the strong interconnection between his 'profession' as a politician motivated by the concept of the community and his 'profession' as a poet, intending his poetry often, yet not only, as a more appealing form of advertisement and expression of his ethical or political thoughts. Indeed, Solon sought to create and use poetry for the needs of the *polis* as a whole, including all the members of it (rather than to exclude or to speak in favour of a faction, as in the poetry of Theognis or Alcaeus, for instance) and all the aspects of their life, considering as well the dimension of pleasures. It is precisely this non-exclusive function of his poetic σοφίη and his consciousness about civic affairs which will be later appreciated by authors like Aristophanes or Euripides, imbued with the omnicomprehensive ideology of the *polis*. This Commentary does not specifically or systematically examine Solon's reception in late antiquity, but the fairly abounding fifth century parallels provide good instances of the reception and fortune of Solon's language and thought at an earlier age.

Solon's poems often appear vague or cryptic and this is certainly the case when one tries to find there detailed explanations or specific clarifications of his political career or reads them as an application of the historical situation and the crisis of his time as described by our principal, yet chronologically later, reconstructions of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* and Plutarch's *Solon*. In this Commentary the connections of the poems with Solon's Laws and the historical background of Athens in his time are taken into consideration, especially when they are helpful to the interpretation — and no-one ought to side-step (at least intentionally) the thorny historic topics involved in them. However, this Commentary does not consider the poems as clues to political history, not only because this perspective has been prevailing in the only line-by-line modern commentary to Solon, namely that by Linforth, but even more because, on the present evidence, we have to admit that much has to remain disputable. For instance, the very words *σεισάχθεια* and *ἐκτήμοροι*, which are a leitmotif of Aristotle's and Plutarch's explanations of Solon's political activity, are not found in the transmitted Solonian poems and, as a matter of fact, we do not have any reliable evidence for any reference to debt by Solon in connection with his reforms which is the hard-core of the most traditional (but still prevailing, though with exceptions) historical interpretations. From Solon's poems we can glimpse a picture of the social system of his time but we can only speculate on the specific economic relations between the mighty and the low inside that system. This certainly is not enough for a historical reading of Solon, but fairly fits the concern of a close reading and literary analysis of Solon's text, which this Commentary claims to be.

The transmitted textual transcriptions of Solon's songs, even if sadly reduced in number and mainly one-sided, do reveal Solon's self-awareness as a poet. With *Salamis* (fr. 2 G.-P.²=1-3 W.²), for instance, Solon acknowledges the distinction between song and prose, attested here for the first time, and deliberately chooses poetry to convey his message to the Athenians because he can avail himself of the status of an *αἰδός* (both prestigious and free of political constraints), and likewise of the divine power of his singing in comparison to a simple prose speech he could have delivered; at the same time, he apparently wants to exploit in a political context the emotional impact of his poetry and thus its efficiency on the audience. But in so doing, he expresses, in an unexpected way, a new attitude towards poetry which shows the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman and not as the traditional *αἰδός* qua inspired servant of the Muses, and the art of 'singing' becomes for him 'making'/composing', in the very same way of other lyric poets (Alcaeus, Pindar).

Besides, other fragments, such as 18 G.-P.²=24 W.², 24 G.-P.²=26 W.², reveal in several ways how Solon has worked inside the poetic tradition of erotic poetry, how he fits into, and differentiates from this larger framework. Other poems, more

expressly, record a literary polemic with the idea of life which can be found in Mimnermus and Alcaeus, and later Alcman, Anacreon, Simonides, who divided human life in the positive phase of the bloom of physical and sexual powers of youth, as opposed to the pure negativity of their decline in old age. Solon's presentation of the maturity and old age as the years of the progressive acquisition of the *νόος* in the *Ages* (23 G.-P.²=27 W.²) or as a period of continuing ability for learning in fr. 28 G.-P.²=18 W.², effectively challenges and militates precisely against the standard erotic/lyric presentation of the theme. Solon's poetic dialogue with Mimnermus (the tradition informs us about his keen interest also for Sappho's songs), and above all his 'reply' to Mimnermus in fr. 26 G.-P.²=20 W.² reveals Solon's dialectic with older and contemporary poets and, quite unexpectedly, the agonistic tone of his own poetic intentions.

No poet in antiquity could ever write without engaging with Homer at some level. The first step to appreciate Solon's reliance on tradition as well as his departure from it is to consider his explicit acknowledgement of literary indebtedness while endeavouring to express new ideas — it is obvious that Solon had to innovate in order to deal with concepts or objects unattested in the Homeric or the Hesiodic poems; it is also self-evident that Solon could deal with the dawning repertory of the elegiac formulas, no less than with the hexametric tradition (as showed by Riedy 1903, 51f., Solon's use of epic formulas in hexameters is a good half less frequent than in the pentameters; see Giannini 1973 and Gentili 1968, 69ff., for an attempt at defining the specific formulas of archaic elegy). Nevertheless, close examination of the style of the fragments will show how Solon takes the option of not adopting what was offered by the formulaic diction even when he is allowed to keep it, but of substituting it with something often quite untraditional, and how he invests the Homeric formulas and concepts with a new syntax and a new meaning much more often than so far suspected. This is equally true for his metaphors, which while inserting and integrating elements borrowed from Homeric pictures and similes, thus sending back the listener to a familiar larger context, become semantically different and unusually striking because what Solon has to say is often genuinely unparalleled.

At times, one clearly remarks in his language the almost absolute absence of Homeric references, epithets and words, together with the frequent use for the first time of new words (some of them absolute *hapaxes*) or of expressions that are known to us only from Athenian comedy or that we suppose to be derived from everyday expressions or proverbs. At other times we notice a keen taste for mimic descriptions of the human reactions (and for mimetically ridiculing his opponents, above all in the poems in tetrameters) which are very uncommon features of the epic tradition. These elements of idiosyncratic innovations — that do not depend on the novelty of this or that idea in comparison with the epic vocabulary and ideas — together with the fact

that Solon, and similarly Archilochus, were two poets of the archaic age who used, besides elegiacs, other types of available metre, should suggest a higher degree of vividness and originality in his poetic activity than is usually acknowledged.

In my opinion Homeric allusion itself in archaic lyric cannot be reduced to the re-use of a ready-made thesaurus of suitable formulas for the dactylic rhythm (in elegiac poetry) or to a standard intention of the archaic poets to evoke the atmosphere or the tone of epic in a general way. Such an approach would wrongly underestimate Solon's self-consciousness in resorting to the so-called 'traditional referentiality': in the following pages the reader can find plenty of instances where the evocation of the Homeric context(s) through a formally more or less evident allusion to a Homeric line appears to be exploited by Solon to gain a powerful intensification of the meaning.

Indeed, the analysis of fr. 11 G.-P.²=19 W.² for instance, points in this direction: a piece of eulogistic poetry intended to pay a high literary homage, it reveals more than other poems how densely Solon could play with the Homeric heritage. In fragment 23 G.-P.²=27 W.², the frequent epicisms have the effect of elevating quite common events of human life to the level of 'heroic' events. Instead, fragments 12 G.-P.²=9 W.² and 13 G.-P.²=12 W.², though simply looking like reshaping of Homeric images, show the subtlety of Solon's thought, where the exploitation of the popularity of the meteorological speculations and skilled use of the naturalistic knowledge would invite the listener to take up a thought association between natural laws and human politics.

From the notes in this Commentary Solon's relation to Homer and Hesiod can look at times as rich and sophisticated as that of the Hellenistic poets, but I am not too much alarmed at a similarity that might seem unhistorical. Some kind of intertextuality can reasonably be presupposed any time poets and hearers/readers share a strong familiarity with one (or more) pre-existing authoritative poetic work(s), both steadily fixed in the memory of the authors and of the audience of an oral culture or fixed by writing. By the way, apart from the doubtful testimony of Dieuchidas of Megara, *FGrH* 485F6, according to whom Solon himself τὰ τε Ὀμήρου ἐξ ὑπερβολῆς γέγραφε ῥαψωδεῖσθαι ... μᾶλλον οὖν Σόλων Ὀμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος, and apart from the reliability of the better attested "Peisistratean" redaction of the Homeric poems (see Davison 1955 and 1959), most of the modern views on the transmission of Homer agree that around Solon's time the poems of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* had already been (see e.g. Janko 1992, 29-32) or were going to be transcribed to (written) text (on the "Peisistratean redaction" see lastly Seaford 1994, 148-53). The 'textuality' of the Homeric poems was a fact or a need which Solon would simply have, respectively, reflected or anticipated.

1 G.-P.² (13 W.²)

When one attempts to outline the structure of this elegy, one is confronted by a multitude of interpretations which vary at times either only in nuances, or are poles apart.

The main problem is the different perspective of a first part, where the idea of divine justice prevails, and appears to rule human actions, and a second part, where the result of the human actions is mainly conditioned by the unforeseen, if not capricious, powers of fortune. Ll. 67-70, in particular, appear to reverse the faith in a divine justice, which is stated several times elsewhere in the poem.

The poem was considered a mere patchwork, expanding on the first lines, the only original ones — the first ten lines, which are imitated by Crates (Perrotta 1924), or the first 14 lines (Puccioni 1957). Several scholars did not share this analytical approach, but simply acknowledged that these two parts are disconnected, and considered the poem as a discursive series of considerations succeeding each other in an almost free order (e.g. lastly Greene, Campbell, Gerber, West). Lattimore 1947, and van Groningen 1958 tried a formalistic analysis of single micro-textual themes, showing a logic at work, which is not at all the one we would expect — an archaic logic (as first described by Fränkel 1924=1960, 70-1), which seems repetitive to our taste and which could not express all at once and straightforwardly the most important truths, but had to present them from different points of view. Lattimore 1947, 162 argues that the elegy is a "progression of thought, each subsequent stage being an expansion, or revision, or illustration of a previous stage. It is, thus, a self-generating series of connected ideas". This approach views the poem as developing with an internal logic which may be perceptible without the necessity of recourse to an externally imposed thematic structure. Van Groningen 1958, 94-7 agrees with Lattimore but he finds a latent structure of the poem as well. He believes that the poem is an example of the type of archaic composition termed as "entrelacement". This structure results when the poet is presented simultaneously with a number of inseparable ideas whose equal importance and complexity renders hard the treatment of each one of them in depth before moving on to the next. Van Groningen, then, points to four ideas which are the dominant and main ones: a. I desire wealth, b. Just acquisition results in abiding wealth, a gift from the gods, c. Man's fortune is variable and unpredictable, d. *Moîpa* determines human fortune and punishment always attends, and x. the parts of the elegy with no direct relation to the movement of the ideas (ll. 1-2, 3-6, 14-15, 69-70), so we get this chain (x) ab (x) abdbcd (x) cdcaaddcd (x) abd which shows that the four ideas are functional, repetitive and always present in the poem.

Some other scholars tried to find a main idea connecting the whole poem and justifying the different perspectives of its two parts: the idea of the wisdom (Allen 1949) or of the correct and incorrect pursuit of wealth (Wilamowitz 1913, 257-68, Büchner 1959, Spira 1981), or the idea of divine justice leading to both the punishment of the unrighteous men and the re-distribution of their wealth, commonly misunderstood as the caprice of fate (Jaeger); ἄτη as divine principle operating on the unrighteous men, in the first part, and ἄτη operating against the bad ἔρδειν in ll. 71-6, after the description of the human professions in the central section (Römisches).

The last decades saw a renewal of the interest in the problem of the unity of the elegy which has been characterised by a similar attempt at justifying the lack of coherence between the two parts rather than at finding out a single, strong idea common to both: Müller 1956, Dalfen 1974, Maurach 1983, Eisenberger 1984, Christes 1986, Pötscher 1987. They attempted to find more and more logical (logical in the modern sense of the word) connections between the two parts, almost all of them trying to emphasise the pervasive relevance of the idea of divine justice, for instance ascribing the human suffering and failure of ll. 67-70 to the late operations of the divine punishment, the main thought developed in the first part (see above all l. 35) — though in fact Solon drops completely the theme of divine punishment in the second part, in order to develop in detail the unpredictability of human actions and the limits of human knowledge; on this matter, more successfully than his predecessors, Manuwald 1989, suggested that the unpunished success of the wrongdoers of ll. 29-32 is simply 'restated in positive terms' in ll. 69-70. But ll. 67-70 cannot be understood in moralistic terms, as convincingly shown by Römisches already in the 1930's; and, in any case, there is still a relevant difference between the passive delay of the divine vengeance presented in ll. 29-32 and the active allowance of success for the wrongdoers of ll. 69f.

Lastly, and most convincingly, Nesselrath 1992, solved the incongruity between the first and second part in terms of different perspectives, the divine one and the human one. He believes that Solon himself subscribes to both of them, and they would somehow be progressive results of his own thought. He remarked that the starting prayer to the Muses for such general human conditions (as prosperity and good reputation), allows Solon to consider all kinds of limitations of the human fortunes as well as to reflect on human guilt and divine justice: this prayer would, somehow, be the start of a speculative chain and the reflection by Solon on the problem which he presents at the start, and is always in progress till the end. The element which allowed the evolution of Solon's ideas in a changed perspective from l. 33 onwards must have been the fact that men do not feel the strokes of destiny as the punishment for their guilt or the guilt of their predecessors but as an unexpected and obscure pain. From l. 17 onwards reference concerned the 'over natural perspective'

of Zeus as ruler of the world and the connection between god and men had been dealt with from this perspective. In ll. 33-6 Solon with the use of the first plural person+θνητοί comes back to the 'natural human plan' and his concern is about cruelly deluded illusions which men alone form for themselves. In all, ll. 33-62 describe the several ways men form their positions and exploit their possibilities in an illusion about happiness and knowledge, and the superhuman forces which unexpectedly hinder them: both the fate and the 'rule of equilibrium' that stops people who have missed the invisible τέρμα which rules the acquisition of wealth.

Nesselrath's interpretation appears to me to be more convincing than the other ones simply because it admits, and justifies the change in perspective between the divine and the human part of the poem, instead of cancelling it for the sake of a single thematic principle. This means that the very issue of searching for a unifying principle has had to acknowledge the unavoidability of an 'anthropological' approach like Fränkel's, which antedates the beginning of the research for a unifying motive for Solon's elegy (and in my opinion undermines its legitimacy): in Solon's logic "the single, valid form of one single relevant truth has to be shown from two or three points of view".

1. Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα: The first line is re-used by the author of a late hymnodic inscription from Amorgos (*IG* XII.7, 95), and the first two by Crates, *SH* 359 in an amusing cynical abasement of the elegy which explicitly also involves ll. 5-10 (cp. above all χρήματα δ' οὐκ ἐθέλω συνάγειν and Sol. l. 7; (πλοῦτον) εὐφορον, εὐκτητον, τίμιον εἰς ἀρετήν and Sol. ll. 2f., 7, 10). Eumelus, *PEG* 16 Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἐννέα κοῦραι was a parallel already known to Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 6.11.1): either Eumelus was really the model of Solon, or, more probably, both Solon and Eumelus testify that a prayer-formula of this kind pre-existed to Solon, cf. also *Hymn. Orph.* 76.1 Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς ἐριγδούποιο θυγάτρες.

Mnemosyne (and/or Zeus) as parents of the Muses are found also in Hes. *Theog.* 52-4, 915-7, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 429-30, Alcman. *PMG* 8.9-10 and *PMG* 28, adesp. *PMG* 941=Terp. °8 Gos., Pind. *Isthm.* 6.75, *Nem.* 7.15, fr. 52f.55-6, and 52h.15-17, Arist. *PMG* 842.19-20, *Scol. PMG* 917c (quoted below), Callim. fr. 735, Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.3.1, *Hymn.Orph. Proem.* 17, *Hymn.Orph.* 77.1f. (quoted above). In a tradition independent of Hesiod, followed by few poets (cf. Diod.Sic. 4.7.1), and attested to us only by Alcman (*PMG* 5 fr. 2.28-30; cf. also 67) and by Mimnermus (fr. 22), the Muses are daughters of Gaia and of Uranus, who in the Hesiodic version are the parents of Mnemosyne.

While following Hesiod's account of the Muses' parentage (and birthplace, cf. below), Solon certainly highlights his version of their lineage in a direct, unsubtle way, by making Μνημοσύνη the first word of his poem (Anhalt 1993, 13), or at least by sharing the traditional formula with Μνημοσύνης at the beginning (see above) and therefore moving κλῦτε from its beginning position which is invariable in Homer (cf. below). Solon's emphasis is most probably intentional, and may well be a signal of his variance with the other two lyric poets, and most especially with Mimnermus, from whom he likes to differentiate himself more than once (see ad fr. 23 and 26).

Μνημοσύνη 'Memory' occupies a prominent place in early Greek theology. She is included among the Titans, the first generation of the theogony of Gaia and Uranus (Hes. *Theog.* 135). For the oral poet, who is a mnemotechnician, she is the means by which he creates, especially if his theme was extensive, as in Homer's case, or his subject factually complex, as with the genealogies of Hesiod's *Theogony*. Poetic craftsmanship and inspiration were closely connected with memory, as Memory also transmitted traditional knowledge from one generation to the next (cf. Notopoulos 1938, Vernant 1965, ch. 2, Yates 1966, West's note on *Theog.* 54, and Finnegan 1977, 52ff.). As late as the early 3rd cent., Mnemosyne still kept a traditional role in the proemial invocations of the improvising poetry, and Solon's proemial emphasis on Mnemosyne has a close parallel in a sympotic poem, *PMG* 917c, which is entitled ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, and starts with the invocation ὦ Μοῦσ' ἀγανόμματα μάτερ, συνεπίσπεο σῶν τέκνων ... ἄρτι βρύουσιν αἰδάν πρωτοπαγεῖ σοφία διαποίκιλον ἐκφέρομεν (text according to Ferrari 1988, 226).

Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου: Hom. *Il.* 15.131, *Od.* 1.27, 2.68, 4.74; *Hom. Hymn* 17.2; Hes. *Theog.* 529, 884, *Op.* 87, 245, fr. 1.15, and 211.8.

ἀγλαὰ τέκνα: The most expected Homeric combination of epithet+neuter plural name for 'children' is νήπια τέκνα (11x in the *Iliad* and 3x in the *Odyssey*). Ἀγλαὰ τέκνα is relatively less frequent in Homer (3x in the *Iliad* 2.871, 18.337, 23.23, 3x in the *Odyssey* 11.249 and 285, 14.223, and 4x in the *Hymns*: *Ap.* 14, *Ven.* 127, 33.2; cf. also the [Hom.] *Epigr.* 4.8 Markwald, where the Muses are called κοῦραι Διὸς ἀγλαὰ τέκνα). On the other hand, Hesiod nowhere has νήπια τέκνα, and he only exploits the formula which Solon adopts. I do not rule out that Solon's use of the Hesiodic phrase is another hint at the Hesiodic choice made by Solon about the lineage of the Muses. Hesiod's *Theog.* 644 Γαίης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀγλαὰ τέκνα is also the closest passage which is certainly before Solon's time (cf. also *Theog.* 366, fr. 31.2 and 4).

2. Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες: [Hes.] *Sc.* 206 Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, and for the adjective in the context of an invocation, cf. Hes. *Op.* 1-2 Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν, αἰδῶσι

κλείουσαι, ... Δί' ἐννέπετε ..., *Hymn.Orph.* 76.1ff. cit. Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς ἐριγδούποιο θύγατρεις, Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες ... ἀλλὰ μόλοιτε, *Bacchyl.* 1.1-3, *Sapph. PLF* 103.8] ... ἄγναι Χάριτες Πιέριδέ[ς τε] Μοῖ[σαι, *Crates, SH* 359.2 Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένω, *adesp. SH* 938.1-8 etc. The association of the Muses specifically with Πιερία (region in the north-east of Olympus) as their birthplace is not-Homeric, and appears to start with Hes. *Theog.* 53-4 (cf. also Eur. *Bacch.* 409 Πιερία, μούσειος ἔδρα; Paus. 9.29.3-4 connects the Muses with some Macedonian Pierus χρόνῳ ... ὕστερόν φασι Πίερον Μακεδόνα ... ἐλθόντα ἐς Θεσπιάς ἐννέα ... Μούσας καταστήσασθαι καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τὰ νῦν μεταθέσθαι σφίσι). However, Solon as well as Hesiod, do not ignore the epic adjective 'Olympian' Muses (see below in l. 51) — an adjective which is more generic, as it refers to the common seat of all the gods, and, therefore, it is not at all incoherent with the specific one Πιερίδες.

Solon's invocation to the Muses in the elaborate proem of his "most personal elegy" (Solmsen 1949, 107) gives the beginning of the poem the appearance of a formal-deferential prayer to the gods (cf. below). This invocation is understandable if we think of Solon simply as a poet who is beginning his poem, and we can find plenty of lyric passages where the Muses are invoked as more or less responsible either for the content or the form of the song — above all if we suppose that Solon wanted to enhance the value of his ethical-paraenetic considerations presenting them as originated from the mouth of the Muses (cf. Jacoby 1931, 103 n. 1). But other reasons, too, may have driven Solon to emphasise the role of the Muses.

In Homer what is requested from the Muses is information on events of the distant past concerning human exploits and stories of the gods of which the poet could have had no first hand knowledge (*Il.* 2.484-93, 11.218ff, 14.508ff, 16.112ff, 2.761ff). Solon may derive from this Homeric, and later wide-spread tradition, by emphasising Μνημοσύνη, because she provides the remembrance of the past, and therefore allows to draw the causal connections between past actions and their unavoidable future outcomes, which is useful for the welfare of the city and for Solon's role as a politician (cf. Anhalt 1989, 19). As was already stressed by Masaracchia 1956, 94-5, in this evaluation of the Muses, Solon would be also relying specifically on Hes. *Theog.* 80-97, where the importance of the Muses had been expressed not only for the poets but also in helping the ruling activity of the βασιλεῖς; in ll. 94-5 the singers are from the Muses (and Solon is a poet) but these goddesses bestow also to the king they protect things that Solon wants for himself as a politician: eloquence (ὄντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο γεινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων, τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσση γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἑέρσην), respect and admiration by the people (οἱ δέ νυ λαοὶ πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὀρώσι κτλ., αἰδοῖ μελιχίῃ), just decisions

(διακρίνοντα θέμιστας ἰθείησι δίκησιν), persuasive power (μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν); therefore the one whom the Muses φίλωνται becomes ὄλβιος (Il. 94f.): cp. Solon's request for ὄλβος in the following l. 3. On Muses and politics see Livrea 1992=1993, and Agosti 1997.

κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένω: Besides the direct imitation of Crates, *SH* 359.2 κλῦτέ μοι εὐχομένω, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 4 μοι κλῦθι, 13 εὐχομένω μοι κλῦθι, adesp. *PMG* 1018b.3 εὐχομένων ἐπακούσατ(ε), Rhian. *CA* 56 κλῦθί μοι εὐχάων. The formal-deferential tone of this initial invocation (the dative instead of the more common genitive, which Valckenaer wanted to substitute for the dat. of codd., is probably a result of this tone, cf. below) is confirmed by the parallels which can be found in the pseudo-orphic poems: cf. *Hymn.Orph.* 28.11 κλῦθί μου εὐχομένου=32.15, 34.10, 49.4, 56.1 (also 59.2 κλῦτέ μου εὐχομένου), and [Orph.] *Lith.* 171 (ὄφρα σευ εὐχομένοιο κλύοι θεός).

For the sequence κλῦτε ... δότε, cf. [Hom.] *Epigr.* 11.1 Markwald κλῦθί μοι εὐχομένω, Κουροτρόφε, δὸς δὲ γυναῖκα, [Hom.] *Epigr.* 6.1-3 Markwald κλῦθι Ποσειδάων ... δὸς δ' οὔρον ... καὶ νόστον κτλ.

In Homer κλῦθι and the other imperative forms of κλυεῖν (such as the reduplicated κέκλυθι or κλῦτε) are invariably at the beginning of the (first line of a) prayer (Il. 11x, Od. 20x, cf. Braswell 1988, 79), followed by the vocative of the invoked person. This fixed position depends on the pragmatic function of these verbal forms, which aim at attracting the attention of the apostrophised person to the following request, and is also more or less analogous in function to the longer phrases with *verba dicendi* which fill the line preceding a direct speech. In the lyric poets — where also the use of the introductory *verba dicendi* is much less regular, cf. Führer 1967 — the imperative forms of κλυεῖν appear not to have a fixed position, but they are still very frequent at the start of the speech (they are at the start in Anac. *PMG* 418, adesp. *PMG* 978b, Archil. *IEG* 108.1, Pind. *Pyth.* 1.90 and 4.13, fr. 78; they are not in Thgn. *IEG* 4, Pind. *Ol.* 14.5, fr. 52f.58). I would not rule out that Solon intentionally moved κλῦτε from the beginning to the second half of the distich in order to emphasise the role of Mnemosyne.

Κλύω regularly takes the genitive of the person heard, and the accusative of the thing heard. However, the dative (μοι) is attested by most of the MSS at least in Hom. *Il.* 24.335, *Od.* 4.767, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 334, Hes. *Theog.* 474 and [Hes.] *Sc.* 68, Thgn. *IEG* 13, [Hom.] *Epigr.* 11.1 Markwald, and by an ancient pap. in *Od.* 15.172; in other passages μοι may have been overwhelmed by μευ in the tradition of the text, since the latter was the reading preferred by Didymus (cf. schol. *Il.* 1.37, *Od.* 6.239, and Ludwich 1884, 1.176). This μοι can be interpreted as a form with double function as genitive and as dative, which appears to be an archaic heritage (cf. Wackernagel

1928, 2, 77f. and Chantraine, *Gramm.hom.* 2,70 §8); a different linguistic interpretation of the dative with the verbs of hearing, as a dative of interest, is also possible, and is maintained e.g. by Haldane 1972, 45. The use of the genitive μεν with κλυεῖν would be an innovation. Since many of the Homeric passages where μοι is best attested are a formulaic celebrative and archaising prayer-invocation (cf. Meier-Brügger 1986), we are perfectly entitled to suppose that also in Solon the dative is a signal of the formal-deferential tone of the prayer.

3-4. The same combination of wealth and reputation (with a different form of limitation) can also be found in Democr. VS 68B77 δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα, which may be hinting at the Solonian precedent. Prosperity was considered a prerequisite of good opinion: cf. Hes. *Op.* 313 πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ (cf. already Hom. *Od.* 11.358-61 καὶ κεν πολὺ κέρδιον εἶη, πλειοτέρῃ σὺν χειρὶ φίλῃν ἐς πατρίδ' ἰκέσθαι· καὶ κ' αἰδοιότερος ... ἀνδράσιν εἶην πᾶσιν κτλ.).

Solon's line 4 is closely paralleled by CEG 396 δὸς δέ F' ἰν ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἔχεν ἀγαθάν (6 B.C.: it is impossible to understand if it was a coincidence in using a traditional phraseology or an imitation of Solon; see also ad l. 8). For the combination of δίδωμι+final infin. ἔχειν+object, cf. Hom. *Od.* 2.335-6 οἰκία ... μητέρι δοῖμεν ἔχειν, Mimn. 1.1-2 Τιθωνῶ μὲν ἔδωκεν ἔχειν κακὸν ἄφθιτον <ό> Ζεὺς γῆρας, and Anac. *Anth.Pal.* 6.346.3-4=°196 G. δὸς δέ μιν ... ναίειν αἰῶνος μοῖραν ἔχοντ' ἀγαθήν. For the phrase δόξαν ἔχειν, Thgn. *IEG* 572 δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγαθῶν (=1104b), Eur. *TGF* 659.10 δόξαν <δὲ> βουλοίμην ἂν εὐκλείας ἔχειν.

The word ὄλβος has a range of uses, including 'happiness', 'good fortune', 'material wealth', 'prosperity', cf. Masaracchia 1958, 204f., and Doyle 1970. Here Solon appears at a first reading to be specifically thinking of economic prosperity, wealth or money, as the following πλοῦτος l. 7 and χρήματα l. 9 (at the beginning of the line, as well as ὄλβος) show; cf. also fr. 8.3 and 29^b.2, where the accompanying adjective πολὺς stresses the material meaning of the word. See also *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 486-9 μέγ' ὄλβιος ὃν τιν' ἐκεῖναι προφρονέως φίλωνται ... αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν. In his imitation of Solon's elegy Crates, *SH* 359 also emphasises the material meaning of ὄλβος: χόρτον ἐμῇ συνεχῶς δότε γαστέρι, ἥ τέ μοι αἰεὶ χωρὶς δουλοσύνης λιτὸν ἔθηκε βίον. Nevertheless the reservation of ll. 7-13 is intended to specify that god-given wealth, as wealth combined with justice (cf. l. 3, where ὄλβος is particularised as πρὸς θεῶν, as well as πλοῦτος l. 9 is by ὃν μὲν

δῶσι θεοί), is different from πλοῦτος (cf., above all, l. 71 for its negative value) and χρήματα in general — after all Solon explicitly contrasts material wealth with ἀρετή in fr. 6, and possibly his ideology of the ὄλβος is less different than it may appear from the Pindaric ὄλβος 'happiness' of *Isthm.* 4.76f., *Pyth.* 1.46ff. and 2.26ff.

In Homer either the gods in general (*Od.* 3.208, 18.19 quoted above) or specifically Zeus (*Od.* 4.207-8, 6.188 quoted above, 18.273) are considered to be responsible for the allotment of ὄλβος. See the occasional requests to different gods for virtue and financial prosperity in the *explicit* of some Homeric *Hymns*: 15.9 χαῖρε ἄναξ Διὸς υἱέ· (scil. Heracles) δίδου δ' ἀρετὴν τε καὶ ὄλβον, 20.8 ἀλλ' ἴληθ' Ἥφαιστε· δίδου δ' ἀρετὴν τε καὶ ὄλβον. However the association of ὄλβος with the Muses has already a parallel in the Hesiodic passage on the Muses as helpers of poets and kings, already considered ad l. 2: *Theog.* 96-7 ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὄντινα Μοῦσαι φιλῶνται=*Hom.Hymn* 25.4-5. I do not agree with Eisenberger 1984, 10, according to whom the specification πρὸς θεῶν is intended to remind the audience that wealth comes from the Olympians, and that he is asking the Muses above all for the δόξα: in this interpretation we would be compelled to presuppose a hard zeugmatic variance in the sense of πρὸς, that would mean 'from' as far as the gods are concerned, and 'at the hand of' as for the men (on the meanings of πρὸς, see below): I prefer to believe, with Römisch 1933, 45, that the Muses have to mediate Solon's gaining of both wealth from gods and reputation from men.

πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων ... καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων: An instance of the flexibility of the formulaic system, being an expansion of the single line formula, *Hom. Il.* 1.339 πρὸς τε θεῶν μακάρων πρὸς τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, *Od.* 9.521 οὔτε θεῶν μακάρων οὔτε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων=*Hes. fr.* 204.117=*Hom.Hymn Herm.* 144 and *Hom.Hymn Aphr.* 35, *Hes. fr.* 25.31=fr. 229.11 ἔκ τε θεῶν μακάρων ἔκ τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων; *Phoron. PEG* 5.2: πάντας γὰρ μάκαράς τε θεοὺς θνητοὺς τ' ἀνθρώπους. Πρὸς+gen. is used of effects proceeding from whatever cause, in the meaning of 'from', 'at the hand of', with verbs of having and receiving (e.g. *Hom. Il.* 1.160, 16.85, *Od.* 11.302, *Alc. PLF* 5.7, *Pind. Ol.* 7.90 and *Nem.* 9.45).

δόξαν ἀγαθήν: The good opinion which others have of one, estimation, repute, first in Solon. The phrase appears to be the 'political' equivalent — the replacement — of the 'heroic' κλέος ἐσθλόν of Homer (e.g. *Il.* 10.212-3, *Od.* 1.95, 19.333-4, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 174-5). To be πάντας ... κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός (*Thgn. IEG* 23), or πολλοῖς τε θ[αυ]μασθεὶς βροτῶν (*Bacchyl.* 1.152), or ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρα πολλῶν ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων πολυζήλωτον εἶμεν (*Bacchyl.* 10.48-9), or περίβλεπτος, δακτυλόδεικτος (*Aesch. Ag.* 1332), ἐπίζηλος (*Aesch. Ag.* 939), περίβλεπτος βροτοῖς ὀνομαστὰ πράσσων (*Eur. HF* 508-9), περιβόητος, would

be especially useful to someone who, like Solon, was aiming at political consensus. For the opposition between the wish for great wealth and the one for good opinion, cf. Critias, *TrGF* 43F17.7-10 οἱ δ' αἰσχροῖα κέρδη πρόσθε τοῦ καλοῦ βροτῶν ζητοῦσιν· ... ἐγὼ <δὲ> τούτων οὐδενὸς χρήζω τυχεῖν, δόξαν δὲ βουλοίμην ἂν εὐκλείας ἔχειν.

Homer has the word δόξη only twice, in the expression οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης 'and not otherwise than one expects'. This phrase is once co-ordinated to ἀπὸ σκοποῦ (*Od.* 11.344), and once (*Il.* 10.324, a line which probably derives from *Od.* 11.344, cf. Shewan 1911, 119, and Laser 1958, 408f.) is attributive of σκοπὸς: σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ οὐχ ἄλιος σκοπὸς ἔσσομαι οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης. In both passages, as the ancient scholia acknowledged, δόξα emphasises the subjective character of the expectation, and is therefore still quite far from the meaning of 'reputation', namely *positive* public opinion, which the term already appears to express in Tyrt. 9.9 — another author mostly concerned with the elaboration of values and concepts of the ideology of the *polis* —, though it was above all developed from the Presocratics onwards (cf. Greindl 1940, 221). On the other hand, in l. 34 the meaning of δόξα is closer to the Homeric one of personal 'expectation'. The same ambivalence of the term is to be found in Theognis, *IEG* 571f. quoted above and 639, where δόξα means 'expectation', and 665-6, where δόξα is synonymous with the contextual τιμή (cf. Anhalt 1989, 29).

The specification of the δόξα as proceeding πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων has to be remarked, since it suits Solon's aim to operate for the well-being of all the citizens: Solon does not want to be esteemed by his friends or a single faction of the Athenians, but by everyone.

5-6. The presentation of the results inherent in the conditions of life Solon was praying for in the second distich, happiness and good reputation. They are somehow the 'public version' of the simple private happiness described in Sol. fr. 17.

γλυκὺν ... φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι ... πικρόν: Corrected by Crates' imitation, *SH* 359.5 ὠφέλιμον δὲ φίλοις, μὴ γλυκερόν, τίθετε. A traditional idea which is rooted in the justice of reciprocation, cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.184-5 πόλλ' ἄλγεα δυσμενέεσσι, χάρματα δ' εὐμενέτησι, Sapph. *PLF* 5.6 καὶ φίλοις]ι Φοῖσι χάραν γένεσθαι ... ἔ]χθροισι, γένοιτο δ' ἄμμιμ]ηδ' εἴς, Archil. *IEG* 23.14-5 ἐπ]ίσταμαί τοι τὸν φιλ[έο]ν[τα] μὲν φ[ι]λεῖν[, τὸ]ν δ' ἐχθρόν ἐχθαίρειν and 126 ἔν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸν κακῶς <μ> ἔρδοντα δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς, Thgn. *IEG* 871-2 εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ τοῖσιν μὲν ἐπαρκέσω οἳ με φιλεῦσιν, τοῖς δ' ἐχθροῖς ἀνίη καὶ μέγα πῆμ' ἔσσομαι (cf. also 89ff. and 337f.), Pind. *Pyth.* 2.83-

5 φίλον εἶη φιλεῖν· ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἄτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι, ἄλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς, also in the tragedians, e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 608, *Cho.* 123, *Sept.* 1049, *PV* 978, Soph. *Ant.* 643-4, Eur. *Med.* 809, *HF* 585-6, *Heracl.* 881-2, *TGF* 1092; later, e.g. Phld. *Anth.Pal.* 5.107.1-2, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.103, and cf. Gow ad Theoc. 14.62. Some kind of softening of this attitude is also attested in Pind. *Pyth.* 9.95 and Pl. *Grg.* 480f., 508f., with Socrates' behaviour, cf. Dover 1974, 180-184, and Blundell 1989, 26-59.

For the oxymoron γλυκὺς/πικρὸς, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 301 and Soph. *Aj.* 966, and for the idea of generosity towards one's friends preferred to excessive wealth, cf. Pind. *Nem.* 1.31ff. (and *Pyth.* 1ff., quoted below ad 1.12, where πλοῦτος combined with ἀρετά is spoken of by the poet as a πολὺφιλον ἐπέταν).

αἰδοῖον ... δεινὸν ἰδεῖν: Hom. *Il.* 3.172 αἰδοῖός τέ μοί ἐσσι ... δεινός τε, 18.394 ἦ ῥά νύ μοι δεινὴ τε καὶ αἰδοίη θεὸς ἔνδον, *Od.* 8.21-2 φίλος ... γένοιτο δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε, 14.234 δεινός τ' αἰδοῖός τε μετὰ Κρήτεσσι τετύγμην; cf. also *Il.* 15.657-8 ἴσχε γὰρ αἰδῶς καὶ δέος, and *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 190 τὴν δ' αἰδῶς τε σέβας τε ἰδὲ χλωρὸν δέος εἶλεν. For δεινὸν ἰδεῖν, Hom. *Od.* 22.405 δεινὸς δ' εἰς ὦπα ἰδέσθαι.

Homer uses the two adjectives as positive parallels to describe an individual, and the two notions seem sometimes to overlap. δεινός reinforces αἰδοῖος 'revered' without implying anything more frightening ('provoking reverence and therefore fear' *LfgrE* s.v.; see also Kirk ad *Il.* 3.172). Cf. *Cypr. PEG* 18.2 ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδῶς, Epich. *CGF* 221K. ἔνθα δέος, ἐνταῦθα καὶ δέος and Pl. *Euthphr.* 12b where αἰδῶς appears to overlap with just a part of the meaning of δέος. But most often δεινός had also the narrower meaning of 'fearful' in Homer, and at *Resp.* 5.465ab Plato treats reverence and fear as distinct and co-ordinate (the distinction between the two concepts is stressed as being original by Erffa 1937, 29f.). By contrasting αἰδοῖος with δεινός Solon is certainly exploiting some difference in meaning between δεινός and αἰδοῖος, and therefore possibly differentiates himself from the endyadic use of the phrase δεινός τ' αἰδοῖος in Homer. Solon's wish is not to harm his enemies, as in several of the similar dichotomies quoted ad 1. 5, but to be 'respected' by them — a wise caution for a politician who liked to present himself in equilibrium between the political factions of his time, as remarked by Alt 1979, 393; cf. also Vox 1983a, 517-9.

7-8. χρήματα δ' ἰμείρω ... οὐκ ἐθέλω: transformed in the parody of Crates, *SH* 359.6-9 χρήματα δ' οὐκ ἐθέλω συνάγειν κλυτὰ, ... ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνης μετέχειν καὶ πλοῦτον ἀγείρειν εὖφορον, εὖκτητον, τίμιον εἰς ἀρετὴν. The

verb πέπαμαι appears here for the first time, and still in Theognis it appears to be specialised for the 'possession' of wealth, see 146 cit. below and 663; see later Pind. *Pyth.* 8.73 and the tragedians (where it is felt as a specifically Doric word with the *alpha impurum*, cf. Björck 1950, 130f.).

For the distinction between right and unrighteous wealth, cf. Hes. *Op.* 320-6 χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἄρπακτά· θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω κτλ., Thgn. *IEG* 29-30 μηδ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἐπ' ἔργμασι μηδ' ἀδίκοισιν τιμὰς μηδ' ἀρετὰς ἔλκεο μηδ' ἄφενος, 145-6 βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέων ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν ἢ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος, 199-202 εἰ δ' ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέει θυμῷ κτήσεται, εἴθ' ὄρκῳ παρ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλὼν, αὐτίκα μὲν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν αὖθις ἔγεντο κακόν, θεῶν δ' ὑπερέσχε νόος, 466 μηδέ σε νικάτω κέρδος ὃ τ' αἰσχρὸν ἔη, 753 ταῦτα μαθὼν φίλ' ἐταῖρε δικαίως χρήματα ποιοῦ, Pind. *Pyth.* 3.110-1 εἰ δέ μοι πλοῦτον θεὸς ἄβρὸν ὀρέξαι, ἐλπίδ' ἔχω κλέος εὐρέσθαι κεν ὑψηλὸν πρόσω (also *Ol.* 2.53 ὁ μὰν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, *Nem.* 9.46 ἅμα κτεάνοις πολλοῖς ἐπίδοξον ... ἄρηται κῦδος), Democr. *VS* 68B77 δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα, *Scol. PMG* 890.3 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, [Phoc.] 5 Depon μὴ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὁσίων βιοτεύειν; also Xen. *An.* 2.6.18. In the fifth century will also appear the doctrine that prosperity in itself *never* lasts, for which see West's note on Eur. *Or.* 340.

πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη: The closest parallel is *Inscr. Graecae metr.* 63 Pr. (ap. Polyb. 4.33 and Paus. 4.22.7) πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὗρε δίκην, κτλ., considered by Callisthenes (*FGrH* 124F23) to be the tombstone of Aristocrates, the Arcadian king who betrayed the Messenians during the first Messenian war (7th cent. B.C.), but was certainly later (cf. Walbank ad Polyb. cit.). For the thought, cf. also below, ll. 28ff., and Sol. 3.16 (Δίκη) τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη, Simon. *IEG* 11.12]. θείης ἄρμα καθεῖλε δίκ[ης, Men. fr. 510.2 K.-Th. τὸ μὴ δικαίως εὐτυχεῖν ἔχει φόβον. The word δίκη appears in the *Iliad* seven times with the meaning 'settlement', namely ruling, legal process which may be proposed and made between two parties in dispute, as opposed to violent or illegal action; this sense accords with the derivation of the word from the root of the verb δείκνυμι 'to show', 'to indicate' (the different sense 'right, custom' or 'characteristic behaviour', 'mark' of a specific category of people or gods first occurs in the *Odyssey*, with the genitive or a limiting clause). Homeric society, being primarily composed of warriors, could not rely upon δίκη (peaceful litigation of disputes) without force (βίη) or violence (ὑβρις) — this is the new meaning which Hesiod emphasises in *Works and Days*, though he also develops the meaning of the word towards a more abstract notion of legal process, law, and towards the idea of punishment for the violation of this process (*Op.*

219-24, 238-9). In several of these cases Hesiod clearly personifies and deifies Δίκη (above all in *Theog.* 901-2, where she is a daughter of Zeus and Themis, sister of Eirene and Eunomia; cf. also *Op.* 213, 275, 283), and thus increases its importance; besides he often makes reference to the role of Zeus in supervising the functions of δίκη, thus implying that a violation of it is in some sense an offence against the god (*Op.* 36, 225-9, 239, 242, 253, 256, 259, 276, 281). At any rate in Hesiod the word does not yet seem to have the meaning of (personal) morality or (public) justice in general, which only Plato appears to exploit fully (as stressed by Havelock 1978; for a different point of view, cf. Solmsen 1949, 87-96 who follows Jaeger in believing in a "religious and moral doctrine of Justice and Injustice" in Hesiod). In Hesiod δίκη still oversees only one activity, the peaceful settlement of disputes: cp. *Op.* 327-34, a section which refers to deeds which are traditionally wrong, but the punishment for these ἄδικα ἔργα has nothing to do with δίκη, since there is no question of harming any legal process, and since δίκη does not mean 'justice' or 'retribution' in general, a meaning (=later δικαιοσύνη) which first occurs in Theognis, and is connected with the increasing association of δίκη with the idea of balance, attested from Solon fr. 13 and the Presocratics onwards (cf. Anaximand. VS 12B1, Heraclit. VS 22B 94, Parm. VS 28B1.14 and 8.14).

On the archaic idea of *dike*, besides Havelock 1978, and Solmsen 1949, citt., see Ehrenberg 1921, 63-9, Becker 1937, 180, Palmer 1950, Rodgers 1971, Gagarin 1973, and id. 1974.

While being strongly influenced by Hesiod, Solon turns his attention above all to the economic and political results of the violation of δίκη, namely uncertainty of wealth, destruction of the whole city (cf. fr. 3), and in this line δίκη (or, better, Δίκη) is something in between the Hesiodic personification and the Theognidean abstraction. Indeed, it means 'punishment against the unlawful acquisition of prosperity' in an economic context, as well as in Thgn. *IEG* 207 ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρψε δίκη, where we find both the violation of δίκη by the ἄδικοι and the failure of the system to punish these ἄδικοι (cf. Il. 743-52, where his indignation about the prosperity of the ἄδικοι and the sufferings of the δίκαιοι is obvious). But at the same time Solon's δίκη also appears to be close to a personified deity as found in Hes. *Op.* 220ff., where she comes into the city and brings evil to those who drove her out, and finally, l. 259-60 αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον. In Solon, too, the coming of δίκη is presented in strict connection with the action of Zeus, described from l. 17 onwards. After all the same gnomic aorist ἦλθε, and the same adverb πάντως are exploited by Solon for the surely personified Δίκη of fr. 3.14ff. quoted below.

The gnomic aorist ἦλθε expressing a general truth, reflects exactly Solon's confidence in the final retaliation of δίκη, a confidence shared piously by Hesiod, *Op.* 217-8 δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα. However, different from Hesiod is in Solon the certainty of the statement, stressed by the adverb πάντως (see also ll. 28 and 31): as remarked by Raaflaub 1996, 1060f., the acknowledgement of firmly established laws in the social-political sphere (see ll. 11f.) allows Solon to replace with certainty the previous faith/belief in justice.

9-13. The perspective in which Solon emphasises the opposition between right and unrighteous wealth is, above all, the perspective of duration of each of them, which may have already appeared in αἰεί l. 4, cf. Römisch 1933, 5. For the thought, see above all Pind. *Pyth.* 5.1-4 ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής, ὅταν τις ἀρετᾶ κεκραμένον καθαρᾶ βροτήσιος ἀνὴρ πότμου παραδόντος αὐτὸν ἀνάγῃ πολύφιλον ἐπέταν, who states that the wealth combined with ἀρετὰ and sent by πότμος is the only εὐρυσθενής πλοῦτος; besides Eur. *El.* 943-4 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ἀδίκως καὶ μετὰ σκαιῶν ξυνὼν ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, σμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον, *Ion* 378-80 ἂν γὰρ βία σπεύδωμεν ἀκόντων θεῶν, ἀνόνητα κεκτήμεσθα τάγαθ', ὦ γύναι· ἃ δ' ἂν διδῶσ' ἐκόντες, ὠφελούμεθα, *TGF* 362.11-3 ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῶ χρήματ', ἣν βούλῃ πολὺν χρόνον μελάθροις ἐμμένειν· τὰ γὰρ κακῶς οἴκους ἐσελθόντ' οὐκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν, *TGF* 419 βία ... ἔλκετε ... κακοὶ τιμὰς βροτοὶ, ... κτᾶσθε πλοῦτον πάντοθεν θηρώμενοι, ... ἔπειτ' ἀμᾶσθε τῶνδε δύστηνον θέρος, *TGF* 459 κέρδη τοιαῦτα χρή τινα κτᾶσθαι βροτῶν, ἐφ' οἷσι μέλλει μήποθ' ὕστερον στένειν. For the connection of wealth and *hybris* (see l. 11), cf. e.g. Eur. *TGF* 437 ὀρῶ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐγὼ τίκτουσαν ὕβριν τὴν πάροιθ' εὐπραξίαν, *TGF* 438 ὕβριν τε τίκτει πλοῦτος.

The idea of the uncertainty of the material goods, especially of those improperly and unrighteously acquired, is frequent in later authors, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 197-208, Eur. *El.* 941 ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα, *HF* 511-2 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ὁ μέγας ... οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ βέβαιός ἐστι, *Phoen.* 558 ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος, *TGF* 354.2-3 οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτός ποτε βέβαιος ἀδικος, *TGF* 362.11-3 ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῶ χρήματ', ἣν βούλῃ πολὺν χρόνον μελάθροις ἐμμένειν· τὰ γὰρ κακῶς οἴκους ἐσελθόντ' οὐκ ἔχει σωτηρίαν, and Men. *Dys.* 797 περὶ χρημάτων λαλεῖς, ἀβεβαίου πράγματος.

On the firmness of wealth sent by gods: Hes. *Op.* 320-6 χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἀρπακτά· θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίῃ μέγαν ὄλβον ἔληται, ... ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ, Thgn. *IEG* 197-8 χρῆμα δ' ὃ μὲν Διόθεν καὶ σὺν δίκη ἀνδρὶ γένηται καὶ καθαρῶς, αἰεὶ

παρμόνιμον τελέθει, Pind. *Pyth.* 3.103-6 χρὴ πρὸς μακάρων τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν. ... ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἔπηται, and *Nem.* 8.17 σὺν θεῷ γάρ τοι φυτευθεὶς ὄλβος ἀνθρώποισι παρμονώτερος.

9. παραγίνεται: the verb appears once in a material sense in Hom. *Od.* 17.173. With reference to an abstract subject in Thgn. *IEG* 139 οὐδέ τῳ ἀνθρώπων παραγίνεται ὅσσ' ἐθέλησιν (also e.g. in Pl. *Men.* 86d, 99e, *Leg.* 5.732d, Xen. *Cyr.* 4.1.14).

δῶσι: Subjunctive with gnomic value.

ἔμπεδος: From the literary meaning of 'standing firmly on the ground', already in the epic ἔμπεδος developed, on the one hand, to 'unchanged', 'undisturbed', on the other, to (metaph.) 'firm', 'reliable', sometimes with a temporary connotation 'continuous' (*LfgrE* s.v.); both metaphorical senses of the word, which Homer exploits almost only in the *Odyssey*, occur in Solon.

10. ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν: For totality described in a 'vertical' sense, see Rhian. *CA* 71.9-10 κᾶς νεάτους ἐκ κορυφῆς ὄνυχας ~ Phil.Thess. *Anth.Pal.* 9.709.4. For the word's substantival use cf. Callim. *Del.* 33 ἐκ νεάτων 'from the foundations'.

11. ὃν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος: There lies a clearly marked contrast between l. 9 (the πλοῦτον) ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί and l. 11 (ὁ πλοῦτος) ὃν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν, further emphasised by the phrases ὑφ' ὕβριος and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. We need a word which will harmonise with this situation, what τιμῶσιν certainly does, in my opinion. Most adopt Ahrens' emendation μετίωσιν (some similar attempts were θηρῶσιν van Herwerden, ἀνάγωσιν von Leutsch, *coll.* Pind. *Pyth.* 5. 3; συλῶσιν Linder and Schmidt, *coll.* Thgn. 345, μαίωνται Linforth, φιμῶσι Masaracchia). However, as Masaracchia 1958, 212 points out, πλοῦτος cannot 'follow' (ἔρχεται) one who pursues it. Björck 1942 attempts to justify τιμῶσιν placing the comma after it instead of after ὕβριος, comparing Pl. *Resp.* 2.364a (πονηροὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας εὐδαιμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν ... τοὺς δ' ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερορᾶν, οἳ ἂν πῃ ἀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ᾧσιν) but then no satisfactory contrast is provided to the previous distich, and Björck's assumption that in ll. 11f. Solon would be repeating ll. 9f. appears to be a *petitio principii*. The expression πλοῦτον τιμῶσιν (reading of the MSS) receives support from Thgn. *IEG* 189 χρήματα ... τιμῶσι, 523 οὐ σέ ... ὦ Πλοῦτε βροτοὶ τιμῶσι μάλιστα, Eur. *TGF*

354 τὰς οὐσίας ... τιμᾶν, Ar. *Plut.* 587, Pl. *Resp.* 8.551a1, 553d5, 555c7, *Ep.* 2.312c5, Arist. *Top.* 117a, Aesop. *Prov.* 58.3, Aristid. *Or.* 13.145.9. As for ὑφ' ὕβριος, it appears to me to be perfectly understandable as denoting "an intentional, anti-social, element in men's pursuit and overvaluation of new wealth; the presence of *hybris* makes the acts of acquisition unjust", cf. Fisher 1992, 69, and see Sol. 3.6 χρήμασι πειθόμενοι, said of the citizens whose foolishness is going to destroy their city. Therefore the distich soundly complements the previous one, if we simply accept Hermann's comma after ὕβριος.

οὐ κατὰ κόσμον: Common epic diction. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.214, 5.759, 8.12, 17.205, *Od.* 3.138, 8.179, 14.363, 20.181, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 255 etc. For the idea of this line, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 677 χρήματα δ' ἀρπάζουσι βίη, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλωλεν.

12-3. (πλοῦτος) ἔρχεται ... ἔπεται: The wealth is here almost personified as in the close parallel of Pind. *Pyth.* 3.105-6 quoted above ad ll. 9-13 ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσαις ἔπηται. On wealth as "companion", besides Sol. 8.3-4, cf. Bacchyl. 1.160 πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ, and Pind. *Pyth.* 5.1ff. ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής, ὅταν τις ... ἀνὴρ ... αὐτὸν ἀνάγῃ πολύφιλον ἐπέταν.

ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος: ἔργμα=ἔργον, poetic word, post-homeric, already found in Hes. *Op.* 801, and in the late *Hom.Hymn* 29.12 (ἔρματα West 1966, 150), and *Hom.Hymn* 32.19. Cf. Sol. 3.11 πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι/, 3.6 χρήμασι πειθόμενοι, Thgn. *IEG* 380 ἀνθρώπων, ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθομένων, 948 ἀδίκους ἀνδράσι πειθόμενος, 1152=1238b=1262 ῥήμασι πειθόμενος, 'Simon.' *Anth.Pal.* 7.249~*FGE* 777 κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων πειθόμενοι νομίμοις, 'Simon.' *Anth.Pal.* 6.50=*FGE* 737 εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῆς λήματι πειθόμενοι. The structure formed by the participle πειθόμενος preceded by a dactylic name in dative is one of the most developed systems of specific formulas for the pentameter: cf. Parry 1930=1971, 281 and Vetta 1980, xlvī.

13. οὐκ ἐθέλων: For a similar personification of an abstract concept, in a similar context (Dike subdued by unrighteous rulers), cf. Hes. *Op.* 220-3 τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης ἧ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας. ἡ δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα ... κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα.

ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτη: Ταχέως only once in Homer (*Il.* 23.365) who almost always has τάχα, apparently a poetic word, much more common in the tragedians, but rarely attested in prose and comedy, which prefer ταχέως (cf.

Lex.rhet. in Anecd. Graec. 309.20 B. τάχα· παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ ταχέως~Thom.Mag. 357.4f. R.).

ἄτη dative (lastly accepted by West), though attested by best MSS, is worse than the nominative, because ἄτη is more easily understood as the subject of the following ll. 14-6, — but not because of the argument raised against the dative by Linforth 1919, 231, who states that ἀναμίσγεσθαι is properly used only of joining a group (cf. the opposite instances of Hom. *Od.* 10.235-6 σίτω φάρμακα, Callim. *Del.* 217 φόβω μῦθος, fr. 24.3 Pf. γέλως λύπη).

The primary meaning of ἄτη appears to have been 'blindness', a state of mind in which a person lacks rational control over his decision and deeds, mostly inflicted by the gods (and this is found at least in Hom. *Il.* 3.100—according to Zenodotus: ἀρχή codd.— 6.356, 9.114-20, 24.28, (cf. 3.164, 19.86-8), *Od.* 4.261); more frequently in Hesiod the word signifies the material consequences or the destruction. Only in Hesiod (*Op.* 213-6) appears the connection between ἄτη and ὕβρις, while neither in Homer nor in Hesiod is there any sign of the idea of ἄτη as punishment for the ὕβρις (on the contrary, in Hes. *Op.* 213-6, after one has already encountered ἄτη he is weighed down with ὕβρις), or of the well-known scheme ὄλβος-κόρος-ὕβρις-ἄτη. Instead, both ideas seem to be implied by Solon (see also frs. 3.8-11 and 8): cf. Dodds 1951, 1ff., Greene 1963, 36-8, Doyle 1984, Roisman 1984, Havelock 1978, 258.

14. ἀρχῆς δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης γίγνεται: Solon compares the beginning of ἄτη with the image of fire which grows big from small beginning. We should prefer the correction by West 1966, 152, ἀρχῆς δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης, rather than ἀρχή κτλ. MSS, which does not give a satisfactory combination with the verb τελευτᾷ (see Wilamowitz 1913, 259). Arnott's reading ἀρχὴν δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου is also plausible but the parallels quoted by West, Solon l. 59 πολλάκι δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος, and Hes. fr. 43(a)61 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀλίγης are most persuasive. I would add Bacchyl. 11.64-6 νεῖκος ... ἀμαιμάκετον βληχρᾶς ἀνέπαλτο ... ἀπ' ἀρχᾶς.

ὥστε πυρός: a brief simile which ends the verse, typical of the elegiac poetry. For a parallel picture cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 3.37 πολλὰν δ' {έν} ὄρει πῦρ ἐξ ἐνός σπέρματος ἐνθορόν αἰστωσεν ὕλαν, and cp. Ar. *Ach.* 916-25.

15. φλαύρη: The adjective appears first here and in Alc. *PLF* 59a3. Cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.87 εἴ τι καὶ φλαῦρον παραιθύσσει, μέγα τοι φέρεται πὰρ σέθεν.

τὸ πρῶτον: Cf. Hom. *Il.* 4.267, 23.324.

16. οὐ ... δὴν: 'not for a long while'. δὴ is the reading of S, δὴν is Gesner's correction and is also found in the late ms. Paris. 1985. οὐ γὰρ δὴν is found in Hom. *Od.* 2.163-4, 20.155 (οὐ δὴν 16x in Hom.).

ὑβριος ἔργα: Similar phrases with ἔργα in Sol. 1.41 πενίης ... ἔργα, Sol. 3.37 ἔργα διχοστασίης; Hom. *Il.* 9.228 δαιτὸς ... ἔργα, Hes. *Op.* 146 (according to the reading of Π³⁸), Mimn. 8.12 πενίης ... ἔργ(α), Xenoph. 2.18 ῥώμης ... ἔργ(α).

17. Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος: Zeus watches over the outcome of everything: Hom. *Od.* 13.213 Ζεὺς ... ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐφορᾷ καὶ τίνυται ὅς τις ἀμάρτη, Hes. *Op.* 267-9 πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμός καὶ πάντα νοήσας καὶ νυ τὰδ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃσ' ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει οἶην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει, Archil. *IEG* 177.1-3 ὦ Ζεῦ, ... σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὀρᾷς λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, Alc. *PLF* 200.10-1 Ζεῦ]ς ἔχει τέλος Κρο[νίδαις, Bacchyl. 15.51 Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων ὅς ἅπαντα δέρκεται, Aesch. *Eum.* 1045 Ζεὺς παντόπτας (see also Ag. 781 πᾶν δ' ἐπὶ τέρμα νωμᾷ (Δίκη)), Soph. *El.* 175 Ζεὺς, ὅς ἐφορᾷ πάντα, Ant. 184 Ζεὺς ὁ πάνθ' ὀρῶν αἰεί, Ar. *Ach.* 435 ὦ Ζεῦ διόπτα καὶ κατόπτα πανταχῇ, Lucian, *Bis Acc.* 2.20 etc. For the gods' (and especially Zeus') power of deciding, cf. Hes. *Op.* 669 ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε, Archil. *IEG* 298 Ζεὺς ἐν θεοῖσι μάντις ἀψεудέστατος, καὶ τέλος αὐτὸς ἔχει, Semon. *IEG* 1.1-2 τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος πάντων ὅς' ἐστὶ καὶ τίθησ' ὅκη θέλει, Alcm. *PMG* 1.83 [σι]ῶν γὰρ ἄνα καὶ τέλος, Pind. *Ol.* 13.104-5 ἐν θεῷ γε μάν τέλος, *Nem.* 10.29 πᾶν δὲ τέλος ἐν τὶν ἔργων, Aesch. *Ag.* 1487 τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;, *Supp.* 823-4 τί δ' ἄνευ σέθεν θνατοῖσι τέλειόν ἐστιν;, Eur. *Or.* 1545 τέλος ἔχει δαίμων βροτοῖς, τέλος ὅπα θέλη, *Supp.* 615-6 θεοὶ ... πάντων τέρμ' ἔχοντες αὐτοί, *TGF* 948 πᾶν γὰρ ἐκ θεῶν τέλος, adesp. *TrGF* 621 οὐδὲ θεοῖσι αὐθαίρετα πάντα πέλονται νόσφι Διός· κείνος γὰρ ἔχει τέλος ἡδὲ καὶ ἀρχήν, Men. fr. 114* K.-Th. νῦν δ' ἔλπομαι μὲν, ἐν θεῷ γε μὴν τέλος.

18-25. ὥστ' ... τίσις: Solon expands a short phrase of comparison (ὥστ' ἄνεμος ... διεσκέδασεν) by adding — in the manner of the extended Homeric simile — an enjambling relative clause which is preceded by the runover adjective ἡρινός, ὅς πόντου κτλ., and develops a picture which extends for six verses. At the end of the simile the correlative τοιαύτη to the introductory adverb marks (in ring form) the return to the narrative. The length of this simile, unusual for archaic elegy, which prefers to condense the Homeric models into one or two words (as noted by Hudson-

Williams 1926, 123), is a clue to the emphasis Solon wants to give to his treatment of the idea of δίκη. The points stressed are the swiftness of the spring-storm, its destructive violence, and the complete calm it finally brings, since the earth is as free from the works of ὕβρις, as heaven from the winter clouds. The implicit point of comparison is that "as the storm comes in its destructive violence only at the end of winter, so Zeus is concerned not with each deed but with the end" (Allen 1949, 53); cf. also Fränkel 1924=1960, 70 n.1, who points out that ἡρινός — which is given importance by its emphatic position — must be given full weight in interpretation: the storm comes in spring, after the clouds of the long winter, and the αἰθρίη following it will be a persistent one (cf. Il. 23f.). The idea introduced in the simile anticipates its appearance in the narrative (Il. 25-8 repeat explicitly what the simile has already implied, and Il. 29-32 repeat the idea again in more precise detail), so that the simile plays an essential part in the sense.

Storm-simile passages are found in epic (Il. 13.795-801, 16.384-93; Hes. *Theog.* 873-80), and the storm of Il. 16.384-93 was already a punishment inflicted by Zeus on unrighteous men, but Solon's simile formally comes from Il. 16.297-302 ὥς δ' ὅτ' ... κινήσῃ πυκινὴν νεφέλην ... Ζεὺς, ... ἔκ τ' ἔφανεν ... σκοπιαὶ καὶ πρόνες ἄκροι καὶ νάπαι, οὐρανόθεν ... ὑπερράγῃ ἄσπετος αἰθήρ, ὥς Δαναοὶ νηῶν ... ἀπωσάμενοι ... πῦρ τυτθὸν ἀνέπνευσαν (cf. also Il. 5.525-6 ζαχρειῶν ἀνέμων, οἳ τε νέφεα σκιάοντα πνοιῇσιν λιγυρῇσι διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντες). In the *Iliad*-passage the active role of Zeus in moving the cloud hints that his plan caused this shift — in Solon ἄνεμος ἡρινός=Zeus; in Homer the simile is related from the Greeks' view point and embodies their emotions, and the sudden gleam of new hope for them is compared to a sudden improvement of weather when light bursts through the clouds — in Solon αἰθρίην ἔθηκεν ... λάμπει δ' ἡελίοιο μένος καλόν for the final serenity of Zeus' justice. By the way, that the focus of Solon's attention is more on the restoration of justice than on the effects of the punishment is proved also, as was remarked by Ziegler 1963, 654, by the length of the description of the good weather coming back, which takes three and a half lines whereas the picture of the effect of divine punishment occupies two and a half lines. Later parallels for the tempest=punishment by gods are Aesch. *Sept.* 758-61 κακῶν δ' ὥσπερ θάλασσα κῦμ' ἄγει τὸ μὲν πίτνον, ἄλλο δ' αἰεῖρει τρίχαλον, ὃ καὶ περὶ πρύμναν πόλεως καχλάζει, and Soph. *Ant.* 584-92 οἷς γὰρ ἂν σεισθῇ θεόθεν δόμος, ἅτας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει ... ὥστε ποντίας ἀλὸς οἶδμα, δυσπνόοις ὅταν Θρήσσησιν ἔρεβος ὕφαλον ἐπιδράμῃ πνοαῖς, κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν κελαινὰν θίνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλήγες ἄκται (on which cf. Easterling 1978, 145).

18. **ἄνεμος νεφέλας ... διεσκέδασεν**: A similar picture in Hom. *Il.* 17.649-50 αὐτίκα δ' ἡέρα μὲν σκέδασεν, καὶ ἀπῶσεν ὁμίχλην, ἥελιος δ' ἐπέλαμψε, and Hes. *Theog.* 873-9 αἱ δὴ τοι πίπτουσαι ἐς ἡεροειδέα πόντον, πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, κακῇ θυίουσιν ἀέλλῃ· ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλαι ἄεισι διασκιδνᾶσί τε νῆας ναύτας τε φθείρουσι· ... αἱ δ' αὖ καὶ κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείριτον ἀνθεμόεσσαν ἔργ' ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων; (cp. Sol. 1. 21 (ἄνεμος) δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα).

19. **ἡρινός**: The form is new, being a typical Attic contraction, for the Homeric/Hesiodic εἰ/ἡαρινός; for the phrase, cf. above all *Il.* 8.307 νοτίησί τε εἰαρινῇσιν. For the separation of the adjective from its name ἄνεμος, see ad l. 45.

πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτοιο: The combination πόντου ἀτρυγέτοιο is found in Hom. *Il.* 15.27 (in accusative), *Od.* 2.370, 5.84, 140, 158, 7.79, 17.289 (in prepositional accusative), Hes. *Theog.* 241 (in dative), 808, 737, (also cf. 131 accompanying the word πέλαγος, 413, and 728 with θαλάσσης).

Πολυκύμων is first found in Solon. The only other instance is Emp. VS 31B38.3 γαῖά τε καὶ πόντος πολυκύμων ἡδ' ὕγρὸς ἀήρ, but *Suda* π 1982 A. πολυκύμονος θαλάσσης (the epithet explained with its name, according to a well known lexicographic principle, for which cf. Degani 1977-8, 143-6) proves that the diffusion of this pattern had to be larger. Homer had expressed the same idea through the phrases πόντον ... κυμαίνοντα: *Il.* 14.229, *Od.* 4.425 and 570, 5.352, 11.253.

20. **πυθμένα κινήσας**: Hom. *Il.* 4.422-3 ... κῦμα θαλάσσης ὄρνυτ' ... Ζεφύρου ὕπο κινήσαντος, *Hom. Hymn* 28.11 ἐκινήθη ... πόντος. For πυθμὴν 'sea-bottom' cf. Hes. *Theog.* 932, Thgn. *IEG* 1035.

γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον: πυροφόρος='wheat bearing' is not a fixed formulaic adjective in Homer: in the *Iliad* once with πεδίοιο (*Il.* 21.602), once with ἀρούρης (*Il.* 12.314) and in the nominative plural with ἄρουραι (*Il.* 14.123) while in the *Odyssey* (3.495) the form πυρηφόρος replaces πυροφόρος to suit the metrical requirements (also in the *Hom. Hymn Ap.* 228). πυροφόρος is twice in Hesiod for ἀήρ (*Op.* 549) and for Ἀσίης ἔδος (fr. 180.3), and of the soil in Sol. 18.2=Thgn. *IEG* 720 γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία, Thgn. *IEG* 988 πυροφόρῳ πεδίῳ, Stesich. *PMG* 222 ii 7 χθόνα πυροφόρ[ον]; see also Pind. *Isthm.* 3/4.72. We cannot rule out that in this context Solon contrasted it deliberately with ἀτρυγέτοιο of the preceding line: ἄκαρπος was one of the two/three meanings which the ancients ascribed to ἀτρύγετος, the Homeric epithet of the sea, whose significance was much debated: cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 210 ὑπὲρ ἀκαρπίστων πεδίῳ, which glosses the Homeric formulas

with ἀτρύγετος and πόντος/ἄλς, as was already remarked by schol. *Il.* 15.27 (cf. also Guida 1994, 24 n. 3).

21. δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα: 'Destroy' is a new meaning of δηόω, first attested here, and later frequent in Ionic-Attic authors (starting from Hdt. 5.89.2). In Homer the verb means above all '(cruelly) to kill' persons, tearing them to pieces; only a few times it is used for the arms of the enemies in the meaning 'to tear in pieces' (ἀσπίδες *Il.* 5.452 and 12.425; τεύχεα *Il.* 18.82). Therefore the idea which is here conveyed may be that Zeus destroys the human works with the martial fury with which the Homeric heroes destroy the defences of the enemies. The prosody of καλὰ, with the first syllable short, is not Homeric, but usual in Attic (and also in other elegiac poets).

ἔργα: 'cultivated fields and crops', destroyed by the rain sent by Zeus in *Il.* 5.92 πολλὰ δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἔργα κατήριπε κάλ' αἰζήων, by overflowing in *Il.* 16.392 μινύθει δέ τε ἔργ' ἀνθρώπων, by winds in Hes. *Theog.* 879 ἔργ' ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων.

21-2. θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει οὐρανόν: See Pind. fr. 162 οὐρανὸν ἐς αἰπύν, Bacchyl. 3.35f. [ἐς αἰ]πὺν αἰθέρα (told of someone rising his arms to the sky to pray to gods), Soph. *Aj.* 845 τὸν αἰπὺν οὐρανόν; Hom. *Il.* 5.367 ἴκοντο θεῶν ἔδος, αἰπὺν Ὀλυμπον, *Il.* 5.868 ἴκανε θεῶν ἔδος, αἰπὺν Ὀλυμπον, *Hom. Hymn Ap.* 109 ἴκανε θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν Ὀλυμπον, [Hes.] *Sc.* 203 θεῶν ἔδος ἄγνός Ὀλυμπος. In Homer the sky is often called εὐρύς, and αἰπύς is said of mountains, but the double indication of the seat of the gods as Olympus and as the sky (the former possibly being the older: cf. Sale 1984, 23-28) already led to some overlapping of the two places even in the Homeric poems (see above all *Il.* 8.19-26, where ἐξ οὐρανόθεν: *Il.* 19 and 21~περὶ ρίον Οὐλύμποιο: l. 25). Above all, according to the schol. ad *Il.* 3.364 and 15.192, Zenodotus read οὐρανὸν αἰπύν in these passages, where the vulgata has οὐρ. εὐρύν. Aristarchus objected that the sky is εὐρύς, while αἰπύς is better said of a mountain, as he carefully differentiated the epithets suitable for Olympus, a mountain, and those for the sky (see also schol. ad *Il.* 13.317), in order to distinguish between what he believed to be the Homeric usage and the later identification of Olympus and the sky (or, better, the allegorical explanation of the Homeric Olympus as the sky: cf. Lehrs 1865, 164-171, Schmidt 1976, 85f.). Against Nickau 1977, 207 n. 60, Janko 1992, ad 15.189-93 maintains that Zenodotus altered the text to further the view that Olympus was in the sky. In my opinion the antiquity and the strongly homerizing tone of Solon's passage (which is unexploited so far in connection with the Homeric variants of *Il.* 3.364 and 15.192) hint, instead, at the

possibility that some ancient texts of Homer had already αἶπὺν οὐρανόν either in *Il.* 3.364 or in 15.192 or in both cases which Zenodotus accepted.

αἰθρίην δ' αὖτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν: αἰθρίη is the Ionic-Attic equivalent of the epic αἴθρη='clear sky', first in Solon. Solon rephrases Hom. *Il.* 17.645 Ζεῦ πάτερ ... ποίησον δ' αἴθρη, δὲ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι (where αἴθρη was not the object of ἰδέσθαι) while adapting to the pentameter the common *Odyssey*-formula θῆκεν ἰδέσθαι (8.20, 18.195, 24.369, 374), which had been always and only said of miraculous alterations of the human reality by Athena. For ἔθηκεν='caused', 'made' see *Od.* 9.235 ὀρυμαγδόν, Soph. *OC* 542 φόνον, Eur. *HF* 590 στάσιν, *Or.* 1510 κραυγὴν. For other examples of 'timeless' aorists used in similes, see West 1989, 136-7.

23. ἡελίοιο μένος: Hom. *Il.* 23.190, *Od.* 10.160, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 371, 374, Hes. *Op.* 414.

κατὰ πῖονα γαῖαν: Πίων in Homer is said metaphorically of rich soil (with ἀγρός, δῆμος etc.), and it is used with masculine/neutral nouns (cf. also Tyrt. 6.3, Phoc. 7.1), while the feminine πείρα frequently accompanies ἄρουρα, and once γαῖαν (*Od.* 19.173). If we accept the reading of the majority of the MSS, κατὰ πῖονα, Solon would use the masculine form for the feminine, as [Hes.] *Sc.* 407-8 ἀγροτέρης ἐλάφοιο πίνος or Aesch. *Ag.* 820 πίνος πλούτου πνοάς (for the interpretation of *Od.* 2.56=17.535 πίνος αἶγας as feminine, see Kühner-Blass 1, 543 and Schwyzer 1, 543). Metrical reasons prevented Solon from using here the Homeric traditional feminine form which the poet adopted in 29^b8 πείρας χθονός πατρίδος. The relevance for Solon of this idea of the fertility of the earth (cf. above 1. 20 and 18.2) allows us to adopt the non-Homeric *lectio difficilior* κατὰ πῖονα γαῖαν instead of the reading κατ' ἀπείρονα supplied by the manuscript B², κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν which would simply repeat the epic formulas ἐπ'/κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν/, of Homer (8x) and Hesiod (6x).

25. τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις: Cf. Alc. *PMG* 1.36 ἔστι τις σιῶν τίσις.

Gagarin 1974, 190 believes that Solon does not elaborate on the nature of the punishment which follows unlawful behaviour in acquisition of wealth, but stresses the timing of that punishment and the uncertainty of economic future; however, τοιαύτη refers back to the whole simile—the vengeance τίσις is like the violent storm in spring which destroys ἔργα in its wake but eventually clears the sky, so that the sun can shine on the rich earth again: all this is not just the simile but also metaphor

for the manner in which Zeus punishes those who acquire wealth ὑφ' ὕβριος, a metaphor through which Solon emphasises more the positive effects of Zeus' vengeance, as was already remarked ad ll. 18-25. We can contrast the forms of the divine punishment in Homer's and Hesiod's detailed accounts about famine and plague: storm and floods in Hom. *Il.* 16.388-92, hunger, plague, sterility of women, military defeat in Hes. *Op.* 243-7 (for an opposite picture of the richness of land and sea in presence of δίκη, Hom. *Od.* 19.111-4 and Hes. *Op.* 232-7).

At any rate, Hesiod (Homer only in the much-discussed passage of *Il.* 16.387-8, which Leaf cuts out) is concerned above all with corrupted or right justice in trials, and though Hesiod cut a distinction between just and unjust possessions (*Op.* 321ff.), which Solon may have echoed, Solon much more definitely than Hesiod identifies *hybris* with the unjust desire for wealth (cf. Solmsen 1949, 109).

25-6. οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐκάστω ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος: A mortal man gets angry at every single incident but Zeus is not prone to anger at each thing done. The thought is new, so is the word ὀξύχολος. For a parallel, see Pallas, *Anth.Pal.* 10.94 εἶναι νομίζω φιλόσοφον καὶ τὸν θεὸν βλασφημίαις τὸν εὐθύς οὐ θυμούμενον, χρόνῳ δ' ἐπαυξάνοντα τὰς τιμωρίας τὰς τῶν πονηρῶν καὶ ταιλαιπῶρων βροτῶν. Even a proverb existed, quoted by Sext.Emp. *In gramm.* 287 ὁψὲ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτά.

As for Solon's emphasis on the timing and thoughtful procedure of divine punishment, it suits the same positive presentation of Zeus' punishment described above ad 18-25. Cp. above all Hom. *Il.* 16.386, where the description of Zeus' vengeance is introduced by a phrase ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἄνδρεςσι κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπήνη, which Solon's l. 26 may seem to criticise, Hes. *Op.* 47, 53, 138, *Theog.* 558, 561, 568, where Zeus reacts to human lack of respect promptly and χολωσάμενος/χολούμενος or ὀχθήσας. Zeus' superior sublimity is stressed by Solon also by the fact that his action is not as a direct one, but it is mediated through the intervention of Ate (ll. 13-6 and 75-6): cp. *Op.* 238-47 quoted above, where, instead, the punishment which falls upon the individual who had offended Dike still came through a spontaneous act of Zeus, who personally reacts by stirring up a war or destroying the ships of unjust men on the sea etc.

26. Cp. Xenoph. *VS* 21B23 θεός ... οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα.

θνητὸς ἀνὴρ: the same phrase occurs several times in Homer and Hesiod in the context of an opposition to gods (e.g. *Il.* 20.41 and 265-6, 24.259, *Od.* 10.306, 16.196, *Hom.Hymn* 19.33) and in Hesiod (*Theog.* 967).

27. αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέληθε διαμπερές: οὐ ... ἐλέληθε: 'litotes' which makes it equivalent to 'bear in mind'. Parallels for the 'litotes' are e.g. Hom. *Il.* 23.323 αἰεὶ τέρμ' ὀρόων στρέφει ἐγγύθεν, οὐδέ ἐλήθει, Hes. *Op.* 268 καὶ νυ τάδ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλησ' ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἐλήθει, and, for the concept, e.g. Pind. *Ol.* 1.64 εἰ δὲ θεὸν ἀνὴρ τις ἔλπεταί <τι> λαθέμεν ἔρδων, ἀμαρτάνει, Eur. *Phoen.* 872 ἄ συγκαλύψαι ... χρήζοντες, ὡς δὲ θεοὺς ὑπεκδραμούμενοι, ἥμαρτον ἀμαθῶς, *TGF* 835 ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν οἶεται τοῦφ' ἡμέραν κακόν τι πράσσων τοὺς θεοὺς λεληθέναι, δοκεῖ πονηρὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἀλίσκεται, ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγουσα τυγχάνη Δίκη, Lucian, *Anth.Pal.* 10.27 ἀνθρώπους μὲν ἴσως λήσεις ἄτοπόν τι ποιήσας, οὐ λήσεις δὲ θεοὺς οὐδὲ λογιζόμενος. For the confusion of the MSS between οὐ (F)έ and οὔτε or οὔτι, also in *Il.* 24.214 (cf. schol. ad loc.) a variant οὔτι existed for οὐ ἐ, defended by Aristarchus. The connection of αἰεὶ and διαμπερές, in the same metrical position, was already in Hom. *Il.* 15.70 and *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 485. For the *clausula*, cf. Callim. *Ap.* 2, fr. 85.14 Pf. (in the end of the hexameter).

28. πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη: Zeus, in the end, brings to light, reveals the rogue. In πάντως we see the theme of the unavoidability of punishment, repeated again later in the poem: 31f., 55f.

For the idea, and for ἐς τέλος+verb in the last three dactyls of the hexameter, see Hes. *Op.* 217-8 δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα (besides 333-4 ἐς δὲ τελευτήν ἔργων ἀντ' ἀδίκων χαλεπήν ἐπέθηκεν ἀμοιβήν; ἐς τέλος+verb in the same position also in *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 462). For the thought, see also ad 3.16.

29-32. Solon admits here that sinners might personally seem to get away unpunished, but corrects himself in ll. 31-2 with the idea of the inherited punishment which will later become the heart of Attic tragedy.

Postponement of divine punishment is fully envisaged in Hom. *Il.* 4.160-1 εἴ περ γάρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ' Ὀλύμπιος οὐκ ἐτέλεσσεν, ἔκ τε καὶ ὀψὲ τελεῖ, σὺν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτεισαν, σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν, where it is already strongly connected with the idea that the pursuing punishment will catch up with the innocent children of the wrongdoers, or their seed after them — a typically archaic way of thought (paralleled e.g. in the *Old Testament*, *Exodus*, 20.5 and *Numeri* 14.18), that can be well understood in the light of the belief in family solidarity prevalent in Archaic Greece, because of which the son's life was felt a prolongation of his father's (cf. Glotz 1904, 560-83, Dodds 1951, 33, and Dover 1974, 260). Hesiod writes in the same spirit about how a man's sin carries with it the ruin of his οἶκος (*Op.* 244) and the extinction of his γένος (*Op.* 282-5, 321-6). The idea will be fully expressed in Thgn. IEG 199-204 εἰ δ' ἀδίκως ... ἀνὴρ ...

φιλοκερδέι θυμῷ κτήσεται, ... αὐτίκα μὲν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν αὖθις ἔγεντο κακόν, θεῶν δ' ὑπερέσχε νόος. ἀλλὰ τάδ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπατᾶ νόον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τίνονται μάκαρες πρήγματος ἀμπλακίας, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔτεισε κακὸν χρέος, οὐδὲ φίλοισιν ἄτην ἐξοπίσω παισὶν ἐπεκρέμασεν· ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρψε δίκη· θάνατος γὰρ ἀναιδὴς πρόσθεν ἐπὶ βλεφάροις ἔζετο κῆρα φέρων, and will become ubiquitous in the tragedians (cf. de Romilly 1968, 59ff.). See e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 58-9, 367-84, 1460-1, 1497-1512, *Cho.* 61-4, Soph. *Ant.* 1074-6, Eur. *Bacch.* 882-96, *Ion* 1615, *Or.* 419-20, *TGF* 800, *TGF* 979 for the idea of late divine punishment, and Aesch. *Ag.* 750-71, 1186-97, 1565-6, 1600-2, *Cho.* 382-5, 648-51, *Sept.* 653-5, 720-91, Soph. *Ant.* 583-603, *OC* 369-70, 964-5, Eur. *El.* 1305-7, *HF* 1261-2, *IT* 199-202, 987-8, *Or.* 811-8, 996-1012, 1545-8, *Phoen.* 379-82, 872-4, 1560-6, 1611, *TGF* 980 for the idea of the guilt (and the punishment) inherited by the children (also see in the fourth century, for instance, Isoc. *Bus.* 25).

30. θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιοῦσα κίχῃ: here μοῖρα is substantially equivalent to αἶσα of fr. 3.1-2 (see ad loc.), and in both cases the Homeric diction is re-used with a different meaning, because here the gods' doom is not concerned with death, as in its Homeric (and lyric) instances for which see notes at Sol. 23.18 and 26.4. See Soph. *OT* 883-91 εἰ δέ τις ... πορεύεται, Δίκας ἀφόβητος, οὐδὲ δαιμόνων ἔδη σέβων, κακά νιν ἔλοιτο μοῖρα, ... εἰ μὴ τὸ κέρδος κερδανεῖ δικαίως ... ἢ τῶν ἀθίκτων θίξεται ματάζων for an analogous use of ἔλοιτο μοῖρα.

31. ἀναίτιοι: Thgn. *IEG* 731-6 provides the first known criticism of the idea of inherited guilt (and divine punishment) from the new perspective of the individual responsibility: Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴθε γένοιτο θεοῖς ... μετὰ φρεσὶ δ' ὅστις τ' ἀθήνης ἐργάζοιτο, θεῶν μηδὲν ὀπιζόμενος, αὐτὸν ἔπειτα πάλιν τεῖσαι κακά, μηδ' ἔτ' ὀπίσω πατρὸς ἀτασθαλίας παισὶ γένοιτο κακόν, but I do not rule out that Solon's ἀναίτιοι may already imply an analogous mode (for other connections between Sol. fr. 1 and the whole the sequence of Thgn. *IEG* 731-52, see Alt 1979, 396 n. 32).

32. παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω: In Solon's passage the effects of the unjust deeds of the ancestors are extended to the successive generation, and not the glorious ones as it was in Solon's possible formal models: Hom. *Il.* 20.308 καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται or Tyrt. 9.30 καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω, concerned with the positive value of the survival of the κλέος (as remarked by Anhalt 1993, 31 "Solon has put the line in a new negative context").

Similar phrasing in Tyrt. 6.12 γίγνεται ... οὐδ' ὀπίσω γένεος. 'Εξοπίσω is used of time and place in Homer (*Od.* 13.144).

33-6. The closest precedent is Hom. *Od.* 18.132-7, where after stating that οὐδὲν ἀκιδνότερον γαῖα τρέφει ἀνθρώποιο (l. 130), Odysseus explains: οὐ μὲν γάρ ποτέ φησι κακὸν πείσεσθαι ὀπίσσω, ὅφρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχωσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρη· ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσωσι, καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετληότι θυμῷ. ... τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. Solon's perspective is different. Both passages deal with the instability of human condition (ll. 32-5) and, therefore, of human thought (l. 136f.): Odysseus sees both wholly dependent on the circumstances decided by the gods, while Solon seems to speak here only of the limits of the human nature and particularly of those of human δόξα, because his perspective at this point of the poem is more concerned with human motivations than with divine control over the human world, though in l. 17 he had stated, as does Odysseus, that the τέλος of all things is always foreseen by Zeus. Closer to Solon's thought are Simon. *IEG* 20.6 (young people) κοῦφον ἔχων θυμὸν πόλλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχει γηρασέμεν οὔτε θανεῖσθαι, οὐδ', ὑγιῆς ὅταν ἦ, φροντίδ' ἔχει καμάτου. νήπιοι, κτλ., Thgn. *IEG* 133-6 (stating that no man is αὐτός responsible for the good or bad outcome of his actions, but gods are δώτορες of both *ate* and *kerdos*, and men cannot foresee the good or bad τέλος), and above all Thgn. *IEG* 639-40 πολλάκι παρ δόξαν τε καὶ ἐλπίδα γίνεται εὖ ρεῖν ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν, βουλαῖς δ' οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος, from which Schneidewin's emendation of l. 34 originated.

The enunciative perspective of l. 33 (νοεῦμεν), which involves also the author in a general and inclusive statement, tones in more with the one of l. 36 (τερπόμεθα) than with the perspective of the previous lines, which is objective, neutral at the beginning of the poem and is suspended with l. 32: on the contrast, in this poem, between the "neutral/objective" perspective, where the author "ne se montre pas comme acteur dans le texte" and the passages (ll. 33, 36, 51-2, 72), where "le locuteur abandonne explicitement cette perspective pour assumer le point de vue des acteurs du texte", cf. Loeffler 1993.

ὁμῶς ἀγαθός τε κακός τε: Hom. *Il.* 9.319 ... ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός, *Il.* 17.631-2 τῶν μὲν γὰρ πάντων βέλε' ἄπτεται, ... , ἢ κακὸς ἢ ἀγαθός, *Od.* 6.188 Ζεὺς ... νέμει ὄλβον ... ἀνθρώποισιν, ἐσθλοῖς ἦδὲ κακοῖσιν, *Od.* 8.552-3 οὐ ... τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμός ἐστ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐ κακὸς οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλός, *Od.* 22.414-5=23.65-6 οὗ τινα γὰρ τίεσκον ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, Hes. *Op.* 669 ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε, Thgn. *IEG* 369

μωμεῦνται δέ με πολλοί, ὁμῶς κακοὶ ἤδὲ καὶ ἐσθλοί (Theognis contrasts the two adjectives even more in 189, 190, 431, 577, 661, 875, 1112). An ethical meaning of this polar expression is certainly left in this opposition after the previous lines about divine punishment of the unrighteous, but the interpretation 'skilful men and incompetents' would better chime with νοεῦμεν ('not only the stupid believe, etc.'): cf. e.g. Wilamowitz 1913, 263 and lastly Donlan 1968, 110f.; it would also suitably set the stage for the following long section about the human skills and professions.

34.†έν δηνην†: έν δηνην I, ένδηνην S. More recent manuscripts tried to correct έν δηνην: see δεινήν ἦν Regin. gr. 146, or δεινήν εἷς (αὐτοῦ), written above the line by a second hand in Paris. 1985. Modern attempts at emending the text are more than numerous: εὐθηνεῖν αὐτὸς κτλ. Ahrens, εὐθενέειν αὐτὸς κτλ. Hartung, ἐν δήειν αὐτὸς κτλ. Bergk, αἰνεῖν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Hermann, εὐ ρεῖν εἷς αὐτὸς κτλ. Schneidewin, ἦδειν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Linder, ἦνδανεν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Valckenaer, κεδὴν εἷς αὐτοῦ κτλ. Emperius, εὐ σχήσειν αὐτῶς κτλ. Rost, εὐ δὴ ἔχειν αὐτὸς κτλ. Tucker, ἐνδεύειν αὐτὸς κτλ. Murray, εἷς ἀνέδην αὐτὸς κτλ. Riedy, δεινήν εἰ' αὐτοῦ κτλ. van Leeuwen, εὐ δεινήν αὐτὸς κτλ. Bücheler, ἐντείνων αὐτὸς κτλ. Linfoth, εὐ δρᾶν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Allen, ἔρδων ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Ziegler, εὐ ἔρδειν αὐτὸς κτλ. Friedländer, σπεύδειν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Reinhardt, ἔρδειν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. Römisch., ἔρδειν ἦν δόξαν ἕκαστος δοκεῖ Jaeger ἐνδεῖν ἦν αὐτὸς κτλ. and later κείνην δὴν αὐτὸς κτλ. Massa Positano. For a discussion of these emendations, see Massa Positano 1947, 54-9 and Masaracchia 1956, 111f. More recent attempts usually limit themselves to reconstruct the words preceeding αὐτός: εὐ ρεῖν ἦν Büchner 1959, 172 and Theiler ap. Hasler 1959, 79 n. 12, accepted by West (εὐ ρεῖν εἷς was already proposed by Schneidewin), ἀνθεῖν ἦν Alt 1979, 398, ε<ῖ>ν δὴν ἦν Di Benedetto 1982 (εἶν δὴν~εῖναι δηναιήν, comparing Hom. *Il.* 6.131 and 139-40; the form of the infinitive is paralleled both in inscriptions from the 4th cent. onwards and in Stesich. *PMGF* S15.i.7: cf. Maltomini 1983), ἴσχειν ἦν Skiadas 1985, 154, εὐροεῖν ἦν Pötscher 1987, 82, ἐλθεῖν ἦν Christes 1986, 8f., ἐσθλήν ἦν Dihle 1988, 36 (already proposed by Kammermeister and Estienne), εὐ σχεῖν ἦν Erbse 1995, 249-51.

The emendation of Büchner and Theiler, accepted by West, is based on Theognis 639-40 but ρεῖν works better in 'Theognis' context, with ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν, than with Solon's δόξα. Di Benedetto's paper deserves much more attention. Indeed, his text is the closest to the MSS, among all of the proposed corrections, though I would not favour its insertion in the text. Besides, it stressed once again (and most convincingly) that the point of ll. 33f. is the deceitfulness of human expectations in connection with

what was remarked in ll. 27-32 (in these lines Solon spoke about the punishment that is unforeseen, in ll. 33f. he would be passing to a more general consideration of the unreliability of the human expectations), much more than with the idea of the illusions and the limits inherent to human professional efforts, which are only emphasised from l. 53 onwards (cf. already above all, Eisenberger 1984, 14, who states that the παθεῖν of l. 35 "is the effect of the δίκη and the τίσις of the first part of the poem").

δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει: For δόξαν ἔχειν, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 572, Pind. *Ol.* 6.82. For the same metrical position of the phrase ἕκαστος ἔχει, see Thgn. *IEG* 214, 312, 898. δόξα has here the Homeric meaning of 'expectation', at variance with the one Solon exploits in l. 4, cf. ad loc.

πρίν τι παθεῖν· ... ὀδύρεται: 'before he suffers; then he mourns'. Solon is aligned with a thought that had become a proverb in Plato's age (*Symp.* 222b7 κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γινῶναι): see Hom. *Il.* 17.32=*Il.* 20.198 πρίν τι κακὸν παθεῖν· ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω (cf. also *Il.* 23.487 ἵνα γνώης ἀποτίνων), Hes. *Op.* 89 ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ' ἐνόησεν, 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω (cf. also Pl. *Symp.* 222b7 quoted). Solon, quite pessimistically, extends these conditions to all human beings, who, according to him, do not appear to learn a lesson out of their suffering: cp. the very different, and later view of the πάθει μάθος, for which see, for instance, Aesch. *Ag.* 177, *Eum.* 276, Soph. *Ant.* 619 quoted below; cf. Dörrie 1956.

36. χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα: The verb χάσκω is new in the meaning 'gape in eager expectation', whose obvious mimic effects are often exploited by the comic authors, above all in the context of the proverb λύκος ἔχανεν or λύκος μάτην χανών, concerning both the rapacity and the stupid self-illusions about the prey (οἱ γὰρ λύκοι ἀθῆρία περιπεσόντες χαίνουσι διερχόμενοι: Diogenianus, *Paroemiogr.* I, 273.20): see Aesop. 417 Perry; Ar. *Lys.* 629 and *PCG* 350; Euphr. *PCG* 1.30f.; Eub. *PCG* 14.11; Men. *Asp.* 372; Plaut. *Stich.* 605 and *Trin.* 169, Luc. *Gall.* 11, Aristaenet. 2.20.35; Hsch. λ 1396 L.; *Suda* λ 816 A.; cf. Tosi 1991, 411 no. 873). Solon likes to emphasise mimetically human faults, as is often shown, above all, in his tetrameters to Phocus. For 'gaping' as a more generic symptom of being stupidly ensnared, cf. Anac. *PMG* 358.8 πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει, Semon. *IEG* 7.110 κεχηνότος γὰρ ἀνδρός.

κούφαις ἐλπίσι: Cf. Thuc. 2.51.6, Hor. *Epist.* 1.5.8 *leves spes*, Hdn. 2.8.4 and 2.9.1. See also Bacchyl. 1.178-80 ὄντινα κουφόταται θυμὸν δονέουσι μέριμναι (~ 'ambitions') ὅσσον ἂν ζώῃ ἄχρόνον, κτλ., and Eur. *TGF* 271 πτηνὰς ... ἐλπίδας. The negative sense of ἐλπίς (on which see Schrijen 1965, 68-81) had

already appeared before Solon in Hes. *Op.* 498-91 πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων, χρηίζων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ. ἐλπίς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζειν ἥμενον ἐν λέσχῃ, where, however, 'hope' is more a cause of inactivity. Solon's view of (false) hopes as a negative motor of human actions, as opposed to rational consideration, appears to be entirely new (cf. Solmsen 1949, 110), and is often resumed: Semon. *IEG* 1.3-6 νοῦς δ' οὐκ ἐπ' ἀνθρώποισιν, ἀλλ' ἐπήμεροι ... οὐδὲν εἰδότες ὅκως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός. ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας κἀπιπείθει τρέφει ἄπρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας. Simon. *PMG* 542.21-2 τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω, Pind. *Nem.* 8.45 κενεὰν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῦνον τέλος, *Nem.* 11.43-6 τὸ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἀνθρώποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἔπεται τέκμαρ· ἀλλ' ἔμπαν μεγαλανορίαις ἐμβαίνομεν, ἔργα τε πολλὰ μενοινῶντες· δέδεται γὰρ ἀναιδεῖ ἐλπίδι γυῖα, προμαθείας δ' ἀπόκεινται ῥοαί, Soph. *Ant.* 615-9 ἀ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλπίς πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνησις ἀνδρῶν, πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων· εἰδότι δ' οὐδὲν ἔρπει, πρὶν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύσῃ; Eur. *Supp.* 479-80 ἐλπίς ... ἐστ' ἄπιστον, ἥ πολλὰς πόλεις συνῆψ' ἄγουσα θυμὸν εἰς ὑπερβολάς, *Heracl.* 433-4 τί δῆτ' ἔτερψας ὦ τάλαινά με ἐλπίς τότε, οὐ μέλλουσα διατελεῖν χάριν, *IT* 413 φίλα ... ἐλπίς †γένετ' ἐπὶ πῆμασι βροτῶν† ἄπληστος ἀνθρώποις, *TGF* 650 πόλλ' ἐλπίδες ψεύδουσι καὶ λόγοι βροτούς; Thuc. 2.62.5, 3.45.4-6, 4.108.4, 5.103.1. For a full list and some discussion of the texts, cf. van Menxel 1983, 51ff.

This distich of Solon, together with Solon's instance of the seafarer (43-46), beginning with σπεύδει ... , possibly were the model of Serapio, *Anth.Pal.* 7.400 Τοῦτ' ὅστεῦν φωτὸς πολυεργέος. ἦ ῥά τις ἦσθα ἔμπορος ἢ τυφλοῦ κύματος ἰχθυβόλος; - 'Ἀγγειλον θνητοῖσιν, ὅτι σπεύδοντες ἐς ἄλλας ἐλπίδας εἰς τοίην ἐλπίδα λυόμεθα.'

37-42. All or some of these lines have been suspected by various scholars (all of them were athetized by Immisch; ll. 37-40 by Bernhardt, Nestle 1942; ll. 39f. by Bergk, Wilamowitz 1913, 260, E. Fraenkel 1927, Römisch 1933, 12f.), but there are no good reasons for doubting them: the first strong defence of their authenticity is by Masaracchia 1956, 120; see also Alt 1979, 399 and Erbse 1995, 251f. The grammatical remarks by Wilamowitz on the non-Solonian character of καλός with long alpha and of the Homeric-aeolic ἔμμεναι do not hold true: ἔμμεναι is justified as an unchanged re-use of a Homeric hemistich (cf. ad loc.); as for the alpha of καλός in thesis, it is measured long less frequently than in arsis, but it is not exceptional at all neither in archaic epic (cf. *Lfgre* s.v.) nor in elegy: cf. at least Tyrt. 7.30 and Thgn. *IEG* 257, 1336, 1369. As for the difference in tenses of the verbs of ll. 37f. and 41f., which are futures, and the one of ll. 39f., being a present, both temporal perspectives

are compatible with the wavering character of the human hopes, as shown by Friedländer 1929, 381f.

I would add that all of Solon's three distichs are paralleled in the gnomic tradition on the human goods, cf. *Scol. PMG* 890 ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνητῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὰν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων, which is quoted (without the fourth wish, which has a specifically symposiastic character) by Pl. *Grg.* 451e and *Leg.* 661a. Besides, this three-fold list would be paralleled by other three-fold lists in a near and related context. After exemplifying in general terms, by three instances, how human beings delude themselves, the section of ll. 43-62 brings forward a specific nuance of ideas (hinted at both in ll. 33-6 and ll. 41-2): man devotes himself in professions with the expectation that effort will command gain and success (cf. κέρδος ἄγειν l. 45~κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ l. 42) but these all are empty, vain hopes since the mortal fails or succeeds according to his portion, and what the gods send cannot be avoided. Also this concept of the 'applied' self-deluding hopes is exemplified by two groups, which would numerically parallel the three instances of ll. 37-42 the craftsmen (merchant, farmer, carpenter) and the intellectuals (poet, seer, physician). This structure, the 'mirror' correspondence of ll. 43-64 to ll. 37-42, is a strong argument for the authenticity of ll. 37-42.

37. νοῦσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέησι: again in l. 61. A standing epic combination — Hom. *Il.* 13.667, Hes. *Op.* 92, fr. 195.43, [Hes.] *Sc.* 43, Amynt. *SH* 43.2, *GVI* 860.6 (3 A.D.), Greg. Naz. *Anth.Pal.* 8.94.3 — which only in the imperial age is shared by prose as well (Philo, *deus immut.* 66.5, 98.1, *mut. nom.* 150.5, *Jos.* 77.3, *In Flacc.* 183; Aelian. *NA* 8.9.8; Euseb. *Vit. Const.* 3.5.1). See also Hom. *Il.* 1.10 νοῦσον ... κακήν, Hes. *Theog.* 527 κακήν δ' ἀπὸ νοῦσον.

38. τοῦτο κατεφράσατο: κατεφράσατο is a rare word, with the meaning 'think upon thoroughly', as the preposition κατά emphasises (cf. Schwyzer 2, 475f.); not in Homer (cf. *Il.* 14.3 φράζω, ... ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα) but once in Hes. *Op.* 248; see later Hippon. *IEG* 79.13 (=Degani) and Hdt. 4.76.5. Thgn. *IEG* 430, 706 has ἐπεφράσατο. The past tense has here a gnomic value.

39-40. δειλὸς ... ἀγαθὸς ... καλὸς μορφήν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων: the first couple of terms, δειλὸς ... ἀγαθὸς, has the same meaning as in Homer ('coward' and 'brave'; cf. also the ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ of Tyrt. 6.2 and 9.10, 20). Fränkel 1975, 233 n. 33 and Christes 1986, 10 are probably correct in noting that the ideal of καλακαγαθία is here implicit. This interpretation of ll. 39-40 would allow us to

consider the distich as a single instance of the self-illusion concerning the psycho-physical conditions — and keep for the three distichs 37-42 a three-fold pattern.

39. δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ: Hom. *Il.* 23.470 δοκέει δέ μοι ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ (ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν also *Il.* 6.488 and *Od.* 6.200).

41. ἀχρήμων: new here (cp. ἀχρημοσύνη in *Od.* 17.502), but frequently used in 5th cent. Athens, cf. Pind. fr. 124a.b 8, Eur. *Med.* 461 etc. The Pindaric occurrence is especially interesting, because fr. 124a.b displays the situation of self-illusion of the poor: due to the liberatory effect of wine, ὅς μὲν ἀχρήμων, ἀφνεὸς τότε κτλ. Cf. also Bacchyl. fr. 20B 12 πᾶσι δ' ἀνθρώποις μοναρχήσειν δοκεῖ.

πενίης ἔργα βιάται: For the periphrasis see above, on l. 16. Thgn. *IEG* 177 πενίη δεδμημένος. For the form of the verb, Thgn. *IEG* 503-4 καὶ με βιάται οἶνος. The epic had used βιάω only for future and aorist, and for the present only in *diectasis* (βιάζω in the other forms of the present).

42. χρήματα πολλά: a very common phrase, cf. for instance Hom. *Od.* 13.203, 15.230, Thgn. *IEG* 186.

43-62. L. 43 introduces the typological description of the diverse forms of human activity and variety of professions, in an extensive list, which has its precedent in *Od.* 17.382ff. τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι, μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων, ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν αἰείδων;, where the introductory phrase ἄλλοθεν ... ἄλλον γ' may also have formally suggested the ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος ... ἄλλος ... ἄλλος ... ἄλλος ... ἄλλον ... ἄλλοι polyptoton in Solon's lines (on which see Krause 1976, 75-81): cf. Race 1982, 65-67, Schmid 1964, 72.

The mention of profit (l. 44 κέρδος) relates to the last example (ll. 42f.) of the previous group of cases, that deals with the illusions of the poor, following a thought pattern which is exemplified also in Thgn. *IEG* 179-80 χρή ... ὁμῶς ἐπὶ γῆν τε καὶ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης δίζησθαι χαλεπῆς ... λύσιν πενίης, whereas with the mention of diseases and the uncertainty of their cure (l. 62) we have returned, in a ring form indicated by the repetition of νοῦσος ἀργαλέη, to the example with which the first series began (l. 37).

In all, Solon lists six classes of professions: the merchant, the seer, the physician, the farmer, the craftsman, and the poet, who have only one couplet each. For the craftsman, the poet, the seer and the physician, Solon mentions the traditional divine patron, but he does not do so for the merchant and the farmer, who also in the

Homeric-Hesiodic tradition do not appear to have had any specific patron god. There is a clear progression from the material profession of the merchant, the farmer, and craftsman, who intend to produce a personal, tangible κέρδος/βίος and appear therefore to be controlled by motives of profit, towards the last three 'intellectual' and 'social' professions, for which Solon is concerned with the effectiveness of the result (τέλος) more than of any κέρδος; the separation between the first and the second group is marked by the opposition χειροῖν l. 50/σοφίης μέτρον l. 52. Common to all of them is the uncertainty of the κέρδος or of the effectiveness, though some emphasis is also on the human knowledge in the professions which are assisted by divine patrons: see δαείς, διδαχθείς, ἐπιστάμενος, ἔγνω. For other lists of human activities/professions in poetry, cf. Hom. *Il.* 13.730-4, Pind. *Isthm.* 1.47f., fr. 221, Bacchyl. 10.39-48, Cleanth. *CA* 1.26-31.

ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος: in the same position in the line, Hom. *Il.* 2.75, 9.671, *Od.* 12.392.

43-5. κατὰ πόντον ... ἰχθυόεντ': a formulaic phrase, 15x in Homer, and often in passages which mention (dangerous) winds during navigation: *Il.* 19.378, *Od.* 3.177, 4.516, 5.420, 9.82-3; *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 34, *Hom. Hymn* 27.9, Thgn. *IEG* 248, *GVI* 741.1 (3 A.D), Nonnus, *Dion.* 1.268, [Orph.] *Arg.* 1039. The formulaicity of the phrase in connection with travels, and the Hesiodic parallels for a mercantile meaning of l. 44 οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν (see ad loc.) suggest that ἰχθυόεις does not hint at the profession of the fisherman (as was proposed by Leutsch 1872, 162). However this last possibility was also included in the evident, though so far unnoticed, imitation by Serapio, *Anth. Pal.* 7.400 (quoted ad l. 36), which seems both an allusion and a 'philological' interpretation of the ambiguity of Solon's passage.

The 'separation' of the adjective ἰχθυόεντα from πόντον by a whole line was considered by Wilamowitz 1913, 261 to be a proof of Solon's lack of skill in re-using traditional epic language. The contiguous combination of the two words certainly was one of the most formulaic phrases of the Homeric-Hesiodic diction (15x), but precisely this is a good reason to suppose that Solon wanted to revive with the 'separation' such a standard *epithetum ornans*: cf. Treu 1955, 270f. At any rate, there is no substantial reason to suspect the adjective, as does Tucker (and more cautiously Linforth), who proposed to replace it with ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. A good explanation of the emphasis that it has at the beginning of the line (it would be "quite unworthy of the important place it occupies, unless it is intended to suggest the dangers to which sailors are exposed from man-eating fish" according to Linforth) was provided by Römisch 1933, 70f.: the first distich l. 43f. would include the three basic ideas, specifying the place (sea), the means of transport (ship), and the aim (profit). The

second distich would expand the first, qualifying more the same three ideas in the same order. The traditional formula, divided into the two distichs, would hint at the continuity between them. For the technique of Solon, consisting in suspending the second part of a phrase or of an idea in order to emphasise it, cf. Massa-Positano 1947, 33.

43. ἀλάται: Hom. *Od.* 2.370 πόντον ἐπ' ἀτρύγετον ... ἀλάλησθαι, *Od.* 5.377 οὔτω νῦν κακὰ πολλὰ παθὼν ἀλόω κατὰ πόντον. The verb is also used of pirates: *Od.* 3.73-4, 9.254, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 454.

44. ἐν νηυσὶν οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγειν: Besides the formal parallels Hom. *Il.* 19.298 ἄξειν τ' ἐνὶ νηυσὶν, *Il.* 3.404 οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι, *Od.* 10.35 χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄργυρον οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι, Hes. *Op.* 576 οἴκαδε καρπὸν ἀγινεῖν, cf. above all Hes. *Op.* 631-2 νῆα θοὴν ἄλαδ' ἐλκέμεν, ... ἵν' οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄρῃαι, Thgn. *IEG* 179-80 χρὴ γὰρ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ γῆν τε καὶ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης δίζησθαι χαλεπῆς Κύρνε λύσιν πενίης, Bacchyl. fr. 20B 13-6 χρυσῷ δ' ἐλέφαντί τε μαρμαίρουσιν οἴκοι, πυροφόροι δὲ κατ' αἰγλάεντα πόντον νᾶες ἄγουσιν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου μέγιστον πλοῦτον. Cf. also the late Jul. Egypt. *Anth.Pal.* 7.586 about a merchant who died in the sea pursuing gain: ἐκ δὲ θαλάσσης ... κέρδος ἀελλομάχον. Solon's attitude is slightly less negative than Hesiod's, who regarded sea-faring as an example of a desperate way of making money (cf. *Op.* 618ff., 646-7) and even included the absence of a need for it among the blessings which are in store for the just city: cf. *Op.* 236ff., 665ff., 674ff., 681ff., 691; cp. Pindar's view in *Ol.* 2.61ff., *Nem.* 7.17-8, (cf. Carey 1981, ad loc.). On the different Greek views about seafaring, cf. Lesky 1947, Fantuzzi 1983, 189-208. For the commercial connotations invested in the word κέρδος in the archaic period see Cozzo 1988.

45. For the verb, cf. Hom. *Il.* 19.377-8 τοὺς δ' ... ἄλλαι πόντον ἐπ' ἰχθυόεντα ... φέρουσιν; for the combination φέρομαι ... ἀνέμοισι, Hom. *Od.* 9.82, 12.425, 14.313 (cf. also *Od.* 12.68). ἀργαλέος is a formulaic adjective of the wind: Hom. *Il.* 13.795 and 14.254, *Od.* 11.400, 407, 24.110; *Hom.Hymn* 7.24 and 33.14.

46. φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος: A parallel for the thought is Hes. *Op.* 682-7 ... πλόος. οὐ μιν ἔγωγε αἶνημ' ... χαλεπῶς κε φύγοις κακόν· ἀλλὰ νυ καὶ τὰ ἄνθρωποι ῥέζουσιν αἰδρίησι νόοιο· χρήματα γὰρ ψυχὴ πέλεται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 22.243-4 μηδέ τι δούρων ἔστω φειδωλή (the only appearance of the word in Homer, cp. φειδώ in *Od.* 16.315). The phrase φείδεσθαι ψυχῆς is very common, cf. Tyrt. 6.14, Soph. *El.* 980, Eur. *HF* 1146, Isoc. *Archid.*

105.2-3, Diod.Sic. 12.62.2.6, Joseph. *AJ* 13.199.4 etc.; *Carm. pop. PMG* 856.5 μὴ φειδόμενοι τᾶς ζωᾶς, *Anth.Pal.* 7.534.1=Alex.Aet.(?) 25.1 Magn. ζωῆς περιφείδεο. Diod.Sic. 14.52.1.6 provides another instance of the Solonian periphrasis ἐπηγείροντο ταῖς ψυχαῖς, οὐδεμίαν φειδὼ τοῦ ζῆν ποιοῦμενοι.

ψυχὴ is the standard word in various martial phrases implying the idea of risking or defending one's life e.g. *Il.* 9.322, *Od.* 1.5, 9.423, 22.245. At sea *Od.* 3.73-4=*Od.* 9.254-5=*Hom.Hymn Ap.* 454-5 ὑπεῖρ ἄλλα, ... ἀλόωνται ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι, Hes. *Op.* 686-7 χρήματα γὰρ ψυχὴ πέλεται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν. δεινὸν δ' ἐστὶ θανεῖν μετὰ κύμασιν, Archil. *IEG* 213 ψυχὰς ἔχοντες κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις, and other passages in West ad Hes. *Op.* 686.

47. γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον: First here in the meaning 'cut lengthwise', 'plough the earth', which remains rare: cf. Aesch. *TrGF* 196.4 τέμνει δίκηλλ' ἄρουραν, Ap.Rhod. 1.628 πυροφόρους τε διατμήξασθαι ἀρούρας, *GVI* 720.1 (2 A.D) οὗτος ὁ γῆς τέμνων. In Hdt. and in Thuc. the phrase γῆν τέμνων means 'destroy/devastate the enemy's land'. Solon's metaphorical use of the verb in connection with agriculture may have been derived from the *Odyssey's dis legomenon* for travelling through the sea, πέλαγος (θάλασσαν) or κύματα τέμνειν (*Od.* 3.174-5, 13.88; see later Arion, *PMG* 939.16-7, Pind. *Pyth.* 3.68, Bacchyl. 17.4, Soph. *TrGF* 271.5). This poetic rephrasing — from cutting the surface of the sea to cutting the surface of the soil — would be paralleled by the post-Homeric re-use of the *Odyssey*-expression for travelling in the sky (*Hom.Hymn Dem.* 383 βαθὺν ἥερα τέμνον ἰόντες, Ibyc. *PMGF* S223(a) ii 7 βαθ[ὺν ἀ]έρα τάμνων, Bacchyl. 5.16-7 βαθὺν δ' αἰθέρα ... τάμνων; on the intertextual connections between these three passages, see Richardson ad *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 383, pp. 279f.), and may have been suggested to Solon by the mention of the seafarer, which immediately precedes in our poem. The analogy is shown in the passage of Nonnus, *Dion.* 1.105-9 γλαυκὰ διασχίζει βοέῳ ποδὶ νῶτα θαλάσσης, καὶ σὺ βυθοῦ μετὰ κῦμα, Ποσειδάων, μετανάστης γαίης δίψια νῶτα μετέρχεο πεζὸς ἀροτρεύς, νηὶ θαλασσαίῃ Δημήτερος αὐλάκα τέμνων, χερσαίοις ἀνέμοισι βατὸν πλόον ἐν χθονὶ τεύχων.

In the epithet of γῆ van Effenterre 1977, 126-7 sees a reference to land-cultivation of olive trees introduced in Solonian Athens, but the epithet accompanies earth also in the epic, Hom. *Od.* 4.737 κῆπον ... πολυδένδρεον, *Od.* 23.139 ἀγρὸν ... πολυδένδρεον, *Od.* 23.359 πολυδένδρεον ἀγρὸν ἄπειμι.

εἰς ἐνιαυτόν: a common epic verse-end (*Il.* 21.444, *Od.* 4.526, 595, 11.356, 14.196; *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 399 m² in the ms. M), which is the shorter doublet of τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν/ (*Il.* 19.32, *Od.* 4.86, 10.467, 14.292, 15.230;

Hom.Hymn Ap. 343, and 20.6). The closest parallels for the content are *Il.* 21.444-5 *θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν μισθῷ ἔπι ῥητῷ*, and its imitation Panyas. *PEG* 3.3 *θητευσέμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν*; in both passages Poseidon and Apollo are in Laomedon's "service" under harsh conditions for a whole year; cp. also Rhian. *CA* °10 *θητεῦσαι μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτόν* (said of Apollo's service to Admetus). At any rate, in Solon the *ἐνιαυτός* is most probably not the civil calendar year, but the "agricultural year circle" which begun when the stores were full, as in the Hesiodic *τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν* of *Op.* 561 (~Homeric *τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν*): for the farmer it takes a whole year before the results of his toils come back. The use of *εἰς* facilitates the interpretation of *ἐνιαυτός* here as the time on which the year-circle is completed~*τελέσφορον* or *τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν*; cf. West 1965, 156 n. 27, Beekes 1969, 142.

48. λατρεύει: The verb is new, cf. Hsch. λ 403 L. *λατρεύει· ἐλεύθερος ὢν δουλεύει*, to be understood in the light of Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 2.2 *ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις ... καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτήμοροι*, and Poll. 3.82 *πελάται δὲ καὶ θῆτες ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν ὀνόματα διὰ πενίαν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ δουλευόντων*. On the lexicographical basis Wilamowitz inferred that Solon's elegy preceded Solon's reforms on debt-slavery, and Ferrara 1956, 66-71 suggested that Solon would be referring either to debt-slaves, or to people who did not own the land they worked on. But Hesychius' source may also simply overinterpret the meaning, thinking of the very legislative action against debt-slavery, which was topically connected with Solon. Solon's *λατρεύειν* may mean nothing more than working as a labourer for hire or pay, as *λάτρις* means in Thgn. *IEG* 302, 486, Eur. *Ion* 4 and *HF* 823: cf. Büchner 1959, 175.

καμπύλ' ἄροτρα: *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 308 *καμπύλ' ἄροτρα*. Cf. also [Orph.] fr. 33 K. *κερκίσι καμπυλόχοισι*, where *κερκίδες*=*ἄροτρα*; see Hsch. κ 616 L., Mosch. 2.81, and [Orph.] fr. 280.3 K. *εὐκαμπὲς ἄροτρον*. The attribute was formulaic for the bow (10x) and for the chariot (2x) in Homer. The starting point of Solon's expression may be found in Hes. *Op.* 427 *πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κᾶλα*, a hemistich which follows the precepts on the straight timbers useful to be cut for the farmer (*Il.* 420-6), and immediately precedes the instructions on how to arrange the *γύης* of the plough.

Basically, the plough must have two elements, one horizontal which is drawn through the soil (*ἔλυμα*) and the other curving upwards and forwards from it, to take the pull of the oxen (*γύης*). This curved shape of the plough-beam (the *γύης*) creates the overall impression that the whole plough is curved, and this is the reason why in

Latin poetry it is the standing epithet for the plough (*curvi aratri*, cf. Ov. *Her.* 1.55, Lucr. 5.933 (~6.1253), Verg. *G.* 1.170, 1.494, 2.513); besides, the γύης is the most important part of the whole implement, and could in itself form a plough (in Hes. *Op.* 433 the plough formed by a plough-stock only, αὐτόγυον ἄροτρον, is opposed to the plough composed by various parts, πηκτὸν ἄροτρον).

49-50. Ἀθηναίης ... καὶ Ἡφαίστου ... ἔργα δαεὶς ... ξυλλέγεται βίοτον: Athena Ἐργάνη was the goddess of any technical activity as early as Homer, and she is invoked as the goddess of *all* handicraft celebrated by the artisans in the streets of Athens at the popular festival of Chalkeia during which a sacrifice was offered to her (see Deubner 1932, 35-6, Parke 1977, 92-3, Burkert 1985, 168, and cf. Soph. *TrGF* 844). Hephaestus χαλκεὺς (*Il.* 15.309-10) was the armourer (e.g. of Achilles' armour *Il.* 18.466ff., of Diomedes' corselet *Il.* 8.195 and of Heracles' greaves [Hes.] *Sc.* 122-3), the goldsmith (e.g. of Zeus' sceptre *Il.* 2.100-8, of Pandora's headband Hes. *Theog.* 579). Both Hephaestus and Athena were divinities of the τέχναι and of craftsmanship (e.g. from Hom. *Od.* 6.232-5 to Arr. *Cyn.* 35), and patron deities of artisans in Athens, and as such were worshipped in a common cult (see Farnell 1896-1909, I, 409 n.98). The association of the two gods is also proved by the fact that Athena's statue was set up in the temple of Hephaestus next to that of the god (see Paus. 1.14.6), and had the epithet Ἡφαιστία (see Hsch. s.v.), while another name for the Chalkeia, a feast chiefly for Hephaestus, was Ἀθηναία (see Harpocration, *Etym.Magn.* and *Suda* s.v.), and Hephaestus had collaborated to the birth of the goddess (Pind. *Ol.* 7.35f.). See Frontisi-Ducroux 1975, 62-3, Loraux 1981, 134-6, Nilsson 1964, 12, Parke 1977, 92.

The association of man's acquisition of skill with his hands from Athena and Hephaestus is especially frequent to emphasise the specific excellence of the single craftsmen, from Homer onwards: cf. *Od.* 6.232-4=23.159-61 ἀνὴρ ἴδρις, ὃν Ἡφαιστος δέδασεν καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη τέχνην παντοίην, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελείει, *Od.* 20.72 ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη δέδασε κλυτὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, *Hom.Hymn Aphr.* 12-5 (Ἀθήνη) πρώτη τέκτονας ἄνδρας ἐπιχθονίους ἐδίδαξε ποιῆσαι σατίνας καὶ ἄρματα ... χαλκῶ ... παρθενικὰς ... ἀγλαὰ ἔργ' ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θεῖσα ἑκάστη, *Hom.Hymn* 20.1-3 Ἡφαιστον κλυτόμητιν ... ὃς μετ' Ἀθηναίης ... ἔργα ἀνθρώπους ἐδίδαξεν, 20.5 νῦν δὲ δι' Ἡφαιστον κλυτοτέχνην ἔργα δαέντες, Hes. *Op.* 430 Ἀθηναίης δμῶδς (i.e. τέκτων), Hes. fr. 43(a)71 ἦ]ν ἔργα διδάξατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη, all of them including the root δα- which is also present in Solon (see later e.g. *GVI* 1528.4 (3/4 A.D.) ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίης τῇ[ς τ' Ἐρατοῦς ἐ]δάης and Quint.Smyrn. 12.83 δέδασεν δέ μιν ἔργον Ἀθήνη). Besides *Il.* 5.59ff., 9.390, *Od.* 7.109ff. See Karusos 1941=1972, 106f.

Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω: Solon often seems deliberately to avoid the obvious Homeric expression or vary the Homeric epithets: here πολυτέχνης replaces the traditional κλυτοτέχνης (*Il.* 1.571, 18.143 and 391, *Od.* 8.286; besides *Hom.Hymn* 20.5, Hes. fr. 141.4).

50. ξυλλέγεται βίοτον: Here βίος with its secondary meaning 'livelihood', cf. Hom. *Od.* 11.490, Thgn. *IEG* 624 etc. The phrasing is parallel to a Homeric one, cf. *Od.* 3.301 πολὺν βίοτον καὶ χρυσὸν ἀγείρων, 4.90 πολὺν βίοτον συναγείρων, and cp. Eur. *El.* 81 βίον ... ξυλλέγειν.

51-2. The poet is here described as the one who knows, by the help of the Muses, the γνωμοσύνης ἀφανὲς μέτρον which Solon defines χαλεπώτατον νοῆσαι in fr. 20.1-2, cf. Müller 1956, 14 n. 1.

The syntax is hardly plain, as no main verb is expressed. Implying that ξυλλέγεται βίοτον is an *apo koinou* verb both for the artisan and the poet (as was last suggested by Masaracchia 1958, 235), would not fit the superior dimension that Solon appears to ascribe to poetry, divination and medicine (as remarked by Gladigow 1965, 16). In my opinion it is not necessary at all to suppose that a distich dropped out after l. 52 (so, first, Rohde and Bergk); instead, we rather have here a 'brachylogy' for ἐπιστάμενος (ἐστί)~ἐπίσταται, as in Hom. *Od.* 4.231-2 ἱητρὸς δὲ ἕκαστος ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων according to the interpretation of the ancient schol. ad loc.: ὁ νοῦς, ἕκαστος δὲ ἱατρὸς Αἰγύπτιος ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους — besides, this passage can all the more be paralleled to Solon's, because it is concerned with a profession.

51. Ὀλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθείς: Hom. *Od.* 8.481 οἶμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, *Od.* 8.488 σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Hes. *Theog.* 22 αἶ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν αἰοιδήν, Archil. *IEG* 1.2 καὶ Μουσέων ἐρατὸν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος; Alcman. *PMG* 59(b)1-2 τοῦτο φαδειᾶν ἔδειξε Μωσᾶν δῶρον, Bacchyl. 10.39 Χαρίτων τιμὰν λελογχῶς, including here the artistic handicrafts under the Χάριτες, 19.3-4 ὅς ἂν παρὰ Πιερίδων λάχῃσι δῶρα Μουσᾶν. On Μουσέων δῶρα cf. also Thgn. *IEG* 250, Anac. *PMG* 346 fr. 11.7-9, Anac. *IEG* eleg. 2.3=56.3 G., Pind. *Ol.* 7.7, Bacchyl. fr. dub. 55.2.

For the epithet, Hom. *Il.* 2.491 (and 2.484, 11.218, 14.508, 16.112), *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 450, Hes. *Theog.* 25, 52, (75, 114), 966, 1022 (=fr. 1.2).

52. σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος: Sol. 20.2 γνωμοσύνης ... μέτρον; Archil. *IEG* 1.2 καὶ Μουσέων ἐρατὸν δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος.

Μέτρον means here 'full measure', something like 'a definite amount', not an incomplete or imperfect thing, but a really mature whole; for its 'noetic' value, cf. ad 20.2. In this meaning ancient epic has only the phrase ἥβης μέτρον ἰκέσθαι or ἔχειν *Il.* 11.225, *Od.* 4.668, 11.317, 18.217, 19.532, *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 166~221, Hes. *Op.* 132 and 438, fr. 205.2 (the same phrase later appears in Thgn. *IEG* 1119 ἥβης μέτρον). The expression "to possess σοφίης μέτρον", namely the full measure of (poetic) skill, appears to be idiomatic, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 876 μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης (see also 790, 1074), Pigres *IEG* 1.2 Μοῦσα, σὺ γὰρ πάσης πείρατ' ἔχεις σοφίης, *CEG* 82.3 (450-425?) σοφίας μέτρο[ν ἐπι]στάμενος, and the epitaph of Hesiod ascribed to Pindar, *FGE* 583 μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης; also two of the *tabulae Iliacae* (the Capitolian one and the one of the Metropolitan Mus., N.Y.: cf. Sadurska 1964, 29 and 39) invite the reader to consider the structure of the *Iliad* and of other cyclic poems ὄφρα δαεῖς πάσης μέτρον ἔχης σοφίας.

Σοφίη is used of manual skill, precisely in carpentry, in *Il.* 15.412, the only example of the word in Homer. Solon is one of the first authors who testify the broadening of the term from practical to intellectual knowledge, both as wisdom and sound judgement in common life (what σοφίη means in Sol. 23.16), and as poetical-musical competence — the latter meaning appears to be first attested in our passage and in *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 483 τέχνη καὶ σοφίη δεδαημένος and 511 ἐτέρης σοφίης ἐκμάσσατο τέχνην (both concerned with the musician's art): cf. Maehler 1963, 66f. and Gladigow 1965, 18-20 (Hes. fr. 306 called Linus the citharist, son of the Muse Urania, παντοίης σοφίης δεδαηκότα, but we do not know in what context his knowledge was praised, and Linus was not only a musician, but also the teacher-tutor of Heracles). Later archaic instances of σοφίη=poetic competence are Thgn. *IEG* 770, 995 and Pind. *Ol.* 1.116, 9.38, *Pyth.* 1.12, 4.248, 6.49, *Nem.* 7.23, *Isthm.* 7.18; see also Ibyc. *PMG* 282(a)23 Μοῖσαι σεσοφ[ισμ]έναι, Bacchyl. 10.39 ἦ γὰρ σ[ο]φὸς ἢ Χαρίτων τιμὰν λελογχῶς ἐλπίδι χρυσέαι τέθαλεν and *Pa.* fr. 5.1 ἕτερος ἐξ ἐτέρου σοφός (about how poets learn from the previous ones: cf. Maehler ad Bacchyl. locc.citt; for a review of the fifth cent. instances, cf. Snell 1924, 8-12).

53. μάντιν ἔθηκεν...Ἀπόλλων: Hom. *Od.* 15.252-3 ... μάντιν Ἀπόλλων θῆκε, Callim. *Lav.Pall.* 121 μάντιν ἐπεὶ θησῶ νιν ἀοίδιμον ἐσσομένοισιν.

ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων: The formula occurs three times in Homer (*Il.* 15.253, 21.461, *Od.* 8.323) always as a nominative, and six times in the *Hymns*; cf. besides Hes. fr. 235.1 ἄναξ ... Ἀπόλλων, Tyrt. 14.1 ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων.

The Homeric formula containing this distinctive epithet of the god is always found at the end of the line, and has been considered the prototype of ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων (Hom. *Od.* 8.334). 'Working (or prohibiting) from afar' (ἐκάς+ἐργάζομαι or εἶργω) is how the epithet was understood by epic poets (see also the cognate epithets of the god ἐκατηβόλος, ἐκηβόλος 'striking from afar', and the inscriptional evidence quoted by Frisk, *Gr.etym.Wört.* s.v. ἐκηβόλος). I would not rule out that the ability of the god to 'operate from afar' is opposed to the limits of his human representative, the seer, who knows but cannot prohibit the κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον. For the formula in connection with the gift of the prophetic skill, Stesich. *PMGF* 222(b) 209 μαντοσύνας δὲ τεὰς, ἄναξ, ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων.

54. ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν ... ἐρχόμενον: Hom. *Od.* 20.367-8 νοέω κακὸν ὕμιν ἐρχόμενον, Hom.*Hymn Dem.* 256-7 ... ἀφράδμονες οὐτ' ἀγαθοῖο αἴσαν ἐπερχομένου προγνώμεναι οὔτε κακοῖο.

55. ξυνομαρτήσωσι: new, but the simple form of the verb is used in the meaning 'to accompany' by Hom. *Il.* 24.438 and *Od.* 13.87. The relative is commonly interpreted as referring to μάντις, two lines above, (e.g. Adrados, Defradas, West: if the seer is favoured by the gods he sees disaster coming from afar). The verb certainly has most often a positive meaning, and the preposition may seem to hint at a positive meaning as well, but I am tempted to connect the relative clause to κακόν of the previous line: besides, if the unavoidable κακόν is the one that comes 'with the assistance of the gods', then also τηλόθεν would profit in significance, because this adverb would be hinting at its being originated outside the human world. After all, Solon has already mentioned Apollo, the specific protector god who endowes the seer with his powers: why to repeat the idea that the assistance of the gods generically is necessary for the seer, in order to foresee the disaster? I think, instead, that Solon stresses that the κακόν which the seer acknowledges but cannot prevent is the one sent by the fate (μόρσιμον) and/or by punishing-prosecuting gods, in terms not different from l. 63, where good and bad things are said to be decided by the Moira, and l. 64, where it is stated that what the gods send cannot be avoided.

55-6. See Hom. *Il.* 2.831-4 υἷε δύω Μέροπος Περκωσίου, ὃς περὶ πάντων ἦδεε μαντοσύνας, οὐδὲ οὖς παῖδας ἔασκε στείχειν ἐς πόλεμον φθισήνορα· τῷ δέ οἱ οὐ τι πειθέσθην· κῆρες γὰρ ἄγον μέλανος θανάτοιο, and 2.858-61 ... Ἐννομος οἰωνιστής· ἄλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρρύσατο κῆρα μέλαιναν, ἄλλ' ἐδάμη, where ῥύομαι has the uncommon meaning 'keep off, ward off' (also found in *Il.* 5.538, *Od.*

23.244, 24.524, Pind. *Isth.* 8.53). See later Ap.Rhod. 4.1503f. (Mopsos) ἀδευκέα δ' οὐ φύγεν αἴσαν μαντοσύναις· οὐ γάρ τις ἀποτροπή θανάτοιο. Prophesying from bird-flight (οἰωνός) or from the behaviour of the victims in the ἱερά 'sacrifices' were two of the most common forms of divination.

The whole concept expressed by Solon is found again e.g. in Pind. *Pyth.* 12.30 τὸ δὲ μόρσιμον οὐ παρφυκτόν, fr. 6.92ff. νέφεσσι δ' ἐν χρυσέοις Ὀλύμποιο καὶ κορυφα[ῖσι]ν ἴζων μόρσιμ' ἀνα[λ]ύεν Ζεὺς ὁ θεῶν σκοπὸς οὐ τολμᾶ, and fr. 232 τὸ πεπρωμένον οὐ πῦρ, οὐ σιδάρεον σχήσει τεῖχος, Bacchyl. 24.7-10 οὐ γάρ τις ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸν ἂν εὐθύ]δικοι Μοῖραι ... φατίξωσιν φύξις, κτλ., Aesch. *Sept.* 281 οὐ γάρ τι μᾶλλον μὴ φύγῃς τὸ μόρσιμον, *TrGF* 362.3-4 οὔτε ... φεύγει τι μᾶλλον τὸν πεπρωμένον μόρον, Eur. *Heracl.* 615 μόρσιμα δ' οὔτι φυγεῖν θέμις, οὐ σοφία τις ἀπώσεται.

57-8. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 16.28 τοὺς μὲν τ' ἱητροὶ πολυφάρμακοι ἀμφιπένονται. Παιήων appears in the *Iliad* as the physician of the gods, at 5.401=5.900 τῷ δ' ἐπὶ Παιήων ὀδυνήφατα φάρμακα πάσσω; and is the one ὃς ἀπάντων φάρμακα οἶδεν, according to Hes. fr. 307.2. In *Od.* 4.231-2 every Egyptian is said to be ἱητρὸς ... ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων· ἥ γὰρ Παιήονός εἰσι γενέθλης.

The participial cluster may be taken as an apposition to ἄλλοι, but in the context of Solon's elegy it is better understood as an anticipated apposition to the specific ἱητροί who are good at their profession since they continue their patron's craftsmanship, as well as the artisan, the poet and the seer mentioned above, were the *good* artisan, poet and seer who respectively had learnt their craft from Athena and Hephaestus, the Muses and Apollo — not 'others, who practice Paieon's work, are physicians', but 'others are physicians who practice Paieon's work'. As in the case of the seer, also in the case of the physician, to point out the professional worth of the unsuccessful professionals would put more emphasis on the irresistible strength of fate.

58. ἱητροί: Other lists of professions that mention the physician, besides Hom. *Od.* 17.384f. (quoted ad 43-62) are in a fragment of Emp. *VS* 31B146 and in Aesch. *PV* 478-99.

καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἔπεστι τέλος: 'even though/and also they achieve nothing'. Cf. *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 150 οἷσιν ἔπεστι ... κράτος; also Hom. *Od.* 17.496 εἰ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρῇσιν τέλος ἡμετέρῃσι γένοιτο, Thgn. *IEG* 164 τέλος δ' ἔργμασιν οὐχ ἔπεται, 640 βουλαῖς δ' οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος, 660 θεοὶ ... οἷσιν ἔπεστι τέλος.

The physicians have no power or efficacy on the outcome, because they are subject to favourable as well as unfavourable surprises. I disagree not only with Lattimore 1947, 168, but also with Cordes 1994, 22 that Solon's text necessarily implies that the τέλος which the physicians cannot control lies in the hands of Zeus. The idea that gods' help is vital in every human profession becomes a common theme of the Greek popular morality (cf. its survival till the Roman period in Arr. *Cyn.* 35 οὐδὲν ἄνευ θεῶν γιγνόμενον ἀνθρώποις ἐς ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελευτᾷ). However in Solon's text, the τέλος with which Zeus is concerned (l. 17) appears to be the fortunes of the wicked men (ll. 27-8), namely he is concerned with the general control of righteous and unrighteous deeds, as his τίσις for wrongdoing appears in the long run (l. 28). But this is certainly not the case for the physician who confronts an unexpected aggravation of disease (ll. 59-60) or an unexpected recovery (ll. 61-2): see below.

60. ἥπια φάρμακα δούς: an adaptation to the pentameter of the *Iliad*-formula for the second hemistich (ἥπια) φάρμακα πάσσω/ (or πάσσειν/): 11.515 and 830, (~5.401 and 900); cf. also ἥπια φάρμακα εἰδῶς/πάσσε *Il.* 4.218.

61. νούσοισι ... ἀργαλείαις: as above, l. 37.

κυκώμενον: Cp. Archil. *IEG* 128.1 θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοισι κήδεσιν κυκώμενε (of soul disquietness).

62. ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἶψα τίθησ' ὕγιῃ: For ἄπτεσθαι+plural dat. of χεῖρ cf. Hom. *Il.* 10.454-5, 20.468; for the structure of the line, cp. Hom. *Il.* 11.392 ἀκήριον αἶψα τίθησι.

The phrase ἄπτεσθαι χειροῖν is neither referring to a cure by hypnosis, magnetic treatment by rubbing and laying on of hands, namely the physician's touch with mesmeric effects, connected with Egyptian or Eastern influences in medicine (as was maintained by Headlam-Knox on Herodas 4.18), nor to the divine-magical curation by the hands which the medical god Asklepios/Paian would have passed to his pupils (as maintained by Weinreich 1909, 35), nor to the magical practices often found in antiquity (cures through incantation or invocations of the daimons out of the body of the ill person). As was already correctly remarked by Cordes 1994, 22, magical practices were expensive, and needed a lot of apparatus, and therefore they do not fit Solon's description of a swift cure. I would add that the Greek texts attribute only to Ἀσκληπιός or to Παιήων the magical effect of the touch and never to a human representative of the god's art (despite Weinreich, quoted above). Since Solon appears to be only concerned with the human aspects and limits in the professions, even from a

methodological point of view it appears to be improbable that Solon refers to the *magical* touch of the physician which sometimes fails to cure. In my opinion, Solon is speaking of the healing touch of the physician which later becomes idiomatic in the phrase *παιωνία χεῖρ* (Aesch. *Supp.* 1066, Soph. *Phil.* 1345-6, Ar. *Ach.* 1223, Magn.med. *Anth.Plan.* 16.270.4, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 14.55.5) and is often ridiculed in the epigrams, e.g. Lucill. *Anth.Pal.* 11.113, and id. 114.5. Pindar, *Nem.* 3.53-5, *Pyth.* 4.270-2 and *Pyth.* 3.47-53 clarify that this touch would be no more than the *μαλακά* "gentle" touch of the physician in applying the medicines which will favour the patient's recovery, a method taught by Cheiron to Asklepios (cf. already Instone 1996, 164).

The mention of the adverb *αἶψα* in Solon's lines is not a hint to magic either. Hippocrates often uses a formula 'doing these things (the sick) was suddenly cured' (*Int.*, chs 20, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 42, 54; the verb is always accompanied by the same kind of adverbs (*τάχιστα*, *ἐν τάχει*, *εὐθὺς*) which give emphasis to the swiftness of cure. Solon is anticipating these formulas — or possibly resuming old primitive formulas, confirmed by Egyptian and assyro-babylonian medical texts, which Hippocrates would have resumed (Di Benedetto 1986, 151f.).

63-4. In Homer, Moira normally operates in the singular as a goddess of fate, death and evil (interchangeable with the singular *Αἶσα*), and the personified plural is found only once in Homer, *Il.* 24.49. Hesiod officially incorporates the Moirai in his system as daughters of Zeus and Themis and gives them their names. However, archaic poets waver between plural and singular, sometimes even within one poem (Callin. fr. 1.9 and 15).

Solon's starting points for this distich are the ideas expressed by Hes. *Theog.* 904-6 *Μοίρας θ', ἧς πλείστην τιμὴν πόρε μητίετα Ζεὺς, ... αἶ τε διδοῦσι θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε*, or in the Homeric passages *Il.* 24.527f. (where Zeus apportions to man his lot from the two *πίθοι*, one containing *κακά*, the other *εἰά*) and *Od.* 4.236f. (*ἀτὰρ θεὸς ἄλλοτε ἄλλω Ζεὺς ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε διδοῖ*). However, Solon does not explicitly involve Zeus, and deliberately chooses the almost abstract concepts of *Μοῖρα* (l. 63) and the almost impersonal plural *θεοί* (l. 64) — cp. *ἐκ θεῶν μοῖρα παγκρατῆς ... κατένευσε* in the third *dith.* of Bacchylides (17.24: *ἐκ θεῶν* is better connected with the verb, cf. Maehler ad loc.) — to introduce the profane idea of risk entailed in human action, which is going to be mentioned in the following line.

The view maintained here by Solon regarding the profession of the physician is not very different from the one which we see refuted in the Hippocratic treatise *de Arte* (ch. 4-6 with the conclusion at the beginning of ch. 7): without completely denying the

interferences of τύχη, the writer is dealing with the criteria which prove that there is such a thing as an art of medicine which is seen as the knowledge of the causes of the sicknesses, ch. 5.16, ch. 6.15. Solon does not simply set the stage for the poetic and sophistic discussions of the effectiveness of the τέχναι and the power of the τύχη, as Cordes 1994, 22 asserts, but, actually, Solon is the first to speak in an archaic context about the dichotomy between medical profession/effectiveness of Μοῖρα=Τύχη, which was going to become a most debated question of the Athenian culture of the fifth century (some poetic parallels: Eur. *Alc.* 785-6, *IT* 89, Agatho, *TrGF* 39F6, and 39F8).

κακὸν ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν: besides Hom. *Il.* 24.528, cf. *Od.* 4.236 quoted above and 15.488-9 σοὶ μὲν παρὰ καὶ κακῷ ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκεν Ζεὺς. In Hes. *Theog.* [218-9] and 906 quoted above Κλωθώ, Λάχεσις, Ἄτροπος give to men ἔχειν ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε, in *Op.* 669 Zeus and Poseidon have the τέλος ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε, in 179 μεμείξεται ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν by the gods to the men. Cf. later, at least, Stesich. *SLG* S150.4 (*PMGF* p. 182) μεμιγμένα δ' ἐσθλὰ κακ[οῖσιν] (in Lobel's reconstruction) and Cleanth. *CA* 1.20 εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας (*scil.* Zeus) ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν.

64. δῶρα δ' ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων: Hom. *Il.* 3.65 οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ... δῶρα, Thgn. *IEG* 446 δῶρ' ἀθανάτων, 1033 θεῶν ... εἰμαρμένα δῶρα ... οὐκ ἂν ... θνητὸς ... προσφύγοι, Rhian. *CA* 1.2 φέρομεν ... θεῶν ἑτερόρροπα δῶρα. On the human necessity to suffer the divine δῶρα, cf. also *Od.* 18.142 and *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 147-8~216-7, Soph. *TrGF* 964 θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον τοῦτο· χρὴ δ' ὅσ' ἂν θεοὶ διδῶσι, φεύγειν μηδέν, ᾧ τέκνον, ποτέ (see also *TrGF* 585).

ἄφυκτος: new. In the epithet ἄφυκτα recurs Solon's idea that Μοῖρα=Fate is always threatening with a sanction, a theme repeated also in πάντως, *Il.* 8, 28, 31. Cp. Simon. *PMG* 520.4 ἄφυκτος ... θάνατος, and adesp. *PMG* 1018a (probably coming from Eur. *Peleus*), κλῦτε, Μοῖραι, Διὸς αἵ τε παρὰ θρόνον ἀγχοτάτω θεῶν ἐζόμεναι περιώσι' ἄφυκτά τε μήδεα παντοδαπᾶν βουλᾶν ἀδαμαντίναισιν ὑφαίνετε κερκίσιν. For the unavoidability of Moira's actions, cp. also Phanocl. *CA* 2 ἀλλὰ τὸ Μοιράων νῆμ' ἄλλυτον, οὐδέ τῷ ἔστιν ἐκφυγέειν, ὅποσοι γῆν ἐπιφερβόμεθα (according to the ancient testimony concerning human death).

For γίγνομαι, 'turn out to be', cf. Hom. *Od.* 2.319-20, *Od.* 9.34-5, Hes. *Op.* 279-80, Aesch. *Supp.* 476, Thuc. 7.8.2, Pl. *Ion* 535a, *Grg.* 526a, *Phdr.* 249e etc.

65-70. A version of these lines occurs in Thgn. *IEG* 585-90 (also quoted by Stobaeus in the chapter περὶ τῶν παρ' ἐλπίδα: 4.47.16), with variants whose relevance indicates that the passage underwent an autonomous symposiastic reworking. The lines of the Theognidean corpus were the work of a minor moralist poet who μεταποιεῖ Solon's text in order to express the idea of the dangers of an imprudent ambition and to cancel Solon's pessimism with a more conventionally pious faith in the benefits from virtue and skill (the most relevant variations in meaning are: l. 587 εὐδοκιμεῖν πειρώμενος instead of εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος, and l. 589 τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι instead of τῷ δὲ καλῶς ποιέοντι): as is well shown by Ferrari 1989, 25-7, the changes made by 'Theognis' to serve this moralistic purpose ruin the chiasmic symmetry of Solon's text in lines 67-70, with the beginning verse 65 having no longer any significance at all now that there lies no danger for the well-doer, and make the word ἀφροσύνης look incongruous, since it does not apply any more to the one who acts well.

65. πᾶσι ... κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν: see Thgn. *IEG* 401-2 μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων, and 449 for the phrase πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἔργμασιν; Thgn. *IEG* 637f. ἐλπίς καὶ κίνδυνος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὁμοῖοι· οὗτοι γὰρ χαλεποὶ δαίμονες ἀμφότεροι for the thought. The latter passage appears to synthesise two thoughts which are articulated in two subsequent sections of Solon's poems, namely the hope as a stimulus of human actions > hereafter the list of the professions) > the danger entailed in every action. Also Bacchylides concludes the list of professions in 10.38-45, which appears to have been modelled on Solon (see Maehler 1997, 189), with the statement (ll. 45f.) τὸ μέλλον δ' ἀκρίτους τίκτει τελευτάς, πᾶ τύχα βρίσκει.

The word κίνδυνος, attested here for the first time (Mette 1952, 409), brings forward another idea that adds to the unavoidability of Μοῖρα. The element of risk, danger, provided by the unexpected and the unforeseen which every human action entails, is somehow the same concept as Μοῖρα=Τύχη (cf. above ad l. 63), but considered from the human point of view, and not as a divine entity — note how the parallelism of the Μοῖρα distich and of the κίνδυνος distich is outlined by the same introductory τοι, which has to be interpreted as the τοι emphasising a proverbial or gnomic sentence (cf. Denniston, *Greek Part*. 542f.).

Μοῖρα=Τύχη is the reason why sometimes things turn out good, sometimes bad, not in proportion to our merit or right. In this way, for the first time, the physician is understood as a model for the whole human situation (so Cordes 1994, 23 paraphrasing Wilamowitz 1913, 266) — but a model that is hardly connected with the right and wrongful actions supervised by the justice of Zeus.

65-6. οὐδέ τις οἶδεν ... χρήματος ἀρχομένου: Parallels for the thought: Thgn. *IEG* 135-8 οὐδέ τις ἀνθρώπων ἐργάζεται ἐν φρεσὶν εἰδὼς ἐς τέλος εἶτ' ἀγαθὸν γίνεται εἶτε κακόν. πολλάκι γὰρ δοκέων θήσιν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκεν, καί τε δοκῶν θήσιν ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκε κακόν, 141-2 ἄνθρωποι δὲ μάταια νομίζομεν, εἰδότες οὐδέν· θεοὶ δὲ κατὰ σφέτερον πάντα τελοῦσι νόον, 159-60 οἶδε γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ὅτι νῦν χήμέρη ἀνδρὶ τελεῖ, 1075-6 πρήγματος ἀπρήκτου χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι τελευτὴν γνῶναι, Semon. *IEG* 1.4-5 (ἄνθρωποι) οὐδὲν εἰδότες ὅπως ἕκαστον ἐκτελευτήσει θεός, Simon. *PMG* 521 ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν μή ποτε φάσης ὅ τι γίνεται αὔριον, ... ὡκεία γὰρ οὐδὲ τανυπτερύγου μυίας οὕτως ἅ μετάστασις, Pind. *Ol.* 7.24-6 ἀμφὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι ἀναρίθμητοι κρέμανται· τοῦτο δ' ἀμάχανον εὐρεῖν, ὅτι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρτατον ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν, *Ol.* 12.7-9 σύμβολον δ' οὐ πῶ τις ἐπιχθονίων πιστὸν ἀμφὶ πράξιος ἐσσομένης εὔρεν θεόθεν, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων τετύφλωνται φραδαί. The lack of certainty in human life and the instability of it will become a cliché in tragedy: cf. e.g. Soph. *Trach.* 1270 τὰ μὲν οὖν μέλλοντ' οὐδεὶς ἐφορᾷ, *TrGF* 590 θνητὴν δὲ φύσιν χρὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν, τοῦτο κατειδότας ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν πλὴν Διὸς οὐδεὶς τῶν μελλόντων ταμίας ὅ τι χρὴ τετελέσθαι, Eur. *TGF* 391 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν χωρὶς ἀνθρώποις θεῶν· σπουδάζομεν δὲ πόλλ' ὑπ' ἐλπίδων, μάτην πόνους ἔχοντες, οὐδὲν εἰδότες σαφές (besides Soph. *Aj.* 1418-20, Eur. *TGF* 262, *TGF* 301, *TGF* 304); see also adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 11.56.1-2 τί γὰρ αὔριον, ἢ τί τὸ μέλλον, οὐδεὶς γινώσκει.

66. πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν: ῆ is the reading of cod. S and Stob. 3.9.23 (περὶ δικαιοσύνης). Πῇ is that of Thgn. cod. A, ποῖ of Thgn. codd. OXI and of Stob. 4.47.16 cit. Homer and Hesiod do not have the Attic ποῖ (cf. Apollon. Soph. 131.8) and use ῆ only with relative value (coordinated to τῇ), or demonstrative (=τῇ ῆ), while they write πῇ or ὅππῃ to denote movement in a certain direction; cf. also Hdt. 1.32.9 σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται. Thus most probably the best reading is πῇ, later replaced in the tradition by ποῖ and ῆ.

Solon's periphrasis with μέλλειν replaces, as well as Hesiod's (fr. 204.113) the traditional, Homeric τὰ ἐσόμενα, and expresses a dynamic idea of time. The use of the periphrasis will be furthered in the fifth century: cf. Basset 1979, 129. The verb ἔχειν in Homer can mean to hold a ship or a chariot in a certain direction, *Od.* 11.70; for the intransitive use, cf. e.g. *Il.* 16.378 of Patroclus driving his chariot, and of ships coming ashore, and Ar. *Ran.* 188 ποῖ σχήσειν δοκεῖς;.

67-70. Also in l. 32 the polar expression *κακός* and *ἀγαθός* synthesises all human beings in opposition to divine forces — here more certainly than there skill (*εὖ*) or incompetence (*κακῶς ἔρδειν*) are relevant, in a technical sense.

In these lines Solon prospects the negative version of the optimistic perspective to be found for instance in Soph *TrGF* 831 ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς, καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, and seems at variance with Solon's faith in divine justice — so at variance, that Del Grande 1956, 75f., even dared to believe that these lines were the phrase by an objector whom Solon answered in the last lines of the poem. A 'dramatic' intervention of a deuteragonist is hardly imaginable in this poem of Solon, but for the change in perspective by Solon several plausible explanations have been provided (see *Introd.* and ad 69-70).

For the thought that the gods (or Tyche) can always reverse human fortunes, cf. Hes. *Op.* 5-7, and see e.g. Archil. *IEG* 130, Eur. *Or.* 340-7, *TGF* 100, *TGF* 554, *TGF* 684, Lyr. adesp. CA 34.4-7. That the treatment of men's fortunes is random, irrational, and sometimes unfair to what human action would deserve, cf. e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 660-6 θεοὶ γάρ τοι νεμεσῶσ', οἷσιν ἔπεστι τέλος. ... πενιχρὸς ἀνὴρ ... ἐπλούτησε, ... καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κακὸς ὢν ἔλαχεν, Eur. *Hec.* 956-60 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν πιστόν, ... οὔτ' αὖ καλῶς πράσσοντα μὴ πράξειν κακῶς. φύρουσι δ' αὐτὰ θεοὶ πάλιν τε καὶ πρόσω ταραγμὸν ἐντιθέντες, ὥς ἀγνωσία σέβωμεν αὐτούς, Eur. *Hel.* 711-5, *TGF* 901 πολλάκι μοι πραπίδων διήλθε φροντίς, εἴτε τύχα <τις> εἴτε δαίμων τὰ βρότεια κραίνει, παρά τ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δίκαν τοὺς μὲν ἀπ' οἴκων δ' ἐναπίπτοντας ἀτὰρ θεοῦ, τοὺς δ' εὐτυχοῦντας ἄγει, adesp. *TrGF* 323b=*717.2-3 πάντα ... τὰ τοῦ βίου ... διὰ τύχην δὲ γίνεται, Agatho, *TrGF* 39F9 τάχ' ἂν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα. Cf. also the general comment of Men. fr. 417 K.-Th.: παύσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς τύχης — εἴτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον, εἴτε νοῦς — τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ κυβερνῶν <ἅπαντα> καὶ στρέφον καὶ σῶζον, ἢ πρόνοια δ' ἢ θνητὴ καπνὸς καὶ φλήναφος. πείσθητε, κού μέμψεσθέ με· πάνθ' ὅσα νοοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν, τύχη 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμέν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.

68. ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην ἔπεσεν: Hom. *Il.* 19.270 μεγάλας ἄτας, Thgn. *IEG* 1082b πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν. On Solon's use of ἄτη, cf. above ad l. 13.

69-70. Solon says that things sometimes turn out not in proportion to one's merit/right, and therefore one can succeed even though going about it the wrong way and vice versa (ll. 67-8); cp. the example of the physician. Therefore, in my opinion, ἀφροσύνη has to be understood as the opposite of σοφίη (and not of σωφροσύνη)

and to be translated as 'ignorance', and would parallel εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος and οὐ προνοήσας in connection above all to the presence or absence of practical skill in the planning of one's actions; contra Fill 1972, 163-5, who sees in the διπλασίως σπεύδουσι of l. 73 a hint at the unrighteous wealth followed by *hybris* of Il. 9-15, and therefore states the ethical implication of εὖ and κακῶς — but the difference between the emphasis on divine justice of the first part of fr. 1 against the focus on the human perspective in the second part appears to me to be one of the best results of the modern analyses of the structure of the elegy.

The singular θεός found here is equivalent with the plural θεῶν ἀθανάτων used in l. 64, and the two words hint at an impersonal Fate no less than Μοῖρα. See François 1957, 59-62, 86, and Büchner 1959, 165.

70. συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης: συντυχίη is not found in Homer. For ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης, cf., in the same hemistich of the pentameter, Thgn. *IEG* 556~1178b πρὸς τε θεῶν αἰτεῖν ἔκλυσιν ἀθανάτων. The term ἀφροσύνη was already in *Il.* 7.110 (in plural *Od.* 16.278, 24.457). For other instances of the same connection of λύειν with ἀφροσύνη, see Pl. *Resp.* 515c5 λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν τε δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης and [Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 108C ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης.

The closest parallel to Solon's line is Ar. *Av.* 544-5 σὺ δέ μοι κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ <τινα> συντυχίαν ἀγαθήν ἤκεις ἐμοὶ σωτήρ, which may help to understand the syntactical connection of the two accusatives. In the common interpretation συντυχίην ἀγαθήν is the object, and ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης the apposition, but the Aristophanic passage shows the idiomatic character of συντυχίην ἀγαθήν, and such an idiomatic and general use is what we would expect much more in an apposition (an anticipated apposition of a kind of which there are other instances in Solon, cf. fr. 2.2), because the apposition intends to explain, while the *explanandum* is more specific and restricted in meaning. The ἀφροσύνη would therefore cause the failure (see Hes. *Op.* 89 ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ' ἐνόησεν, and 218 παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω, after Hom. *Il.* 17.32 ῥεχθὲν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω), but the θεός would sometimes provide the ἄφρων with the liberation from the ἀφροσύνη, leading him therefore unexpectedly to success: cf. Römish 1933, 21-2 (and Büchner 1959, 167, Maddalena 1943, 9-10 for an unsuccessful attempt at refuting the interpretation by Römisch).

71-6. Thgn. *IEG* 227-32 has a version of these lines, with variants.

Scholars usually interpreted these lines above all as a return to the thoughts on wealth of the first part. Certainly the πλούτου which is programmatically at the start of l. 71 hints at the πλοῦτος which is in the same position in l. 9, and the final lines resume the criticism of the pursuit for unrighteous wealth of ll. 9-25, together with the idea of divine justice and of ἄτη. But the final lines also develop from another perspective the outline of the human σπεύδειν presented in ll. 43ff. The logic underlying the transition between the ways of σπεύδειν and the πλοῦτος may be explained through the Theognidean principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν, on which, cf. above all, ll. 401-4 μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων. πολλάκι δ' εἰς ἀρετὴν (emended in ἀάτην by Ahrens) σπεύδει ἀνὴρ κέρδος διζήμενος, ὄντινα δαίμων πρόφρων εἰς μεγάλην ἀμπλακίην παράγει (cp. Sol. ll. 65-70).

The nuances of the different approaches to the theme of the wealth in the first and the last part of the poem have been fully appreciated first by Nesselrath 1992. In l. 9 Solon only wanted to distinguish between the good wealth and the wealth gained by men in unlawful ways; l. 71 is concerned with wealth for which οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον (namely, also in case that a τέρμα exists, all the same, it is not understandable by the man). The system presented in ll. 9-32 implied that human actions and efforts, all of them being more or less motivated by the wish for well-being, can be divided into good or bad (namely the ones which are in accordance with the gods and those against the order established by them, which are doomed to be pursued by ἄτη). The second part of the poem presents a new perspective which shows that the division of human actions and efforts between good and bad does not match, and that both depend on the superior power of chance; besides, ἄτη is not any more only the punishment of the *hybris* in contrast with divine law, but also affects men who simply surpassed the invisible τέρμα in gaining the κέρδεα which had been provided to them by gods, and may somehow seem close to a profane principle of equilibrium, though it is managed by the "gods".

In ll. 9-25 the criticism of the wealth had been more specifically ethical, as it had opposed there good and bad means to gain it; here the criticism concerns another inherent danger of this pursuit, namely its boundlessness. For the idea that unbridled growth leads to ἄτη, cf. also Sol. 8.3; it leads to great instability also according to Bacchyl. 15.57-60 ἃ δ' αἰόλοις κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφροσύναις ἐξαισίοις θάλλουσ' ἀθαμβῆς ὕβρις, ἃ πλοῦτ[ο]ν δύνανται τε θοῶς ἀλλότριον ὥπασεν, αὐτὶς δ' ἐς βαθὺν πέμπει φθόρον, which is a relevant parallel also for the following lines of Solon; for Democr. VS 68B.219 χρημάτων ὄρεξις, ἣν μὴ ὀρίζηται κόρῳ, πενίης ἐσχάτης πολλὸν χαλεπωτέρη· μέζονες γὰρ ὀρέξεις μέζονας ἐνδείας

ποιεῦσιν. Cf. also, more generally, Men. fr. 786 K.-Th. ἀρχὴ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κακῶν τὰγαθὰ, τὰ λίαν ἀγαθὰ.

71. πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον: As the participle both of φαίνω and of φημί, πεφασμένος had two different meanings, 'evident' and 'shown forth' by words (see *Suda* π 1416 A. and Hsch. π 2099 S.). In Hom. πεφασμένος of *Il.* 14.127 was attributive of μῦθος, and therefore may have the second meaning (cf. Hom. *Od.* 8.499 φαίνει δ' αἰοιδήν). Solon's πεφασμένος means 'evident', after *Il.* 2.122 τέλος δ' οὐ πώ τι πέφανται, as in Soph. *OC* 1122, and, possibly, in one of Solon's laws: Lysias, in *Theomn.* (10.16), making reference to the "ancient laws of Solon", namely the *axones* or the Athenian law code of 403 B.C. which were still rich in archaisms (cf. Hillgruber 1988, 65), quotes the law whose beginning was ὅσαι δὲ πεφασμένως πωλοῦνται, and glosses τὸ μὲν πεφασμένως ἐστὶ φανερώς (19; cf. also Harp. α 198 K. ἀποπεφασμένον· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀποδεδειγμένον καὶ πεφανερωμένον).

Τέρμα='end' had already been used metaphorically by Tyrt. 12. On the phrase, cf. Sol. 20 γνωμοσύνης δ' ἀφανὲς ... μέτρον.

For the thought, Thgn. *IEG* 596 πλὴν πλούτου παντὸς χρήματός ἐστι κόρος, 1158 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλούτου θυμὸν ὑπερκορέσαις, Pind. *Nem.* 11.47-8 κερδέων δὲ χρὴ μέτρον θηρευέμεν· ἀπροσίκτων δ' ἐρώτων ὀξύτεραι μανίαι, Bacchyl. 1.172-4 ἴσον ὃ τ' ἀφνεὸς ἰμείρει μεγάλων ὃ τε μείων παυροτέρων, Ar. *Plut.* 193-97 σοῦ δ' ἐγένετ' οὐδεὶς μεστὸς οὐδεπώποτε. ... ἦν τάλαντά τις λάβῃ ... πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν ... βούλεται, ἢ φησιν εἶν' ἀβίωτον αὐτῷ τὸν βίον, fr.lyr.adesp. CA 37.20 μέτρα τίς ἂν πλούτου, τίς ἀνέυρατο μέτρα πενίας;, 'Sotad'. CA 8.6-7 ὡς πένης θέλει σχεῖν, καὶ πλούσιος πλεον σχεῖν, ἴσον ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ μεριμνᾶν.

72-3. οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον, διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι: For the idea, cf. Eur. *Supp.* 238-9 οἳ μὲν ὄλβιοι ... πλειόνων τ' ἐρῶσ' αἰεί, fr.lyr.adesp. CA 37.22-3 νῦν γὰρ ὁ χρήματ' ἔχων ἔτι πλείονα χρήματα θέλει, πλούσιος ὢν δ' ὁ τάλας βασανίζεται ὥσπερ ὁ πένης.

72. βίος=βίωτος in the sense of 'life-means' is not Homeric, and occurs first in Hesiod, *Theog.* 605, *Op.* 301, 307, 400, 476, 499. Cf. Soph. *Phil.* 1282, Eur. *Hel.* 433, *Supp.* 240, 861.

73. διπλάσιος is new, and will later be typical of prose. The less well attested adverbial neuter is preferable, since the replacement of the epithet by the adverb is easier than the opposite way round.

For σπεύδειν 'to strive eagerly or anxiously' denoting at the same time emulation and rivalry in an apparently analogous context, cf. Hes. *Op.* 23-4 ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ'· ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἦδε βροτοῖσιν, Thgn. *IEG* 402-3 πολλάκι δ' εἰς ἀρετὴν σπεύδει ἀνὴρ κέρδος διζήμενος. But both in Hesiod and Theognis the σπεύδειν to equalise other people's wealth is considered a positive fact; on the contrary Solon's perspective is pretty negative (other passages criticising the greed and those who always want more when they already have enough are frr. 3.7-10, 5.3-4).

73. τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας: Hom. *Il.* 16.747 πολλοὺς ἂν κορέσειεν ἀνὴρ, Thgn. *IEG* 1158 οὔτε γὰρ ἂν πλούτου θυμὸν ὑπερκορέσαις, cp. Pind. *Nem.* 10.20 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κόρος ἀνθρώπων βαρὺς ἀντιάσαι, Bacchyl. 1.172-4 ἴσον ὃ τ' ἀφνεὸς ἰμείρει μεγάλων ὃ τε μείων παυροτέρων.

74. κέρδεά τοι ... ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι: Hom. *Hymn Dem.* 220 ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι (beginning of the line); cf. Hom. *Od.* 18.19 ὄλβον δὲ θεοὶ ... ὀπάζειν, Thgn. *IEG* 321 εἰ ... θεὸς κακῶ ἀνδρὶ βίον καὶ πλοῦτον ὀπάσσει, Rhian. *CA* 1.9-10 θεὸς δ' ἐπὶ ὄλβον ὀπάζει καὶ πολυκοιρανίην. The verb ὀπάζειν is often told of divine gifts: e.g. *Il.* 6.156-7, *Od.* 8.498, Hes. *Theog.* 420, Hom. *Hymn* 24.5, 30.18, 31.17, Bacchyl. 17.130, of bad ones, Semon. *IEG* 7.72.

75. ἄτη ... ἀναφαίνεται: Cf. above l. 28 (Ζηνὸς τίσις) ἐξεφάνη. Hom. *Il.* 11.174~17.244 ἡμῖν δ' αὖτ' ἀναφαίνεται αἰπὺς ὄλεθρος; cf. also Soph. *OC* 1222 μοῖρ(α) ... ἀναπέφηνε.

ἐξ αὐτῶν: Hardly from the θνητοί, as first maintained by Wehrli 1931, 12, see later West 1974, 181: either from the κέρδεα (Ziegler 1922, 204, Römisch 1933, 25, cp. Sol. 8.3 τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν), or from the θεοί (Hamilton 1977 the gods would be presented as givers of both κέρδεα "gains" l. 73 and ἄτη, as also in Thgn. *IEG* 133f. — but in this case I would expect some kind of conjunction 'also' between κέρδεα and ἄτη). Thgn. *IEG* 227-32, who resumes Solon's *ll.* 71-76, cuts out any mention of the gods as responsible for human κέρδεα, and lets ἄτη derive from the χρήματα when they become ἀφροσύνη (instead of Sol. l. 74, he has χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς γίνεται ἀφροσύνη: cf. Hasler 1959, 83).

76. ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει: Sol. 6.4 χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει/, Thgn. *IEG* 232, 318 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει/. Hiatus is admitted with *polyptota* of ἄλλος (though in most cases a particle, usually τ', or a preposition has intruded in some or all manuscripts): see *Od.* 4.236-7 (analogous context: θεὸς ἄλλοτε ἄλλω Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε διδοί), *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 558, Hes. *Op.* 713, Archil. *IEG* 13.7 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει, specifically of the κακά sent by gods (on the points of contacts with Solon, cf. Krause 1976, 79): indeed, I believe that Solon, too, resumes here from l. 29 the idea of the unpredictability of the punishment, and I would rule out that he is implying that Ate does not punish the specific individuals, but one or the other member of the community, namely that her concern is to punish the whole *polis*, as Hasler 1959, 84 maintains. See later Thgn. *IEG* 157, 992, Phoc. 16.1, Ap.Rhod. 1.881, Opp. *H.* 2.268, 566, 4.290.

The object of ἔχει is most probably ἦν, *apo koinou* with πέμψη, and the parallel of fr. 6.4 is not enough to justify the syntactically hard connection of ἔχει with κέρδεα, proposed by Ziegler 1922, 204 and accepted by Allen 1949, 60, Fränkel 1975, 236 n. 41, Müller 1956, 11.

τεισομένην: Ate is the executor of Zeus' vengeance, as stated in ll. 14-7. For the "vengeance" of Dike, Sol. 3.15-6. Theognis, who differently from Solon did not emphasise her role in dealing with the idea of divine punishment, meaningfully replaced τεισομένην ("Ἀτην) with τειρομένοις (θνητοῖς) in l. 232 of his passage reproducing Solon's ll. 71-6.

2 G.-P.² (1-3 W.²)

The natural position of the island of Salamis, forming a barrier towards Nisaea, the harbour town of Megara on the Saronic Gulf, and stretching out towards Piraeus would have made it necessary for either of the two nearest mainland cities, Megara and Athens, to want to hold it for reasons of defence. Especially after the annexation of Eleusis to Athens (at the end of the 8th or the beginning of the 7th century, cf. Hopper 1961, 211 n. 204), the acquisition of the island can safely be said to have become even more desirable for the Athenians. Important economic reasons can be added: possession or neutralisation of the island implied seizing or safeguarding the sea-route to the isthmus of Corinth (see French 1957, 238-40, Waters 1960). Such considerations could be expected from Megara as well, given the city's colonising activity over a longer period in the seventh century and its powerful position in the north-east trading sphere as well as from Athens who had considerable naval interests (as shown by its struggle against Mytilene for Sigeum in the Troad: Hdt. 5.94-5, Diog.Laert. 1.74).

At Cleisthenes' time Ajax from Salamis was considered to be 'ally' of the Attic heroes (Hdt. 5.66), and two lines were apparently added in the Homeric Catalogue of Ships, where the forces of the Salaminian Ajax follow the Athenians in terms that imply the subordination of Salamis to Athens (*Il.* 2.557f.). The two lines were hardly original, since nowhere else in *Iliad* Ajax is strongly connected to Athens; therefore they were athetized by Aristarchus, and sometimes considered to be a 'late addition' by Homer (*Vita Herod. Homeri* 390-3, p. 210 A.) but more often a forgery by Solon (cf. Dieuchidas *FGrH* 485F6, Plut. *Sol.* 10, schol. ad *Il.* 2.494-877, 2.558, schol. Dem. 19.251, 478b Dilts; see also Strab. 9.394: by Solon or by Peisistratus) — it is significant that also the Megarians tried a similar interpolation in order to connect Ajax with troops from the Megarian towns of Tripodes and Nisea: cf. Strab. quoted. Closely connected with Athenian claims to Salamis was the legend of the giving of the island to Athens by Philaios and Eurysakes, the sons of Ajax (Plut. *Sol.* 10) or by one of them (Paus. 1.35.2), in exchange for the Athenian citizenship. According to Plutarch, *Sol.* loc.cit., Athenian accounts recorded that Solon exploited this legend about the sons of Ajax during a public trial between Athens and Megara on the historical ties with Salamis, where the judges, five Spartans, decided in favour of Athens (also the Delphic oracle would have been helpful, calling Salamis 'ionic'); on the same occasion, Plutarch says that Solon read in public the two lines of the Homeric catalogue about Ajax and the Athenian troops (cf. also Arist. *Rh.* 1375b30). The war for Salamis is obscure in the extreme and the evidence for it is late and meagre (see above all Hopper 1961, 208-217, and Piccirilli 1978). An apparently long and difficult struggle, some phases of which certainly belong to the latter part of the

seventh century as it can be identified by the Megarian support of Cylon's unsuccessful *coup d'état* in Athens (Thuc. 1.126.5) ended by the arbitration of Sparta in favour of Athens mentioned above. In spite of some isolated defences of Plutarch's chronology (Busolt, Meyer), the Spartan arbitration is most often considered to be more or less later than Solon's times, and dated to the 560's or early 550's (Legon 1981, 138f., Andrewes 1982, 373), to 519/18 B.C. (Piccirilli 1973, 52f.), or between 510 B.C. and 508/7 B.C. (Beloch). Daimachus (*FGrH* 65F7=Plut. *Comp. Sol. et Publ.* 4.1) was the only voice in antiquity to deny that Solon acted as a general in the war against Megara, and Solon's figure is most present in the testimonies about the Athenian conquest of Salamis. However, at some point Peisistratus' name, too, appeared in the story in a quite confusing way. Apart from the fact that Solon obviously took a stand on the Salamis issue as his celebrated poem guarantees, his share in the *final* conquest of the island remains debated in Plutarch, whose narration is the fullest we have: in chs 8f. he presents two versions of the capture of Salamis (for the chronology according to Plutarch, see Manfredini-Piccirilli ad *Sol.* 8.4) and his account is also contradictory regarding the end of the war, because at the start of ch. 10 it is stated that the war continued (!) till the arbitration of Sparta.

With this obviously confused account one has to fit together Herodotus' narration (1.59.4) which records the capture of Nisaea by Peisistratus before his tyranny, but says nothing of Salamis or Solon, and Aristotle, who in *Ath.Pol.* 14.1 accepts Peisistratus' participation in the war together with Solon (also prospected by Plut. *Sol.* 3-4), while he denies it in 17.2 as a chronological mistake. The story of the murderous cross-dressing by which the final capture of the island was accomplished appears in Plut. *Sol.* 8.4f. as a *strategema* engineered by both men, but is ascribed only to Peisistratus by Aen.Tact. 4.8-11 and Just. *Epit.* 2.7f. while others (Polyaenus 1.20.1-2 and Aelianus, *VH* 7.19) consider only Solon to be the responsible.

We should not forget in the ancient biographies of literary men the efforts to tie literary history in with fixed points in political history and the temptation to claim, defying sensible chronological facts, that close events were absolutely simultaneous or the strong attempt to elaborate legends around them (see e.g. Podlecki 1987, 9-10), and it is natural to suppose that probably Athens gained and lost Salamis more than once, and that the war urged by Solon was not the one in which Peisistratus was a general (see Rhodes ad *Ath.Pol.* 17.2) or that, after an early but insecure capture of the island (before Solon's archonship) Peisistratus' success improved Athens' bargaining position in the war (see Legon 1981, 137, and Andrewes 1982, 373). Solon's poem *Salamis* and the circumstances under which it was composed and cited are reported in a number of sources containing elements of doubtful historicity. Plutarch, *Sol.* 8f., reports in detail that Solon had to prevent a newly established law forbidding to propose in public to resume the war for Salamis, and so he pretended to be out of

his mind (ἐσκήψατο μὲν ἔκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν), sallied out into the market place with a cap upon his head (ἐξεπήδησεν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἄφνω, πιλίδιον περιθέμενος), and got upon the herald's stone (ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ κήρυκος λίθον) to perform his poem; according to Diog.Laert. 1.46, who confirms the detail of Solon's pretence to be mad, Solon would have gone to the market place ἐστεφανωσάμενος, and would have had the poem read by a herald. An allusion to Solon's cap as a πιλίδιον occurs as early as Dem. 19.255 οὐκ οἷε δίκην δώσειν ... καὶ πιλίδιον λαβὼν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστήσας καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορῇ (where the "even if" proposition seems already to hint at some kind of peculiarity of the cap most probably as a device intended to gain impunity), and the tradition of some queer Solonian disguise is already in the Pseudo-Aristotelic *Homeric Problems*, on *Il.* 2.183 (Arist. fr. 143 Rose³=368 Gigon). The story of the feigned madness is also found in Cic. *Off.* 1.30.108, Philod. *mus.* 20.18, Polyaen. *Strat.* 1.20, and Just. *Epit.* 2.7.9.

Different interpretations have been proposed about the context of the performance, and Solon's disguise. Apart from this poem by Solon, the *agora* is nowhere mentioned by ancient testimonies as a performance-place of elegiac poetry, as remarked by Bartol 1993, 54. Some scholars trust the testimonies and believe that this poem was exceptionally delivered in the market-place, and not, as usually, at the symposium (cf. West 1974, 12, Henderson 1982, 29, Tedeschi 1982, 42-4), but the mention of the *agora* might have been a reconstruction of theirs by an inference based on the misunderstanding of ἀντ' ἀγορῆς l. 2 (cf. e.g. Lefkowitz 1981, 40, and Bowie 1986, 19-20). More recently, Bartol 1993, 54f. interpreted the first distich in a metaphorical sense: Solon would play a herald by presenting himself as a herald, though being at the symposium (what is plausible; Bartol most unlikely intends the second line, too, from the same perspective: ἀντ' ἀγορῆς would mean "instead of the *agora*", or "not in the *agora*", and l. 2 "I shall speak not in the *agora*, so I shall use poetry", but this interpretation of l. 2 not only is very hard (and Solon would be presupposing a too implicit reference to the sympotic context, to allow such an interpretation of ἀντί), but also belittles the meaning of the emphatic self-reference of the message as a poem (better understandable as functional to an opposition between poetry-prose).

As for Solon's πιλίδιον, mentioned by Plutarch and Demosthenes, it was interpreted by Weil 1883, 348 n. 13 as the traveller's hat, which would indirectly fit the image of the herald of the first verse — but the heralds had their own hats (see below). Most recently, Mastrocinque 1984, remarked that πιλίον was also the hat of the strangers or of the liberated slaves: the fact that the Athenian Solon spoke in public with his head covered in such a way might be attributed by the Athenians to madness, fitting perfectly Solon's own intentions — however this interpretation only connects the testimony about the hat and the testimony about the madness, but offers no clue to

Solon's very lines. I agree with the proposal of Freeman 1926, 171 n. 2, followed e.g. by Flacelière 1947, 247, according to whom the *πιλίδιον* of Plutarch's story was the *πίλος* of the herald, but the legendary evolution misunderstood it before Demosthenes' time for a *πιλίδιον*, namely a sign of weakness or inferiority which would have prevented the Athenians from being hard in applying the law against him. Indeed, this *πιλίδιον* would have been over-interpreted as the sick man's *πιλίδιον* of Pl. *Resp.* 406d, or the *πιλίδιον* which Dicaeopolis adopts in Ar. *Ach.* 439, in keeping with his role as a foolish beggar who while starting a 'long speech' to the chorus wants to avoid any serious judgement or any harm — αὕτη (the speech) δὲ θάνατον, ἣν κακῶς λέξω, φέρει (see ll. 416f.). In other words, through his hat Solon was originally enacting a herald because he wanted to appear holy and untouchable as heralds were (see e.g. schol. bT *Il.* 1.334 κοινὸς δὲ νόμος μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κήρυκα; the inviolability of the heralds belonged according to Hdt. 7.136.2 to τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα), but his performance was later interpreted as that of a madman — untouchable again, because of this status (see Tedeschi 1982).

Either with a hat or without it, certainly Solon's own text, l. 1, presented the poet as a κῆρυξ. The meaning of this auto-presentation is far from being clear. According to Bowie 1986, 19 it would not have implied any kind of real disguise or madness, but would be one of the many possible ways ancient lyric poets presented their own 'I' — Archilochus, fr. 1 could introduce himself as a servant of the Muses, Theognis 257 as a mare, Solon would have presented himself as a traveller just coming from Salamis, in the same way the 'I' of Theognis 783-8 presented himself as a traveller who had been in Sicily — after all the multiformity of the auto-presentations of the ancient lyric poets may be considered an early parallel of the equation between the "rhapsode"/poet and the "actor", which is later found in Pl. *Ion* 532d6-7, 536a1, *Resp.* 373b7, 395a8, Alcid.Soph. 14 Avezzù, and in Arist. *Rh.* 1403b22 and *Poet.* 1462a6).

However, we have to cut some distinction between the conventions of the fictional 'I', and to differentiate between the ones because of which the poet may 'hand over' to a *persona loquens* completely different from his own self (and so, for instance, the 'I' that speaks may be a mare) and the less radical fictional way with which Solon (and Archil. fr. 1 quoted above) express the 'I' of their own selves. Solon's (or Archilochus') auto-presentations do not hand over to a different self, but simply emphasise at different levels metaphorical or metonymic aspects of the author's real self. Archilochus, as a singer inspired by the Muses, over-stresses his dependence on the Muses and, therefore, states that he is their "servant", Solon, as a politician who is going to speak about Salamis, says that he brings news from Salamis. The problem is that the metonymy with which Solon presented his own self in order to gain a strong illocutionary effect of exhortation upon his audience (cf. Slings 1990, 17f.) certainly

implied at least one un-realistic feature, and at least in one point he tried to seem someone different from who he was. He wanted to look like a herald from Salamis — this is the minimum level of unrealistic 'staging' that l. 1 makes sure: no Athenian could in reality be a herald from Salamis, since Salamis was Megarian/not Athenian by that time.

Apart from this 'anomalous' self-presentation, did he more explicitly feign to be mad — e.g. in the disguise, that the *Homeric problems* of Pseudo-Aristotle appear to imply? Nothing in the remaining eight out of the original one hundred lines (so Plutarch) of the poem hints at Solon's madness (though behaving like a madman kept being attributed to him during his lifetime, cf. fr. 14), but both Solon's pretended madness and his disguise — which would result in a fully pre-tragic staging (see Else 1965, 40f.) — would have been easily understandable in archaic Greece as a στρατήγημα. The gods used to appear to humans in disguise (e.g. Athena in *Od.* 1.105f. or Demeter in *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 119-44), and disguise was also a common device to operate in dangerous situations: Odysseus again was disguised as a deserter at Troy to gain information from the Trojans in *Od.* 4.244-58 (cp. the Persian Zopyrus of Hdt. 3.154, who feigned to be a deserter to enable Darius to conquer Babylon), or as a beggar on his return to Ithaca (*Od.* 14.192-359). Furthermore, Odysseus had been considered very successful in 'setting the stage' for his hortatory speeches in *Il.* 2.183-97: when he throws off of his cloak before speaking to the leaders and the troops in order to stop their flight from Troy, the ἀπρεπές gesture of τὴν χλαῖναν ἀποβαλόντα μονοχίτωνά θεῖν appeared to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Homeric problems* loc.cit. as a device to θαυμάζειν 'astonish' the people (a device that already [Aristotle] had compared with Solon's), and the schol. ad *Il.* 2.183b considered it a way to ἐπιστρέφειν τῇ παραδόξῳ θεῶα τοὺς πολλούς, ἢ ἵνα ταπεινὸς ὑπηρέτης δοκῇ εἶναι τῶν βασιλικῶν δογμάτων. Furthermore, Odysseus also resorted to some kind of oratory strategy which more closely resembles the device ascribed to Solon by the testimonies: while standing to speak in the assembly, according to the description of Antenor (*Il.* 3.219-24), Odysseus ἀστεμφές ἔχεσκεν, αἶδρεῖ φωτὶ ἐοικώς· φαίης κε ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἔμμεναι ἄφρονά τ' αὖτως but as soon as ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἶη καὶ ἔπεα ... οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος (for a full analysis of the analogy between Solon's and Odysseus' deceiving strategies, cf. Vox 1984, 17-49). Solon would have exploited the ἀπροσδόκητον-effect provoked by the gap between his mad look and the sharpness of his words, more or less like Odysseus did, according to Antenor's description of his oratory.

As for the information presented by the testimonies (by Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Justinus, Polyaeus, Aelius Aristides; implicitly by Demosthenes), that Solon feigned madness in order to avoid the punishment of the law which forbade any

kind of discussion about Salamis, it is certainly open to doubt. For instance, Raaflaub 1996, 1037 says that the idea of a law prohibiting discussions on a delicate political question was familiar in the late fifth and in the fourth centuries (cf. e.g. Thuc. 2.24.1, 7.15.1), but seems to be rather improbable in the first decades of the sixth; if so, the whole anecdote would have developed to explain the puzzling imagery of the first couplet and an original performance by Solon as 'inspired' κῆρυξ (or as simulating to be so), elaborating also on the reference to his μανία which Solon himself makes in fr. 14 (so for instance Lefkowitz 1981, 40 and Bowie 1986, 19). I personally believe that the testimonies about Solon's feigned madness may simply have re-interpreted Solon's 'Odyssean' behaviour in an age when political oratory had got its own fixed and peculiar rules, and the histrionic style of rhetoric could not be understood any more, while the high consideration of Solon's cleverness led to the need of explaining the device of the feigned madness. So, for instance, Phainias probably used Solon's statements to be in the middle between poor and rich (e.g. fr. 30.15ff.) and elsewhere his defence for having done what he had promised (fr. 29^b.4ff.) in order to state that Solon used *apate* in the program for his archonship, promising to both sides (rich and poor) to act in favour of them, lying for the benefit of his city (fr. 20 Wehrli, ap. Plut. *Sol.* 14.2).

1. Αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον: Eur. *Supp.* 589 αὐτός τε κῆρυξ, Hdt. 1.79.2 αὐτὸς ἄγγελος Κροίσῳ ἐληλύθει; Soph. *OC* 1511 αὐτοὶ θεοὶ κήρυκες ἀγγέλλουσί μοι. Αὐτοκῆρυξ may also be a single word: Aesch. *TrGF* 420a=Phot. *Lex.* a 3226 Theod.-Phryn. *PS* 5.17 de Borries (ὁ μὴ δι' ἐτέρων ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτοῦ κηρυκεύων).

Stressing αὐτός, Solon possibly opposed his personal self-performance to the practice of the "canto affidato", namely the sending of the song to be performed in absence of the composer, which was also exploited by archaic poets: see Vetta 1981, 485f.

ἀφ' ἰμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος: Sol. 2.8. The adjective was used in Homer of one's native land, e.g. *Il.* 2.751 ἀμφ' ἰμερτὸν Τιταρησσόν, *Od.* 11.275 ἐν Θήβῃ πολυηράτῳ; Archil. *IEG* 22 (Θάσος) οὐ ... καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ' ἐφίμερος οὐδ' ἐρατός, Tyrt. 1^b.4=°14.4 Σπάρτης ἰμερόεσσα πόλις, Mimn. 3.2 ἰμερτὴν Ἀσίην, Alcman. *PMG* 55 Κύπρον ἰμερτάν, Bacchyl. 1.123 Κνωσὸν ἰμερτάν [πό]λιν. This erotically charged presentation of one's love for one's own fatherland is therefore quite widespread in archaic poetry: Solon uses it here in a very pointed way, because Salamis was not of course the homeland of the Athenians, but it was, nonetheless, something very worthy of loving and fighting for, see Robertson 1997, 149-50. The repetition in l. 8 gives more strength to the idea; if we consider it the last line, then Solon's poem would be cleverly constructed to form skilfully a propagandistic ring.

2. κόσμον ἐπέων: All the Homeric instances of the word κόσμος point to a notion of order, arrangement (*Il.* 10.472, 11.48, 12.85, 225, 24.622), often in a moral/social way (*Il.* 5.759, 8.12, 17.205, *Od.* 14.363). When it refers to a speech, κόσμος means a sequence that contains everything necessary and does not leave out anything, this being a proof of its truthfulness (see Maehler 1963, 19 and *LfgrE* s.v.): cf. *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 433, 479, and above all *Od.* 8.489-91, where the phrase λίην κατὰ κόσμον 'all quite according to the order of things' refers to the content of the bard's song and to its good internal structure as an accurate, articulated and well-ordered sequence of the themes concerning the fate and the venture of the Achaeans. The sense of κόσμος 'composition' is also apparent in several post-Homeric authors: besides *Hom.Hymn* 7.59 γλυκερὴν κοσμήσαι ἀοιδήν, see *Parm.* VS 28B8.52 μάθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων, *Democr.* VS 68B21 "Ὅμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτήνατο παντοίων, [*Orph.*] fr. 14 K.=Pl. *Phlb* 66c 8-9 καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς, *Pind. Ol.* 11.14 κόσμον ἐπὶ στεφάνῳ χρυσέας ἐλαίας ἀδυμελῇ κελαδήσω, fr. 194.3 κόσμον αὐδάεντα λόγων, *Simon. IEG* 11.23 μελ[ί]φρονα κ[ό]σμον ἀοιδῆς, *Philet. CA* 10.3 ἀλλ' ἐπέων εἰδὼς κόσμον καὶ πολλὰ μογήσας μύθων παντοίων οἶμον ἐπιστάμενος, *Antip.Thess. Anth.Pal.* 11.20.3 οἳ τ' ἐπέων κόσμον λελυγισμένον ἀσκήσαντες; cf. also *Demiourg. Anth.Pal.* 7.52.1 Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου στέφανον καὶ κόσμον ἀοιδῆς, Ἀσκραῖον γενεὴν Ἡσίοδον κατέχω, [*Orph.*] *Arg.* 252 μητρὸς ἐμῆς ἐκέρασσ' εὐτερπέα κόσμον ἀοιδῆς. On the much debated meaning of *kosmos*, cf. Haebler 1967, Puhvel 1976, Diller 1956, Adkins 1972b.

Solon's κόσμος most probably keeps the Homeric meaning and therefore does not denote anything more than an ordered sequence of ἔπεα metrically defined, that is, disposed according to an order that is different from that of prose. In Homer ἔπος is exchangeable with μῦθος in the meaning of "statement" (in the schol.min. it is usually glossed with λόγος), and the sense of "poetry", which is possible in *Od.* 8.91 and 17.519, is no more than incidental (*LfgrE* s.v.); in Solon the word appears once more in no connection with poetry, ἐς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὁρᾶτε καὶ εἰς ἔπη αἰμύλου ἀνδρός, εἰς ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε (fr. 15.7).

However the phrase κόσμος ἐπέων cannot simply be interpreted as 'an adornment of words', using one of the Homeric meanings of κόσμος 'decoration' or 'ornament' (*Il.* 4.145), because such an emphasis on poetry as instrument of aesthetic pleasure would fit a later author (as for instance *Thuc.* 3.67.28 λόγοι ἔπεσι κοσμηθέντες), but hardly Solon. In my opinion, Solon's phrase refers to the fascinating linguistic structure of the song, ὦδή, which through its alluring

illocutionary power could potentially, and eventually did drive his audience against its previous orientation. Solon's ὥδή, as Gentili 1984, 67-8 nicely puts it (similarly, Walsh 1984, 135 n. 8), constitutes a linguistic universe (κόσμος ἐπέων) carefully worked out, fitted together and governed by the rules of metre and rhythm.

From a syntactical point of view the phrase is an anticipated apposition to the word ὥδήν —despite Westman 1974, 190, who considers ὥδήν a superfluous gloss on κόσμος ἐπέων, which would have replaced an expression qualifying the herald's proclamation (possibly the adjective λιγέων). Westman's main point is that it would be strange from a purely syntactical point of view that ὥδήν is a postponed apposition to κόσμος ἐπέων. In fact, this use of an anticipated apposition by Solon can be seen as an extension of or variation on Homeric patterns like ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων and it seems to be a linguistic feature that suits Solon, since his extant verses supply us with two other examples of the same sort: 1.21 θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει οὐρανόν, and 1.57 ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες ἱητροί. In this way, Westman's objections to the MSS text can be dismissed; there is also no need to add τ' after ἐπέων, which Hartung had proposed and Bergk introduced in the text.

The distinction between song and simple prose speech, here for the first time — the Homeric poems know only poetry and poetic speech — had to be made because a poem was not expected on such an occasion, and Solon ought have to speak in prose. Prose was the means he had himself used for his own Laws: as Solon himself states in fr. 30.18-20, θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ... ἔγραψα, where the difference between γράφειν and ὥδήν θέσθαι has to be noted: as recently remarked by Dover 1997, 183-4, classical Greek denoted the composition of poetry by ποιεῖν, while written composition in prose was denoted by γράφειν (usually in compound forms); therefore Solon's phrasing seems to obey this special terminology.

Solon is aware of the distinction and deliberately chooses poetry: in so doing he apparently shares the dominant archaic belief which sees the poet or the wise-man as the 'teacher of the truth' (see the 'classic' Detienne 1973), and wants to be able to avail himself of the prestige and independence of an ἀοιδός and likewise of the divine power and the emotional impact which his singing, ὥδή, is endowed with, contrary to a simple speech which would not have it. Two passages from authors as different as Plutarch and Dio Chrysostomus show that the choice of poetry was a common and accepted practice in ancient politics: according to Plutarch (*Lyc.* 4.2ff.), Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, was believed to have called the lyric poet and lawgiver Thales to Sparta in order to soften the hard customs of his fellow-citizens through the powers of Thales' poetic art. In a similar way, many centuries later, Dio Chrysostomus (*Or.* 32.20.9), while delivering a lengthy discourse to the people of Alexandria in their great theatre, will complain of not being able to deliver his thoughts in verse.

ὥδῃν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος: a variation on the Homeric formula καὶ τότε ἔγων ἀγορῇν θέμενος μετὰ πᾶσιν ἔειπον (*Od.* 9.171=10.188~12.319) which Odysseus uses as a wise commander of his companions to brief them boldly on his plan to investigate the land of the Cyclops and the island of Circe or, later on, to suggest to them a strategic behaviour concerning Helios' cattle on his island. The similarity in context is obvious: a potentially dangerous situation, the lost or unguided crowd, the clever wisdom of the one who solves the crisis. However, Solon invests this formula with a new value, through the shift in the meaning of ἀγορά, which in *Od.* 9.171 etc. meant 'assembly'.

In Solon's context it is impossible to have the word ἀγορά in its most common meaning (ἀντί cannot mean 'in front' of the assembly; for the other implausible interpretation 'instead of being in the market place', by Bartol, see *Introd.*). This was clearly acknowledged by the ancients: see Phot. *Lex.* α 221 Theod. ἀγορά· τόπου ὄνομα. καὶ τὰ ἀγοραζόμενα. Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν λιμένα ἀγορὰν καλοῦσι. Κρήτες τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. παρ' Ὀμήρῳ πᾶς ἀθροισμός. Σόλων δὲ ἀγορὰν καλεῖ τῷ πεζῷ λόγῳ ἀγορεύειν. καὶ ὁ τόπος παρ' Ὀμήρῳ ἢ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρων. Solon's ἀγορά means 'public speech', 'discourse', as sometimes in Homer (*Il.* 2.275, 788, 4.1, 400, 9.441, 12.211, 18.106, *Od.* 4.818), though '(place of) assembly' is the original (from ἀγείρω) and prevailing meaning of the word already in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 18.497, *Od.* 1.90, 16.361). On the meanings of ἀγορά, cf. [Apion] *Gloss.Hom.* 212.2 Ludwich ἀγορή ἔστι τὸν τόπον τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τὴν βουλήν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν δημηγορίαν, καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν ὠνίων οἷον τὰς ἀγορὰς, *Ap.Soph.* 4.15 ἡ ἐκκλησία, τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ συνάθροισμα~*Etym.Magn.* 12.44 which adds καὶ ὁ λόγος; see Martin 1951, 157, contra Ford 1981, 162 and 278, n. 43.

As for θέμενος, Solon's expression is the first in a long line of phrases presenting the production of poetic or prose speech as the work of a craftsman — an idea that survives all through Greek Literature in the vocabulary of ancient poetics: cf. e.g. *Alc. PLF* 204.6]αι θέσις (cp. *Etym.Magn.* 319.30ff. ἔθηκε ... ἢ ἐποίησεν. ἀφ' οὗ καὶ θέσις ἢ ποίησις, παρὰ Ἀλκαίῳ), *Pind. Ol.* 3.8 βοὰν αὐλῶν ἐπέων τε θέσιν ... συμμείξαι (schol. ad loc.: τὴν ποίησιν ἐπέων θέσιν εἶπεν), *Ar. Ran.* 1052 λόγον ... ξυνέθηκα, *Isoc.* 10.11 οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ καὶ τούτοις ὅμοιοι ... χαλεπωτέραν ἔχουσιν τὴν σύνθεσιν, etc.).

This shift to a new concept where the art of 'singing' of what the Muses inspire becomes 'making'/'composing' will continue with Theognis, showing the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman with a more analytical/rational view towards the process of poetic composition as technical making. Indeed, through this verb, Solon stresses his craftsmanship as an artist in the very same way that the later poets will use

the verb ποιῶμαι — after all, it is in Sol. fr. 26.3 that we find the first use of this very verb ποιεῖν for the activity of the poet in his address to Mimnermus: μεταποίησον, Λιγυαστάδη, ὦδε δ' ᾄδει, see notes ad loc.

3. εἶην δὴ τότε' ἐγὼ: Hom. *Od.* 9.561 δὴ τότε' ἐγὼν, 10.100 δὴ τότε' ἐγὼν (for the use of the particle δὴ preceding temporal adverbs, see Denniston, *Greek Part.* 228 §2).

Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινήτης: Folegandros and Sikinos, being islands of the Sporades, are mentioned in a number of sources —and are sometimes accompanied with adjectives or comments that hint at their desolation and roughness. Cf. above all Aratus, *SH* 109.1-2 με σιδηρεῖη Φολεγάνδρῳ, δειλῇ ἢ Γυάρῳ παρελεύσεαι αὐτίχ' ὁμοίην (cp. Strab. 10.5.1(484) Φολέγανδρος, ἣν Ἄρατος σιδηρεῖην ὀνομάζει διὰ τὴν τραχύτητα and 10.5.3(486) δηλοῖ δὲ τὰς ἀπορίας αὐτῶν καὶ Ἄρατος, κτλ.) and Antip. Thess. *Anth. Pal.* 9.421.1-4 Νῆσοι ἐρημαῖαι, τρύφεια χθονός, ἃς κελαδεινὸς ζωστήρ Αἰγαίου κύματος ἐντὸς ἔχει, Σίφνον ἐμιμήσασθε καὶ αὐχμηρὴν Φολέγανδρον, τλήμονες, ἀρχαίην δ' ὠλέσατ' ἀγλαίην; Hsch. φ 726 S. Φολέγανδρος. νῆσος ἐρήμη.

The inhabitants of the Aegean islands were commonly spoken of with contempt as inferior to the ἡπειρώται, presumably because islands would be poorer in resources than mainland kingdoms and because of the lonely life the νησιῶται would lead, outside any participation in a community: see Eur. *Andr.* 14 τῷ νησιώτῃ Νεοπτολέμῳ δορὸς γέρας, 210 τὴν δὲ Σκῦρον οὐδαμοῦ τίθης, *Heracl.* 84 οὐ νησιώτην, ὦ ξένοι, τρίβω βίον, ἀλλ' ἐκ Μυκηνηῶν σὴν ἀφίγμεθα χθόνα, *Rhes.* 701 νησιώτην σποράδα κέκτηται βίον, Dem. 13.34 εἰ μὲν οὖν Σιφνίοις ἢ Κυθνίοις ἢ τισιν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις οὔσι συνήδειν ὑμῖν, ἔλαττον φρονεῖν συνεβούλευον ἂν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔστ' Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ τὴν δύναμιν παρασκευάσασθαι παραινῶ, and 23.211 πῶς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν Αἰγινήτας μὲν τουτουσί, νῆσον οἰκοῦντας οὕτω μικρὰν καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχοντας ἐφ' ᾧ μέγα χρὴ φρονεῖν αὐτούς; see lastly Aeschin. 2.72 where Athens' hegemony of Hellas is compared to and contrasted with the little island of Myonnesus, and the pirates there. For other small islands that became proverbially unimportant places see, on Belbina, a rocky island in the Saronic Gulf, Hdt. 8.125, Teles fr. 3 Hense (ap. Stob. 3.40.8) ὀνειδίζουσι μὲν ὅτι Κύθιος ἢ ὅτι Μυκόνιος ἢ ὅτι Βελβινίτης; on Seriphus, see Ar. *PCG* 884=Hsch. σ 428 S. Σέριφος· Ἀριστοφάνης τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Σέριφον (cp. Phot. *Lex.* p. 151 N. Σέριφον (codex Σέρειφον)· τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, διὰ τὸ σκληρῶς ζῆν· καὶ χρησμὸς αὐτοῖς ἐξέπεσεν), Pl. *Resp.* 330a, Plut. *Them.* 18, Juv. 10.170.

For the paradoxical wish expressed by Solon, cf. Odysseus' wishes in *Il.* 2.259-64 μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ κάρη ὤμοισιν ἐπέιη, μηδ' ἔτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἶην, εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ σε ... δύσω, κτλ. — similar but different are Hom. *Od.* 2.230-4=5.8-12 μή τις ἔτι πρόφρων ἀγανὸς καὶ ἥπιος ἔστω σκηπτουῆχος βασιλεύς, μηδὲ φρεσὶν αἴσιμα εἰδώς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ χαλεπὸς τ' εἶη καὶ αἴσυλα ῥέζοι, ὥς οὐ τις μέμνηται Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο λαῶν οἷσιν ἄνασσε, πατὴρ δ' ὥς ἥπιος ἦεν, Hes. *Op.* 270-2 νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος εἶην μήτ' ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον ἔμμεναι, Soph. *OT* 830-3 μὴ δῆτα μὴ δῆτ', ... ἴδοιμι ταύτην ἡμέραν, ἀλλ' ἐκ βροτῶν βαίην ἄφαντος πρόσθεν ἢ τοιάνδ' ἰδεῖν κηλὶδ' ἐμαυτῷ συμφορᾷς ἀφιγμένην.

Σικινήτης: For the form, cf. Σικινῆται *IG* I³.71.90, 287.16; *SIG*³ 147b127.

4. ἀντί γ' Ἀθηναίου: The participle γε gives force to Solon's epexegetis introduced with the participial clause, as noted by Denniston, *Greek Part.* 138 §12.ii.

πατρίδ' ἀμειψάμενος: The verb is used again in 23.6. Solon's idea was not going to be shared by Socrates, who before facing the death penalty is indignant with his fellow citizens just like Solon is, but in Pl. *Ap.* 37d ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ, declines the perspective which Solon seemingly "threatens" to adopt. In reality, Sol. 30.8 shows how much Athens meant to him.

5-6. Solon is trying to evoke the feeling of shame to his audience, and prospects that the fear of ridicule or contempt — a dominant feature in the 'shame-culture' of the Homeric time (cf. Dodds 1951, 17-8) — would not only be applicable to him individually, in case that he had not dared reminding the Athenians of the need to (re)conquer Salamis, but collectively to all Athenians for their behaviour, since they apparently refuse to deal with the matter. The closest Homeric parallel to Solon's gesture is *Od.* 21.322-6 οὐ τί σε τόνδ' ἄξεσθαι οἶόμεθ' ... ἀλλ' αἰσχυρόμενοι φάτιν ἀνδρῶν ἠδὲ γυναικῶν, μή ποτέ τις εἴπησι κακώτερος ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν· ἢ πολὺ χεῖρονες ἄνδρες ἀμύμονος ἀνδρὸς ἄκοιτιν μνῶνται, ... διὰ δ' ἦκε σιδήρου'.

At the same time, he marks some kind of σφραγίς for his exhortation to the war and for his poem — though this σφραγίς really is the reversal of the 'normal' type attested by Thgn. *IEG* 22f. ὦδε δὲ πᾶς τις ἐρεῖ· "Θεύγνιδος ... Μεγαρέως"; Epich. fr. 86.12f. Austin συντίθημι τὰν τέχνην τάνδ' ὅπως εἶπη τις· "Ἐπίχαρμος σοφὸς τις ἐγένετο", Erathosth. *CA* 35.17f. λέγοι δέ τις ἄνθημα λεύσσων· "Τοῦ Κυρηναίου τοῦτ' Ἐρατοσθένης": cf. Wilson 1979, 4s. and Vox

1984, 32s.), because Solon cannot 'present' himself and his native city, until the shame of Salamis in enemy hands is not averted from the Athenians.

5. αἶψα γὰρ ἂν φάτις ... γένοιτο: besides *Od.* 21.323-6 quoted above, possible formal models are *Hom. Od.* 23.362 αὐτίκα γὰρ φάτις εἶσιν, and *Od.* 6.29 ἐκ γάρ τοι τούτων φάτις ἀνθρώπους ἀναβαίνει.

μετ' ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο: *Hom. Od.* 18.225 σοί κ' αἶσχος λώβη τε μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιτο in context similar to Solon's tone —cf. also *Hom. Il.* 3.287=460 (τιμήν) ἧ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοις μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται and *Od.* 8.160 μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλονται.

6. Ἀττικὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ: See *Hom. Od.* 1.406 ὀππότεν οὗτος ἀνὴρ, *Il.* 3.167 ὅδ' ἐστὶν Ἀχαιὸς ἀνὴρ, 14.471 οὐχ οὗτος ἀνὴρ Προθοήνορος ἀντὶ πεφάσθαι ἄξιος, 18.257 οὗτος ἀνὴρ Ἀγαμέμνονι μῆνιε δίω, *Tyrt.* 9.20 οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, but above all the formulaic phrase before the identification of the Greek heroes by Helen to Priam in *Il.* 3.178 οὗτός γ' Ἀτρεΐδης, εὐρὺν κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων, 3.200 οὗτος δ' αὖ Λαερτιάδης πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς, 3.229 οὗτος δ' Αἴας ἐστὶ πελώριος, ἔρκος Ἀχαιῶν. Cf. also *Simon. IEG* 19.1 Χῖος ... ἀνὴρ, *Bacchyl.* 5.191 Βοιωτὸς ἀνὴρ, *Timocr. PMG* 732 Σικελὸς ... ἀνὴρ.

τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν: The word, coined by Solon and found only here, is something like the correspondent of the demotic: he is Attic, of the tribe of the people who abandoned Salamis. Through this 'demotic' Solon avoids the presence of the names 'Athens' or 'Athenian', as if the name of the city was somehow destined to a *damnatio nominis* because of her coward inhabitants — both by Solon himself and by the future generations.

From this rebuke by Solon it is not clear if the Athenians had held and then lost Salamis or they have just given up the attempt to (re)gain it. Plutarch, in *Sol.* 8.1 implies with the adverb αὐθις the second version whereas in 12.5 the first one.

7. ἴομεν ... μαχησόμενοι περὶ νήσου: *Hom. Il.* 2.801 ἔρχονται πεδίῳ μαχησόμενοι προτὶ ἄστυ, *Il.* 12.216 μὴ ἴομεν ... μαχησόμενοι περὶ νηῶν. For ἴομεν 'short-vowel' subjunctive, see Schwyzer, 1, 674.

8. αἶσχος ἀπώσόμενοι: *Hom. Il.* 12.276 νεῖκος ἀπωσαμένους, *Archil. IEG* 13.10 πένθος ἀπωσάμενοι. Cf. *Dem.* 19.252 καὶ τὴν μὲν χώραν ἀνέσωσε τῇ πόλει, τὴν δ' ὑπάρχουσαν αἰσχύνην ἀπήλλαξεν.

3 G.-P.² (4 W.²)

This elegy has survived through some MSS of Dem. 19 (*De Falsa Legatione*), which was delivered in 343-2 B.C. to prosecute Aeschines for his alleged misconduct and bribery in the second embassy to Philip. The text we have is preserved by several inferior manuscripts, which give the 39 verses without any indication of a lacuna (but at least one hexameter is missing after l. 10 and l. 11, and one pentameter after l. 25). However S and L, two of the best manuscripts of Demosthenes, do not have the poem while A and T only include ll. 1f. and 5f., and only in the scholia. This varying way of transmission, and the fact that poetical quotations by the orators are usually short, suggested to Wilamowitz 1893, 2.306 and Jaeger 1926=1966, 78-9 that the preservation of the poem as a whole may be due to some ancient grammarian who added a fuller quotation to Demosthenes' mention of some initial lines, and maintained that ll. 17-29 (where the destruction of the whole city is described) could not suit Demosthenes' speech which states the permanent protection of Athens and the Athenians by the gods. These doubts on the transmission of the poem do not hold good, because, as Jaeger himself admitted, there are at least two other quotations from poetry in the orators that are long as well (55 lines from Euripides' *Erechtheus* and 32 lines from Tyrtaeus fr. 6 in Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates*); besides the analysis by Rowe 1972 showed that several other points of Solon's poem, not only the starting lines on the divine protection of Athens, were plainly acceptable and even useful for Demosthenes' concern.

Poetry was used in the orators' speeches of fourth century Athens, and six of them, held in political trials, include more or less extensive quotations from poetry: each of the three speeches of Aeschines, Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, Demosthenes, *De corona* and *De Falsa Legatione*. This kind of quotations reflects not only the general taste of the period and the preferences of the audience acquired both in school and in course of general attendance at performances but also the literary education of the orators themselves. They are, at the same time, essential to the orators' methods since they are used not only for refutation of the opponent's arguments (cp. Dem. 19.243-7, where the quotations from Hesiod and Euripides are aimed at Aeschines, or Aeschin. 2.158, where the quotation from Hesiod is his counter-thrust to Demosthenes' quotations from Solon), but could also fill the lack of any concrete evidence by witness to prove the opponent's guilt, or even were the only reference points in cases ambiguously in between law and ethics: as is stated by Lycurg. *Leoc.* 102, οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττουσιν ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπεῖθουσιν. Quotations from poetry in oratory were also appreciated by Aristotle (*Rh.* 1375-1376) who considered them to be a repertory of

reliable evidence on the moral quality of the actions. See Des Places 1935, North 1952, Johnson 1959, Perlman 1964, 162.

Demosthenes makes reference to Solon as a paradigm of modesty, to be contrasted with the briberies of Aeschines. After showing the difference between Aeschines' behaviour and the way in which Solon had been represented in a statue at Salamis — "You ought not to speak with your hands within the folds of your robe (as Solon had been represented), no, but to go on an embassy with your hands within. But you there (in Macedonia), holding forth and holding under your hands", namely receiving bribes, etc.: 19.255 — Demosthenes asks Aeschines how he could think of escaping δίκην δώσειν τηλικούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἀδικημάτων, even if he πιλίδιον λαβὼν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστήσῃ καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορήῃ;. This pathetic question is immediately followed by the quotation of Solon's lines, which are not expressly presented as a quotation from Solon (the audience could guess the authorship only through the reference to Solon's famous πιλίδιον in the performance of *Salamis*), but are introduced by the short λέγε σύ which usually was the order to the γραφεύς to read the laws. In such a way, since many of the laws which the Attic orators quote in their speeches were ascribed to Solon, these verses of Solon, too, might sound to Demosthenes' audience as elevated to the authoritative level of laws, and had even more the effect of leaving the impression of having been written precisely to condemn Aeschines.

The structure of the poem is less problematic than that of fr. 1, and there is a general consensus about the main sections, with few differences in details (see Maharam 1993, 320-57). The first four lines are a unity, delimited between the inceptive δέ and the δέ of l. 5, and show confidence in the divine help to Athens, just in order to emphasise the guilt of the mischievous citizens who are going to ruin a city that would be otherwise destined to a safe future. The rest of the poem is a depiction of the present *dysnomia* of Athens (ll. 5-29); after a first person statement by Solon on his duty to warn his fellow citizens (30-1), follows the prevision of the effects of a possible *eunomia* (ll. 32-9). In the central part of the poem (devoted to the opposite situation of *dysnomia*), ll. 5-6 state the guilt of all the citizens, ll. 7-14 the guilt of the leaders. After the statement of the guilt, the presentation of the consequences follows; the mention of the violations of Dike (l. 14) introduces the statement of Solon's certainty about her τίσις. The description of the actual situation (ll. 17-29) both in its length and in its structural centrality strongly parallels Hesiod's admonition about the consequences of the violation of Dike, that is the heart of the moral part of *Works and Days* (248-85). In particular, we note the precise correspondence between ἔρχεται l. 17, which introduces the ruin for the *polis*, and ἔρχεται l. 26 which introduces the final destruction of the private fortunes. Solon's first person warning in ll. 30-1 sets the stage for the abstract definition of the κακά just described, namely the personified *Dysnomia* — as if by naming them Solon could gain

some kind of control, at least conceptual, over the situation. However, as if it was evoked in a polar way by the mention of Dysnomia, Eunomia (l. 32) and her effects are the theme of the last part of the poem — in such a way Solon effectively leaves the impression that his own personal 'voice' is more strongly connected with the optimistic prevision of the possibility of Eunomia, than with the observation of the Dysnomia; the message implied is that Solon as a politician would provide Athens with this *eunomia*, whereas the present ruling class was driving Athens to the deepest ruin. This section (ll. 32-9) has a hymnodic tone, and, by means of some kind of ring composition, reintroduces the hopes about the future which had surfaced in the first four lines about the divine protection, but had been submerged by the statement of the present misery and the future dangers of the city. Also to be noted is the series of punctual repetitions that resume concepts from the first lines (or the first part) of the poem, ἀδίκους (33)/ἄδικος νόος (7); κόρον, ὕβριν (34)/ὕβριος (8) and κόρον (9); δίκας σκολιάς (36)/Δίκης θέμεθλα (14); ὑπερήφανα ἔργα (36) and τοῖς ἀδίκους (33)/ἀδίκους ἔργμασι (11); ἔργα διχοστασίας (37)/στάσιν (19); ἀργαλέης ἔριδος (38)/πόλεμον (19); κατ' ἀνθρώπους (39)/κατὰ Διὸς αἶσαν (1); ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά (39)/ἀφραδίῃσιν (5). This kind of ring composition is most probably intended to show that "all the previously uttered apprehensions are unfounded in a well-ordered state" (so Halberstadt 1954-55, 202).

The relations of this poem with the elegy to the Muses are self-evident. Fr. 1 expresses Solon's opinions and warnings in the field of morals, fr. 3 in the field of politics. In both cases excessive greed for wealth appears to be the main cause that stirs up human mischief (1.7-13, 71-6; 3.6, 11-4). Both poems start with a pious request for help from some gods (a direct *apostrophe* in fr. 1, an indirect one in fr. 3), and in both Solon ascribes to a divine principle the responsibility of ensuring the fulfilment of the moral or political order that he favours, and of punishing human contravention of the established norm, called in both poems acts of *hybris* (cf. 1.11; 3.7); the divine validation that Solon is maintaining for his opinions involves in both poems a marked emphasis on the forms of the divine punishments: in fr. 1 it is Zeus' τίσις (cf. l. 25), in fr. 3 it is Dike's τίσις (cf. ll. 15-6). As a consequence, deviation from the norm is much more stressed than the norm itself. No wonder: the statesman Solon could materialise the positive map of his (=Zeus' or Dike's) norms in his laws, and the poetic messages had simply to smooth the way for them, inducing the Athenians to the fear of their absence.

1-2. Ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις: Cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.191 ἡμετέρην τε πόλιν, Thgn. *IEG* 782 ἡμετέρην τήνδε πόλιν. We cannot rule out that Solon sets his own view against another opinion or that a statement existed in the previous (lost) lines of the kind "other cities have perished because their gods were unwilling to protect them, but our city ..." (so lastly Adkins 1985, 111; Manuwald 1989, 3 and n. 19) or "Athena's wrath against

Paris brought Troy to destruction, when Zeus eventually stopped to help it, but in case of our city ..." (so Nestle 1942, 135). However, it is more economical to suppose — as was lastly remarked by Siegmann 1975, 271 — that this line is the beginning of Solon's poem, with inceptive δέ. This start would give emphasis to Solon's words and mark the song as something deserving special attention; besides, introducing at the very start the city as the dearest thing to him and to his fellow-citizens would fit well a poem where the community of interests between author and audience is often stressed.

Some further examples of inceptive δέ are: Hes. *Op.* 286, Mimn. 7.1, Heraclit. VS 22B1 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ' ἐόντος, Ion Chius VS 36B1 ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου (where the emendation by Lobeck in <ἦ>δε would introduce an attractive Hecatean and Herodotean *incipit*), Philol. VS 44B1 ἀ φύσις δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρμόχθη, the beginning of the *Athenian Constitution* by the 'Old Oligarch' etc. (for more instances of the inceptive δέ, or of the quasi-continuative one, cf. Denniston, *Greek Part.* 172-3; the most natural explanation seems to be that inceptive δέ is a weak form of δή, cf. de Falco 1949, Leumann 1949, Verdenius 1955, 17, Chantraine, *Dict.étym.* 1.255.

κατὰ ... Διὸς αἶσαν: combines the epic abstract formulas κατ' αἶσαν and Διὸς αἶση, ἐκ Διὸς αἶσης, ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν. Already in Homer, Zeus is said to be a dispenser of αἶσα e.g. at *Il.* 9.608 Διὸς αἶση, 17.321 ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν, *Od.* 9.52-3 κακὴ Διὸς αἶσα ... ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθοιμεν (see below, l. 8 ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν). Here, as well as in the two *Iliad*-passages, the term means especially what is allotted to individuals or people inside the established order within which either Zeus or an abstract δαίμων (*Od.* 11.61, *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 300)/θεός (Eur. *Andr.* 1203) expect human beings to act, and actively intervene to see it fulfilled (Bianchi 1953, 14-7, Yamagata 1994, 116-9). Αἶσα appears nowhere connected with a god different from Zeus or δαίμων/θεός (cf. note ad Sol. 1.69); hence, most probably, Solon's distinction between the αἶσα of Zeus and the φρένες of the other gods. A distinction between θεῶν βουλαί and Διὸς θέμιστες was already in *Od.* 16.402-3; see also Hom. *Od.* 5.7=8.306 Ζεῦ πάτερ ἦδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες.

οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται: Epic ending of the formulaic line which states the immortality of the glory ... κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται/ (Hom. *Il.* 2.325, 7.91, *Od.* 24.196, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 156, Hes. fr. 70.7). In spite of the negative situation, Solon's prevision is a strong statement of his trust in divine protection, and shows that the poet ranges with the 'party' of the gods favourable to Athens against the party of the mischievous citizens who want its destruction. This stance of surety counterbalances the emphasis on the concrete fear of the danger, which Solon presupposes for his audience, as if he were pretending to present his poem as the answer to the preoccupation of the audience on the future of Athens.

Διὸς ... καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων: Hom. *Il.* 3.298 Ζεῦ ... καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι~*Il.* 3.308, *Od.* 5.7 Ζεῦ πάτερ ἡδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες~8.306, Thgn. *IEG* 757-9 Ζεὺς ... ἄλλοί τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοί (see also *Il.* 4.127-8 θεοὶ μάκαρες ... ἀθάνατοι, Thgn. *IEG* 834 ἀθανάτων ... θεῶν μακάρων). For θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων, cf. Hom. *Il.* 15.194 Διὸς ... φρεσὶν, Thgn. *IEG* 330 σὺν ... θεῶν δίκη ἀθανάτων (second half of a pentameter, as here).

3. Precedents for the whole line are Hom. *Il.* 4.390 τοίη οἱ ἐπίρροθος ἦεν Ἀθήνη, and *Od.* 4.826-8 τοίη γάρ οἱ πομπὸς ἅμ' ἔρχεται, ... Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη (see later, at least, Callim. *Del.* 27). Athena is here the instance of the θεοί favourable to Athens, not only because of her strong connection to Zeus, l. 1 (she is remembered as the daughter of Zeus in Homer, and ὀβριμοπάτρη also reminds us of this parentage), but also because she appears to be in particular the eponymous champion of Athens who assures the city's prosperity under the Olympian regime, together with Zeus. In the absence of earlier Athenian literature we cannot be certain that this idea of Athena which tactfully reconciles the panhellenic and the local goddess with political overtones and features was Solon's own invention, but this seems quite possible (Herington 1963, 63). This new Athenian image of the goddess (Ἀθηνᾶ Πολιάς) is always present in Athenian politics throughout the period from Solon to Pericles, and, as in Solon, is often joined to Zeus: see e.g. *Scol. PMG* 884 Παλλὰς Τριτογένει' ἄνασσ' Ἀθηνᾶ, ὄρθου τήνδε πόλιν τε καὶ πολίτας ἄτερ ἀλγέων [[τε]] καὶ στάσεων καὶ θανάτων ἁώρων, σύ τε καὶ πατήρ, Αἰσχ. *Εὐμ.* 997-1002 χαίρετ', ἀστικὸς λεῶς, ἵκταρ ἡμενοὶ Διός, παρθένου φίλας φίλοι σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνῳ· Παλλάδος δ' ὑπὸ πτεροῖς ὄντας ἄζεται πατήρ, 1044-6 σπονδαὶ δ' ἔς τὸ πᾶν ἔνδαιδες οἴκων† Παλλάδος ἀστοῖς· Ζεὺς παντόπτας οὕτω Μοῖρά τε συγκατέβα. Τηε χλοσε περσωναλ χοννεχτιον οφ Ατηενα ωιτη Ατηενσ ισ αλσο χλεαρλψ σηων βψ τηε φρεθυεντ τραγιχ ιδιομ Ατηενσ=Παλλάδος πόλις (ορ πόλισμα, ορ ἀστοί), χφ. Αἰσχ. *Περσ.* 347, *Εὐμ.* 79, 772, 1045, *Εὐρ. Μεδ.* 771, *Ηεχ.* 466, *ΗΦ* 1323, *Ιον* 8-9, ανδ τηε αττριβυτεσ τηατ Σολον ασχριβεσ το Ατηενα (ιχτοριουσ προωεσσ ιν ωαρ, ιντελλιγενχε, λόε οφ τηε αρτσ) αρε μορε ορ λεσσ τηε σαμε τηατ ωερε ασχριβεδ το τηε Ατηενιαν πεοπλε βψ Περιχλεσ ιν τηε Φυνεραλ Σπееχη, αχχορδινγ το τηε ρεπορτ οφ Τηυχ. 2.35φφ· χφ. *Ηερινγτον* 1955, 56.

Ινδεεδ, Ατηενᾶσ επιτηετσ φορ τηε γοδδεσσ φιτ Ατηενῶ φυνηχιονσ· μεγάθυμος ισ υσεδ ιν τηε Ηομεριχ επιχ οφ ωαρριορσ (Διομεδεσ· *Ιλ.* 6.145, Αχιλλεσ· *Ιλ.* 20.498 ετχ.) ανδ σολδιερσ (Ἀχαιοὶ *Ιλ.* 1.123, *Οδ.* 24.57), ανδ φορ Ατηενα ηερσελφ, α ωαρριορ γοδδεσσ, τωιχε ιν τηε *Οδψσσεψ* (8.520, 13.121) χπ. αλσο Βαχχηψλ. 13.195 μεγάθυμος Ἀθάνα. Ἐπίσκοπος in Homer was said of the

scout Dolon (*Il.* 10.38 and 342), of traders 'attentive' to their merchandise (*Od.* 8.163) or of the shepherd as 'guardians' of the μῆλα (*Hes.* fr. 217.3), or of the gods as overseers and watchers over human compacts (*Il.* 22.255), but the passage closest to the Solonian idea of protection comes from Andromache's prophecy in *Il.* 24.728-30 for Troy: πόλις ἦδε κατ' ἄκρης πέρσεται· ἦ γὰρ ὄλωλας ἐπίσκοπος, ὅς τέ μιν αὐτὴν ῥύσκει. Solon may have referred to this passage specifically because he wanted to imply that differently from Hector's Troy, his city, Athens, has an immortal ἐπίσκοπος, but in spite of this its internal enemies are doing their best to destroy it (cf. already Anhalt 1993, 78). Of tutelary gods the epithet only occurs in passages later than the Solonian one: e.g. *Pl. Leg.* 872e δίκη, *Pind. Ol.* 14.4 Χάριτες. The epithet ὀβριμοπάτρη connects Athena intimately with Zeus and his might. It is already used of Athena in the epic (*Hom. Il.* 5.747, 8.391, *Od.* 1.101, 3.135, 24.540, and *Hes. Theog.* 587); see later at least *Bacchyl.* 16.20. Also Παλλάς Ἀθηναίη is frequently found in *Hom.* (*Il.* 10.275, 11.438, 15.614, *Od.* 4.828, 16.298, *Hom. Hymn* 28.1, 16) but the combination of all the four adjectives accompanying the goddess's name is Solonian.

Ar. Eq. 1173-8 ὦ Δῆμ' ἐναργῶς ἢ θεός σ' ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ νῦν ὑπερέχει σου χύτραν ζωμοῦ πλέαν. — οἶει γὰρ οἰκεῖσθ' ἂν ἔτι τήνδε τὴν πόλιν, εἰ μὴ φανερώς ἡμῶν ὑπερεῖχε τὴν χύτραν; testifies to the fortune of Solon's *incipit*, because it most probably is a loving parody of Solon's lines on Athena, with a pun between χεῖρας 'hands' and χύτραν 'pot'.

4. χεῖρας ὑπερθεν ἔχει: Ὑπερθεν χεῖρα+a form of ἔχειν is a phrase said several times for divine protection: *Hom. Il.* 4.249 αἶ κ' ὕμιν ὑπέρσχη χεῖρα Κρονίων, *Il.* 5.433 οἱ αὐτὸς ὑπείρεχε χεῖρας Ἀπόλλων, *Il.* 9.419-20=9.686-7 Ζεὺς χεῖρα ἔην ὑπέρεσχε — the last two instances are the comment of Achilles on Zeus' permanent protection of Troy, which might seem to prevent the Greeks from conquering Troy for ever, but eventually it did not: inferring from these two passages that Solon implies "Athens' protection cannot be counted upon to prevent the destruction of Athens" (Anhalt 1993, 78) is in my opinion a bit too far fetched —, *Thgn. IEG* 757 Ζεὺς μὲν τῇσδε πόλῃος ὑπείρεχοι ... αἰεὶ δεξιτερὴν χεῖρ(α), *Eur. IA* 915-6 ἦν δὲ τολμῆσης σύ μου χεῖρ' ὑπερτεῖναι, σεσώμεθ(α), *Theodorid. Anth.Pal.* 6.155.6 χεῖρας ὑπερθεν ἔχειν, *Epigr.Gr.* 831.10 (2 B.C.) χεῖρα θ' ὑπερθεν ἔχεις, *Lucian, Tim.* 10 ὑπέρεσχε γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὴν χεῖρα. Cf. also the epithets ἐπίρροθος 'bringing help' said of Athena in connection with Diomedes (*Il.* 4.390, 5.808=828, 23.770) and ἐρυσίπολις 'protecting the city' (*Il.* 6.305, *Hom. Hymn* 11.1).

5-8. Here, as well as in fr. 15.1-3 εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ ..., μὴ θεοῖσιν τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε· αὐτοὶ ... ἠϋξήσατε κτλ. (consider also the parallelism between l. 4 διὰ ταῦτα κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην, and ll. 23-5 of the present fragment), Solon may have in mind Zeus' programmatic statement in Hom. *Od.* 1.33-4 ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν: mentioning Aegisthus' case, the supreme god affirms that mortals bring their downfall upon themselves by their foolish and wicked deeds, and gods are wrongly blamed as responsible (a similar opposition of human and divine perspectives will be also expressed in Aesch. *PV* 1071-9 ἀλλ' οὖν μέμνησθ' ἀγὼ προλέγω, μηδὲ πρὸς ἄτης θηραθεῖσαι μέμψησθε τύχην, μηδέ ποτ' εἶπηθ' ὥς Ζεὺς ὑμᾶς εἰς ἀπρόοπτον πῆμ' εἰσέβαλεν· μὴ δῆτ', αὐταὶ δ' ὑμᾶς αὐτάς· εἰδυῖαι γὰρ κοῦκ ἐξαίφνης οὐδὲ λαθραίως εἰς ἀπέραντον δίκτυον ἄτης ἐμπλεχθήσεσθ' ὑπ' ἀνοίας). Other similar passages in the epic concern the end of the suitors and that of Odysseus' companions who too had perished due to their own ἀτασθαλίαι (*Od.* 1.7, 10.27, 22.317=416, 23.67, 24.458), or the destiny of the men of the Hesiodic silver race, who were not able to survive outside the arms of their hyperprotective parents, and παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε' ἔχοντες ἀφραδίης· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, κτλ. (*Op.* 133-5). However, in the same first book of the *Odyssey* (ll. 48ff.), Odysseus' distress for missing the return to Ithaca is expressly ascribed by Zeus himself to Poseidon's anger, and it was a most common practice in the epic and in classical poetry as well to attribute to a god the full responsibility for any misfortune for which there was no obvious cause (see *Il.* 3.164-5, 19.86-8, *Od.* 1.347-9, 11.558-60, 12.371-2 with the parody of Eur. *Cyc.* 285, and Eur. *Supp.* 734-6), or at least some share in it (for instance, Agamemnon apologises for his ἄτη in *Il.* 19.86-7 also blaming Zeus, Moira and Erinys, or he regarded the gods as μεταίτιοι with himself in the capture of Troy in Aesch. *Ag.* 811, and at *Cho.* 910 Μοῖρα is considered partly responsible, παραιτία, for Clytemnestra's crime), or to be in doubt about human or divine responsibility for human misfortunes (cf. e.g. Bacchyl. 11.34-6). Even for the very example of Aegisthus quoted above, Nestor's 'human' point of view is that Clytemnestra yields to Aegisthus' seduction by μοῖρα θεῶν (*Od.* 3.269). See further, at least Dodds 1951, Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 811, Yamagata 1994.

The result on the audience of this allusion to the 'divine' perspective' of *Odyssey* 1.33-4 would be that Solon takes over the function of the prophetic warner which in *Odyssey* 1, or later in Aeschylus' *Prometheus*, is carried out either by Zeus or by Hermes, the messenger of the gods (as lastly remarked by Jaeger 1926=1966, 86-7). Solon adopts an analogous voice of a warner also in fr. 14, but there he will have a more personal and defensive stance. See for a similar idea Thgn. *IEG* 833-6 οὐδέ τις ἡμιν αἴτιος ἀθανάτων Κύρνε θεῶν μακάρων, ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν τε βίη καὶ κέρδεα δειλὰ καὶ

ὑβρις πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἐς κακότητ' ἔβαλεν, and 855-6 πολλάκις ἡ πόλις ἦδε δι' ἡγεμόνων κακότητα ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν, Bacchyl. 15.51-2 Ζεὺς ... οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑμέσῳ κεῖται κιχεῖν ... ἀνθρώποις Δίκαν κτλ.

It is better to interpret αὐτοὶ ... ἀστοί as 'the whole of the citizens', δῆμος, and χρήμασι πειθόμενοι as 'pursuing (someone else's) wealth' (as in Thgn. *IEG* 194 χρήμασι πειθόμενος, told of a noble who marries a rich but base-born woman), than to suppose that ἀστοί means a part of the citizens, the rich, who are 'trusting in (their own) wealth', though the latter meaning can be underlying as well, see Thgn. *IEG* 191-2, where ἀστοί=ἀγαθοί. As stressed by Adkins 1985, 226, "the effect of the rhetoric depends not on ἀστοί clearly denoting the prominent citizens but on the possibility of doing so". In this interpretation Solon would imply that a new immorality was spreading in between the δῆμος, which originated from the greed of the rich, cf. Stahl 1992, 388. Indeed the 'citizens' are here principally opposed to the gods of ll. 1f.; however, as the gods and the leading upper-ruling class of the city are mentioned, Solon may also underline the personal responsibility of the whole body of the citizens in relation with both the gods and the leading class. In this case, here as well as in fr. 12.3-4 ἐς ... δῆμος αἰδρεῖη δουλοσύνην ἔπρεσεν, and 15.1 already quoted, Solon would anticipate the 5th century theories of the two opposite social classes, stating the political failure of each of the two (rich-poor), and he would imply what he fully maintains in fr. 8 (see ad ll. 3-4), namely that not only rich or powerful people may be affected with *hybris*, but also the *demos* as soon as it reaches conditions of particular *olbos*.

Solon's view is shared by Theognis, who, at any rate, emphasises much more than Solon the specific responsibility of the leaders of the *demos*, cf. *IEG* 41-5 ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἶδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ τετράφεται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν. οὐδεμίαν πω Κύρην ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεσαν ἄνδρες· ἀλλ' ὅταν ὑβρίζειν τοῖσι κακοῖσιν ἄδη, δῆμόν τε φθείρωσι.

5. Besides the passages quoted above, cf. also Hom. *Il.* 5.648-9 ἦτοι κείνος ἀπώλεσεν Ἴλιον ... ἀνέρος ἀφραδίῃσιν ἀγανοῦ Λαομέδοντος, said of a different destruction of a city, that of Troy, by Heracles for Laomedon's cheating.

μεγάλην πόλιν: Pind. *Pyth.* 7.1 αἱ μεγαλοπόλεις Ἀθᾶναι, *Nem.* 2.7 ταῖς μεγάλαις Ἀθάναις (cf. also *Pyth.* 2.1 with reference to Syracuse).

6. φθείρειν βούλονται: instead of a less emphatic μέλλουσιν or similar, Solon underscores the intention with which, pursuing their own profit, the citizens intent on destroying the community. For the sentiment, cf. Pl. *Menex.* 243d δόξαν γὰρ δι' αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις ἔσχεν μή ποτ' ἂν καταπολεμηθῆναι μηδ' ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων

— καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔδοξεν — τῇ δὲ ἡμετέρα αὐτῶν διαφορᾷ ἐκρατήθημεν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων· ἀήττητοι γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνων ἐσμέν, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνικήσαμεν καὶ ἡττήθημεν.

χρήμασι πειθόμενοι: for the interpretation see ad ll. 5-8. Solon expressly links wealth and ἄδικοι ἔργα below in l. 11 πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι; cp. his view on πλοῦτος which οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος in fr. 1.11ff.

Euripides, *Supp.* 236-7 includes lust for gain in the list of the selfish motives in the city that put in danger the public interest and the common good ἄλλος δὲ κέρδους οὐνεκ', οὐκ ἀποσκοπῶν τὸ πλῆθος εἴ τι βλάπτεται πάσχον τόδε. Regarding the self-interested citizen, cp. also Eur. *Heracl.* 3-5 ὁ δ' ἔς τὸ κέρδος λῆμ' ἔχων ἀνειμένον πόλει τ' ἄχρηστος καὶ συναλλάσσειν βαρύς, αὐτῷ δ' ἄριστος, and see the remarks by Nestle 1901, 191f., 336.

6-9. ἄδικος νόος ... ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ... κόρον: a similar sequential relation between injustice > *hybris* and satiety can be found in the hexameter-oracle quoted by Hdt. 8.77.1 διὰ Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον, "Ὑβριος υἱόν, and in Pind. *Ol.* 13.10 "Ὑβριν, Κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον. On the late (most probably Solonian) chain ὄλβος-κόρος-ὕβρις-ἄτη, well known to us from Herodotus (e.g. 3.80.3 ἐγγίνεται μὲν γὰρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ. δύο δ' ἔχων ταῦτα ἔχει πᾶσαν κακότητα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕβρι κεκορημένος ἔρδει πολλὰ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ) and the Attic tragedy, see ad 1.13.

7-10. Solon's thought and his emphasis on the injustice by the members of the upper class are paralleled by the warnings to Perses which follow the *ainos* of the nightingale (*Op.* 202-24; cp. above all ll. 213 σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μήδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε and 217-8 δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα) and are mainly concerned with the violations of justice by the ἐσθλοί, including the βασιλεῖς of l. 202 and judges of l. 221. At any rate, the scope of Solon's perspective is much larger, because he hints at several forms of civic injustice in the following lines, while Hesiod appears to be mainly concerned with the injustice in the trials.

7. δήμου ... ἡγεμόνων: all the members of the upper-ruling class, more probably than the "leaders of the mass" (the same term, but in a different, less negative perspective, can be found in fr. 8.1), cf. Nagy 1985, 43, and see below ad l. 19. Δῆμος means here "the free *inhabitants* of a community, excluding the immediate leadership", juxtaposed to

its rulers much more neatly than it is found in the Homeric poems, in Hes. *Op.* 261-4 and in Tyrt. °14, cf. Forti Messina 1956, 233ff., and Donlan 1970.

έτοῖμον: 'certain', said of death or other unpleasantness: Hom. *Il.* 18.96 πότμος, Anac. *PMG* 395.12 καταβάντι μὴ ἀναβῆναι, Hippoc. *Art.* 66 χώλωσις, Eur. *HF* 86 μὴ θανεῖν, Heracl. 502 θνήσκειν, Pl. *Resp.* 9.575e ὑπηρετεῖν, Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 706c τὸ διαφθαρήναι.

8. ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν: Hom. *Od.* 9.53 quoted ad ll.1-2, *Od.* 1.4 πολλὰ ... πάθεν ἄλγεα, *Od.* 13.90 πολλὰ πάθ' ἄλγεα, 310 πάσχειν ἄλγεα πολλά, *Od.* 16.189 πάσχεις ἄλγεα πολλά; see also Tyrt. 9.38 πολλὰ δὲ τερπνὰ παθὼν ἔρχεται εἰς 'Αἴδην (the phrase ἄλγεα πάσχειν/παθεῖν is very common in epic: Homer 19x).

9-10. The ordered drinking-party had already been in Homer a metaphor/instance of a stable community of a *polis* ruled by εὐνομία and εὐφροσύνη, on the assumption that knowing how to control the drinking-parties and their pleasures is of the same nature as the art of controlling/governing a city: see *Od.* 9.6-8 εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχη κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα, δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ ἤμενοι ἐξείης, παρὰ δὲ πλήθωσι τράπεζαι (dealing with the utopic Phaeacian society); Xenoph. 1, where the κρατὴρ ... μεστός εὐφροσύνης (l. 4) is, *inter alia*, the visible sign of a party (and of a society) which hates gigantomachies and avoids the στάσιες σφεδαναί. For more passages connecting drunkenness and *hybris*, well-ruled drinking and peace, cf. Slater 1981; on the strong connection between *hybris* and excess in eating and luxury, which can be found in authors of fifth century Athens, cf. MacDowell 1976. On the symposium as the expression of the aristocratic archaic life and the illustration of the relations favouring civic collectivity which are established while eating and drinking together, see Murray 1983b, Levine 1985, Nagy 1988 (Engl. reworking in Nagy 1990, 269-75), Schmitt Pantel 1992, 53-113, Fisher 1992, 203-7.

However, in this fragment of Solon, the connection between ordered city and ordered apportionment of food and drink in the feast may be something more than a metaphor by analogy, as is commonly assumed (see e.g. Gerber 1970, 132 "men who show no restraint in their greed for wealth and power are compared to men who place no curb to their appetites"). Indeed, Solon's metaphor fitted very well a symposiastic meeting, possibly the real occasion on which the poem was performed (cf. Tedeschi 1982), but it also, and more pointedly, called into question the symposium as the most important occasion of the aristocratic groups for meeting, being, therefore, also the unofficial venue for many political decisions that were made beyond the institutional and really public arrangements of the *polis* — these lines may therefore anticipate the image fully presented in ll. 21f. For the ties between symposiastic occasions and archaic

ἐταιρεῖται, see lastly Vetta 1980, xxxi-xxxvii and Rösler 1980, 37-41; for the opposition between (most) aristocratic drinking groups and democracy in the fifth century Athens, cf. Murray 1990, Rhodes ad Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3, Bowie 1997, 3. Besides, Solon's warning against the catastrophic symposium of these lines may have included a hint at the idea that the statesman was possibly going to actualise (or had already actualised) in one of his laws, which was going to be the forerunner of the Athenian law on *hybris* we find quoted by Dem. 21.47 and Aeschin. 1.16. As shown by Murray 1987, Solon may really have passed a law forbidding the acts of *hybris* by the rich in the κῶμοι after their banquets, because these revels often ended in offences against other people's τιμή, and were, at any rate, instances of social disorder.

In this perspective of reading, Solon's choice of the word δαῖς to mean the feast seems hardly casual, since its etymology, from δαίομαι, hinted at the 'distribution' of the portions — δαῖς was a technical term for the religious banquet where meat was equally apportioned to the different gods (cf. Nagy 1988, 203), and Vetta 1997, 208 even supposes that a religious feast with a banquet for the gods may have been the real occasion of the performance of this poem which suggested the connection to Solon. However, this direct pragmatic reference to the occasion is not necessary for understanding Solon's emphasis on the opportune aspect of the δαῖς. In fact, "from Homer to Plutarch ... the egalitarian meal, via sacrifices and public banquets, functions as an institutional practice conjoined with the social relationships that underlie the *isonomic* figure of the city" (cf. Detienne-Svenbro 1979=1989, 153): cp. above all the most explicit (pre-)history of the human eating outlined by Ath. 1.12c-d: the first men were rapacious and violent because they neither knew yet the Homeric idea of δαῖς εἶση, nor had food in abundance, so they all threw themselves upon it together, seized it by force, and took it away from those who had it: hence ἀκοσμία and murders also started, and the 'wickedness' was called ἀτασθαλία, "because it was amid festivity (ἐν ταῖς θαλίαις) that men first sinned against one another". It is impossible to ascertain how old was the ideology of the equal distribution between the members of the society underlying this metaphor. At any rate, from a strictly linguistic point of view, the acquaintance with the Homeric diction unavoidably led anyone hearing of δαῖς to think of the very common formula δαιτὸς εἶσης — and ἴσος δασμός might (at least might) have already been in Solon's time a material image for the ideal of *isonomia*, as it certainly was in Theognis, *IEG* 677-8 χρήματα δ' ἀρπάζουσι βίη, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλωλεν, δασμὸς δ' οὐκέτ' ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον, for which cf. Cerri 1969, Figueira 1985, 149f., and in general Schmitt Pantel, 1992, 45-52.

9. οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον: Both Homer and Hesiod use the verb κορέννυμι and the noun κόρος in a positive sense to describe a condition of satisfaction

and satiety (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.379, 11.562, 13.831, 22.427, Hes. *Op.* 33, 368, 593), whereas only the adjective ἀκόρητος (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 7.117, 14.479, [Hes.] *Sc.* 346, 433, 459) indicates the negative value of insatiability, the inability to stop wanting more of something. Solon's usage of the noun is different, and the term always takes on the negative, dangerous sense of insatiability, excessiveness, incessant greed for more: cf. Sol. 5.2-5 and 8.3-4. Thus, while for Homer and Hesiod the component of restraint is inherent in the condition of κόρος itself, for Solon the condition is one which requires restraint if cessation is to occur: cf. Anhalt 1993, 85-7, who explains: "if the pursuit of *koros* has a terminus for Homer and not for Solon, this may largely reflect the fact that epic poetry is praise poetry of a certain type and gives relatively little emphasis to faults which stem from heroic excess".

The phrase κατέχειν κόρον has been reconstructed in Sapph. *PLF* 68a.8 κόρον οὐ κατίσχε (where the verb makes clear that κόρος has already a negative meaning), and is found in Pind. *Isth.* 3.2 quoted below; see besides for the verb Thgn. *IEG* 322 ἀφραίνων κακίην οὐ δύναται κατέχειν. Like Solon, Theognis and Bacchylides, and more often Pindar, will proclaim the necessity and the difficulty of restraining the κόρος of the rich several times: cf. Thgn. *IEG* 749-51 ὁππότε' ἀνὴρ ... ὑβρίζῃ πλούτῳ κεκορημένος, Bacchyl. 15.57-8 ἃ δ' αἰόλοις κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφροσύναις ἐξαισίοις θάλλουσ' ἀθαμβῆς ὕβρις, and Pind. *Ol.* 1.55ff. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέψαι μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ' ἔλεν ἅταν ὑπέροπλον, *Ol.* 13.10 Ὑβριν, Κόρου ματέρα θρασύμυθον, *Isthm.* 3.1-3 εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν ... σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φρασὶν αἰανῇ κόρον, ἄξιός ἐυλογίαις ἀστῶν μεμίχθαι. The closest parallel to Solon for the connection between the κόρος of the rich, their *hybris* and the violation of *Dike* is Aesch. *Ag.* 381-4 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑπαλξίς πλούτου πρὸς Κόρον ἀνδρὶ λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν.

10. εὐφροσύνη 'merriment' is a specialised term for the pleasures of the lavish banqueting: besides Hom. *Od.* 9.6-7 and Xenoph. fr. 1, quoted ad ll. 9-10, see Anac. *IEG* el.fr. 2 οὐ φιλέω, ὅς κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέῳ οἰνοποτάζων ... ἀλλ' ὅστις ... ἐρατῆς μνήσκειται εὐφροσύνης, Panyas. *PEG* 16.17-9 τῷ σε χρὴ παρὰ δαιτὶ δεδεγμένον εὐφρονι θυμῷ πίνειν, μηδὲ βορῆς κεκορημένον ἥύτε γῦπα ἦσθαι πλημύροντα, λελησμένον εὐφροσυνάων (cp. also Hom. *Hymn Herm.* 480-2 where the lyre has to be εὐφροσύνη νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματος for the δαῖς θάλεια and the κῶμος, and later e.g. Aristid. *Rom. enc.* 224.31 ὥσπερ πανηγυρίζουσα πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη ... εἰς δὲ κόσμον καὶ πάσας εὐφροσύνας τέτραπται σὺν ἐξουσίᾳ).

For the phrase ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 48 πολλῇ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ; for ἡσυχία and the symposium, Pind. *Nem.* 9.48 ἡσυχία δὲ φιλεῖ μὲν συμπόσιον; on ἡσυχία and

feasting, Hom. *Il.* 1.579, Hippon. *IEG* 26.1-4 (=36 Degani) ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ ῥύδην θύννάν τε καὶ μυσσωτὸν ἡμέρας πάσας δαινύμενος ... κατέφαγε κτλ. The *incipit* of Pind. *Pyth.* 8 is a hymnodic invocation to the personified Ἥσυχία, the daughter of Δίκη, who is μεγιστόπολις and knows how to annihilate the ὕβρις of whoever ἀμείλιχον καρδία κότον ἐνελάσῃ; in *Pyth.* 11.55-6 envy may be aroused εἴ τις ἄκρον ἔλων ἡσυχᾶ τε νεμόμενος αἶνάν ὕβριν ἀπέφυγεν; see besides Pind. fr. 109 τὸ κοινόν τις ἀστῶν ἐν εὐδία τιθεὶς ἐρευνασάτω μεγαλάνορος Ἥσυχίας τὸ φαιδρὸν φάος, στάσιν ἀπὸ πραπίδος ἐπίκοτον ἀνελών, πενίας δότεيران, ἐχθρὰν κουροτρόφον and *Pyth.* 4.296s. δαιδαλέαν φόρμιγγα βαστάζων πολίταις ἡσυχία θιγέμεν, μήτ' ὦν τινι πῆμα πορών, ἀπαθὴς δ' αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀστῶν. For κοσμεῖν "organise in orderly and methodical fashion", cf. *Od.* 7.13 δόρπον ἐκόσμει; Hes. *Op.* 306 σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέτρια κοσμεῖν, and above all Hippon. *IEG* 128.1-2 (=126 Degani) ... Εὐρυμεδοντιάδεα ... τὴν ἐν γαστρὶ μάχαιραν, ὅς ἐσθίει οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, resumed by Lucian, *Anth.Pal.* 9.367.9 γαστρὶ χαριζόμενος πᾶσαν χάριν οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, where the connection between excess in food and lack in *kosmos* is emphasised (cf. Degani 1984, 197).

10-2. A hexameter is missing both before and after l. 11, or l. 11 has to be removed, or l. 11 is a corrupted hexameter. If we share the first idea, either a new period is starting with l. 11 ("where indeed unrighteous men ...": so West), or there is no syntactical pause before l. 11, and after l. 10 something like 1.7 followed, while after l. 11 there was a line like that of 8.3 — the insertion of these two other Solonian lines in the text of fr. 3 had been quite common in pre-Bergk editions, but is no more methodologically acceptable. Also the deletion of l. 11 (proposed by Voemel in his 1862 ed. of Demosthenes 18 and 19) appears to be too arbitrary. Since there is no need of any filling for the sense, I share the last perspective, which also appears to be favoured by Diehl and Gentili-Prato; the original hexameter might be something like πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκουσιν ἐπ') ἔργμασιν θυμὸν ἔχοντες: cf. Sitzler 1879, 668f.

11. πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι: an internal modification of Sol. 1.12 ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος (πλοῦτος). Cf. later Thgn. *IEG* 380 ἀνθρώπων, ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθομένων. For the combination of injustice and profit, see Eur. *Med.* 87 [οἱ μὲν δικαίως, οἱ δὲ καὶ κέρδους χάριν,], *TGF* 758 κακοῖς τὸ κέρδος τῆς δίκης ὑπέρτερον.

12-13. οὐθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν: Homer has only the adjective φιλοκτέανος and the dative κτεάτεσσι, but the word

κτέανα was already in Hes. *Op.* 315 and Thgn. *IEG* 1149, and the whole Solonian phrase reappears in Xenoph. 2.8 δημοσίων κτεάνων; δημόσιος is here attested for the first time.

On the existence of a distinction between sacred, public property, cf. *Sel. of Greek Hist.Inscr.* 13.1-3 Meiggs-Lewis, a τεθμὸς concerning the ἀνδαιθμὸν πλακὸς Ὑλίας καὶ Λισκαρίας καὶ τῶν ἀποτόμον καὶ τῶν δαμοσίων of a Locrian colony around (?) 525-500 B.C.: according to the editors (p. 25) τῶν ἀποτόμον is to be interpreted as sacred precincts (cf. τέμενος from the same root), opposed to public property; see also Rihll 1991, 110 and n. 68.

I would not rule out that Solon is here recalling to the minds of the Athenians a recent, specific episode (if we trust in the commonly accepted chronology which dates Cylon's putsch between 640 and 623). Cylon with the help of an ἐταιρεῖα of supporters attempted to make himself tyrant of Athens, and according to schol. Ar. *Eq.* 445 committed a sacrilege in plundering the temple of Athena: he managed to escape, but his followers were killed (stoned) though they had sought for protection at the gods' altars, and those responsible for their execution (the supporters of the Alcmeonid archon Megakles, according to Herodotus and Aristotle) were therefore themselves considered ἐναγείς or ἀσεβεῖς (the sources are Hdt. 5.71, Thuc. 1.126, Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 1, Plut. *Sol.* 12, and schol. Ar. *Eq.* 445 quoted). According to Plut. *Sol.* 12.3-4, Solon had to perform the task of settling the strife between the Cylonians and the supporters of their executors (τῆς στάσεως ἀκμὴν λαβούσης μάλιστα, καὶ τοῦ δήμου διαστάντος), and he persuaded the Alcmeonids to enter the trial where they were found guilty of sacrilege, and exiled. Both the sacrilege perpetrated by the Cylonians on that occasion (according to Hdt. 5.71 Cylon would have relied on a ἐταιρηίη τῶν ἡλικιωτέων), and the sacrilege which the supporters of the aristocratic family of the Alcmeonids were considered to have committed was possibly for Solon exemplary instances of the consequences provoked by the contrasts involving aristocratic clans.

At any rate, such sacrileges were not uncommon (cf. Diod.Sic. 16.56.6 on Delphi), and guards were employed against domestic temple-robbing still in the classical age (cf. Sokolowski 1969, 60), though robbers were heavily punished: at Athens, still in the classical age, the temple-robber, like the traitor, was denied burial in his native land, and many Greek states chose methods of execution apparently intended to prevent any form of burial, and orators, like Demosthenes, commonly accused their opponents of sacrileges of any kind and such offences became an ideal device for political manipulation (see Dem. 22.69f., 24.111f., 120, 129, 137, 49.65). Disrespect for sacred money was considered a sign of a tyrant's behaviour in Xen. *Hier.* 4.11, and in Diod.Sic. 14.67.4, of barbarians in Hdt. 1.105.2 etc. Temple-sacking or exploitation of sacred property provided accusations which led into the first, third and fourth sacred wars (possibly also

into the second) — as for the first (ca. 600-590), the holy alliance of Thessaly, Athens and Sicyon against Cirrha/Krisa exploited the main themes of "impiety" and of "Greek states coming to the god's aid", and according to the accounts of Aeschin. 3.108, Plut. *Sol.* 11, Paus. 10.37.4-8 it was Solon who in the Amphictiony proposed this crusade: on the first sacred war, and the problems it presents, see Davies 1994, with references; more generally, cf. Parker 1983, 170ff. Temple robbery is mentioned in Ar. *Plut.* 30 etc.

Van Effenterre 1977, 114 n.72 argued that the reference to the sacred properties fits very well the region of Eleusis and the ὀργάς there (cf. Harp. ο 27 Κ. τὰ λοχμώδη καὶ ὀρεινὰ χωρία καὶ οὐκ ἐπεργαζόμενα, ὅθεν καὶ ἡ Μεγαρική ὀργὰς προσωνομάσθη τοιαύτη τις οὔσα, περὶ ἧς ἐπολέμησαν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρεῦσιν), in order to maintain — with no really substantial evidence — the general idea of his that all the agrarian problems Solon was concerned with did not refer to Attica, but to this recently conquered land (his hypothesis was furthered by L' Homme-Wéry 1996).

On the insatiability of human desire in the pursuit of wealth, see also Sol. 1.71-3. On the politicians who 'steal' (most used is the very verb κλέπτειν) the common goods of the city see Ar. *Vesp.* 663f., *Eccl.* 608, *Plut.* 565-9, and Xen. *An.* 4.6.16 ἀλλὰ μέντοι ... καὶ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἶπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται.

13. κλέπτουσιν ἐφ' ἄρπαγῇ: the two words are found side by side in other passages which describe rapacious behaviour: Aesch. *Ag.* 534 ἄρπαγῆς τε καὶ κλοπῆς δίκην, Soph. *Phil.* 644 κλέψαι τε χάρπάσαι, Ar. *Plut.* 372 οὐ κέκλοφας ἀλλ' ἥρπακας.

ἐφ' ἄρπαγῇ: ἀφαρπαγῇ or ἀφαρπαγῇ is the reading of some MSS of Demosthenes, accepted by West and Gentili-Prato, while some other more recent ones have ἐφ' ἄρπαγῇ. The compound ἀφαρπαγή may be *lectio difficilior*, namely a new Solonian formation from ἀφαρπάζω (so already *LSJ* s.v.), but the parallel of Sol. 29^b.1 ἐφ' ἄρπαγαῖσιν, and the possibility that ἀφαρπαγῇ is simply a mistake (ἐφ' α- > ἀφα-) favours the reading of the *recentiores* — being not always *deteriores*.

ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος: epic phrase=Sol. 1.43 (see ad loc.); cf. also Sol. 1.76 and 6.4 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

14. οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα: Cp. Heraclit. VS 22B23 Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἦδεσαν. Θέμεθλα/θεμείλια is never attested in a metaphorical meaning before Solon. Masaracchia 1958, 263, and Defradas 1962, 49 link θέμεθλα to θέμις, which both as an abstract principle, and as the corresponding personification, were close

and often connected to Δίκη: cp. first of all the Hesiodic description of the consequences on Δίκη of the misrepresentation of the θέμιστες by the corrupt judges, τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης ἧ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας (*Op.* 220-1), in the context of a passage that Solon had certainly in mind (see ad l. 8), Parmenides, VS 28B1.28 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. On the linking of the two, taken up later by Pind. *Ol.* 13.6-8, Bacchyl. fr. 15.53-6 etc., see Stafford 1997, 159-60.

This idea of Masaracchia and Defradas is fascinating, but, at any rate, Solon leaves it to the imagination of his audience, and the prevailing sense of the θέμεθλα must here be the root of τίθημι: "what Dike is set in", the basics of Dike, as a metaphor of the common idea of the βάθρον or πυθμὴν of Dike, which can be found, above all, in Pindar and in Aeschylus: cf. Pind. *Ol.* 13.5-6 ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασιγνήτα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές, Δίκα, Aesch. *Cho.* 646-7 Δίκας ... πυθμὴν, Soph. *Ant.* 854 ὑψηλὸν ἐς Δίκας βάθρον. Aeschylus, *Eum.* 539-42 βωμὸν αἰδεσθαι Δίκας, μηδέ νιν κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέω ποδὶ λὰξ ἀτίσης· ποινὰ γὰρ ἐπέσται is also a very close passage to Solon, since we find there the same connection between lust for money, violation of Dike's altar and punishment (there are several passages of the *Eumenides* which may have adopted Solon's *Eunomia* as their model, cf. Ameduri 1970-71, 18); for other literary references to altars of Dike cp. also Aesch. *Ag.* 381-4 ... μέγαν Δίκας βωμόν, [Dem.] 25.35 καὶ δίκης γε καὶ εὐνομίας καὶ αἰδοῦς εἰσι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις βωμοί, and see Shapiro, *LIMC* 3.1, 389. The thought follows also formally the steps of Hes. *Op.* 222-4 (when Dike is violated in the bad sentences by the corrupt judges) ἔπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἡθεα λαῶν, ἡέρα ἐσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα, οἳ τέ μιν ἐξελάσουσι καὶ οὐχ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν, and 238-41 οἷς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμηλε κακὴ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς. πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει κτλ. See ad l. 8. At any rate, there are relevant differences between Hesiod's and Solon's Dike: above all, differently from the Hesiodic picture, who appears quite sceptical about the end of injustice, Solon strongly connects the situation in Athens to the precise historical factors described in ll. 5-14, and in the end prospects the possibility of a final triumph of justice (the best treatment of the differences between the presentations of Dike by Hesiod and Solon is Manuwald 1989, 5-9).

Similar thoughts reflecting the pious belief that Dike is ever a watchful avenger of the bad and the unjust are a *topos* in the Tragedians: besides the close parallel of Eur. *TGF* 979 προσελθοῦς' ἡ Δίκη ... σῖγα καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ στείχουσα μάρψει τοὺς κακοὺς, cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 61-5 ῥοπὰ δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ Δίκας ταχεῖα τοὺς μὲν ἐν φάει, τὰ δ' ... μένει χρονίζοντας ... τοὺς δ' ... ἔχει νύξ, Soph. *TrGF* 12 τᾶς Δίκας δέδορκεν ὄμμα, τὸν δ' ἄδικον ἀμείβεται, Eur. *Bacch.* 882-90, *El.* 771 Δίκη τε πάνθ' ὀρώσ',

ἤλθες ποτε, *Rhes.* 876 ἡ Δίκη δ' ἐπίσταται, *TGF* 151 τὴν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ' εἶναι Διὸς ἐγγύς τε ναίειν τῆς βροτῶν ἀμαρτίας, *TGF* 255 δοκεῖς ... τὴν Δίκην που μάκρ' ἀπωκίσθαι βροτῶν· ἢ δ' ἐγγύς ἐστιν, οὐχ ὀρωμένη δ' ὀρᾷ ὃν χρὴ κολάζειν τ' οἶδεν· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶσθα σὺ ὁπότεν ἄφνω μολοῦσα διολέσῃ κακοῦς, *TGF* 555 οὐ δῆκται πῶς κύνες οἱ θεοί (quoted by Callim. *SH* 239.5) ἀλλ' ἡ Δίκη γὰρ καὶ διὰ σκότου βλέπει (but see also Antigone's denial of this belief in *Phoen.* 1726-7 οὐχ ὀρᾷ Δίκα κακοῦς οὐδ' ἀμείβεται βροτῶν ἀσυνεσίας). Besides Dionys. *TrGF* 76F5 ὁ τῆς Δίκης ὀφθαλμός ὡς δι' ἡσύχου λεύσσων προσώπου πάνθ' ὅμως αἰεὶ βλέπει, *adesp.TrGF* 421 ἔστιν Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὅς τὰ πάνθ' ὀρᾷ, *adesp. TrGF* 486.3 ἀλλ' ἡμέρας ἢ νυκτὸς ἡ Δίκη ποτὲ τῷ δυσσεβοῦντι σίγ' ἔχουσ' ἐνήλατο, *adesp. TrGF* 493 ὀρᾷς Δίκην ἀναυδὸν οὐχ ὀρωμένην εὖδοντι καὶ στείχοντι καὶ καθημένῳ, *adesp. TrGF* 655.19-20 ἢ τοι πάρ[ε]δρον θεῶν δρόμον κεκτημένη Δίκη δέδορκεν ὀξύ, κὰν ἀπῇ μακ[ράν; some later instances: *Cerc. CA* 4.18-9=1.12 *Livrea* μή ποτ' οὖν ὁ τῆς Δίκας ὀφθαλμός ἀπεςπαλάκῳται, *Hymn.Orph.* 62.1-4: ὄμμα Δίκης ... πανδερκέος ... τοῖς ἀδίκοις τιμωρὸς ἐπιβρίθουσα δικαία, *Nonn.* 40.1: Δίκην ... πανόψιον, *Leo, Anth.Pal.* 9.362.24 Δίκην ... πανδερκέα, *Synes. Ep.* 44.164 τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶδέ τε καὶ οἶδεν ἡ Δίκη.

On Dike as a bringer of vengeance, *Parm. VS* 28B1.14 calls her πολύποινος, *Soph. Trach.* 808-9 ὦν σε ποίνιμος Δίκη τείσαιτ' Ἑρινύς τε, and *Eur. Bacch.* 992 ξιφηφόρος while in *Hipp.* 1172 he speaks of the ῥόπτρον, her weapon (cf. also *Paus.* 5.18.2, who speaks of her ῥάβδος). For σιγῶσα, cf. also *Men. fr.* 462 K.-Th. ἅπαντα σιγῶν ὁ θεὸς ἐξεργάζεται.

On the personification of Dike in archaic poetry, see above ad *Sol.* 1.8. The representations of Δίκη in art of the archaic period (on the Vienna amphora and the Cahn fragment) exemplify her actions as avenging the misdeeds, since she is sometimes portrayed as a beautiful woman beating with a hammer an ugly Ἀδικία, whose body is covered by dotted circles like tattoos, of a type that appears in the vase representations of barbarian women, see Shapiro 1993, 39-44.

15. τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα: such phrases summarising omniscient knowledge are usually said with reference to the knowledge of priests-prophets, cf. *Hom. Il.* 1.70 ὅς ῥ' ἤδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα for Calchas, *Eur. Hel.* 13-4 τὰ θεῖα γὰρ τά τ' ὄντα καὶ μέλλοντα πάντ' ἠπίστατο for Theonoe and *Ion* 7 τὰ τ' ὄντα καὶ μέλλοντα θεσπίζων αἰεὶ for Apollo (Apollo is also probably the theme of *Hes. fr.* 204.113 ἔ]στι καὶ ὁππόσα μέλλ' ἔσσεσθαι); for poets or the Muses, cf. *Hes. Theog.* 32 θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 38 εἴρυσαι τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, *Certamen* p. 229.97 Α. Μοῦσ' ἄγε μοι τά τ'

έόντα τά τ' έσσόμενα πρό τ' έόντα. To these we could also add the orac. ap. Diog.Laert. 1.33=Thal. VS 11A1 τά τ' έόντα τά τ' έσσόμενα πρό τ' έόντα, Anaxim. VS 13A7 άέρα ... έξ οὗ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ έσόμενα, Emp. *PStrasb.gr.Inv.* 1665-6 a(i)8 πάντ' ὅσ' τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' έστ' ὅσα τ' ἔσσετ' ὀπίσσω.

As often remarked (see lastly Treu 1955, 276f.), Solon replaces Homer's and Hesiod's permanent mentions of τὰ έσσόμενα with τὰ γινόμενα, for the sake of his more pragmatic view of the dimensions of the human time, which is to be found here for the first time, and anticipates the perspective of the historiographers. A simpler interpretation for the omission of the future perspective is plausible as well: Solon's Δίκη is aware of what is happening now and what has gone before — if there was, or is, injustice, Δίκη will bear it in mind and punish it; unlike the prophets, she does not need to know the future.

16. τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη: 'with time', cf. also Sol. 1.8 πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη, and cp. Pind. *Pyth.* 8.15 ἐν χρόνῳ, Bacchyl. 18.45 πάντ' ἐν τῷ δολιχῷ χρόνῳ τελεῖται concerning the destruction of the proud and the unjust man respectively. Similar associations between paying the penalty of one's bad actions sooner or later occur in tragedy: see e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 58, 126, 463, *Cho.* 383, where the adjective ὕστερόποινος is applied to punishment (cf. also *Ag.* 462f., 700ff.); *Cho.* 61ff., where the fact that one never knows when justice will be achieved is stressed; *Cho.* 935 ἔμολε ... Δίκα ... χρόνῳ, *Supp.* 732-3 χρόνῳ τοι κυρίῳ τ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ... τις βροτῶν δώσει δίκην, *Eum.* 498 μεταῦθις ἐν χρόνῳ, Soph. *Ant.* 303 χρόνῳ ποτ' ... δίκην, *Phil.* 1041 τείσασθε τείσασθ' τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ, Eur. *Heracl.* 941 εἶλέ σ' ἡ Δίκη χρόνῳ, *TGF* 223 Δίκα τοι Δίκα χρόνιος, ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑποπесоῦς' ἔλαθεν, ὅταν ἔχη τιν' ἀσεβῇ βροτῶν, *TGF* °1131.5 χρόνῳ ... δώσει δίκην, *Antiope GLP* 10.55 Page δίκ[α τοι δί]κα χρόνιος ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔλαβεν ὅταν ἴ[δ]ῃ [τ]ιν' ἀσεβῇ βροτῶν, *TGF* 624.5 χρόνῳ γὰρ οὗτος ὕστερον δώσει δίκην; cf. also the epithet βραδύπους said of her in Greg.Naz. *Anth.Pal.* 8.246.2, 247.1.

On the gnomic aorist ἦλθε, see ad Sol. 1.8; as remarked by Henderson 1982, 27, it "indicates a timelessness which, together with the present participle σιγῶσα, the verb σύνοιδε and the adverb πάντως, presents before the listener a graphic, ever-present view of Justice". Furthermore, the abundance of the present tenses in the following lines change the abstract character of Dike into an imminent moral principle whose actions are cast graphically in the present. This gnomic and general presentation of Dike marks the start of a section of the poem where it is hardly possible to ascertain whether Solon is thinking specifically of Athens or of the *polis* in general — and certainly general is the last part on Eunomia.

In his confidence in the final retaliation of δίκη, Solon is at variance with the Homeric epic, where gods' moral functions do not meet much of human expectations and beliefs about the divine reward of righteous and pious men and the punishment of the bad ones (on which, cf. Yamagata 1994, *passim*), and also with the Hesiodic perspective (see above ad l. 15-7).

17ff. The presentation in ll. 17ff., and of the opposite consequences of the Eunomia in ll. 32ff., all of them concerning social/political aspects, appears to be very different from the material, traditional presentation of the harsh disasters or of the blessings respectively affecting the Unjust or the Just City of Hesiod's *Works & Days* (failure of crops, famine, plague etc., ll. 238-47; good harvest, excellent children, glorious festivals etc., ll. 225-37; see also later, e.g. Callim. *Dian.* 130ff.). Though Solon's Dike is still a personified goddess, she is somehow in between Hesiod and the principles ruling the human experience that we can find in some Presocratics, for instance the δίκη-τίσις because of which, according to Anaximander, VS 12B1, everything that comes to be has compensated with death the 'injustice' of their birth in accordance with the ordering of time (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν): cf. Jaeger 1926=1966, 92f.

17. τοῦτ' ... ἔλκος ἄφυκτον more probably resumes the anti-social behaviour of some citizens described in ll. 12-4, and presents it as already affecting (ἤδη ἔρχεται) the whole political body (πάσῃ πόλει) as an inescapable polluting wound. ἔλκος ἄφυκτον may also refer to the punishment by Dike (as Jaeger 1926=1966, 91 believes, and West 1993, appears to propose in his translation of the poem), but it is hardly possible that Solon defines in such a grim way the effect of the intervening divine Justice (cp. the luminous and positive simile which describes the intervention of Zeus' τίσις in fr. 1.17-25), and the Hesiodic description of the effects of justice and injustice (*Op.* 225-47 mentioned above) provides a good parallel for the former interpretation (already emphasised by Manuwald 1989, 6-7). On ἄφυκτος see fr. 1.64.

The closest parallel to Solon's metaphorical ἔλκος, in a context where the same juxtaposition of public and individual evils is introduced as in Solon (see ll. 26ff.), appears to be Aesch. *Ag.* 640-2 πόλει μὲν ἔλκος ἐν τὸ δῆμιον τυχεῖν, πολλοὺς δὲ πολλῶν ἐξαγισθέντας δόμων ἄνδρας διπλῇ μάστιγι, κτλ. See also Thgn. *IEG* 1134, Pind. *Pyth* 2.91, Soph. *Ant.* 652. According to Hammond 1961, 89, the metaphor of this major disease in the state would hint at the image of the ὄροι, the marks of the enslavement of the land which Solon removed in order to free the land from its bondage. As for the metaphor itself of the ἔλκος, the connection between medical disease (νόσος) and failure of the ἰσονομία of the δυνάμεις of the body (namely their σύμμετρος κρᾶσις) and the idea that this failure leads to the ὑπερβολή or μοναρχία of the single

class of the rich (probably the danger of the tyranny is not yet envisaged here: see below ad l. 18) can also be found in the philosopher and physician of the late 5th century, Alcmaeon, VS 24B4: cf. Vlastos 1947, 156-58, Kudlien 1967, 51f. and 60, Cambiano 1982 (especially important on the overlapping between political and medical metaphors in the 5th century). Solon's Eunomia was certainly not the same as the ἰσονομία, but, so to say, was the step before it (see below, ad l. 32). After all, Solon himself may have shared these metaphors with the beginnings of medical speculation: cf. Introd. to fr. 29-29^b.

18. ἐς δὲ κακὴν ... ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην: The word δουλοσύνη is found once in the epic, Hom. *Od.* 22.423 καὶ δουλοσύνην (v.l. -ης) ἀνέχεσθαι (v.l. ἀπ-), and after Solon only from Pindar and Herodotus onwards.

The meaning of the word in the Homeric passage has been debated. The reading with the accusative, which is usually accepted by the editors, would be said of the δμωαί of Odysseus who were educated to spin the wool and "to fulfil their status as slaves", but yielded to the suitors and became their concubines. The variant δουλοσύνης has been recently defended: it would mean the "sexual bondage" that the slaves would have been educated to "contrast" or "cope with" (see Beringer 1960, followed by Fernández-Galiano ad loc.(Engl. ed. 1992), who also accepts the papyrus variant ἀπέχεσθαι, which more explicitly that ἀνέχεσθαι has the sense of "to resist to"). Also in case that this strained interpretation is correct (but I do not think so) we are not necessarily driven to believe that the meaning of "sexual bondage" is the original meaning of the word δουλοσύνη. Indeed, even if we assume it to be present in *Od.* 22.423, (for the behaviour of some of Odysseus' female slaves), we cannot maintain that the same implication is a part of the meaning of the Homeric δούλη, though the context often implies some kind of sexual submission of the female slaves to their owner: cf. Gschnitzer 1976, 10f.

Therefore, through the term — in a meaning not different from the Homeric one — Solon may anticipate the idea of chattel slavery to which ll. 23-5 refer, but also possibly something more. The word could denote, at different metaphorical degrees, the state and the conditions of those who had been literally sold into slavery overseas (as in ll. 23-5 and in fr. 30.8-9), or of the *hectemoroí* "sixth-parter" serfs (Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 2.2, Plut. *Sol.* 13) — namely the various forms of total subordination or lack in political freedom, which Solon had to cope with according to Aristotle, *Pol.* 1274a15 Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος).

The relevance of debt-slavery in the political thought of Solon has been much debated and perhaps overstated. The aim of Solon's reforms appears to have been that the poor should no longer be rigidly tied clients or serfs to the rich, and could become mobile workers with looser ties to their patrons: one of the effects of the old system may have

been the creation of factions in the political body by constraint rather than choice, and the nobles could exploit their groups in their rivalry for offices and for the defence of the private interest of their own or of their clan (cf. Lintott 1982, 46-7). Such a kind of social dependence, an almost δουλοσύνη, could be presented by Solon in the following line as the potential starter of inner wars between opposite aristocratic families.

Stahl 1992, 392f., is perhaps a bit too confident in seeing here a mere reference to the danger of the tyranny. We do not know a lot about the chronology of Solon's poems, but this fragment most probably precedes fr. 12 and 15, where the perspective or the actuality of the tyranny is called δουλοσύνη. Therefore, we cannot be sure that Solon was already implying in this fragment that the tyranny, namely the δουλοσύνη of the whole *demos* (including the rich) to a tyrant, was the inherent danger of the enmity among the aristocratic factions — a danger which was materialised after Solon's departure from Athens after the *nomothesia*, with the anarchy that did not allow the election of the archon, and drove Peisistratus to seize absolute power.

19. Cf. Alc. *PLF* 70.11 ἐμφύλῳ ... μάχας, and Thgn. *IEG* 51 ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν; see also *Scol. PMG* 884.3 quoted above ad l. 3, and Hdt. 8.3.1; Democr. *VS* 68B249, Aesch. *Eum.* 862f. and Soph. *Ant.* 1263-4. The word στάσις also occurs in the famous allegory of the ship by Alc. *PLF* 326 ἀσυννέτημι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν, where it may have primarily meant the 'direction' of the winds, but most probably also metaphorically included the idea of 'strife'. In my opinion πόλεμος is the open conflict consequent to the enmity between the factions (στάσις), and it is not necessary to suppose that it had already in Solon the meaning of 'external' war (ἀλλότριος καὶ ὀθνείος), which it certainly has in opposition to στάσις as a civil strife (οἰκεῖος καὶ συγγενής) in Pl. *Resp.* 5.470b (for a different opinion cf. Ferrara 1964, 74).

The relative pronoun is usually interpreted as dependent on δουλοσύνην. The attempt of Weil 1883 to connect it with Dike is hardly defensible; more interesting is the possibility, recently re-proposed by Adkins 1985, 118-9, that it is connected with πόλιν: 'the city which stirs up stasis ... swiftly comes to slavery' under a tyrant. It is true that Athens really suffered this fate in Solon's lifetime, when Peisistratus' success rode on the political and social dissatisfaction of the poor, but apart from the difficult syntax presupposed by Adkins' interpretation, we do not know whether Solon is foreseeing the tyranny here or not (see ad l. 18), and besides the *polis* appears in these lines to receive (and not to cause, as Adkins proposes) all the bad events of ll. 17, 18, 21f., cf. Manuwald 1989, 5 n. 26.

The metaphor of the awakening of the fight (φύλοπις, μάχη) is not uncommon in Homer (cp. also Ἄρηα ἐγείρειν: *Il.* 2.440, 4.352 etc), but πόλεμον ἐγείρειν appears

to be an *hapax* of *Il.* 20.31, πόλεμον δ' ἀλίσστον ἔγειρε (cp. later Thgn. *IEG* 549 πόλεμον ... ἐγείρει, Hdt. 8.142.2 ἡγείρατε ... πόλεμον), which Solon resumed most probably intentionally, since this line marks out the start of the Theomachy, namely the moment of the *Iliad* when the gods fought their internal war, openly against each other in two opposite ranks, οἱ μὲν θεοὶ ἅντα θεῶν ἴσαν (l. 75) — an internal hostility already exists, as *Il.* 12f. had suggested: the δουλοσύνη simply allows it to be exploded in the hardest form (that of a civil war). At any rate, Solon contaminated the Iliadic hemistich with the other Homeric formula ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει (*Il.* 24.344=*Od.* 5.48 and 24.4), in order to produce the image of the 'sleep' of the war which is not attested before him.

20. ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην: an epitaphic expression, belonging to the conventional language both for the ἄωροι, and more specifically for the young fallen in war, which justifies the presence of the past tense (possibly re-interpreted by Solon as a gnomic one): cf. [Simon.] *Anth.Plan.* 26=*FGE* 690 οὐκ ἀδίκως, ἐρατὴν γὰρ ἀπωλέσαμεν νεότητα, [Simon.] *Anth.Pal.* 7.258=*FGE* 878 ἀγλαὸν ὤλεσαν ἥβην, [Simon.] *Anth.Pal.* 7.515=*FGE* 987 ἐρατῇ νεότητι, [Simon.] *Anth.Pal.* 7.254=*FGE* 890 ὠλέσαθ' ἥβαν, *GVI* 1226.3 (6 B.C.) and 305.3 (5 B.C.) νεαρὰν ἥβην ὀλέσαντα, *GVI* 18.1 (440/39 B.C.) ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαὸν ἥβην, *CEG* 732.5 (4 B.C.) ὤλεσας ἡλικίαν (in the end of the pentam.), *GVI* 1913.1 (beginning 3 B.C.) ὤλεσας ἡλικίαν, *GVI* 771.4 (1 A.D.) ἐρατὰν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίαν; besides Tyrt. 9.23 ἐν προμάχοισι πεσὼν φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν, after Hom. *Il.* 11.342=20.412 φίλον ὤλεσε θυμόν).

21. πολυήρατον ἄστυ: See Bacchyl. 19.9-10 πολυηράτοις ... Ἀθάναις, Ar. *Nub.* 300-1 εὐάνδρον γὰν Κέκροπος ... πολυήρατον; also Hom. *Od.* 11.275 ἐν Θήβῃ πολυηράτῳ, Hdt. 4.159.3 ἐς Λιβύην πολυήρατον, Ael.Phleg. *Parad.Gr.* 3.7 p. 190 Giann. Θρινακίης νήσου πολυηράτου, *Orac.Sibyll.* 5.289 Geffcken πολυήρατε Τράλλις.

δυσμενέων: certainly the internal enemies of the communal welfare, not the external enemies, *pace* Adkins 1985, 119 who resumes the 19th century interpretation of the ἐν συνόδοις (see at the following line) in the meaning of 'hostile meeting of armies', and considers δυσμενέων of our line as external enemies.

22. τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις: The verb sometimes denotes physical distress or hardship in the epic (see Hom. *Od.* 10.177, 17.387 and Hes. *Op.* 305), and it is said of Odysseus' οἶκος (for the suitors eat his goods in his absence): *Od.* 1.248=16.125=19.133: I believe that Adkins 1985, 119 is correct in proposing that Solon could here imply some equivalence between behaviour of his ill-natured fellow-

citizens and the Homeric suitors; cf. also Mimn. 8.12 οἶκος τρυχοῦται (because one has to support a big family).

This is the earliest extant occurrence of the word σύνοδος with the meaning of 'associations'/'clubs' or of the actual meetings of these clubs (cf. later Ar. *Eq.* 477, Thuc. 3.82.6, Pl. *Tht.* 173d, Isoc. 3.54, Andoc. 1.47). Solon's preoccupation about the danger for the community of these clubs is confirmed by Gaius, *Dig.* 47.22.4 (F76a Ruschenbusch), who quotes a Solonian law that gave legal validity to the regulations of these societies, provided they were not contrary to the state laws: *Sodales sunt, qui eiusdem collegii sunt quam Graeci ETAIPEIAN vocant. his autem potestatem facit lex pactionem quam velint sibi ferre, dum ne quid ex publica lege corrumpant. sed haec lex videtur ex lege Solonis tralata esse. nam illuc ita est* ἐὰν δὲ δῆμος ἢ φρατόρες ἢ ὀργεῶνες ἢ γεννηῆται ἢ σύσσιτοι ἢ ὁμόταφοι ἢ θιασῶται ἢ ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι ἢ εἰς ἐμπορίαν, ὅτι ἂν τούτων διαθῶνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κύριον εἶναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἀπαγορεύσῃ δημόσια γράμματα.

There is not sufficient information on these societies of Athenian politics (ἐταιρεῖαι is their more common designation: see already Phoc. 5), their composition, organisation, activities even for periods better documented than the archaic age. Certainly the word seems already to have here a sinister ring, and Solon may be hinting at the subversive aristocratic clubs which Mazzarino 1943, 41f. called the ἐταιρεῖαι ἐπὶ τυραννίδι, relying on Hdt. 5.71 ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἐκόμησε, προσποιησάμενος δὲ ἐταιρήϊν τῶν ἡλικιωτέων καταλαβεῖν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπειρήθη (about Cylon), and on Arist. *Pol.* 1311b27 (who described Megakles, the author of the putsch against the Penthelidai as operating μετὰ τῶν φίλων). It would be tempting to see an analogous instance of the word in Alc. *PLF* 130: the poet remembers to have been driven into exile far from the property he and his ancestors had in Mytilene, πεδὰ τωνδέων τῶν [ἀ]λλαλοκάκων πολίταν (ll. 21-2); but he has decided to get rid of strife, στάσιν γὰρ πρὸς κρ.[....]. οὐκ ἄμεινον ὀννέλην (ll. 26-7) and to live keeping his feet clear of the κακά in a sanctuary where Lesbian women hold their beauty competitions: ll. 30-1 χλι.[.].[.].[.]ν συνόδοισί μ' αὐταῖς οἴκημ' κ[ά]κων ἔκτος ἔχων πόδας. The syntactical connection of συνόδοισί μ' αὐταῖς with what remains of l. 29 and with l. 30 is not clear, and a political meaning of σύνοδοι l. 29 cannot be ruled out. Indeed, it is maintained by Rodríguez Somolinos 1992, 145, 165, 185, and by De Martino-Vox 1996, 3.1259, but most modern scholars appear to agree in interpreting σύνοδοι as the meetings of the women in the sanctuary. See further Calhoun 1913, Sartori 1957, Talamo 1961, 302-3, Ghinatti 1970.

τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι φίλαις: the hemistich has been variously dealt with. Most MSS have φίλοις, which is unacceptable; φίλους of F, also kept by West, would be the object of τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι, a dative of the agent: 'by people who injure the φίλοι'. In that case

φίλοι has been sometimes intended in the meaning of '(political) friends' of Solon, namely the class that Solon favours while opposing the rich δυσμενεῖς, but it is hardly possible to believe that any reader would recognise who the φίλοι are and whose friends they are (Linforth 1919, 203), above all in a distich where the main theme had been the political clubs, whose members could also be called φίλοι (cp. Thuc. 1.126.5 and Arist. *Pol.* 1311b27 quoted, and cf. Ghinatti 1970, 16). If we try to keep the MSS text, it would be better to consider φίλοι~ἄστοί: the (members of the) clubs would "injure their fellow-citizens (friends and relatives)". The word ἄστυ is mentioned in the previous line by Solon, and for this equivalence in meaning see Lévy 1985, 55-6; as a matter of fact, civil strife usually involved the devastation of the land of fellow-citizens, φίλοι: cp. Pl. *Resp.* 5.471b, see also 5.470d. The idea would be attractive but syntactically a dative of the agent is normally found only with passive perfect and pluperfect (otherwise it is ὑπὸ+genitive). Another possibility would be to intend this hemistich as describing the cause, not the consequence of the civil strife, as West 1993, 75 appears to interpret: "for if men injure their own people, they soon find their lovely city scarred and faction-torn"; but this interpretation is syntactically difficult, and above all our hemistich would be overlapping with ἐκ δυσμενέων l. 21 (both are supposed to mean the same persons: the translation cit. by West meaningfully suppresses ἐκ δυσμενέων).

For these reasons, Bergk's emendation of φίλους in φίλαις qualifying συνόδοις, accepted by Gentili-Prato, is preferable (for a full review of the emendations proposed, Maharam 1993, 290-2).

23. ἐν δήμῳ: usually interpreted as 'at home', opposing the pains that the poor citizens have to suffer when sold as slaves abroad.

Demos is better interpreted (with Halberstadt 1954-55, 201 n. 16) in the meaning of 'inside the whole body of citizenship', which is recurrent in Solon (see ad l. 7), and the phrase would therefore mean more or less 'at a public level': the city in its entirety is reached by the evil so that no single individual can escape, and the evil roams through the public. In the line(s) which Demosthenes left out between the first and the second passage, Solon may have provided further details on the other calamities which were affecting the πενιχροί or, beyond the πενιχροί, other classes of the Athenian citizens.

The μέν-δέ opposition between δῆμος and the πενιχροί sold abroad would be between the general distress of the former, and the extreme consequences of this situation for the latter.

στρέφεται κακά: στρέφομαι was already in Homer with the meaning "to go round", "to circulate". Sol. 30.27 ὥς ἐν κυσὶν ... ἐστράφην λύκος.

24-5. Cp. Sol. 30.8-15 πολλοὺς δ' Ἀθήνας, πατρίδ' ἐς θεόκτιτον, ἀνήγαγον
πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως, ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἀναγκαίης ὑπο χρειοῦς
φυγόντας, ... ὥς ἂν πολλαχῇ πλανωμένους, τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἦθη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους, ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα.

In Homer fetters are "painful"/"strong" (ἀργαλέα, δυσηλεγή, κρατερὰ, χαλεπά etc.), but already in Hes. fr. 37.4 the δεσμός is ethically qualified as ἀεικές~Aesch. *PV* 97, 525. Solon calls the fetters "degrading" because in his view it is shameful (a shame for Athens) if free citizens are enslaved. By preventing the enslavement of the Athenians with his Laws, Solon created a legal boundary distinction between free (Athenian citizens) and slave (non-citizens): on the implications and the importance of such a boundary see Finley 1981, Brook Manville 1990, 132ff. Demosthenes 59.88 attests that the Athenian citizenship was considered something very valuable, καλὸν καὶ σεμνόν. Generally, the Greeks were strongly opposed to the enslavement of their own fellow-citizens, cf. Callicratidas' statement at the siege of Methymna in 406 that no Greek would be enslaved (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14), and the general compassion for the Greeks enslaved by Philip at Olynthus in 348 (Aeschin. 2.156, Diod.Sic. 16.53.3). Enslavement was excluded for full citizens in classical Athens, where the only penalties applicable were fines, political disqualification (ἀτιμία), imprisonment, exile and death.

Solon speaks here about the selling abroad of the citizens lower-down the economic scale in a context that points more to social inequality than to anything else, and certainly does not mention the idea of debt', cf. Harris 1997, 105-6). The entire passage (17-26) is valuable for revealing the close connection in Solon's poetry between *stasis* (discord) and *doulosyne* (slavery): it does not describe the economic exploitation of dependent labour in some kind of quasi-feudal system, and the enslavement of the poor is not linked to any failure of the *hectemoroi* to make payments to their lords or to the foreclosure of mortgages on land held by poor farmers, but comes about from a breakdown of law and order described in Il. 5-22. This breakdown of law and order (l. 31 *Dysnomia*) has produced the kind of raids for plunder and slaves found throughout the *Odyssey* and *Iliad* (e.g. Il. 9.328-36, 664-8, 11.623-6, 21.40-1, *Od.* 7.7-11, 9.40-2). As a matter of fact, in Solon's poems the reference to debt is not explicit, at least in the ones transmitted to us. It is only a logical inference to suppose that the 'slavery' Solon is speaking was a debt slavery — a condition which, as we know from later sources, took place in *later* Athens: see a collection of sources in Rhodes ad *Ath.Pol.* 6.1. The practice of self-enslavement for debt continued to exist in Gortyn in Crete and in other places, cf. Lenger 1966, no. 22, 42-5, Lintott 1982, 27; it is also found in the Hellenistic period at least at Delphi, in Egypt, and in the Peloponese. Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 147-8 διὰ μικρὸν ἀργυρίδιον δοῦλος γεγένημαι; also Lys. 12.98, Isoc. 14.48. At any rate, export markets existed for the

debtor slaves in other Greek cities in later times, see Westermann 1955, 3, Garland 1988, 53.

As for fr. 30.11 quoted above, the London pap. has (ἀναγκαίης ὑπο) χρεῖους, the Berlin pap. has (ἀναγκαίης ὑπο) χρεων. Most of the modern historians who support the indebtedness-theory read ἀναγκαίης ὑπο χρεῖους, interpreting the latter as the genitive of τὸ χρεῖος 'debt' and ἀναγκαίη as the common epic substantive=ἀνάγκη, 'through the necessity of debt': cf. Hammond 1961, 89f., Chambers 1967, 56. However, this assumption does not appear to be solid at all. All the recent editors of Solon — none excluded — print χρειοῦς *perispomenon*, and imply that ἀναγκαίης is an adjective dependant on it, some of them quoting the relevant parallel of χρειοῖ ἀναγκαίη Hom. *Il.* 8.57f. (Gentili-Prato add Ap.Rhod. *Argon.* 3.998: ἰκάνω χρειοῖ ἀναγκαίη γουνούμενος; the syntagm appears in many more instances so far as I have checked). Faced by the linguistic evidence, χρειοῦς, in concordance with ἀναγκαίης, has to be considered the better reading, and I do not see how and why we would have to stretch χρειοῦς to be=χρεῖους and to mean 'debt', as Defradas 1962, 63 tries to do out of the few passages where χρέος means 'need' (not only Ar. *Ach.* 454f., quoted by Defradas, but also Hom. *Od.* 11.479 and Bion fr. 5.2), and is therefore equivalent to χρειώ. Nowhere, as far as I could check, is the reverse true, that is χρειώ meaning 'debt'. As for the reading of the Berlin pap. it can be considered, safely I think, as a gloss on Solon's ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ χρειοῦς which later entered into the text. Therefore, we do not have any reliable evidence on any Solonian mention of 'debt' (slavery) in connection with Solon's reforms.

24. γαῖαν ἐς ἄλλοδαπήν: Cf. Sol. 30.8ff. For the phrase see Hom. *Od.* 9.36 γαίη ἐν ἄλλοδαπῇ, GVI 1043.3 (2 A.D.) γαίη ἐν ἄλλοδαπ[ῇ], 2029.14 (2/3 A.D.) γαῖαν ἐς ἄλλοδαπήν.

26. δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστω: The lacuna of at least one pentameter after l. 25 was most probably not long, and l. 26 resumes and more vividly personifies ἐν δήμῳ κακά of l. 23 (the pentameter preserved by the single ms. Matrit. 4562, apart from unmetrical ζῦ-, is too oddly repetitive, and may be a forgery by the humanist Constantinus Laskaris, cf. West).

The phrase δημόσιον κακὸν also appears in the cenotaph of the Corcyraean *proxenos* Menekrates, 625-600 B.C., CEG 143.4 δαμόσιον δὲ κακὸν ῥο[, where πο[τὶ πάντας ἠίκανε] and πο[τὶ πάντας ἀφῖκε] were proposed by Hoffmann and Peek to fill the end of the line. Cf. Hom. *Od.* 20.367-8 κακὸν ὕμιν ἐρχόμενον, *Od.* 2.45 ὃ μοι κακὸν ἔμπεσεν οἴκῳ, Thgn. *IEG* 50 κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σὺν κακῷ ἐρχόμενα.

οἴκαδ' ἐκάστω: *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 302 οἴκαδ' ἕκαστος. Contrast δημόσιον with ἐκάστω: "public" disease affects the individual. The "visionary" strength of the image of the public disease entering everyone's house is probably intended as a warning that the final effect of the excessive greed for one's own house-wealth could involve everyone's house, room after room.

27. αὖλαιοι ... θύραι: they are the doors of the gate of the court-yard into the street, cf. Harp. α 263 K. αὖλειος· ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁδοῦ πρώτη θύρα τῆς οἰκίας. The phrase ἐπ' αὐλείησι θύρησιν is a common epic hexameter-ending, cf. *Od.* 18.239, 23.49, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 26, see later Pind. *Nem.* 1.19, Hdt. 6.69, Theoc. 29.39.

οὐκ ἐθέλουσι: with the meaning οὐ δύνανται, possibly already in Homer — see e.g. *Il.* 9.353 or 21.366, where the schol. ad loc. (Aristonicus) interpreted οὐδ' ἔθελε προρέειν, ἀλλ' ἴσχετο as ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἠδύνατο —, but certainly in this passage and often in Attic: cf. *LfgE* s.v. ἐθέλω (3).

28. ὑψηλὸν ... ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορεν: The verb ὑπερθρώσκω is used four times in the *Iliad*, in three references to horses leaping or fearing to leap over the Greek ditch (8.179, 12.53, 16.380) and once by Phoenix in his discourse to Achilles at 9.476 (ὑπέρθορον ἐρκίον αὐλῆς) in relation to his leaping over the courtyard wall when he fled his home to take refuge with Achilles' father, Peleus, after having quarrelled with his father. Solon may have combined this relevant precedent for the diction with the image of the Homeric similes in which lions attack domestic animals in the fold (cf. e.g. *Il.* 5.136-42), which had been lastly suggested by Adkins 1985, 118.

We have scanty information on the domestic architecture of archaic and classical Greece (we know something more about that of the fourth century, from the excavations at Olynthus). From the Homeric epics we can draw a picture of the Homeric house, where indeed the αὐλή is surrounded by a perimeter wall called either ἐρκίον αὐλῆς (*Il.* 9.476) or ἔρκος αὐλῆς (*Od.* 22.442, 459); see also *Il.* 24.452-5. The general description of the palace in *Od.* 17 mentions some θύραι ... εὐερκέες (l. 267), and the same adjective is usually grouped with αὐλή in the meaning "well-enclosed" in *Il.* 9.472, *Od.* 21.389, 22.449; see also Hes. *Op.* 732 τοῖχον ... εὐερκέος αὐλῆς, and Archil. *IEG* 37 τοῖον γὰρ αὐλήν ἔρκος ἀμφιδέδρομεν. In the Olynthian houses also the main entrance to the house regularly opened, where possible, directly into the court, and whenever the court was contiguous to the street the court was enclosed with a wall.

The emphasis on the 'barriers' of the *aule*, the θύραι and the ἔρκος, was most probably intentional: the δημόσιον κακόν also invades the sphere of the *private* property of the house: cp. the commonly joined cult of Zeus Herkeios and Zeus Ktesios, on which see Sjövall 1931, 41-8, 55 and *RE* 15, 1978, 1049-51 s.v. Compare the similar —but

comically excessive— emphasis on the barriers and the borders of the house in the *Wasps* of Aristophanes (above all, ll. 126-55), where Bdelycleon copes with the huge danger represented for his household by the insane passion for trials and tribunals of the father Philocleon (though in Aristophanes' case Philocleon is a danger if he manages to go out of the house, not if he enters, as Solon's δημόσιον κακόν): cf. Crane 1997, 218f.

πάντας: The emphatic contrast of l. 26 between δημόσιον and ἐκάστῳ — "public" disease affects every individual — favours in my opinion the conservation of the reading of a part of the MSS (v.l. πάντων) against the correction πάντως of the *recentiores*.

29. Degani-Burzacchini 1977, 111 note the rare omission of ἄν, and compare Callin. 1.12f. οὐ γάρ κως θάνατόν γε φυγεῖν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν ἄνδρ', οὐδ' εἰ προγόνων ἦ γένος ἀθανάτων.

ἐν μυχῷ ἢ θαλάμου: ἢ θαλάμῳ MSS. Schneidewin's emendation is right, because μυχὸς θαλάμου is an almost idiomatic phrase of the poetic language — Hom. *Il.* 17.36 μυχῷ θαλάμοιο, *Od.* 16.285 ἐς μυχὸν ὑψηλοῦ θαλάμου, 22.180 θαλάμοιο μυχὸν κάτα, 23.41=*Hom. Hymn Dem.* 143 μυχῷ θαλάμων εὐπήκτων; Pind. *Nem.* 1.42 ἐς θαλάμου μυχὸν εὐρύν (cf. also Simias, CA fr. 26.17 ἐν κόλπῳ θαλαμᾶν μυχοιτάτῳ) —, but nowhere do they appear juxtaposed as synonyms (Hsch. θ 21 L. θάλαμος ... μυχός, and schol. Aesch. Ag. 96 μυχόθεν ἤγουν ἐκ τῶν μυχῶν, τουτέστι τῶν θαλάμων can be better considered as instances of the typical use of the lexicographers to explain a member of a syntagm with another one).

The word θάλαμος signifies in the epic any of the private rooms of the house (the sleeping room and the store-room) as opposed to the *megaron* (see, above all, *Od.* 22.143): cf. Pesando 1989, 39. The *megaron*, with its central hearth, was the common space of the house for dining and entertaining guests, and was connected with the most typical male activity of the symposium, while θάλαμος is usually mentioned in connection with female life and activities (see e.g. the opposition between battlefield and θάλαμος regarding the coward Paris of *Il.* 3.382ff.). Solon's expression describes the most natural thing the ill-natured citizens, whom Solon had just described as intemperately enjoying the symposiastic pleasures (ll. 9f.), would do as a reaction to the spreading of the punishing δημόσιον κακόν consequent to their guilt: also in the *Odyssey*, after the first spears thrown by Odysseus, Telemachus and Eumaeus, the suitors feasting in the *megaron* vainly try to retreat to the inner part of the *megaron* itself: ἀνεχώρησαν μεγάρῳ μυχόνδε (22.270).

30. ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς ... κελεύει: The verb διδάξαι points to a didactic stance, and also suggests that Solon himself saw this poem as a lecture in verse. Solon is not speaking to a younger brother, as Hesiod was in *Works and Days*, so the Athenian

statesman devises a strategy of presentation which understates the position of superiority which he is keeping. Κελεύω is often used to describe inner motivation in relation to the θυμός (or to κραδίη θυμός τε in the parallel constructed phrase κραδίη θυμός τε κελεύει); κέλομαι also appears with θυμός as its subject, cf. Hom. *Il.* 7.68, 349, 369, 8.6, *Od.* 7.187, 8.27, 17.469, 18.352, 21.276, Hes. *Theog.* 645 etc. The choice of the word is meaningful: as is clear from the formula κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, the θυμός was considered to be mainly the seat of the emotions (cf. Caswell 1990): that implies, as remarked by Stahl 1992, 396, that "the warnings of Solon are not only a matter of understanding, but also have their roots in the depth of the soul".

32-9. The mention of the personified Dysnomia leads to the mention of Eunomia. Solon's final short hymn to Εὐνομία was most probably conceived after the model of Hesiod's Hymn to Zeus in the beginning of the *Works & Days* (3-9). The resemblance is striking in size, in style (the *asyndeton*, which is a common feature of prayers — see for instance the beginning of *Hom. Hymn* 8 or *Hom. Hymn* 19, and cf. Fraenkel ad Ag. 163, Jaeger 1926=1966, 97-9 —, but in Hesiod and in Solon it is exceptionally persistent; besides the polar antitheses, the anaphora of παύει and the rhymes of αὐαίνει-λειαίνει (cp. above all the repetition of ῥέα in Hesiod), and the tone (both passages are theodicies of the divine justice administered by the god Zeus in Hesiod, of human justice ruled by the personified abstract principle of Eunomia in Solon).

The word εὐνομία appears first in the *Od.* 17.487, "a passage strongly reminiscent of Hes. *Op.* 249-55" (so West ad Hes. *Theog.* 902), where gods in concealed identity visit certain mortals to test their hospitality and to discover their ὕβρις or εὐνομίη. In Hesiod, Dysnomia is sister of Ate and daughter of Eris (*Theog.* 226-30), while in *Theog.* 902 Εὐνομία is one of the three Horai, daughter of Themis and Zeus, and sister of Dike and Eirene. This Hesiodic genealogy had a lasting influence on the poetry up to the fifth century, cf. adesp. *PMG* 1018b6-7, Pind. *Ol.* 9.15f. and 13.6-9, Bacchyl. 15.54f., but Alcman. *PMG* 64 offers an alternative genealogy where Τύχη is called Εὐνομίας <τε> καὶ Πειθῶς ἀδελφὰ καὶ Προμαθήας θυγάτηρ.

As noted by Jaeger 1926=1966, 89, Solon's fr. 3 has two clearly distinct components that recall Hesiod's contrast of the just and the unjust city: the negative part (ll.1-32) where what is brought to the city by injustice is described, and the positive part (ll. 33-39), where the blessings of *eunomia* are exalted. However, the more 'modern' level of abstraction of Solon's εὐνομία and δυσνομία has to be underscored, comparing the mythological presentation of the two goddesses in Hes. *Theog.* 226-30 and 903 referred to above, which had included the traditional genealogy, cf. Manuwald 1989, 8f. (Adkins 1985, 124 overstates in my opinion the divine status and features of Solon's *eunomia*). As was well put by Meier 1980, 79f., Solon's *eunomia* is the fruit of a

"religious realism", that transforms the conscience of the need for a solution of the disorder and of the aristocratic *hybris* and the optimism about the possibility of this solution into a divine principle of renewal and in the faith in divine assistance.

Already the Hesiodic Eirene-Dike-Eunomia are clearly personifications that hint at "social virtues which cannot be usefully practised by the individual in isolation, but if widespread make possible the collective life of the city" (so Andrewes 1938, 89), but the political value of the *eunomia* is explicit at least, in the archaic age, in *Hom. Hymn* 30.11 αὐτοὶ δ' εὐνομίῃσι πόλιν κάτα καλλιγύναικα, Xenoph. 2.19 (where athletic achievements are said to add to the εὐνομία of the *polis*), Pind. *Ol.* 13.6 Εὐνομία ... βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές, Bacchyl. 13.186-9 Εὐνομία τε σαόφρων, ἃ θαλίας τε λέλογχεν ἄσπεά τ' εὐσεβέων ἀνδρῶν ἐν εἰ[ρ]ήνῃ φυλάσσει, adesp. *PMG* 1018b 5-9 πέμπετ(ε) ... Εὐνομίαν ... τ' ἀδελφὰς Δίκαν καὶ ... Εἰράναν, πόλιν τε τάνδε βαθυφρόνων λελάθοιτε συντυχιᾶν. Eunomia is also the title that according to Arist. *Pol.* 1307a1 and Str. 8.4.10(362) was given to the elegiac poem by Tyrtaeus, whose subject was obedience to the existing law and the loyalty to the Spartan kings, who are presented by Tyrtaeus as Sparta's guarantee to her claims on the land, since their authority would have sprung from Zeus' award to the sons of Heracles, and as the best reference point in a period of social discontent and fear for disorder in Spartan history (see on the poem Andrewes 1938, 95-102, and Wade-Gery 1944). Solon's ideal of Eunomia is not concerned with the city's past nor has the sense of a divine act as the one which established the Spartan order, and is certainly not equal to the idea of πειθαρχία, which probably had a strong relevance in Tyrtaeus' defence of the established order (cp. Soph. *Ant.* 672-6 ἀναρχίας δὲ μείζον οὐκ ἔστιν κακόν. αὕτη πόλεις ὄλλυσιν, ἥδ' ἀναστάτους οἴκους τίθησιν, ἥδε συμμάχου δορὸς τροπὰς καταρρήγνυσι· τῶν δ' ὀρθομένων σώζει τὰ πολλὰ σώμαθ' ἢ πειθαρχία). The term in later times was more often connected with the Spartan political and educational system (Hdt. 1.65.2 etc.), but there is evidence for a worship of Εὐνομία together with Εὐκλεία in Athens, which goes back at least to 400 B.C. (a temple of Εὐκλεία was one of the many Marathon dedications according to Paus. 1.14.5). For her depictions on vases see Shapiro 1993, 80-5.

As a political ideal, Solon's εὐνομία is still distinct from the principle of egalitarianism, the ἰσονομία (see above all fr. 29b.9, where Solon denies to have wanted the ἰσονομία of the land between poor and rich), though it anticipates some of its features (see above all ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ, αὐαίνει ἄτης ἄνθεα): according to Meier 1970, 15ff. and 1980, 278-88 Solon's idea of *eunomia* is the premise to the idea of *isonomia*, and the latter the premise to the concept of *demokratia*.

32. εὖκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει: for the combination of the two adjectives, see Hom. *Od.* 8, where after Odysseus' speech against Euryalus who had not

spoken κατὰ κόσμον about his athletic virtue (179), Alkinoos apologises saying that nobody would really blame him, ὅς τις ἐπίσταιτο ἧσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν (240). Solon's line was imitated in Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (CA fr. 1), ll. 18-9 σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, καὶ κοσμεῖν τ᾽ἀκοσμοῦ.

ἄρτια: The adjective, from the root of the verb ἀραρίσκω (see Calame 1977, 216-8) is a favourite word and concept for Solon, see also l. 39 and frr. 5.5 and 8.4 which perfectly synthesises the political ideal of Solon as being in the middle between rich and poor, and trying to "fit" both classes (see fr. 31.9). See later Thgn. *IEG* 946 ἄρτια πάντα νοεῖν, where, at any rate, the meaning appears to be simpler, virtually the same as δίκαιος, cf. van Groningen 1966, ad loc. As remarked by Treu 1955, 274-5, this adjective expresses an ideal of 'conformity' which is strongly opposed to the Homeric ideal of ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων. Therefore, the phrases εὐκοσμοῦ καὶ ἄρτια l. 32 and ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά l. 39 themselves are emphasised by the ring composition that forms the frame of the hymn to Eunomia, and in both pairs ἄρτιος is the constant element expressing the idea of "conformity" to the same principle of an "ordered wisdom".

33. τοῖς ἀδίκοις ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας: πέδη is used only once in Homer, of the foot-hobbling of the horses in *Il.* 13.36 ἀμφὶ δὲ ποσσὶ πέδας ἔβαλε χρυσείας; later usually with reference to men: e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 539 οὗτος ἀνὴρ φίλε Κύρνε πέδας χαλκεύεται αὐτῷ. For the combination of πέδη to the verb, see Semon. *IEG* 7.116 καὶ δεσμὸν ἀμφέθηκεν ἄρρηκτον πέδην, and Lycoph. *Alex.* 1344 τραχήλῳ ζευγλαν ἀμφιθεῖς πέδαις.

34. τραχέα λειαίνει: presents the lowering of the over-powerful / over-rich people affected by κόρος to the level of the other citizens through the image of the flattening of the raggedness of a landscape. Cp. Pl. *Ti.* 66c λειάνη ... τὰ τραχυθέντα.

παύει κόρον: Cf. besides l. 9 above, Sol. fr. 8 and note there. Greg.Naz. *Carm. de se ipso* 1319.1 γαστρὶ μὲν ὕβριν ἔπαυσα κόρου. Anhalt 1993, 93 notes that Eunomia stops the insolence which in ll. 9f. was described as a threat for the banquet, and that such an association of Eunomia with festivity is taken up by Pind. fr. 52a.9ff., and Bacchyl. 13.186-9.

34-5. On the use of withering of the evil, Hes. *Op.* 7 (Ζεὺς) ἀγήνορα κάρφει. Plant-growth imagery is often associated with ἄτη or madness, cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 821-2 ὕβρις ... ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν ἄτης, ὅθεν πάγκλαυτον ἔξαμᾶ θέρος, *Sept.* 601 ἄτης ἄρουρα θάνατον ἐκκαρπίζεται, Soph. *Ant.* 959-60 τᾶς μανίας δεινὸν ἀποστάζει ἀνθηρόν τε μένος, *Trach.* 999 μανίας ἄνθος, *TrGF* 786 ὕβρις ... ἀνθεῖ

καὶ πάλιν φθίνει, and cp. Pl. *Pol.* 310d ἐξανθεῖν παντάπασι μανίαις (cf. Michelini 1978 for the opposite metaphor of *hybris* in connection with vegetable life). For other similar constructions cf., for instance, Asclep. *Anth.Pal.* 12.163.4 πειθοῦς ἄνθεα καὶ φιλίας and Sol. 27.6 ad loc.

36. εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς: For the plural δίκαι in the meaning 'judgements', cf. already in Hom. *Il.* 16.542, *Od.* 3.244, 9.215, 11.570. Cp. Hom. *Il.* 16.387-8 σκολιάς κρίνωσι θέμιστας, ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι (possibly an interpolation from Hes. *Op.* 219 quoted below: cf. Leaf ad loc.), Hes. *Op.* 7-8 (Zeus) ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν, 219 σκολιῇσι δίκησιν, 221 σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας, 250 σκολιῇσι δίκησιν ἀλλήλους τρίβουσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, 263 βασιλῆς ἰθύνετε μύθους δωροφάγοι, σκολιῶν δὲ δικέων ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθεσθε, Thgn. *IEG* 40 εὐθυντῆρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης, Pind. *Pyth.* 4.152 ἀλλὰ καὶ σκᾶπτον μόναρχον καὶ θρόνος, ᾧ ποτε Κρηθείδας ἐγκαθίζων ἱππόταις εὐθυνε λαοῖς δίκας, Pl. *Prot.* 326e εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, Callim. *Jon.* 82-3 οἳ τε δίκησι λαὸν ὑπὸ σκολιῆς' οἳ τ' ἔμπαλιν ἰθύνουσιν.

37. ἔργα διχοστασίης: a common periphrasis, see Sol. 1.16 and note there.

διχοστασίης: The same political use of the term in connection with civil strife is found in Thgn. *IEG* 78 ἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ Κύρνε διχοστασίῃ, adesp.el. *IEG* *12 ἐν δὲ διχοστασίῃ καὶ ὁ πάγκακος ἔλλαχε τιμῆς, Eur. *TGF* 173 οἰκέιος ἀνθρώποισι γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ πόλεμος ἐν ἀστοῖς, ἦν διχοστατῇ πόλις.

38. παύει ... ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον: Hom. *Il.* 1.192 χόλον παύσειεν, 19.67 παύω χόλον; *Il.* 18.107-8 ἔρις ... καὶ χόλος. For ἀργαλέη ἔρις, cf. Hom. *Il.* 11.3-4, 17.384-5, 21.385-6, Ap.Rhod. 1.773, Dio Chrys. *Or.* 12.78.7-8.

39. ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά: For the phrase see above, l. 32. πινυτός is an *Odyssey*-word, said of Penelope.

4 G.-P.² (4a W.²)

According to the testimony, Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 5.1, this fragment was the *incipit* of a political elegy where Solon would have stated his position as a μέσος πολίτης between the opposite needs of the classes of the rich and of the poor who were δουλεύοντες τοῖς ὀλίγοις, and therefore rebelled against οἱ γνώριμοι: after criticising both parties, he would have recommended them to stop with a common agreement the present φιλονικία (for the problem inherent in Aristotle's presentation, see Introd. to fr. 5). Sploester 1911, 18-34, has good remarks on the features of this elegy and its possible analogies with the thoughts of fr. 3, but his attempt to reconstruct a single poem including frs. 4+5.1+3+ 5.2-5 does not seem persuasive, because Solon likes to repeat the main ideas of his political program (see ad fr. 6).

1-3. γιγνώσκω καὶ ... ἐσορῶν γαῖαν .. κλινομένην: γιγνώσκω+a nom. participle of ὁράω followed by an object (+acc. predicative participle) is quite common in epic, in the meaning of 'to identify at sight something/someone (as this or that)': e.g. *Il.* 7.189 γνῶ δὲ κλήρου σῆμα ἰδὼν; *Od.* 15.532 ἔγνων γάρ μιν ἐσάντα ἰδὼν οἰωνὸν ἐόντα; see also *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 94f. οὐδέ τις ἀνδρῶν εἰσορόων γίγνωσκε (but I think we cannot assume, with Vox 1984, 51-6, that this last passage is the model of Solon, who would be paralleling his personal observations with the impossibility to recognise goddess Demeter disguised as an old woman: the evidence for an allusion is really too scanty).

γιγνώσκω means intellectual, objective acknowledgement, and here it is strongly connected with the visual element of ἐσορῶν (cp. *Il.* 8.52=11.82 εἰσορόων Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν) and with the subjective feeling expressed in the parenthetical second hemistich of l. 1. The juxtaposition of the two perspectives is not only reinforced through the "slight *anacolouthon*" (so Linforth 1919, 178) which focuses on the first person of the *persona loquens*, instead of connecting the participle ὁρῶν with μοι as would be more natural, but also through the *apo koinou* construction of γαῖαν, which is the object both of γιγνώσκω and of ἐσορῶν (I do not believe that the isolated γιγνώσκω was going to be completed, and its object expressed, somewhere else in the following lines, as Masaracchia 1958, 273 prefers to intend). The resulting implication is that 'it is enough to see (the city reclining, lying down) to realise and to feel pain'.

1. φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν ἄλγεα κεῖται: the final phrase adapts the common epic formula ἄλγεα+a form of πάσχειν at the end of a hexameter, but follows for the content the model above all of *Hom. Od.* 24.423 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔκειτο and possibly of *Il.* 24.522-3 ἄλγεα δ' ἔμπης ἐν θυμῷ κατακεῖσθαι ἐάσομεν (where the verb may mean

"to rest"). These Homeric passages could be something more than a formal model for Solon, because they both deal with paternal pains for the children, and Solon could exploit this connotation here, to imply that the depression he feels for his fatherland ranges among the close and intimate father-son feelings (so already Vox 1984, 53f.). As for φρενὸς ἔνδοθεν, it is paralleled by several epic lines where the adverbs ἔνδοθι, ἔνδον, ἔνδοθεν occur near a term for an organ (which syntactically is independent of the adverb) — see above all φρένας ἔνδον, 4x in *Od.*

There are several passages of lyric poets that mention φρένες being affected by outside objects and emotions, and at least twice besides Solon φρήν is the location of negative, painful feeling (Mimn. 7.7, Thgn. *IEG* 387; cp. also Thgn. *IEG* 593, 657): cf. Sullivan 1988, 59f. For more general discussions of the identification of the φρήν, see Onians 1951, 23ff., Ireland-Steel 1975, 184.

2. πρεσβυτάτην ... γαῖαν [Ἰ]αονίας: In Hom. *Il.* 13.689 the Ionians mentioned at l. 685 are equated with the Athenians, Bacchyl. 17.3 κούρους Ἰαόνω[ν, 18.1-2 βασιλεῦ τᾶν ... Ἀθανᾶν, τῶν ἄβροβίων ἄναξ Ἰώνων (cp. also l. 15), Aesch. *Pers.* 178 Ἰαόνων γῆν οἴχεται πέρσαι θέλων (564 διὰ ... Ἰαόνων χέρας), Ar. *Ach.* 104 Ἰαοναῦ, 106 Ἰάονας (the only uses of the term for Athenians in Aristophanes, see Sommerstein ad loc).

We seem to have here for the first time the tradition that Asia Minor had been colonised from Athens (by Neleus the son of the Athenian king Codrus according to Hdt. 9.97, cf. 1.146f.): the idea that Ἰαονίας is a specifying genitive, and not a partitive one (cautiously prospected by Vox 1984, 50), or even the correction of Ἰαονίας in Ἰαονίαν (Richards 1893, 210) cannot be taken in consideration, since there is no reason in the context for calling Athens 'Ionia' rather than 'the oldest land of Ionia'.

πρεσβυτάτην may be ambiguous in meaning: both "the oldest" and "the most important" — the latter being a linguistically possible nuance that Solon would let surface, as a propagandistic evaluation, though from an objective perspective Athens could hardly be considered the most important Ionic city at the beginning of the 6th century.

For Athens' role as mother city of Ionia, cp. Hdt. 5.97.2 (on the Ionian revolt of 499) and Thuc. 1.6, 1.12.4, 1.95.1-2. The claim seems to have a kernel of truth but it was inflated later, in the time of the Delian League for the Athenian propaganda purposes: cp. above all Pherecydes the Athenian and Panyassis, who respectively maintained that the Athenian colonisation of Asia Minor had started from Ephesus or from Miletus. Cf. Sakellariou 1958, 27, Barron 1962, 6 and n. 40, Barron 1964, 46-48, Mazzarino 1966, I, 92, Alty 1982, 12 n. 8, 9 n. 46, Parker 1987, 205-7, Hornblower ad Thuc. 1.95.1.

No matter how the term was interpreted, as already remarked by Maharam 1993, 365f., its role was essential, because the antiquity of Athens was the objective reason why every Athenian, not only Solon, had to regret about the present situation of Athens.

3. κλινομένην: Blass 1892, 572 (approved by Richards 1893, Kenyon in the Berlin ed. of *Ath.Pol.* of 1903 and *O.C.T.* 1920, Mathieu in the Paris ed. of 1922, Rhodes 1985, 123 and Chambers 1990, 162) read καινομένην in the papyrus, but the reading of Wilcken 1895, 620f., κλινομένην, which Kenyon considered not impossible, has been accepted in all the modern editions of the text after Linforth. Indeed καινομένην would introduce too hard a metaphor, since καίνω is never said of a land anywhere else.

Almost the same problem applies to the easy emendation in καιομένην 'being burnt', 'in flames' (printed in the text by Hudson-Williams), that would seem to be paralleled by Hes. *Theog.* 693f. ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖα φερέσβιος ἐσμαράγιζε καιομένη (where however καίεσθαι is a first degree metaphor, since the earth is really burning because of Zeus' thunder), and above all by Lys. 33.7 (ap. Dion.Hal. *Lys.* 30): τίνι ποτὲ γνώμη χρώμενοι (*scil.* the Spartans) καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν. Lysias' passage is certainly crucial, because it may involve an allusion to Solon's (cp. περιορῶσιν and Solon's ἐσορῶν), but even in Lysias the hyperbole looked excessive to the editors: Dobree had emended καιομένην in κακουμένην, and as soon as the papyrus of the *Ath.Pol.* was published, Kern 1918, proposed to correct Lysias' καιομένην in κλινομένην. Nowhere else Solon presents the consequences of the strife so fiery as to justify the image of the land being 'burned' and, objectively, the internal rivalries of the aristocratic families or the social contrast of Solon's time could hardly drive the Attic land to look like a burned territory.

The most economic solution is to opt for κλινομένην: the metaphor "to lie down"="to be oppressed/depressed" (parallel to the technical expression of boxing εἰς γόνυ πεσεῖν: see 'Simon'. *Anth.Plan.* 24) is a more moderate image (cf. Maharam 1993, 362), and better fits the real conditions of Athens. The same verb is also attested at least in Aesch. *Pers.* 929-30 Ἀσία δὲ χθών ... ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται, and in Thgn. *IEG* 856 ὥσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρὰ γῆν ἔδραμεν (where the meaning 'to go off course', 'to loose one's own balance' seems more probable than 'to be inclined': cf. Masaracchia 1958, 274). Other parallels (unexplored so far for Solon) for this kind of metaphor about a city are Hdt. 6.27 ἡ ναυμαχίη ὑπολαβοῦσα ἐς γόνυ τὴν πόλιν ἔβαλε (for the equivalence of εἰς γόνυ πεσεῖν and κλίνεσθαι εἰς τὴν γῆν, cf. Phryn. *Praep.soph.* 71.11f.), Euph. CA 18=*Etym.Magn.* 687.33 ὁ δὲ Εὐφορίων οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει περὶ τοῦ Διονύσου, ὅτι ταῖς γυναικείαις τάξεσιν ἐγκελευσάμενος ἐπρήνιξε τὴν Εὐρυμέδοντος πόλιν, τουτέστι τὸ Ἄργος (cp. *SH* 418.41 πρήνιξε δορυσσοῦ),

Nonn. 47.668 Ἄργος ἔπερσε καὶ ἐπρήνιξε Μυκήνας (for the equivalence of πρηνιχθῆναι and εἰς γόνυ κλιθῆναι, cf. Zonar. 1585 T.).

5 G.-P.² (4b-c W.²)

LI. 2-5 of this fragment are quoted by Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 5.3 as evidence of Solon's μεσότης, just after the quotation of fr. 4 (cf. also *Pol.* 4.1296a18-20). Aristotle continues to say that Solon blamed Athen's situation on the rich, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις· διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοικέναι φησὶ 'τὴν τε φιλ[οπλο]υτίαν τὴν θ' ὑπερηφανίαν', ὥς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς ἔχθρας ἐνεστώσης (*Ath.Pol.* 5.3.12). However, the surviving quotation fails to prove the point of Solon's μεσότης. This may be a hint that the source of the *Ath.Pol.* gave at this point other poems of Solon which might have proved his μεσότης, but Aristotle cut the number of the instances (Rhodes, *Ath.Pol.* ad loc). Indeed, we are promised ποιήματα: the best attested and oldest meaning for ποίημα is (short) composition embodying poetic features and above all the μέτρον (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1408b30), often opposed in the Hellenistic and Roman period to ποίησις which is the large poem with a σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων (Arist. *Poet.* 1447a7f.): cf. Dahlmann 1953 and Greenberg 1961. As for our passage, Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 5.3, we can assume that the later attested meaning of ποιήματα=distichs was already in use in the fourth century (following Ardizzoni 1953, 47 n. 9, who quotes Varro, *Parm.* 398 Bücheler *distichon epigrammation vocant poema*), or, preferably, we can share Rhodes' suggestion that Aristotle would take the word without alternating it from his source, though, in abbreviating, he quoted only one of the 'small poems' he found in it.

The other testimony, Plutarch, *Sol.* 14.2, would seem to solve the problem of Solon's μεσότης. Referring to the situation before his election to archonship, Plutarch says that he feared the φιλοχρηματίαν of the poor, the ὑπερηφανίαν of the rich. According to Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 179 Plutarch would do a *lapsus memoriae* in attributing one fault to the poor the other to the rich, because, they state, in Aristotle the rich are most probably charged with both faults. However, the text of Aristotle, as we saw, speaks about Solon's favouring the μεσότης, and therefore might be understood also by later ancient authors as implying a charge against the poor for their φιλοχρηματία: either Plutarch is mislead by Aristotle or, similarly to Aristotle (according to Rhodes' interpretation), he cuts out of his quotation the relevant poems for the point of μεσότης.

On the basis of the surviving evidence, Solon's views in our fragment coincide with what he had identified in other elegies as the source of the disastrous situation of the *polis* (at least before his archonship): the comparison of fr. 3.7-10 δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ, and of fr. 8.3-4 τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπῃται

ἀνθρώποις ὅποσους μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ἦ, with the ll. 2-3 of the present fragment ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ, οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἡ]λάσατε, suggests that in all these lines the common denominator is the relation between the κόρος of people who are already rich and its consequence (ὕβρις) in a civic context. Already Linforth 1919, 179 correctly remarked that Solon had in mind the quality of μεγαλοφροσύνη which characterises those rich citizens who can combine the qualities of μέγαν νόον and καρτερὸν ἦτορ: admirable in instances of restrained conduct but deemed dangerous if exercised with no restraint over their pursuits, and above all when not keeping their appetites under control.

1. τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν τήν θ' ὑπερηφανίαν: τήν τε φ[...][...].τίαν is the papyrus reading of the first of the two words, which were recognised as a Solonian pentameter by Jackson and Mayor 1891, 107. The reconstruction is based upon Plut. *Sol.* 14.2 δεδοικῶς τῶν μὲν τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν; cp. also Diod. 7.12.5, of the oracle given to Lucurgus, ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν. Other proposals for the papyrus lacuna include φιλαργυρίαν (Kenyon), φιλοπλουτίαν (Blass³, Chambers 1965, 34: φιλοπλουτίαν does not fit the metre, and if it is the correct reading, this might suggest that possibly Aristotle was quoting from memory here). Solon, 30.21 uses φιλοκτῆμων in a negative context: on the compounds with φιλο-, see the discussion by Cozzo 1991, 29-30, 91-2, 94-6.

From the context in Aristotle and Plutarch we can safely infer that the two accusatives would have been introduced in Solon's text by a perfect tense of a verb of fear, pointing to the firmness of Solon's persuasion.

ὑπερηφανίαν: new. Cp. 3.36-7 (Εὐνομία) ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα πραῦνει. The wealthy are censured in Ar. *Plut.* 559-64, among other things, for arrogance. The two vices are distinguished by Plato, *Resp.* 391c5 ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίω ἀλλήλοιιν, ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὖ ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

2. For ἡσυχάζω transitive, cf. Pl. *Resp.* 572a5 ἡσυχάσας μὲν τῶ δύο εἶδη, Philo, *In Flacc.* 51.1 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Φλάκκος τά τε λεκτέα ἡσυχάζων καὶ τὰ ἡσυχαστέα λέγων οὕτως εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανεν, Joseph, *AJ* 7.147.6 τὰς μὲν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγεννημένας ἀπειλὰς ἡσυχάζειν ἔκρινεν, Dio Cass. *Hist.Rom.* 59.30.2 ἀνὴρ ὑπατευκῶς θαυμαστὸν δὴ τινα τρόπον αὐτοὺς ἡσύχασεν, ἀνελθὼν ἐς περιφανές τι χωρίον, Palladius, *Dialog. de vit. Joan. Chrys.* 41.4 παρακαλέσας δὲ τοὺς ἄνδρας φιλοθέῳ σιγῇ πρὸς πάντας ἡσυχάσαι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς παρουσίας.

Solon's ἡσυχία represents the restraint of spirit in the face of success, an idea that can be already found in *Odyssey* 18.142 where Odysseus advises Amphinomus that one

should hold the gifts of the gods silently, σιγῇ, and not to do ἀτάσθαλα as the suitors, and in Hesiod, *Op.* 119 where the golden race is enjoying many goods ἡσυχοί in contrast with the men of the silver race who suffered ills, as they could not keep from wanton ὕβρις, ll. 134f. (cf. Dickie 1984, 84-5).

ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ: A — possibly Solonian — fusion of various epic expressions, as Hom. *Il.* 17.111 ἐν φρεσὶν ἄλκιμον ἦτορ, Hom. *Od.* 15.486 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν ὄρινας, *Od.* 20.38 θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει, *Od.* 21.87 θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὀρίνετον; cp. Thgn. *IEG* 646 κείμενος ἐν μεγάλῃ θυμὸν ἀμηχανίῃ, Panyas. *PEG* 17.13 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν ἀέρση. For ἐνὶ φρεσὶ as a local dative, Aesch. *Supp.* 606 with Johansen and Whittle ad loc; for phrases mentioning φρένες in a positional relationship to another organ, as seen in Hom. *Il.* 8.202 ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός, Tyrt. 7.17 ἄλκιμον ἐν φρεσὶ θυμόν, Thgn. *IEG* 122 δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ, Aesch. *Cho.* 831-2 ἐν φρεσὶν καρδίαν, see Ireland-Steel 1975, 190.

The adjective καρτερός included both positive and negative qualities (for the latter see above all, Hom. *Il.* 5.757 where the term chastises the deeds of Ares as an ἄφρων who ὅς οὐ τινα οἶδε θέμιστα, or 5.872 for Diomedes' violent act that Zeus is asked to deplore, οὐ νεμεσίζῃ ὀρώων τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα; besides e.g. Aesch. *Supp.* 612, *PV* 212), but in the Homeric poems it almost always synthesised the positive values of heroic 'strength' and 'courage'. Here, in combination with the verb ἡσυχάζω, Solon makes it clear that he is thinking above all of its negative connotations: another instance of the reshaping of the epic values by the means of Homeric expressions, for which see, for instance, ad 1.3-4, 3.9, 7.5.

3. ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἡ]λάσατε: Cf. Tyrt. 8.10 ἀμφοτέρων δ' ἐς κόρον ἡλάσατε, Hdt. 2.124.3 ἐς πᾶσαν κακότητα ἐλάσαι, and for the phrase ἀγαθῶν ... κόρον, Aesch. *Ag.* 381f. (fully quoted above ad 3.9) οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔπαλξις πλούτου πρὸς Κόρον — if πλούτου is connected with κόρον, as some recent scholars (Fraenkel, Bollack) agree, and not with ἔπαλξις. Besides Fraenkel ad loc., cf. Dopchie 1968.

4. ἐν μετρίοισι: In Solon as in other early archaic poets (cf. Sol. 14.2, Thgn. *IEG* 335, Phoc. 12, Pind. *Pyth.* 11.52) μέτριος and its related concept μέσος express the notion of moderation, reflective attitude in a political content, which will produce in fourth century sources a concept of the *polis* as a community of οἱ μέσοι, the middle class (e.g. Eur. *Supp.* 244-5: ... ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις, κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὄντιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις; see further Morris 1996).

μέγαν νόον: this very combination of words is usually attested for the mind of gods: see *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 37 τόφρα οἱ (Demeter) ἐλπὶς ἔθελγε μέγαν νόον ἀχθυμένης περ, Hes. *Theog.* 36-7 ταὶ Διὶ πατρὶ ... τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἐντὸς

Ὀλύμπου, Pind. *Pyth.* 5.122 Διός τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων, Theoc. *Id.* 30.30 θεός ὃς καὶ Δίος ἔσφαλε μέγαν νόον; differently (but still with a very positive value) only in Pind. *Nem.* 6.5 ἀλλά τι προσφέρομεν ἔμπαν ἢ μέγαν νόον ἧτοι φύσιν ἀθανάτοισ.

However, in parallel with the case of καρτερόν (see ad l. 2), we can guess that Solon's use of the expression possibly balanced this highly positive connotation of the phrase (or of the similar idiomatic expressions μέγα/μεγάλα φρονεῖν or μεγαλοφρονέω, which most often in epic and in later Greek positively describe the greatness of mind of the heroes) against the negative meaning of 'arrogance' which the μεγαφρον- expressions are sometimes attested to have had in the Greek prose writers at least from the fifth century onwards, and which most probably already surfaces both here and in fr. 12.3: cf. Bissinger 1966, 307.

5. πεισόμεθ(α): The first person plural was thought by nineteenth century scholars to be proof of Solon's being a προστάτης τοῦ δήμου. However, as Masaracchia 1958, 276 lastly pointed out, far from being so, Solon rather uses some kind of powerful rhetoric in his attempt to check the greedy rich: the plural would better convey the idea of isolation the rich are going to face in relation to all the other Athenians.

οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια ... ἔσεται: the arrogant rich are driving Athens to an instability that might lead to tyranny (not mentioned in the text) and that certainly cannot be 'suitable' to their interests. By using the key-term of his *eunomia* in its basic sense (ἄρτια from ἀραρίσκω), Solon manages to imply that also the 'future' interests of the ruling class he tries to rebuke coincide with his own project for 'conformity' and *kosmos* inside the *polis* (see ad 3.32, 39, and ad 7).

6 G.-P.² (15 W.²)

The whole fragment with small changes is found in the Theognidean corpus, ll. 315-8. It appears to be a variation of the ideas of Solon's fr. 1 (see above all, ll. 3f., 7-10, 67-70) describing the destruction which derives from human wealth as well as the instability of it (note also the same *polyptoton* in frr. 1.76 and 6.4).

However, Solon's criticism of the wealthy is in the strongest terms here, because, unlike fr. 1, which, somehow, 'offered' to the audience a theory of ethics, this fragment does not have such an 'ambition', but looks like more connected to the specific and urgent events of Athens.

1. πολλοὶ ... πλουτοῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ ... πένονται: it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of the distinction ἀγαθοί and κακοί. One possibility is that it points here expressly to the 'technical' opposition between nobles and non-nobles (as a consequence of the developments taking place in pre-democratic Athens of Solon's age, many of the nobles, who traditionally in the aristocratic society of archaic Greece had also been the wealthier class, had become poor, and many non-*agathoi* rich, see e.g. Mitchell 1997, 143-4): in this case, as is clear from ll. 2f., Solon would number himself among the nobles who were poor and would be rejecting the new wealth of the non-ἀγαθοί in favour of aristocratic *arete*. It is much better to believe that the opposition points at the ethical distinction between, on one side, people who because of their merits and qualities would deserve to be rich (the 'men of account') but are not, and, on the other, the unworthy, evil people who, nonetheless, gain fortunes (a less historically plausible paradox provoked by the unforeseen characteristics of the destiny). I agree with Donlan 1968, 112f. that the latter possibility is better, because, after all, in the other poetic fragments preceding the reforms, Solon prefers to avoid the use for the ruling aristocrats of the term ἀγαθοί which, though being technical, could still imply the original positive value, and hints at the distinction between the powerful and leading class on one side, and the rest of the *demos* on the other side, in terms of possessing or not power and wealth (wealth which usually has negative connotations): frr. 3.7ff., 7.3, 8, 5.2-3; also fr. 12.3 ἀνδρῶν ... μεγάλων, fr. 31.4 μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες; see Donlan 1973, 366-7, n. 4. On the meaning of ἀγαθοί/κακοί in the poems following the reforms, where the dichotomy appears more technically to apply to the aristocratic (and usually rich) class and to the non-nobles, cf. Introd. to frr. 29-29^b.

What is more important, in my opinion, is that in this fragment Solon surely 'turns around' the social values underlying this terminology (rich-ruling-aristocratic class=virtuous people) and presents himself as an 'anomalous' *agathos*, namely a non-rich one, and at the same time dramatically disjoins his own new idea of ἀρετή from

wealth: contrast Solon's attitude to Hesiod, *Op.* 313 πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ (cf. Fränkel 1975, 232). Theognis appears to have gone far beyond in this direction, since he registers the economical emergency of the new (namely not aristocratic) rich as an 'unnatural' possession of wealth by evil people: 57-8 οἱ δὲ πρὶν ἐσθλοὶ νῦν δειλοί, 683 πολλοὶ πλοῦτον ἔχουσιν αἰδρίες· οἱ δὲ τὰ καλὰ ζητοῦσιν χαλεπῇ τειρόμενοι πενίῃ (321 ... κακῶ ἀνδρὶ βίον καὶ πλοῦτον ὁπάσση, 749-52 ὁππότε' ἀνὴρ ἄδικος καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ... ὑβρίζῃ πλούτῳ κεκορημένος, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι τρύχονται χαλεπῇ τειρόμενοι πενίῃ; 1061-2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύψαντες ἔχουσιν πλούτῳ, τοὶ δ' ἀρετὴν οὐλομένην πενίῃ (see Cerri 1968, and Lahr 1992, 19-23). See later Bacchyl. 1.160 πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ, 10.49-51 οἶδα καὶ πλούτου μεγάλαν δύνασιν, ἃ καὶ τ[ὸ]ν ἀχρεῖον τί[θησ]ι χρηστόν, Eur. *TGF* 247 τί δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρηστὸς ὄλβιος γεγώς; *TGF* 641 πλουτεῖς, τὰ δ' ἄλλα μὴ δόκει ξυνιέναι· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ὄλβῳ φαυλότης ἐνεστί τις, πενία δὲ σοφίαν ἔλαχε διὰ τὸ συγγενές, Ar. *Plut.* 502-4 πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄντες πλουτοῦσι πονηροί, ἀδίκως αὐτὰ ξυλλεξάμενοι· πολλοὶ δ' ὄντες πάνυ χρηστοὶ πράττουσι κακῶς καὶ πεινώσιν, Men. *Kol.* 43 οὐθεὶς ἐπλούτησεν ταχέως δίκαιος ὢν, fr. 84 K.-Th. πλοῦτος δὲ πολλῶν ἐπικάλυμ' ἐστὶν κακῶν, Crates, *PCG* 48 spoke of the man who had become rich through wrong-doing, ἀδικοχρήματος. Compare also the type of class/status expressions in Eur. *TGF* 326 ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὀθούνεχ' οἱ μὲν εὐγενεῖς βροτῶν πένητες ὄντες οὐδὲν ἀλφάνουσ' ἔτι, οἱ δ' οὐδὲν ἦσαν πρόσθεν, ὄλβιοι δὲ νῦν, δόξαν φέρονται τοῦ νομίσματος χάριν καὶ συμπλέκοντες σπέρμα καὶ γάμους τέκνων; δοῦναι δὲ πᾶς τις μᾶλλον ὄλβίῳ κακῶ πρόθυμός ἐστιν ἢ πένητι κάγαθῷ. κακὸς δ' ὁ μὴ ἔχων, οἱ δ' ἔχοντες ὄλβιοι. Cercid. fr. 1.1-11 Livrea=1.41-50 Lomiento (with the note ad loc.)

πένονται: With the meaning 'to toil' in Homer, here for the first time 'to be poor or needy'; see later Aesch. *Ag.* 962, Eur. *Hec.* 1220, etc.

2-3. οὐ διαμειψόμεθα τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον: The plural of the first person is here most probably a mere variety for the singular of fr. 1 — the inclusion of the audience as subject of this choice would not find any sure parallel in Solon's fragments. For the medium form, cf. Sol. 7.2, 23.6 and Tyrt. 1^b.6.

ἀρετὴ (still in a martial sense) and richness are two prerequisites for happiness commonly considered to be joined, and concretely combined e.g. in Homeric *Hymns*: 15.9=20.8 δίδου δ' ἀρετὴν τε καὶ ὄλβον. For the idea, cp. Solon's statement at 1.7-8, Sapph. *PLF* 148 ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ † ἀρέτας οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος ἃ δ' ἀμφοτέρων κρᾶσις† εὐδαιμονίας ἔχει τὸ ἄκρον†, adesp. *PMG* 961 οὐ μὴν ποτε τὰν ἀρέταν ἀλλάξομαι ἀντ' ἀδίκου κέρδους, Thgn. *IEG* 149-50 χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν Κύρν'· ἀρετῆς δ' ὀλίγοις ἀνδράσι μοῖρ' ἔπεται, Callim.

Jon. 95-6 οὐτ' ἀρετῆς ἄτερ ὄλβος ἐπίσταται ἄνδρας ἀέξειν οὐτ' ἀρετὴ ἀφένιοι· δίδου δ' ἀρετὴν τε καὶ ὄλβον, with McLennan ad loc.

The reading of Plutarch, αὐτοῖς, has been more often accepted than τούτοις of the codd. of Theognis and Stobaeus. Certainly, when a list of items precedes, οὗτος commonly resumes the last of them (what in our case would be absurd). If, however, we consider that the polemical target on which Solon focuses are the bad-rich of the first hemistich of l. 1 (here as several times elsewhere in Solon), and suppose that ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται consequently has a semi-parenthetical marginal relevance, the reading τούτοις (accepted by West) may not be desperate at all. It would have the emphatic connotation of contempt that οὗτος often has, in order to refer to the bad-rich who are the real enemies of Solon (cp. the use of οὗτος with reference to the opponent or the hostile party in Attic juridical or political prose).

3-4. The idea of virtue as the safest possession is often paralleled in the fifth century: cf. Bacchyl. 3.90-1 ἀρετᾶ[ς γε μ]ὲν οὐ μινύθει βροτῶν ἅμα σ[ώμ]ατι φέγγος (most probably opposed not only to youth but also to εὐφροσύνη δ' ὁ χρυσός l. 87 as a non-permanent possession: see Maehler ad loc.), and 13.176 Ἀρετὰ ... ἔμπεδον ... στρωφᾶται, Soph. *TrGF* 201d ἀρετῆς βέβαιαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κτήσεις μόνης, Eur. *El.* 939-44 ἡῦχαις τις εἶναι τοῖσι χρήμασι σθένων· τὰ δ' οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ βραχὺν ὁμιλῆσαι χρόνον. ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ παραμένουσ' αἶρει κακά· ὁ δ' ὄλβος ἀδίκως καὶ μετὰ σκαιῶν ξυνῶν ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, σμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον, *TGF* 53 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν κακοῖσιν εὐγένεια, παρ' ἀγαθοῖσι δ' ἀνδρῶν, *TGF* 542 οὗτοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος μόνον καὶ χρυσός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κἀρετὴ βροτοῖς νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν, ἢ χρῆσθαι χρεῶν, *TGF* 734 ἀρετὴ δὲ κἂν θάνῃ τις οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, ζῇ δ' οὐκέτ' ὄντος σώματος· κακοῖσι δὲ ἅπαντα φροῦδα συνθανόνθ' ὑπὸ χθονός, *TGF* 1029 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῆς κτῆμα τιμιώτερον· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε δοῦλον οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτ' εὐγενείας οὔτε θωπείας ὄχλου. ἀρετὴ δ' ὅσῳ περ μᾶλλον ἂν χρῆσθαι θέλῃς, τοσῶδε μείζων αὖξεται τελουμένη, *TGF* 1030 ἀρετὴ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις καλόν, *TGF* 1066 ἢ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ χρήμασιν λελείμμεθα, ἢ δ' εὐγένεια καὶ τὸ γενναῖον μένει; besides Lucian, *Anth.Pal.* 10.41.1-2 πλοῦτος ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς πλοῦτος μόνος ἐστὶν ἀληθής· τᾶλλα δ' ἔχει λύπην πλείονα τῶν κτεάνων.

Solon's statement is not a banality to be taken for granted, because the opposite notion that wealth guarantees and maintains one's social standing — otherwise reduced as a result of lack of it is also widely expressed. Cf. Alc. *PLF* 360.2 χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένυχρος δ' οὐδ' εἰς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος (Solon may have been in a polemical strain with the perspective of the *persona loquens* in Alcaeus' fragment, some Aristodamus: he says that a man is one's richness; Solon maintains that richness and the

man are well distinguished), *Scol. PMG* 910 οὐδὲν ἦν ἄρα τᾶλλα πλὴν ὁ χρυσός, Thgn. *IEG* 621 πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀτίει δὲ πενιχρόν, Bacchyl. 10.49 (quoted ad l. 1), Soph. *TrGF* 354.6-7 ἐμοὶ δ' οὐδεὶς δοκεῖ εἶναι πένης ὢν ἄνοσος, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ νοσεῖν, Eur. *El.* 37-8 χρημάτων δὲ δὴ πένητες, ἔνθεν ἡύγენαι' ἀπόλλυται, *Phoen.* 442 πένης γὰρ οὐδὲν εὐγενὴς ἀνὴρ, *TGF* 95 ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡύγένεια πρὸς τὰ χρήματα· τὸν γὰρ κάκιστον πλοῦτος εἰς πρῶτους ἄγει, and also later, Crantor Sol. *SH* 345 οὐκ ἔστι πενίας οὐδὲν ἀθλιώτερον ἐν τῷ βίῳ σύμπτωμα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν φύσει σπουδαῖος ᾗς, πένης δέ, κατάγελως ἔση.

3. ἔμπεδον αἰεὶ: at the beginning of the line also in Hom. *Il.* 16.107 (in a different position also in 15.683), and Thgn. *IEG* 1084 ἔμπεδον αἰέν.

4. χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ... ἔχει: Thgn. *IEG* 918 χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων (in the preceding hemistich of the pentameter).

For the gnostic notion of the instability of wealth, cf. Hes. *Op.* 326 παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ, Thgn. *IEG* 157-8 Ζεὺς γάρ τοι τὸ τάλαντον ἐπιρρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, ἄλλοτε μὲν πλουτεῖν, ἄλλοτε μηδὲν ἔχειν, Pind. *Pyth.* 3.106 ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀνδρῶν ἔρχεται κτλ., Men. fr. 116.1 K.-Th. περὶ χρημάτων λαλεῖς, ἀβεβαίου πράγματος, fr.ep.ad. CA 4.9-15 ἄλλοτε γὰρ ἄλλοις ὄλβου λάχος ἀνθρώποισιν· οἷη τοι πεσσοῖο δίκη, τοίηδε καὶ ὄλβου· πεσσοῦς ἀμειβόμενός ποτε μὲν τοῖς, ἄλλοτε τοῖσιν εἰς ἀγαθὸν πίπτει καὶ ἀφνεὸν αἶψα τίθησι πρόσθεν ἀνολβεῖοντ', εὐηφενέοντα δ' ἀνολβον· τοῖος δινητῆσι περιστρέφεται πτερύγεσσιν ὄλβος ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλον δ' ἐξ ἄλλου ὀφέλλει. That wealth — not only the unrighteous one — is short-lived is a common-place in tragedy, cf. Soph. *TrGF* 646.4 ἐν γὰρ βραχεῖ καθεῖλε κώλῳ χρόνῳ πάμπλουτον ὄλβον δαίμονος κακοῦ δόσις, ὅταν μεταστῇ καὶ θεοῖς δοκῇ τάδε, Eur. *Phoen.* 558 ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος, *HF* 511-2 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ὁ μέγας ... οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ βέβαιός ἐστι, *El.* 943 ὁ δ' ὄλβος ... ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, σμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον, *TGF* 618 τὸν ὄλβον οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ κρίνω βροτοῖς, ὃν γ' ἐξαλείφει ῥᾶον ἢ γραφὴν θεός. As for its fast passing from one to another, cf. Eur. *TGF* 420.4 where vanishing wealth is called ὑπόπτερος, and *TGF* 518.2 τοῦ μὲν (πλούτου) ὠκέϊα πτέρυξ.

ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει: Cf. Sol. 1.76 and note there.

7 G.-P.² (5 W.²)

The picture we draw from this poem can hardly be reconciled with the interpretations which have either celebrated Solon as a revolutionary leader championing the cause of the poor or criticised him for showing a paternalistic attitude towards *demos*. His objective was a more just, though still a stratified, society which sought to retain the co-operation of its élite: cf. Hornblower 1992, 228-9. As Solon puts it here, he gave as much as was sufficient to each of the groups in seventh- and sixth- century Athens (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274a15-18, who says that Solon only gave to the *demos* the very minimum of power), as his intentions were to preserve order and not to change the social position of either side.

1. δῆμῳ ... ἔδωκα τὸσον γέρας ... ὅσον ἀπαρκεῖ: For the thought, cf. Eur. *TGF* 626.1 δῆμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσης κράτος μήτ' αὖ κακώσης.

Literally γέρας means every kind of privilege, which someone has as an inherent feature of one's situation (old people, deceased or gods; in this case verbs of 'bestowing' are nowhere attested) or which someone is bestowed with because of one's social status; in this second case it either concerns the privileges of the kings, or of the military leaders, above all, the special share bestowed by the soldiers to the military leaders in the distribution of the booty or in similar cases (the most common verb of bestowing used is δίδωμι, as in Solon, both in the Iliadic occasions of division of the prey, cf. 1.123, 135, 138, 163, 276; 9.334, 367, and in the acknowledgement of Arete's kingship by the people in *Od.* 7.150). In this second meaning, which clearly better fits Solon's passage, γέρας always implies a kind of relationship in which the recipient (the leader of a group) is in a position of marked superiority to the donor (usually the group-members) — apart from the sarcastic parody of the equal gift-giving from beggar to beggar in *Od.* 20.297. For the etymology of the word, (probably Mycenaean in origin) see Chadwick-Baumbach 1963, 180, and Scheid-Tissinier 1994, 234-4. For the acquisitive heroic society, where γέρας is the material prize/rightful privilege from the standpoint of τιμή 'honour', which confers moral consideration to the one who possesses, see Riedinger 1976, and Bottin 1979.

Solon is inverting the Homeric organisation of sharing/redistribution by offering a *geras* not to a *basileus* /'king' or to an outstanding warrior or to a person of exceptional social standing, but to *demos*: as remarked by Anhalt 1989, 10 through this inversion of the donor and the recipient, Solon underscores his intention to distinguish the *demos* as an actor in the political process. I would also add a relevant detail of Solon's use of the Homeric cultural model, which Anhalt appears to have missed.

In by far the most numerous instances, the bestowing of the γέρας concerns the typical scene of the distribution of the booty, reflecting the 'tribal' use to put in common and afterwards dividing the spoils (cf. Borecki 1965, 12-4). But the premise of this distribution, and therefore of the bestowing of the γέρας, is obviously that something 'in common' exists to be distributed, as Achilles pointed out in *Il.* 1.123-4 πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί; οὐδέ τί που ἴδμεν ξυνήϊα κείμενα πολλά. Therefore, in this line Solon was also most probably implying (in order to cope with the dissatisfaction of the *demos*) that not only he had given the suitable γέρας to the *demos* (and not the leaders) but also that he, Solon, had *put in common* political rights, and started the distribution.

ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ: For ἐπαρκεῖ, preferred by West, cp. Soph. *El.* 354 ἐπαρκούντως expressing also a sense of sufficiency, or *Ant.* 612 ἐπαρκέσει νόμος which is the only instance of the verb without an object as in Solon, but ἐπαρκέσει has the different meaning of 'will hold good' or 'endure'~διαρκέσει.

Besides, ἀπαρκεῖ (which was already conjectured by Koraes before the discovery of the *Athenaion Politeia*) is by far the most idiomatic verb in this meaning: cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 379 (see the substantial note by Fraenkel ad loc.), *Pers.* 474, Soph. *OC* 1769, Eur. *TGF* 892.4, Ar. *PCG* 474. Ziegler 1963, 656 (after Bergk²) argues for a consecutive infinitive, rather than an indicative but I do not see the need for this.

2. ἐπορεξάμενος=Hom. *Il.* 5.335, where the participle is said of Diomedes 'leaning out to'. Lloyd-Jones (in Rhodes 1981, 172) interpreted 'not reaching out for it' (Solon would not be 'exposing himself' too much). However, here the recipient of the participle has to be the *demos* as it is understood from its opposition to ἀφελών with which it is connected by the οὔτε ... οὔτε: cf. also Vox 1984, 58. It is better to interpret, as Hudson-Williams 1926, 19 translates 'not handing out more than their due', in the sense which the verb has in the active voice and in tmesis in Hom. *Il.* 5.224f. εἴ περ ἂν αὖτε Ζεὺς ἐπὶ Τυδείδῃ Διομήδεϊ κῦδος ὀρέξῃ.

3. χρήμασιν ... ἀγητοί: First in Solon with the instrumental or causal dative (*aliter* Theoc. 1.126 τὸ καὶ μακάρεσσιν ἀγητόν, where the dative is an indirect object). It is worth noting that Solon characterises the 'respectability' of the group opposed to *demos* (which was traditionally labelled by the technical term ἀγαθοί, see ad 6.1) purely in materialistic terms.

4. καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην ... ἔχειν: For the use of the article as demonstrative in elegiac and lyric poetry, see e.g. Sol. 1.6, 1.58, Tyrt. 6.7, Thgn. *IEG* 33-4, 395, 871,

Pind. *Ol.* 6.75. For the syntax φράζω+infinitive, cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.347 in the sense of "to plan".

μηδέν ἀεικὲς ἔχειν: Sol. 30.13-4 δουλίην ἀεικέα ἔχοντας, cf. also 3.25. For the pattern, cf. Hom. *Il.* 19.133 ἔργον ἀεικὲς ἔχοντα; Hdt. 3.15.2 ἔχων οὐδέν βίαιον.

On the mediatory ethos of a correct ruler and of the correct political system in the later Athenian political ideology, cf. Eur. *Supp.* 403-8, 434-5, *IA* 339-45, *TGF* 626.1-2, Thuc. 2.37.1.

5. ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι: Compare Sol. 30.26-7 τῶν οὐνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος ὥς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος, and Sol. 31.8-9 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταχμίῳ ὄρος κατέστην.

Though being formally dependent also on Hom. *Il.* 17.742 κρατερὸν μένος ἀμφιβαλόντες, the shield-image was more probably reminiscent of Hom. *Il.* 3.334 (Paris)=16.135 (Patroclus) ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ὤμοισιν βάλετο ξίφος ... ἔπειτα σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρόν τε (*pace* van Effenterre 1977, 115-6, who maintains that σάκος alludes specifically to Ajax in the *Iliad*, whose σάκος is never called ἀσπίς). Jaeger observed that the use of the Homeric language shows that Solon felt he was a Homeric heroic warrior of his times, a protector of his people (most probably against internal political disaster and not against outsiders, as was proposed by Linforth 1919, 180). Furthermore, Solon's version of the Homeric image is surprisingly original as Solon covers with the shield not his shoulders but the two opposing factions, ἀμφοτέροισι, protecting one from the other. Solon's image constitutes a paradox also when compared to the Hoplite-tactics of his own time: ἔστην evokes the image of the phalanx, (see Tyrt. 8.28-38, Ar. *Vesp.* 1081-3) but on this battlefield Solon stands alone: Loraux 1984, esp. 206, has many good points on the metaphor, see also Anhalt 1989, 129. I would add the remarkable absence of the mention of the sword, which was present in both the armouring scenes quoted above: Solon is armed to protect both existing parties, and not to kill any opponent.

Vian 1960, 275 proposes to read ἔστην=ἀντέστην, 'I opposed both parties, posing myself between them', and therefore 'covering *myself* with the shield'. However, Solon's line shows that his aim was not self defence (*pace* Rhodes 1981, 172-3) but, as the following line confirms, not to allow either of the two conflicting parties to prevail (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 284).

6. οὐδετέρους: Hom. *Il.* 14.18 has οὐδετέρωσε, οὐδέτερος is first found in Hes. *Theog.* 638, and [Sc.] 171. Cp. for the thought, Sol. 30.22-5 εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον ἅ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥνδανεν τότε, αὐτὶς δ' ἅ τοῖσιν οὐτέροι φρασαίατο, πολλῶν ἂν

ἀνδρῶν ἥδ' ἐχηρώθη πόλις, and see Eur. *TGF* 21 δοκεῖτ' ἂν οἰκεῖν γαῖαν, εἰ πένης
ἅπας λαὸς πολιτεύοιτο πλουσίων ἄτερ; οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακὰ,
ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς. ἃ μὴ γὰρ ἔστι τῷ πένητι πλούσιος
δίδωσ'· ἃ δ' οἱ πλουτοῦντες οὐ κεκτῆμεθα, τοῖσιν πένησι χρώμενοι τιμώμεθα.

8 G.-P.² (6 W.²)

With the opposition between *demos*, the whole body of the citizens (cf. Forti-Messina 1956, quoted ad 3.7) and their chiefs, Solon had dealt with also in fr. 3.7. However the perspective from which Solon considers the leadership of Athens in this fragment is different from fr. 3. In fr. 3 the *demos* was stupidly being allured by wealth, and the leadership, which appeared to be rapacious and deliberately unrighteous, was the most negative pole of the opposition. Instead, in this fragment the leadership is not expressly told to be the worse element of the opposition, and though the conclusion that the citizens ought to follow their leadership is not drawn, it seems to be implied. A plausible explanation of this difference would be that fr. 8 belongs to a stage of Solon's political action later than *Eumonia* and Solon's archonship (cf. Ferrara 1954), or however a time when Solon was considering the dangers from an unruly *demos* no less than from an unruly noble-ruling class.

In Homer and in Hesiod *hybris* and *ate* are almost always connected with powerful and rich characters — for the variance of Solon with Hesiod in the sequence of the two factors, cf. ad fr. 1.12. In this fragment it is not sure at all that Solon is simply only concerned with the *hybris* of the leaders (*pace* Masaracchia 1958, 276, 286, and Ferrara 1964, 138). I agree with Santoni 1981, that Solon is most probably warning both classes, the *demos* and the leaders, not to exploit too much the situation and to loose the qualities of conformity/order (expressed with *artios*). Solon would first attest here the possibility that persons of the *demos* may be affected by *hybris*, when acquiring positions of *olbos*; taking evidently into consideration the increasing importance of the "new" mercantile wealth of Athens of his age, Aristotle, who was convinced that *hybris*, the exhibition of superiority, affects above all young and rich people (*Rh.* 2.1378b28), is very correct, when he 'glosses' the maxim first attested in Solon in connection, above all, with the "new rich" (*Protr.* fr. B4 Düring τίκτει γὰρ, ὥς φησι ἡ παροιμία, κόρος μὲν ὕβριν, ἀπαιδευσία δὲ μετ' ἐξουσίας ἄνοιαν, κτλ., and *Rh.* 1391a14ff. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἥθη τῷ ἅπαντα μᾶλλον καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλοῦτους (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι), κτλ.

1-2. δῆμος μήτε ... ἀνεθείς μήτε βιαζόμενος: The lines most probably were the model of Aesch. *Eum.* 526-8 μήτ' ἀναρκτον βίον μήτε δεσποτούμενον αἰνήσεις, and 696-7 τὸ μήτ' ἀναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν (where respectively the chorus and Athena warn against the danger of anarchy); cf. also Eur. *TGF* 626.1 δῆμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσης κράτος μήτ' αὖ κακώσης.

For ἀνεθείς, see Plut. *Per.* 11.4 μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνεῖς ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν.

σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο: Hom. *Il.* 12.87 and 13.801 ἄμ' ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἔποντο.

2. ἀνεθείς: for a similar use of the verb, cf. above all Hdt. 2.129.3 τὸν λεῶν τετρυμένον ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ ἀνεῖναι, and Eur. *Andr.* 727 ἀνειμένον τι χρῆμα πρεσβυτῶν γένος.

3-4. Cf. Sol. 3.5-10, 3.34 where the idea is expressed in a more general/absolute way. On the causal chain *olbos-koros-hybris-ate*, see 1.12-4 and 3.6-9, with notes ad locc. The kinship κόρος-ῥυβρις is stated in Thgn. *IEG* 153-4 τίκτει τοι κόρος ῥυβριν, ὅταν κακῷ ὄλβος ἔπῃται ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ which reproduces Solon's passage with some changes and, in a different order, also in the oracle quoted by Hdt. 8.77 κρατερὸν Κόρον, Ὑβριος υἱόν, and Pind. *Ol.* 13.10 cit. ad 3.6-8.

ὅταν ... ὄλβος ἔπῃται ἀνθρώποις ὅποσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ: Cf. Axiop. *CA* 5.2-3 χῶρος οἰκία τυραννὶς πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς καλλονὰ ἄφρονος ἀνθρώπου τυχόντα καταγέλαστα γίνεται. For πολὺς ὄλβος, cf. Sol. 29^b2.

9 G.-P.² (7 W.²)

The testimony, Plut. *Sol.* 25.6, quotes this line while making a personal comment on Solon's decision to leave Athens for a long trip soon after completing his reforms, in order not to have to cope with the opposite complaints against his legislation provoked by the different needs of the various classes. However, we do not have to assume that this line necessarily reflects Solon's personal experience *after* the reforms, and comments on the different dissatisfied responses he had got from the Athenians.

In fact, in this line Solon may have also simply pointed out (programmatically) how difficult it was for him to be in the middle between rich and poor, and to try to satisfy both: see fr. 7 and the testimony of Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 5.1-2, who says that in the elegy beginning with fr. 4 and including fr. 5 Solon would have presented himself as a ruler who πρὸς ἐκατέρους (=rich and poor) ὑπὲρ ἐκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ. Solon was not interested in taking sides and acquiring personal friendships and political partnerships (which would also involve enmity towards the enemies of the side he would have chosen or particularly favoured, see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 9.613-5 οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μή μοι ἀπέχθαι φιλέοντι. καλὸν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδιν ὅς κ' ἐμέ κήδη).

ἔργμασι<ν> ἐν μεγάλοις: Hom. *Il.* 10.282, Hdt. 1.14.4 μέγα ... ἔργον. ἔργμα is not used by Homer but occurs in Hesiod (2x) and the *Hymns*.

πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν χαλεπόν: A traditional characteristic of the archaic society is the importance of being positively considered among one's fellow citizens: apart from Solon's prayer in the beginning of the *Elegy to the Muses*, also Archil. *IEG* 133 warned that οὔτις αἰδοῖος μετ' ἀστῶν οὐδὲ περίφημος θανὼν γίνεται· χάριν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ζοοῦ διώκομεν <οί> ζοοί, while Pind. *Nem.* 8.38 wished for himself to die ἀστοῖς ἀδῶν (for a fuller collection of passages see Lévy 1985, 58).

Solon's concession that the difficulty to please everyone arises out of ἔργμασι<ν> ἐν μεγάλοις gives place in Theognis to a trend of general and more negative thinking on common opinions and likings, cf. ll. 23-4 πάντας δὲ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός· ἀστοῖσιν δ' οὔπω πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν δύναμαι, ll. 25-6 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ... πάντεσσ' ἀνδάνει ..., ll. 367-8~1184 a-b ... νόον ἀστῶν ὄντιν' ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ εὖ ἔρδων ἀνδάνω οὔτε κακῶς, ll. 801-4 οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὔτ' ἔσσεται οὔτε πέφυκεν ὅστις πᾶσιν ἀδῶν δύσεται εἰς Ἀΐδεω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅς θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσει, Ζεὺς Κρονίδης, θνητοῖς πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν δύναται; see also e.g. Bacchyl. 13.202-3 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπ' ἔργοις, adesp. *Anth.Plan.* 84 παντὶ δ' ἐπ' ἔργῳ μῶμος.

10 G.-P.² (28 W.²)

The tradition on Solon's trip to Egypt most probably derived from this short fragment or the poem it comes from. The chronology of this trip is much debated. Plut. *Sol.* 26.1 connected this trip with Solon's ἀποδημία after his legislation. Hdt. 1.29 says that Solon travelled to Egypt, and was a guest of Amasis during his ἀποδημία, the ten years he spent travelling abroad after the archonship — ostensibly for θεωρία, the pleasure of getting in touch with different peoples and cultures, but in reality to safeguard himself from the risk of being asked to change his Laws. But the same Herodotus — inconsistently with himself — presents Solon at 2.177 as including in his legislation the so-called νόμος ἀργίας which had been passed by Amasis (F 78a Ruschenbusch). The chronology of Amasis' reign (from 570 or 569 to 526) is also inconsistent with the date of Solon's ἀποδημία, which is said to have taken place more or less soon after Solon's legislation during his archonship (the canonical date for the archonship is 594-3; Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 13.1 dates Solon's *nomothesia* to 592-1: cf. Hammond 1940, 71-83; the attempts of Hignett 1952, and Miller 1959, id. 1963, id. 1968, id. 1969, to question the reliability of the ancient archons' list and to move the date of Solon's archonship down to the '70 of the 6th century did not find favour).

We do not have enough evidence to solve Herodotus' inconsistencies. It is possible that the reference to Amasis as the pharaoh at the time of Solon's trip is an invention induced by the fact that this pharaoh was the first and most important interfering with Greek archaic history, and even got the title of φιλέλλην (cf. Hammond 1955, 396 n. 1). Nonetheless, it is also possible that the whole story of Solon's ἀποδημία after the archonship was fictitious, made up by Hecataeus or by Herodotus: the trips of Solon might therefore have taken place in different periods of his life (cf. Podlecki 1976, and Wallace 1983, 88f.). After all, Plutarch, relying on Hermippus (fr. 7 Wehrli), speaks of a series of trips of the young Solon (unknown, or at least never mentioned by Herodotus and Aristotle), and it is plausible that also Herodotus' report about the law on the idleness as being inspired by the Egyptians and inserted in Solon's laws, reflected a tradition about juvenile trips of Solon, and specifically about his stay in Egypt (on this cf. Alessandrì 1989, esp. 191-215). In any case, the absence of any historical context does not allow to decide whether fr. 11 belongs to Solon's youth, or to the period after the *nomothesia*.

Also the problem of what town Solon's topographical allusion refers to cannot be solved in a definitive way. The town most often considered the best candidate is Naucratis. Naucratis was a trading town which lay according to Strabo on the east bank of the Canopic branch of the Nile some fifty miles from the open sea and the later Hellenistic capital Alexandria; archaeological evidence indicates that Naucratis was

founded before Amasis' reign and that the Greek settlement on the site dates back to 630-10: Bissing 1951; Braun 1982, 37-8, Boardman 1980, 121; Cook 1937. Therefore this town may well have been the city Solon is referring to here, as is maintained by von Bissing cit., 48 and Boardman cit., 132.

Another possibility should be discussed. In Plato's *Timaeus* (21c ff.), while reporting the λόγος Ἀτλαντικός — the story of Atlantis which Solon would have brought back to Greece from Aegypt (cf. also *Critias* 108d ff.), and started to sing in verses (cf. also Plut. *Sol.* 26.1) — Critias precisely starts with a description of the delta of the Nile, which culminates in a reference to the νομός Σαϊτικός and the city of Σάις: Ἔστι τις κατ' Αἴγυπτον, ... ἐν τῷ δέλτα, περὶ ὃ κατὰ κορυφὴν σχίζεται τὸ τοῦ Νείλου ῥεῦμα, Σαϊτικὸς ἐπικαλούμενος νομός. Sais fits the geographical specifics presupposed by Solon's fragment (though it is a bit more distant than Naucratis from the Canopic Nile), and Plato's phrase might be a reworking of Solon's line — one might even dare to conjecture that our fragment was the beginning of Solon's started but never concluded poem on Atlantis. However, Plato's testimony cannot lead to any certain conclusion, because Plato's report on Solon and Atlantis may have been fiction (cf. Weber 1927, 270-4) — in this case the philosopher, while attributing to Solon the tale of Atlantis, may have found it very profitable to exploit an 'Egyptian' line of Solon on an originally different subject for his own fictional reconstruction. On Solon and Atlantis, see further Griffiths 1991.

Νείλου ἐπὶ προχοῇσι: Cf. Hom. *Il.* 17.263 ἐπὶ προχοῇσι διπετέος ποταμοῖο, Pind. *Isthm.* 2.42 Νείλου πρὸς ἀκτάν, Aesch. *Supp.* 1024-5 Νείλου προχοὰς σέβωμεν ὕμνοις, Ar. *Nub.* 272 εἴτ' ἄρα Νείλου προχοαῖς ὑδάτων χρυσέαις ἀρύτεσθε πρόχοισιν. However, much closer to Solon are the parallels *GVI* 33.12 (beginning of the 2nd cent. B.C.) Νείλου τ' ἐν προχοαῖς Ναύκρατιν εἰσά[μ]ενοι, *GVI* 1080.1 (Roman period) Νίλου ἐπὶ προχοαῖς, *Epigr. Gr.* 1078.12 K. Νείλου προχοὰς ζεῦξαν ἀπειρεσίους, cf. also *GVI* 904.1 (3-2 B.C.): ἦκει ... Νείλου προχοὰς.

The Nile is named first in Hes. *Theog.* 338 (Hom. *Od.* 4.477 has Αἰγύπτιοι, διπετέος ποταμοῖο). The reference here is to the Nile Delta: cp. Aesch. *PV* 846-8 ἔστιν πόλις Κάνωβος, ... Νείλου πρὸς αὐτῷ στόματι καὶ προσχώματι, a passage which may have been influenced by Solon's description.

Κανωβίδος ἀκτῆς: The Canopic branch of the Nile; the homonymous city, said to have been founded by Menelaus in memory of his pilot who died there of snake-bite (Tac. *Ann.* 2.60) on the furthest north-west edge of the land of Egypt, is mentioned in Aesch. *PV* 846-8 (quoted above) and likewise in *Supp.* 311, Hdt. 2.15.1 etc.

11 G.-P.² (19 W.²)

Solon departing from Cyprus bids farewell to the king and the citizens of Soloi in Cyprus. The chronology of Solon's journeys has been variously debated (cf. Alessandri 1977/80, and Id. 1989; Reeker 1971; Markianos 1974; Podlecki 1976), but it falls completely outside the concern of the interpretation of Solon's poems. However, there is a general agreement about the date of Solon's stay in Cyprus after his *nomothesia*, sometime between 569 and 560, and not in the period of his travelling as a young man (cf. Plut. *Sol.* 2.1-2, after Hermippus) — the latter chronology appears to be solely favoured by Alessandri.

Post-Hellenistic sources inform us that Solon was connected with the foundation, or the re-foundation of Soloi by a king named Cypranor or Philocyprus (the latter name being confirmed by Hdt. 5.113). According to Ach.Tat. *Vita Arat.* in *schol. Arat.* p. 7.14ff. Martin, the town was called Soloi after Solon because of his advice to the king Cypranor during the foundation; in another source, Plut. *Sol.* 26.3-4, Soloi was the new name that king Philocyprus gave to the pre-existing town of Aipeia, again to honour the Athenian statesman who had advised him to re-locate the previous, ugly settlement in a fertile plain, and Solon himself planned what Plutarch calls the *συνοικισμός* of the town. For a suggestion about the location of Soloi, see Karageorghis 1973, and for Philocyprus' dates, Hammond 1955, 396 n. 2.

Linguistic history disproves beyond any doubt that the name Soloi was really connected with Solon, as the place-name is an Aramaic word already attested in Assyrian texts one century before Solon, cf. *RE* 3A, 938f. Besides, the antiquity of the tradition — as well as of the other (false) tradition regarding the foundation by Solon of an homonymous Soloi in Cilicia, which in fact was a Rhodian colony (both stories can be found flanked in *POxy.* 680 of the second half of the 3rd cent. A.D., cf. Gallo 1975) — has to be assessed taking into consideration that Hdt. 5.113, while mentioning the stay of Solon in Soloi, did not hint at any eponymic connection of the statesman with the town. As a fact, the traditions about the eponyms of both towns are not attested before the Hellenistic age, a period when many legends concerning the foundation of *poleis* arose as the result of the Hellenistic taste for aetiology.

Taking into consideration this doubtful evidence, Sykutris 1928, thought that the story of Solon being eponymous of Cyprian Soloi was a late fiction derived from the tradition of Solon being eponymous of the Cilician Soloi, and that the third distich of our fragment (which by the way is omitted by Ach.Tat. *Vit. Arat.* cit.) was a spurious addition introduced to record this story — indeed he took for granted that *οἰκισμός* l. 5 alluded to Solon's role as a *synoikistes*.

The authenticity of the whole fragment has been reaffirmed by Wilamowitz 1929, 459f. on the grounds of a reappraisal of the possible historicity of some kind of re-foundation (οἰκισμός)/resettlement of Soloi by Philocyprus (cp. Gelon's συνοικισμός of the inhabitants of Camarina and of Megara into Syracuse: see Hdt. 7.156); cf. also Reeker 1971, 103 and n. 27. Above all, it has also been observed that Solon's word οἰκισμός need not necessarily be intended as implying any reference to the story of Solon's participation in the foundation of the town (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 83-7, 288); quite on the contrary, the ambiguity of this and other expressions of fr. 11 may have started, as part of a 'political mythology', some fanciful reconstruction by a later scholar, for instance either an Attidographer (as we learn from Plut. *Sol.* 26.10-1 and Str. 14.683, Athenian propaganda singled out the Athenian Demophon son of Theseus, or Phaleros and Akamas, brothers of Demophon, as *ktistai* of Aipeia or of Soloi, respectively), or one of the Peripatetic biographers dealing with Solon's life, like Phainias or Hermippus, who appears to have been the first to treat Solon's journeys extensively (cf. Gallo 1975, cit. 189 n. 20, and Id. 1976). Furthermore, the absence of the last distich in *Vita Arati* proved to be a very weak *argumentum ex silentio* against its authenticity; as remarked by Alessandrì 1977/80, cit., 172f., the interest of Achilles Tatius was on the name of the citizens of Soloi, being both Σόλιοι and Σολεῖς; therefore he may have cut out lines of the poem which were not relevant to him.

This fragment is one of the most 'literary' of Solon, in the sense that the re-use of the Homeric models is most frequent and emphatic, consequently to the 'aulic' function it had as a farewell to a king. The poem would have been recognised in late antiquity as a (self-generated) *propemptikon* of equal to equal, according to Menander Rhetor's distinction between the sorts of the genre (Men. Rhet. 395.4-32). The equal standing of both is stressed by the way Solon employs the personal pronouns (ll. 1, 3), prominently in the starting positions of consecutive distichs and how he pairs the wishes for the king and himself in the *clausula*: the first couplet offered to his host is succeeded by the second containing a prayer and invocation of Aphrodite for his own protection and a good voyage; then the last couplet is equally divided between the good wishes for his addressee and the reiteration of the asking for divine help for the journey.

Some compliments and praise (being typical of the *propemptikon* from inferior to superior according to Men. Rhet.) appear to be implied in the first three lines, with Solon's wish about the king's long reign in Soloi and the mention of the island as κλεινὴ νῆσος. At any rate, even this very deferential reference to the island is also revealed in the following line as functional to the introduction of the idea of Solon's sea-voyage to Athens (and the dangers it implies).

Besides, the mention of Aphrodite is two-folded in this elegy, as was already remarked by Masaracchia 1958, 289. To say that it is explained by the regular association

of Aphrodite with Cyprus is to point out the obvious: she was traditionally Κυπρογένεια and here appears with her name Κύπρις (possibly intentionally adopted by Solon, as this name is rare in archaic Greek epic, see ad l. 4). Solon's mention of Aphrodite also points to her function as a marine goddess, protector of navigation and of the merchants: on Aphrodite's connection with the sea, cf. first of all Sappho's prayer to Κύπρις (PLF 5) for granting her brother Χάραξος a safe passage home from Egypt, the possible reflection of the pareymology of her name from ἀφρός 'sea-foam' and ὀδίτης 'wanderer' in the Hesiodic story of the birth of the goddess, *Theog.* 188-206 (for which see Kretschmer 1895, 267-68, and Boedeker 1974, 8 and 14-7), and her cult titles as Εὐπλοία, Λιμενία, Ποντία, Γαληναίη, Εἰναλίη, Θαλασσαίη, Ἰστοπόνος (on which cf. Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 433-437). This association of Aphrodite both with Cyprus and with Solon's return journey is fully exploited in the third distich. It not only resets the tone of general good wishes of the *propemptika* for the king of Soloi (this ring-composition was emphasised by Fränkel 1960, 71), but also in my opinion gives a very prominent final position to the author's νόστος towards his native city.

It is difficult to escape the temptation of seeing in the use of the word νόστος a hint at Odysseus' attitude which would fit Solon perfectly here. The possibilities and the implications of this analogy are evident. Philocyprus is a wonderful host, and Cyprus is a wonderful island (Calypso was in deep love with Odysseus, and promised immortality to him, *Od.* 5.209 / Alkinoos was so fond of Odysseus, that he promised Nausicaa in marriage to him, *Od.* 7.311-5; besides, Calypso's island was so beautiful that "even a deathless god who came upon that place would gaze in wonder, heart entranced with pleasure", *Od.* 5.73f./ Phaeacian Scheria is another paradise on earth, *Od.* 7.86-132 — Cyprus could still appear as a *locus amoenus* to the Athenians of 5th cent. Athens, cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 402-16); even so, I, Solon, have the duty to continue my journey back (νόστος) to my fatherland (πατρίς), like Odysseus who told Calypso that he wanted to οἴκαδέ τ' ἐλθέμεναι καὶ νόστιμον ἦμαρ ἰδέσθαι (*Od.* 5.220) / Odysseus had told Alkinoos that he had to go back to his πατρίς, *Od.* 7.332; nevertheless, I, Solon, am aware of the danger of the sea trip (on Odysseus' fear about the sea trip before leaving Calypso, see above all *Od.* 5.221-4 / even after listening to Alkinoos' guarantee that Odysseus would experience that the Phaeacian ships and sailors are the best, Odysseus prays to Zeus to fulfil this last promise of Alkinoos, *Od.* 7.329-32). Again, in accordance with the twofold structure of fr. 11, this kind of implications would not only please Philocyprus, but also reinforce the meaning of Solon's final invocation to the goddess, who would have to ward off from Solon the shipwreck which, instead, Odysseus had actually suffered after he left Calypso's island. After all, also from a formal point of view, the last distich appears to adapt the combination of the requests that we find in the phrase with which Odysseus expresses his intention to leave from Scheria (except that

Solon prays for the king's prestige and not for fame): Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἴθ' ὅσα εἶπε τελευτήσειεν ἅπαντα Ἀλκίνοος· τοῦ μέν κεν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν ἄσβεστον κλέος εἴη, ἐγὼ δέ κε πατρίδ' ἰκοίμην, *Od.* 7.331-3.

1. πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἀνάσσω: a combination of epic formulas for the second hemistich: Hom. *Il.* 2.343 πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' (έόντες/), *Od.* 4.594 (μῆ) ... πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' (ἔρυκε/), 15.68 πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' (έρύξω/), 15.545 πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδε (μίμνους/) with several expressions where ἀνάσσω, at the end of the hexameter (the typical position of almost all the various forms of this verb), is preceded by the name of the persons who command authority.

2. τήνδε πόλιν: Hom. *Il.* 24.728 πόλις ἦδε, *Od.* 6.177=6.195 τήνδε πόλιν καὶ γαῖαν ἔχουσιν, 7.26 τήνδε πόλιν καὶ ἔργα νέμονται.

γένος ὑμέτερον: For ὑμέτερος referring to one person cf. *Hom. Hymn Herm.* 309-10, Callim. *Del.* 203-4. See Floyd 1970, 122 n. 9.

3-4. To Solon's wish compare the one made by Sapph. *PLF* 5 for the return of her brother.

ξὺν νηὶ θεῇ: Hom. *Il.* 1.389-90 σὺν νηὶ θεῇ, *Il.* 16.123 νηὶ θεῇ, *Od.* 3.61 θεῇ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ (=10.332), Hes. fr. 43(a)67 νηὶ θεῇ.

4. ἀσκηθῇ πέμποι: together with the logically connected specification πατρίδ' ἐς ἡμετέρην of l. 6, this phrase resumes in an allusive way an *Odyssey*-phrase of book 5.26=144 ὥς κε μάλ' ἀσκηθῆς ἦν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἵκηται (~168), and book 9.79 καὶ νύ κεν ἀσκηθῆς ἰκόμην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν (differently *Il.* 16.247 ἀσκηθῆς μοι ἔπειτα θεὰς ἐπὶ νῆας ἵκοιτο), and varieties it through two other epic expressions, *Od.* 5.263 πέμπ' ἀπὸ νήσου διὰ Καλυψώ and 15.65 μ' ἀπόπεμπε φίλῃν ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν. As remarked by Alessandrì 1977/80, 190-1, the use of ἀσκηθῆς in the Homeric model *Od.* 5.26, 144~168 was more 'logical' than in Solon — one arrives 'safe', does not leave 'safe': by using the adjective as 'proleptic', Solon means "so that I am safe" (on arrival), and the word hints at the sentimental focus of his on that very moment.

Κύπρις ἰοστέφανος: The goddess' name Κύπρις is found five times in the *Iliad*, all in book 5, once in the *Hymns*, and once in the Hesiodic fragments, never receiving an epithet. Its limited use as well as the lack of epithet systems, suggest that it was not a traditional part of Aphrodite's names in archaic epic, cf. Boedeker 1974, 18-22 and Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 310-318.

Apart from the ἐϋστεφάνου τ' Ἀφροδίτης (*Od.* 8.267), or ἐϋστέφανος Κυθήρεια (*Od.* 8.288, 18.193), the equimetrical variant ἰοστέφανος is only posthomeric

(*Hom.Hymn* 5.175, 6.18, Thgn. *IEG* 1304, 1332, 1383, Polystr. *Anth.Pal.* 12.91.6; cf. also *CEG* 368 (ca. 600-550? or ca. 500?) *Φιοστεφάνοι Ἀφροδίται*, *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 102 *φιλοστεφάνου Ἀφροδίτης*, *CEG* 454.3 (ca. 535-20 or 525-20) *καλλιστε[φά]γο: Ἀφροδίτες* on 'Nestor's Cup'). Aphrodite shares this epithet with several other divine figures, but according to Cook 1900, 5-10, and Boedeker 1974, 28, the epithet may refer to the garlands often worn in the sacred dances in cults associated with vegetal or animal fertility (the evidence for such cult functions of Aphrodite is gathered in Farnell 1896-1909, II, 642-53).

5-6. The distich addresses Philocyprus and what Solon intends is that, besides this (re)foundation (which the goddess has already permitted), she should also give future prestige (to the new city and to the king) and safe return (to Solon). The parallelism established by Solon can be found again in Pind. *Pyth.* 1.33-8 *ναυσιφορήτοις δ' ἀνδράσι πρῶτα χάρις ἐς πλόον ἀρχομένοις πομπαῖον ἐλθεῖν οὔρον· εἰκότα γάρ καὶ τελευτᾷ φερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν. ὁ δὲ λόγος ταύταις ἐπὶ συντυχίαις δόξαν φέρει λοιπὸν ἔσσεσθαι στεφάνοισι νικῶν ἵπποις τε κλυτὰν καὶ σὺν εὐφώνοις θαλίαις ὀνυμαστάν.* The striking similarity, and the fact that Pindar's passage is also thematically close to Solon in celebrating a new-founded city, Etna, in connection with its founder Hieron (see below, ad l. 5), suggest that these lines of Pindar may have been directly influenced by Solon, where the combination of the two wishes reflected, however, the pragmatic situation of the poet and of the *propemptikon*-nature of the poem.

κῦδος ... ἐσθλόν: Solon exploits again the practice of bold conflation of Homeric formulas, which we saw operating in other lines of this 'aulic' poem. Indeed, the obvious Homeric models for *χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι* (see ad l. 5) appear to be varied through the reminiscence of the widespread formula *κλέος ἐσθλόν*, possibly provoked by *Od.* 7.331-3, a passage of relevance for the poetic ideology of Solon's poem (see *Introd.*).

The meaning of *ἐπί+dat.*='on the basis of' (Solon: 'given that you have founded this city, may the goddess' etc.), with the "dative of the motive" is certainly less frequent than the final value of *ἐπί+dat.*, but it is well attested from Homer onwards: see e.g. *Il.* 2.270 *ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασαν* and 9.492 *ἐπὶ σοὶ μάλα πόλλ' ἔπαθον* (cf. Gonda 1957, 7). One might also accept here for *ἐπί+dat.* the meaning 'in addition to', 'besides' (*LSJ* s.v.); for the verb *ὀπάζω* with this secondary meaning 'give besides something else, add', *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 120, *Hom.Hymn* 24.5, Pind. *Isthm.* 6/5.67, see *LSJ* s.v. II.2), cp. also the much later attested *ἐποπάζω* 'bestow besides' (*LSJ* s.v.).

5. οἰκισμῷ: Casevitz 1985, 100 paraphrasing Plut. *Sol.* 26.4, connects *oikismos* with Soloi and its population (*oiketores*), and adds that the simple *oikismos*=operation of the foundation (of a new city) is the poetic equivalent of *synoikismos*. The most ancient

instance of the word after Solon is Plato's *Leg.* 4.708d, where πόλεων οἰκισμοί refers to the (historic) operations of foundations of cities. *Oikismos* cannot mean anything other than foundation=re-foundation / resettlement with the inclusion of new citizens, taking into consideration what Plutarch says. However, as already stated by Masaracchia 1958, 288, this does not imply any direct connection of Solon with the arrangements of the re-foundation of Soloi and the consequent eponymity with Solon (see Introd.). I would add that the mention of the foundation is justified on its own, without implying an involvement of Solon in the foundation, because references to the more or less recent episode of the foundation of a city is a very common feature in eulogistic poetry about cities and rulers of the choral poetry of the late sixth and fifth centuries, for which a real "poetics of colonisation" (see Dougherty 1993) may have existed: cf. above all Pind. *Pyth.* 1.59-63 (Etna), 5.55-61, 72-81 and 89-95 (Cyrene), *Ol.* 7.27-33 (Rhodes); Bacchyl. 11.64-72 (Tiryns). In the opinion of the author of the *Vita Aeschyli* 9 (*TrGF* III p. 34), Aeschylus, too, in his tragedy celebrating the foundation of Etna, εἰς Σικελίαν Ἰέρωνος τότε τὴν Αἴτνην κτίζοντος ἐπεδείξατο τὰς Αἴτνας οἰωνιζόμενος βίον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς συνοικίζουσι τὴν πόλιν — exactly the motivation which appears to have underlain this short poem by Solon.

χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι: resumed by [Sol.] 40.2 τύχην ἀγαθὴν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάσσαι. The models are Hom. *Od.* 15.320 ἀνθρώπων ἔργοισι χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζει, and *Il.* 4.95 χάριν καὶ κῦδος ἄροιο (more common is the simple κῦδος ὀπάζει, cf. *Il.* 8.141, 16.730, 17.566, Hes. *Theog.* 438; for χάριν ὀπάζειν cf. *Hom. Hymn* 24.5). In the Homeric epic the verb is used of abstract notions and usually refers to divine interventions, as it does here: cf. Scheid-Tissinier 1994, 20.

Solon's request for κῦδος "strength", "power," "prestige" refers to the king, (cp. Alc. *PLF* 70.13 Φιττάκῳ δὲ δίδοις κῦδος ἐπήρ[ατ]ον), and in this way, κῦδος takes up πολὺν χρόνον ἀνάσσω (l. 1) in ring composition.

6. πατρίδ' ἐς ἡμετέρην: Cf. Thgn. *IEG* 1044 πατρίδος ἡμετέρης; Sol. 3.1 ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις.

12 G.-P.² (9 W.²)

The wishful statement expressed at the beginning of fr. 3 is about to be overtaken by the worsening of the situation, and because of the actual ruin of the *polis* by the aristocratic ruling class (the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι of l. 3, more derogatorily called μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες in fr. 31.4), the δῆμος, the whole body of the citizens who did not trust any more these traditional ἡγεμόνες of theirs, are on the point of resorting to give the full autocratic power over the *polis* to a μόναρχος.

The μόναρχος Solon speaks about must still be identified, if not with Peisistratus, with a tyrant like Peisistratus, whose access to absolute power would really be a consequence of the political disaster which Solon charges against the irresponsibility of the δήμου ἡγεμόνες in fr. 3 and here, first of all, against the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες of l. 3: it is hardly possible to prove that Solon is not referring to the same people (see further ad l. 3). Therefore, I think that the point of frr. 3 and 12 has to be the same, namely a prospective fear, and I do not believe that Solon's fragments (12, 14, 15) dealing with the autocratic danger may be the retrospective reflection, product of Solon's youth on the extraordinary office given to Drakon for his law-giving, as was suggested by Rihll 1989.

Plut. *Sol.* 3.23-9 reports the initial distich of this fragment, together with fr. 13, in order to show Solon's "simple and old-fashioned" knowledge ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς, in contrast with his keen interest in, and love of the ethic-politic thought (φιλοσοφίας δὲ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μάλιστα τὸ πολιτικόν, ... ἡγάπησεν). Plutarch considered this passage as a versification by Solon of 'naive' principles of coming-into-being, since he most probably shared the picture maintained by Dicaearchus (frr. 30, 31 Wehrli=T 106 and 112 Martina; cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 122f.), according to whom the Seven Sages would have been concerned with the θεωρητικὸς βίος, and therefore would have been mainly συνετοὶ καὶ νομοθετικοί. This perspective led Plutarch to misunderstand the thoughtful and skilful use of the meteorological images by Solon.

We cannot see here either a simple re-use of Homeric imagery. Masaracchia 1958, 298-99, tried to connect Solon's meteorological allegory with Zeus, since in the epic Zeus oversees the meteorological phenomena — e.g. *Il.* 2.146, 10.154, 13.796 —, and Solon himself in fr. 1 had explicitly compared Zeus' punishment with the spring-wind. However, at least here, in my opinion, Solon's approach to the physical aetiology of the natural phenomena is evidently profane, since Solon does not connect them at all with Zeus, and to see Zeus behind the allegory is over-stressed: as was already remarked by Fränkel 1975, 228 it is not Zeus who sends tyranny, and the calamities of the actual situation are human faults: cp. Solon's remarks and ideas on responsibility for the situation in Athens in fr. 15. In fact, Masaracchia, somehow, contradicts his remarks, when he points to *Il.* 15.170 as the main model of Solon's l. 1 (see below), where, in

contrast with the other Homeric passages he had quoted before, there is no mention of Zeus.

Certainly Solon uses here the meteorological images first of all to "bring out the elemental power of the process described but also to reveal the iron law of causality that governs political and social life corresponding to the absolute necessity of nature", as remarked by Jaeger 1926=1966, 93 (see also Müller 1975, 135), and Solon's allegory itself belongs to a tradition well established in archaic poetry which explains in terms of meteorological phenomena negative ideas (war, civil disorder, discord, e.g. Archil. *IEG* 105, Alc. *PLF* 326; see Edmunds 1987, 9 for later instances and bibliography). At any rate, in my opinion, far from simply touching on the subject of nature in a simplistic way, Solon skilfully exploits the popularity of the meteorological speculations among the Ionian philosophers, and a correct appreciation of Solon's implications reveals a competence the subtlety of which has not so far been noticed.

At first sight the two meteorological phenomena in ll. 1f. appear to be co-ordinated to each other at the same level — from the clouds come the snow and the hail, just as from the lightning comes the thunder —, and as a consequence the responsibility of the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι in ruining the city and the ignorance of the δῆμος, resulting in empowering a μόναρχος, would also seem independently co-ordinated facts. Instead, Solon was most probably referring to the contemporary theories of nature which had stated that the lightning and the thunder were a product of the clouds, no less than, more obviously, the snow and hail (for which cf. e.g. Anaximen. *VS* 13A7.7 and Anaxag. *VS* 59A85). Indeed, we know that at least a younger contemporary of Solon, Anaximander, had acknowledged that the thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and hurricanes are all produced by the interaction of winds and clouds: according to the testimony of Aetius (~Sen. *QNat.* 2.18: *VS* 12A23) περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν ... Ἄ. ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ταυτὶ πάντα συμβαίνειν· ὅταν γὰρ περιληφθὲν νέφει παχεῖ βιασάμενον ἐκπέσῃ τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ κουφότητι, τόθ' ἢ μὲν ῥῆξις τὸν ψόφον, ἢ δὲ διαστολὴ παρὰ τὴν μελανίαν τοῦ νέφους τὸν διαυγασμὸν ἀποτελεῖ. The point was destined to be reaffirmed by other naturalistic philosophers: after Anaximen. *VS* 13A17 see Heraclit. *VS* 22A14 βροντὴν μὲν κατὰ συστροφὰς ἀνέμων καὶ νεφῶν καὶ ἐμπτώσεις πνευμάτων εἰς τὰ νέφη, ἀστραπὰς δὲ κατὰ τὰς τῶν θυμιωμένων ἐξάψεις, and Anaxag. *VS* 59A1.9 βροντὰς σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν· ἀστραπὰς ἔκτριψιν νεφῶν (cf. also A42.11).

Therefore, if Solon shared this naturalistic interpretation — which is possible in terms of chronology — he would have meant that, as the νεφέλαι are responsible not only for the snow and the hail, but also for the thunderbolt and the thunder, so the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι, the Athenian élite, were explicitly responsible for the ruin of the *polis*, but implicitly also the main cause of the despair (cf. 3.21-5) which was going to lead the

δῆμος, because of its αἰδρεΐη, to look for a tyrant (*pace* Masaracchia 1958, 298 who thinks that Solon is blaming the faults of *both* classes).

1. χιόνος μένος ... χαλάζης: See Sol. 1.23 ἡελίοιο μένος. Of natural/inanimate forces already in Homer, where μένος is a metaphor from the vitality of a human being or animal: Hom. *Il.* 15.170 ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἄν ἐκ νεφέων πτῆται νιφὰς ἢ ἐ χάλαζα is particularly close to the Solonian imagery. For hail and snow combined in the same passage, see *Il.* 10.6-7, 15.170-1 (quoted), 22.151-2.

3. ἀνδρῶν ... ἐκ μεγάλων πόλιν ὄλλυται: note the use of ἐκ, which is not the preposition we would expect with ὄλλυσθαι (ὑπό is more common), but contributes to stress the parallelism with l. 1f. (cf. Römisch 1972, 166f.). With μεγάλοι ἄνδρες Solon means the aristocratic ruling class which in fr. 31.4 is referred to as μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες, and in fr. 3.7 as δήμου ἡγεμόνες. Theognis, *IEG* 43-52, in a similar context, will exclusively blame the κακοὶ ἄνδρες for the plight of the city and the *demos*, ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ... φόνοι ἀνδρῶν μούναρχοί τε· πόλει μήποτε τῇδε ἄδοι. For the negative implications of μεγάλοι, cf. ad 5.4.

μονάρχου: Hsch. μ 1604 L. μονάρχου· τυράννου. Alc. *SLS* S271.5]ου μοναρχ[/]τυρανν[, and *PLF* 6.27 μοναρχίαν; see besides Thgn. *IEG* 52 quoted above (in plural, to criticise the growth of tyranny), Pind. 169a10, Aesch. *PV* 324, Hdt. 3.80.2, 5.46.2 (other instances of the word in Berve 1967, 5 and Lanza 1977, 236). The word was used again after Solon by Alcmaeon in a similar context, to define the loss of the ἰσονομία between the opposite elements of the human body, and its consequent sickness, cf. ad 29^b.9.

3-4. The verbs ὄλλυται, ἔπεσεν (a gnomic aorist, as was already remarked by Mühl 1956, 317 n. 3), and ἐστι refer to statements of universal applications while ἤδη χρή (l. 6) points to the unavoidable consequence of the parallelism for the actual state of affairs in Athens: see Linforth 1919 ad loc., and Masaracchia 1958, 299.

4. δῆμος ... αἰδρεΐη ἔπεσεν: For the thought of ll. 3-4, cf. Eur. *Supp.* 423-5 ἡ δὲ νοσῶδες τοῦτο τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν, ὅταν πονηρὸς ἀξίωμ' ἀνὴρ ἔχη γλώσση κατασχὼν δῆμον, οὐδὲν ὦν τὸ πρίν, Eur. *TGF* 200.4 σὺν ὄχλῳ δ' ἀμαθία πλείστον κακόν.

On the favour and support of the δῆμος towards the tyrant, besides Sol. fr. 15, cf. the contemporary Alc. *PLF* 348. Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.1310b14-16, 29-31 considers the early tyrants demagogues, meaning that they enjoyed popular=non-élite support. He also states that the tyrants acted as champions of the people against the rich (πλούσιοι), and that they

were trusted by the people because they attacked the γνώριμοι (*Pol.* 5.1305a22-3, 1310b12-16); see also *Pl. Resp.* 8.568e ἐκ τῶν πατρώων θρέψεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἐταῖροι καὶ ἐταῖραι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἐταίρους. On the tyrants as orientated by the aim of putting an end to the arbitrary rule and privileges of the aristocrats, see Salmon 1997, 62-4; on the dialectic relations between aristocracy and tyranny, see generally Stahl 1987.

αἰδρεΐη: often in epic with the extension genitive νόοιο (e.g. *Hom. Od.* 11.272 αἰδρεΐησι νόοιο, *Hes. Op.* 685 αἰδρεΐησι νόοιο), but also twice alone, *Od.* 10.231 and 12.41=ἀπειρία (which is the usual explanation of the word: *Apoll. Soph* 17.3, *Hsch.* α 1794 L., *Suda* α 677 A.). Solon may have intended to allude specifically to the two *Odyssey*-passages, because in both of them Odysseus' companions by their αἰδρεΐη (ignorance, stupidity) are bewitched by Circe or lured to their doom by the song of the Sirens: Circe θύρας ὥϊξε φαεινὰς καὶ κάλει, the companions αἰδρεΐησιν ἔποντο; as for the Sirens, ὅς τις αἰδρεΐη πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ does not escape death (Römisches 1972, 166f. had already pointed out the latter passage, but missed the similar relevance of the former). Such an allusion by Solon is all the more probable, because of the image of entrancing fascination also implied in fr. 15.7f.

The formation of the name, from ἴδρις, is far from being sure: αἰδρι-η (with lengthening of ι in ει, by analogy to the formations from the themes in σ-: *LfgrE* s.v.), or αἰδρι-ιη (from the weak vocalism of the root and contraction: West ad *Op.* 685), or αἰδρεj-ια (from the full vocalism: Solmsen 1909, 250). No choice is, therefore, possible between the two different readings of the MSS.

δουλοσύνην: Solon is fond of using the term, for the meaning of which, see fr. 15.4 and the remarks at fr. 3.18. Here the αἰδρεΐη of the *demos* consists in believing that the tyrant leads them to freedom from the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες, whereas a tyrant leads everyone — rich and poor — to slavery.

ἔπεσεν: probably a gnomic aorist (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 299, and Maharam 1993, 395), hinting at the certainty of the features of a tyrannic rule, which the *demos* ignored.

5. λίαν δ' ἐξάραντ': λείης δ' ἐξεραντα V, which makes no sense. Bergk corrected in λείως δ' ἐξάραντα which he translated '*si quem plane extuleris*', comparing *Phot. Lex.* p.383 N. τὸ γὰρ λέως ἔστι τελέως. However, apart from *Archil. IEG* 226 λέως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐφρόνεον, and a series of testimonies in the lexicographers (see West ad *Archil.* fr.cit.), λέως is only found in compounds (e.g. λεωργός).

Most recent editors of Solon adopt Schneidewin's correction λίαν δ' ἐξάραντ' '*si quem nimis extuleris*' which better conveys the idea of supreme power a tyrant was vested in: cp. *Sol.* 15.3 αὐτοὶ τούτους ηὔξήσατε.

κατασχεῖν: Here said of the *demos* who is going to be powerless in stopping the emerging tyranny. In fr. 30.22 οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, 31.6 οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον the verb is, instead, seen from the perspective of the one towards the many.

6. <περὶ>: νοέω means 'to acknowledge', more than 'to consider well' in order to devise. When this latter meaning is needed, which clearly best fits Solon's context, it is usually emphasised by coupling the verb with a co-ordinated or a participial form of φράζομαι or complementing it with ὀξύ (see the instances in *LfgrE* s.v.): in Solon we would expect something like πεπνυμένα πάντα νοῆσαι (Hom. *Od.* 18.230). To avoid this lack in emphasis on the devising strength of the verb, one could accept West's <καλὰ πάντα νοεῖν, or Dindorf's <περὶ πάντα νοεῖν. I favour the latter, because it does not present the structural problems noted by Gentili-Prato, namely that the pattern monosyll.+bisyll.+bisyll.+bisyll. is never found in Solon. For περινοέω, cf. schol. Tzet. in Ar. *Ran.* 958 περινοεῖν: πανουργότατα καὶ βαθέως πάντα νοεῖν.

13 G.-P.² (12 W.²)

Regarding the choice of the metaphor, Solon is clearly near to Alcaeus who singled out the winds as the beginning cause of the allegorical storm at sea against the ship of State: *PLF* 326.1-4 ἀσυννέτημι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔνθεν κῦμα κυλίνδεται, τὸ δ' ἔνθεν, ἄμμες δ' ὄν τὸ μέσσον νᾶϊ φορήμεθα σὺν μελαίνα. However, in the case of Alcaeus, we cannot say anything else about the context. In the case of Solon we can, because of fr. 12. Indeed, the naturalistic colouring and overtones of this fragment have to be understood allegorically, as it is clearly shown by the formal correspondences between ἐκ νεφέλης πέλεται χιόνος μένος ἡδὲ χαλάζης of fr. 12 and ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα τaráσσεται of fr. 13 (both the clouds and the winds hint at the irresponsible ruling aristocrats), as well as by the instances of other parallels which take up Solon's implicit (or, at any rate, not-reported to us here) reference to the Athenian *demos* as sea: cf. fr. iamb. adesp. 29 D.³ δῆμος ἄστατον κακὸν καὶ θαλάσση πάνθ' ὁμοῖον ὑπ' ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται, καὶ γαληνὸς ἦν τύχη πως, πνεῦμα βραχὺ κορύσσεται, *Hdt.* 7.16 τὰ σὲ καὶ ἀμφότερα περιήκοντα ἀνθρώπων κακῶν ὁμιλίας σφάλλουσι, κατὰ περ τὴν πάντων χρησιμωτάτην ἀνθρώποισι θάλασσαν πνεύματά φασι ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῇ ἐωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι, *Dionys.Hal. Ant.Rom.* 17.12 παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχουσιν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις τοῖς πελάγεσιν· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων τaráττεται φύσιν ἔχοντα ἡρεμεῖν, αὗται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δημαγωγῶν κυκῶνται μηδὲν ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσαι κακόν (where the uncommon verb κυκάω for humans, cp. *Sol.* 1.61, may reinforce the possibility of a reminiscence of Solon), *Polyb.* 11.29.9 ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περί τε τοὺς ὄχλους καὶ τὴν θάλατταν. καθάπερ γὰρ κάκεινης ἢ μὲν ἰδία φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβῆς τοῖς χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δ' εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ τὰ πνεύματα βία, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις οἷοί τινες ἂν ὦσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἰεὶ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ γίνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους οἷους ἂν ἔχῃ προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους, *Liban.* 25.44.3 ἦν δὲ κυματίας ὁ δῆμος γένηται κτλ. (on which see Lomiento 1987); also *Liv.* 28.27.11 *sed multitudo omnis sicut natura maris per se immobilis est, [et] venti et aurae cient; ita aut tranquillum aut procellae in vobis sunt; et causa atque origo omnis furoris penes auctores est, vos contagione insanistis*, 38.10.5 *qui volgata similitudine, mari tranquillo, quod ventis concitaretur, aequiperando multitudinem Aetolorum, usus, cum in fide Romanae societatis mansissent, insita gentis tranquillitate quiesse eos aiebat*, *Cic. Clu.* 49 *ex quo intellegi potuit, id quod saepe dictum est, ut mare quod sua natura tranquillum sit ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari.*

Masaracchia 1958, 300 notes the Homeric influence of the wave-similes in *Il.* 2.144-6, 394-7, 4.422-8, where the noise of the crowd of the Achaeans is compared with the surge and noise of the waves, but the Homeric examples account for a single detail of Solon's imagery, which at least in its main idea of natural 'justice' could not have derived from Homer, but was probably conditioned by the thought of the naturalistic philosophy and the theories on nature (cf. Müller 1975, 135f.).

According to the testimony schol. Nic. *Alex.* 172, Heraclitus (VS 22A14a) would have said that the sea is δοῦλος of the winds. Besides, certainly Nicander, and possibly also Heraclitus, said that the sea, only as a consequence of the intervention of the ἐχθροί winds on it, becomes a δεσπότης φιλοργῆς of the sea-men (καί ῥ' ἡ μὲν ἀκοσμήεσσα, φιλοργῆς δεσπόζει νηῶν τε καὶ ἐμφθορέων αἰζηῶν). If Solon was already aware of this kind of imagery, and his distich belonged to a longer poem where the comparison of *demos* to the sea was furthered, the following context of the fragment might have been articulated in analogous terms to fr. 12, and the evolution of Solon's thought may have run somehow like this: "it is because of the winds (the troublesome leaders), that the sea (the *demos*) is now in the storm (the tyranny of a μόναρχος — the *demos* alone would not have, otherwise, resorted to a tyrant)".

Besides, the opinion that the sea, when it is not stirred by the winds, is "naturally smooth", may have had its beginnings in the concern of the naturalistic philosophers for the definition of the qualities of the elements: see the much later Anon. *Introd. ad Arat. schol.* p. 92.20-23 Maass ... καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ γίνεται· τὸ <γὰρ> ὕδωρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων κινούμενον ἀνώμαλον δείκνυσι τὴν ἐπιφάνειάν ποτε μὲν κυρτουμένων κυμάτων διὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος σφοδρότητα, εἴθ' ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης εἰς λειότητα διαχεομένων. At any rate, it was certainly a standard point of popular thought: see Aesop. *fab.* 178 Hausrath, where a shipwrecked complains with the sea being calm after the storm, ὅτι γε δελεάζουσα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ πραύτητι τῆς ὄψεως, ἥνίκα ἂν αὐτοὺς προσδέξηται, ἀπαγριουμένη διαφθείρει, and θάλασσα, personified as a woman, answers with the specification: μὴ ἐμὲ μέμφου, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιαύτη εἰμί, ὁποῖαν καὶ νῦν με ὀράς· οἱ δὲ αἰφνιδιὸν μοι ἐμπίπτοντες κυματοῦσι καὶ ἐξαγριαίνουσιν (cf. Jedrkiewicz 1989, 327); Varro, *ling. Lat.* 7.23, p. 259 *Traglia Mare aequor appellatur quod aequatum cum commotum vento non est*; Cic. *Acad.* 2 (fr. 3) *quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor illud poetae vocant*; Serv. ad Verg. *G.* 1.50 *terram ... ab aequalitate dictam ... unde et maria aequora dicuntur*.

The naturalistic philosophy certainly provides a key to understand Solon's identification of the "stability" of the sea, namely the absence of the disturbing winds, as a state of δίκη, whereas when winds appear, the sea loses its natural balance and the result is injustice (the winds are something like the sickness that makes κυκώμενος the

patient whom the ἱητρός tries to heal in fr. 1.61: cf. Vlastos 1946, 68-70). The whole imagery would parallel the fact that, in a political/social context, δίκη is the healthy absence of those turbulent factors which disturb the *demos* and the city, and are expressly mentioned in fr. 12. To call 'justice' the absence of perturbing factors in the realm of nature may strike us (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 302) but such a response only reveals our distance from Solon's time (cf. Vlastos 1947, 156). To assume that it is simply a literary metaphor, an example of interaction between the 'tenor' and the 'vehicle' of an image (cf. for the terminology Silk 1974, 79), would presuppose a radical difference between the world of nature (where justice is not really found) and the world of humans (where it actually is): the two worlds would be distinct one from the other, they would operate according to different rules, and consequently, social, moral, evaluative language would apply only in the human world.

This interpretation is somehow inappropriate for the pre-Socratic philosophers who place humans squarely in the natural world, and for Solon who is contemporary with the oldest of them: cf. Gentili 1975, and Edmunds 1987, 11. For Solon the alteration that the winds operate to the sea by changing its natural state is of the same kind as that which the bad powerful citizens commit to the *demos* and the *polis*, and δικαιοσύνη (and its implied opposite) describes and evaluates all kind of acts, regardless of the nature of the agent. Not very differently from Solon, his contemporary Anaximander maintained the notion that natural elements may be "unrighteous" in the cosmological process, and that justice is maintained only when the rival principles alternately prevail over one another in a uniform, impersonal and inevitable manner: cf. above all VS 12B1 διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (αὐτά most probably are the opposed world-masses of the opposite elements: cf. Kirk 1955, 33 and Kahn 1960, 178ff.). In Solon as well as in Anaximander, ἀδικία is the temporary prevalence of one element on its opposite (see Kahn 1960, 178-83); besides, the coincidence between the idea of some δίκη being given κατὰ τῆς τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν in Anaximander and Solon's ἐν δίκη χρόνου, fr. 30.3 should be noticed (cf. Jaeger 1947, 207 n. 60). Compare the analogous way of thinking in Parmenides, VS 28B1.14, who maintains that Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς of the "doors" of Day and Night. On the natural state as the "just" one, examples from medicine are collected by Vlastos 1946, 66 n. 19 (cp. *in primis* Alcmaeon's ἰσονομία, for which see above, and ad 3.17).

1. θάλασσα ταρασσεται: For the use of the verb with reference to the stirring up of bodies of water, Hom. *Od.* 5.291 ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντον, 304 ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντον, Archil. *IEG* 105 ταρασσεται πόντος, Pind. *Ol.* 2.63, Aesch. *PV* 1088 etc. The

opposite state, that of a non-disturbed sea, will provide the most prominent metaphor for the Epicurean doctrine of ἀταραξία, cf. Clay 1972.

For a survey of the semantics of ταραττειν in its earliest occurrences as well as in the fifth century literature where it characterises the negative behaviour of the demagogues, see Edmunds 1987, 5-16.

2-3. ἦν ... τις αὐτήν μὴ κινῇ: Cp. Sol. 1.19-20 ἄνεμος ... ὃς πόντου πολυκύμονος ... πυθμένα κινήσας. In our fragment the point of the image is on the one, τίς, who is able not to move the sea, namely not to be a wind. I agree with Maharam 1993, 413-5 that this 'one' must be identified with Solon himself, who would, in this way, present once again his political action in favour of Athens but opposite to the solution of a μόναρχος.

2. πάντων ἐστὶ δικαιοτάτη: Thgn. *IEG* 314 πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ δικαιοτάτος, 'Cleobulina' *IEG* 2.2 (in the end of the pentam.) τοῦτο δικαιοτάτον. One may expect δικαιοτάτον as Mimn. 2.2 ἀληθείη ... πάντων χρῆμα δικαιοτάτον, but for the construction πάντων (everything)+fem. superlative, Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 1097b16 and *Protr.* 62.2 Düring.

δικαιοτάτη: cp. the opposition between μαίνεσθαι and being δίκαιος in Thgn. *IEG* 313f., and Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5 ἵππον καὶ βοῦν ... δικαίους ποιήσασθαι. Of the summer-sea which stands quiet and therefore is harmless, Hes. *Op.* 670 τῆμος δ' εὐκρινέες τ' αὔραι καὶ πόντος ἀπήμων, and Semon. *IEG* 37-9 θάλασσα πολλάκις μὲν ἀτρεμῆς ἔστηκ', ἀπήμων, χάρμα ναύτησιν μέγα, θέρεος ἐν ὥρῃ.

For the fortune of δίκαιος said of the sea (possibly after this very fragment of Solon), see Ar. *Nub.* 1290-2 —τὴν θάλατταν ἔσθ' ὅτι πλείονα νυνὶ νομίζεις ἢ πρὸ τοῦ; — μὰ Δί' ἄλλ' ἴσην. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον πλείον' εἶναι (where δίκαιον is banalised by schol. ad loc.: οὐ γὰρ λυσιτελὲς οὐδὲ συμφέρον τῆς γῆς πλείονα εἶναι τὴν θάλατταν).

14 G.-P.² (10 W.²)

The source for this fragment, Diog.Laert. 1.49, presents it performed in the assembly (*ecclesia*) by Solon, shortly before the events that led Peisistratus to seize the absolute power, as his response to the accusations made against him by the *boule*=the Peisistratean supporters. The truth of this late testimony cannot be accepted unquestioningly (see Introd. to fr. 15), and it has more the characteristics of an 'enriched' anecdotal reconstruction rather than of a historically reliable information —the details on Solon's dressing the arms recall the testimonies, at least partially fictional, on Solon's dress while performing *Salamis*. Besides, Diogenes Laertius' reference to a βουλή uttering comments on Solon's actions may be thought to have been influenced by the practice of the Roman *senatus*, whose duties had really included some kind of evaluation of the actions of the various magistrates in the republican age, and afterwards the *consecratio* or the *damnatio memoriae* of the dead emperor in the early imperial age (about the Solonian *boule* we know scarcely anything and, on the sources we have, it is not possible to say whether it is a historical fact or myth: some scholars have been so sceptical as to deny its existence; on the historical improbability of the four hundred βουλή which Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 8.4 and Plut. *Sol.* 19.1.2 ascribe to Solon, cf. lastly Ruzé 1997, 350-68; on Solon's *boule*, see further, Cloché 1924, Hignett 1952, 64-92, Rhodes 1972, 208 n.2, with bibliography). I would add that Solon's reference to his audience by the term ἀστοῖς hardly makes any sense if the occasion was a public speech, as the narration by Diog.Laert. explicitly states (μαίνεσθαι ἔλεγον αὐτόν· ὅθεν εἶπε ταυτί). Indeed, in such a context, the ἀστοί were most probably going to be the audience itself, and we would rather expect something like the personal pronoun ὑμῖν.

Regarding the metaphorical image of the truth coming to the centre, the centre is obviously for Solon the place of the greatest visibility and control, which is common for everyone (cf. Cerri 1969, 102f.) — the place where everyone can see and hear you, as in Hom. *Od.* 8.262 κί' ἐς μέσον (of Demodocus who prepares to start singing) or in Plut. *Agis* 9 εἰς μέσον προελθών (of Agis who goes to speak in public); see also Hdt. 4.97 ἐς μέσον φέρω ('to make public'). 4.161 ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἔθηκε ('to make public'), 6.129 λέγειν ἐς τὸ μέσον ('to say in public'), or the place where, when something is there, everyone can control it, as in *Il.* 23.704 γυναικ' ἐς μέσον ἔθηκε (of a prize in the games) and 23.574 ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέροισι δικάσσετε, or everyone can share it, as in the symposiastic imagery of Lycoph. *TrGF* 100F3 ὥς ἐκ βραχείας δαιτὸς ἢ βαιὰ κύλιξ αὐτοῖς κυκλεῖται πρὸς μέτρον, τράγημα δέ ὁ σωφρονιστῆς πᾶσιν ἐν μέσῳ λόγος, and Plut. *Conv. sept. sap.* 156d αἱ Μοῦσαι καθάπερ κρατῆρα νηφάλιον ἐν μέσῳ προθέμεναι τὸν λόγον. However, the formally closest and most idiomatic precedents for Solon's phrase are also the Iliadic expressions meaning the spatial,

physical 'middle' of the battlefield, where Hector goes twice to incite his soldiers and to start a duel, cf. *Il.* 3.77 ἐς μέσον ἰών=*Il.* 7.55, or where the warriors go when they want to start the duel: cf. *Il.* 6.120 ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέρων συνίτην μεμαῶτε μάχεσθαι=20.159~23.814, 18.263-4 Τρῶες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφοτέροι μένος Ἄρηος δατέονται (see later e.g. *Soph. Trach.* 514 ἴσαν ἐς μέσον, and *Theoc. Id.* 22.183 ὁ δ' εἰς μέσον ἦλυθε Λυγκεύς). I would not rule out the possibility that the pacific Truth which Solon wanted (or at least advertised) to be shared by every party of the community is here deliberately balanced against the martial-exhortatory *meson*, place of the Homeric leaders, or the starting point of the fight between opposite armies, and enhances Solon's usual self-image as a politician and a ruler who redefines and intends the idea of the centre as the place of the peaceful resolution of the contrasts, instead of a place for fight. After all, this second level of meaning, though more implicit, is closely parallel to the one presupposed by the use of μεταίχμιον (a post-Homeric technical term of the military language with exactly the same meaning as τὸ μέσον of the Iliadic expressions quoted above) in fr. 31.8 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταίχμῳ ὄρος κατέστην. Solon goes where the general or the warriors go in order either to urge to fight or to start fighting, but he goes there to prevent the strife between the two opposing factions: see also ad 7.5-6.

The relevance of the metaphor ἐς μέσον as an item of the imagery of politics was already pointed out by Cerri quoted, in connection with Theognis 678, but there is space for remarking that Solon is at the origin of this metaphor, which is exceptionally functional to Solon's self-image as politician. The "centre" between the opposite social factions (the powerful privileged rich and the *demos*) is the position which Solon 'invented' to place his action for social unity; therefore, Solon's metaphor also implies that the personified Truth will eventually reach and join Solon in his own political stance, after being 'hidden' for a long time where no-one could profit from her.

1. The emphatic δὴ, without a verb of saying, thinking etc., often denotes words that are not to be taken at their face value, objectively, but express something merely believed, or ironically supposed to be true (cf. Denniston, *Greek Part.* 214 §8f., 234 §6). Therefore, Solon might be correcting his opponents' statement by giving to it the effect of inverted commas, 'my so-called madness'.

Indeed, the idea expressed in the fragment is rather close to the one of the long trimeter poem (fr. 30), though in the latter Solon appears to have lost every concrete support, and to be resigned emotionally only to the criterion of Time for the defence of his political actions: cf. 30.3ff. συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ' ἂν ἐν δίκη χρόνου μήτηρ μεγίστη κτλ. In fr. 14 the epanaphora of the verb at the beginning of the lines still shows Solon's certainty, and emphasises his voice as a "warner" (on the difference

between Solon's stance here and in fr. 3, see ad fr. 3.5-8). On the verb, besides Sol. 1.8 and note there, cp. also the impersonal use of δείξει 'reveal' in Ar. *Vesp.* 994, *Ran.* 1261, and Dem. 2.20 δοκεῖ δ' ἔμοιγ' ... δείξειν οὐκ εἰς μακράν.

Other poets and philosophers of the sixth century B.C. besides Solon offer semi-personifications of Time as being endowed with the power to vindicate the exact truth: Thales, *VS* 11A1 (=Diog.Laert. 1.35) σοφώτατον χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα, Thgn. *IEG* 967 τούτων δ' ἐκφαίνει πάντως χρόνος ἦθος ἐκάστου, fr.eleg.adesp. *IEG* 22 οὐκ ἔστιν μείζων βάσανος χρόνου οὐδενὸς ἔργου, ὅς καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνοις ἀνδρὸς ἔδειξεν νόον; see later Pind. *Ol.* 10.53-5 ὃ τ' ἐξελέγχων μόνος ἀλάθειαν ἐτήτυμον Χρόνος (also *Ol.* 1.33-4 ἀμέραι δ' ἐπίλοιποι μάρτυρες σοφώτατοι), fr. 159 ἀνδρῶν δικαίων Χρόνος σωτὴρ ἄριστος, Bacchyl. 13.204-7 ἃ δ' ἀλαθεία φιλεῖ νικᾶν, ὃ τε πανδ[α]μάτω[ρ] χρόνος τὸ κᾶλῳς ἐ]ργμένον αἰὲν ἀ[έ]ξει. Opposite considerations of oblivion, the other result of time, are more occasionally presented: Pind. *Ol.* 2.15-7 τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων ἐν δίκᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἂν Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατὴρ δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος, Paron *VS* 26 οἱ μὲν σοφώτατον ἔλεγον (*scil.* τὸν χρόνον), ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρειος Πάρων ἀμαθέστατον, ὅτι καὶ ἐπιλανθάνονται ἐν τούτῳ, λέγων ὀρθότερον, Simpl. in Arist. *Ph.* 4.13.222b 17 ... λέγων ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ Σιμωνίδου τὸν χρόνον ἐπαινοῦντος ὡς σοφώτατον, εἴπερ ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ μαθήσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, παρόντα τινὰ τῶν σοφῶν εἰπεῖν 'τί δέ, ὦ Σιμωνίδη, οὐκ ἐπιλανθανόμεθα μέντοι ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ;' (cf. Simon. *PMG* 645).

The same cultural orientation can be found in tragedy, where oblivion is seldom emphasised, while usually Time and revelation of the truth are explicitly connected (this is shown by the verbs that are used, hinting at the idea of 'discovery': besides δεικνύναι we find ἀναπτύσσειν, ἐκκαλύπτειν, ἀνευρίσκειν, εἰς φῶς ἄγειν, ἐφευρίσκειν). The discoveries concern small details in Aeschylus (cf. *Supp.* 993, *Ag.* 727), but in Sophocles and Euripides time eventually shows up the good and the evil: cf. Soph. *OT* 614 χρόνος δίκαιον ἄνδρα δείκνυσιν μόνος (see also 1213), *TrGF* 62 ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔρπει ψεῦδος εἰς γῆρας χρόνου, and *TrGF* 301.1f. ὡς ὁ πάνθ' ὀρώων καὶ πάντ' ἀκούων πάντ' ἀναπτύσσει χρόνος, *TrGF* 918 πάντ' ἐκκαλύπτων ὁ χρόνος εἰς <τὸ> φῶς ἄγει, Eur. *Hipp.* 428-30 κακοὺς δὲ θνητῶν ἐξέφην' ὅταν τύχῃ, προθεὶς κάτοπτρον ... χρόνος, 1051 μηνυτὴν χρόνον, *HF* 805 λαμπρὰν δ' ἔδειξ' ὁ χρόνος τὰν Ἡρακλέος ἀλκάν, *Antiope*, *Greek Literary Papyri* 101-2 Page ηῦρε μηνυτῆς χρόνος ψευδεῖς μὲν ἡμᾶς, *TGF* 60 χρόνος δὲ δείξει <σ>· ὦ τεκμηρίῳ μαθὼν ἢ χρηστὸν ὄντα γνῶσομαί σ' ἢ κακόν, *TGF* 112 ὁ χρόνος ἅπαντα τοῖσιν ὕστερον φράσει, λάλος ἐστὶν οὗτος, οὐκ ἐρωτῶσιν λέγει, *TGF* 222 τήν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ' εἶναι χρόνου, δείκνυσι δ' ἡμῶν ὅστις ἐστὶ μὴ κακός, *TGF* 303.3-4 ὁ γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἐκφῦς χρόνος δικαίους ἐπάγων κανόνας δείκνυσιν ἀνθρώπων κακότητος

έμοί, *TGF* 441 χρόνος διέρπων πάντ' ἀληθεύειν φιλεῖ, adesp. *TrGF* 511 χρόνος τὰ κρυπτὰ πάντα τῆς φάος† ἄγει (see later e.g. Dem. 18.310 ἔδωκεν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος πολλὰς ἀποδείξεις ἀνδρὶ καλῷ τε καὶ αἰσχροῷ, Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.2 συνεμαρτύρησε δὲ ταῦτ' αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ ἀληθέστατος λεγόμενος χρόνος εἶναι, *GVI* 33.13-4 (beginning of 2nd cent. B.C.) μυρίος αἰὼν μάρτυς ... τάν τ' ἀρετὰν δείξει πᾶσιν ἐπεσσ[ο]μένοις). Cf. Accame 1961, de Romilly 1968, 35, 51, 107, 117, and Strohm 1949/50, 148ff.

βαιὸς: Homer has only the compound ἡβαιός, but already in Hes. *Op.* 418 βαιόν='for a short time'; the phrase βαιὸς χρόνος is again found in Soph. *Trach.* 44 χρόνον γὰρ οὐχὶ βαιόν, and *OC* 397 βαιοῦ κούχῃ μυρίου χρόνου.

2. ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης: On the granted results of the affirmation of truth, cf. e.g. Pind. fr. 205 ἀρχὰ μεγάλας ἀρετᾶς ὤνασσε 'Αλάθεια and Bacchyl. 8.21-2 σὺν ἀλαθείᾳ δὲ πᾶν λάμπει χρέος.

As most often in archaic Greek (cf. above all Krischer 1965, 161-4, Maehler ad Bacchyl. 3.96), ἀλήθεια has to be understood in its etymological meaning as absence of the 'oblivion' veiling the reality of things—it is more the opposite of 'defect in recording' than of 'falsehood'. Therefore, we do not have to imply that this distich had to be followed by some kind of self-defence and explanation of Solon's true intentions. In my opinion, Solon neither displays here (yet) the auto-apologetic attitude that he certainly displays in the tetrameters nor explicitly charges his citizens of being not true, namely 'false' in saying that he is mad: he still has hopes in the future, and in the plain visibility of the meaning of his actions which will be achieved by means of the unveiling operations of χρόνος.

15 G.-P.² (11 W.²)

Though the ancient testimonies associate these lines with the context of Solon's reaction to Peisistratus after his seizure of tyranny (Solon tried to oppose it according to some sources but the exact scenario of his reactions to Peisistratus' *coup* varies considerably: see Podlecki 1987, 9), the prevailing tendency among modern scholars is to refuse to follow these sources: Wilamowitz 1893, II, 312 insisted that there is no reason to believe such an association, as the reference in l. 3 (τούτους) is made to a plural group (Peisistratos and his party?). Linforth 1919, 207, added that since ῥύματα δόντες, which Diodorus and Plutarch understood as the body-guard granted to Peisistratus by the Athenians, is in plural, it must refer to something more than the body-guard alone. Masaracchia 1958, 292-3 attempted to reconcile ancient interpretations and modern objections, suggesting that the plural τούτους could be referring to Peisistratus and his faction. More recently, Podlecki 1987, 9 denied that there is anything in Solon's verses themselves that shows his warnings pointed specifically at Peisistratus and attributed the whole episode to the fiction which grew up to heighten the contrast between the two men; he added that similarly monitory statements can be found at fr. 3.7f. and 5, directed against the 'leaders of the people', whoever these may have been. Rihll 1989, 279-80 also gave several reasons against the association of the lines with Peisistratus and even argued for their association with Drakon (for which see the criticism in the Introd. to fr. 12). Lastly, West 1993 believes that since Solon speaks of plural tyrants we may have here reference to some earlier junta of which we know nothing.

Apart from the too speculative identification of the αἰμύλος ἀνὴρ of this fragment with Drakon, Rihll 1989, 280 has well pointed out that there is no obvious reason that this fragment should be considered as an example of anti-tyrannical rhetoric (aiming at Peisistratus). Instead, Solon's criticism would be aimed once again at the choices of the people who put themselves in harsh conditions by superficially putting their trust in men they should not. Fr. 15 could be seen as the last, culminating piece of the sequence started with *Eunomia* and followed by fr. 12: the fact that the Athenians did not manage eventually to avoid the tyranny shows that Solon's aim of awakening his people was not achieved: the Athenians remained superficial and possibly they may have once again ridiculed Solon's concern and fears (fr. 14). A co-examination of the three poems will clarify better the issues at hand.

Here, as in *Eunomia*, Solon speaks of the Athenians' responsibility: after charging the leaders because of their rapacious behaviour in fr. 3, in our fragment Solon would concentrate on the responsibility of the *demos*, both from a past and a present perspective — the difference in perspective is made clear by the shift in the verbal tenses, which is crucial for my own interpretation. After his first statement, which strongly parallels fr.

3.1-2, Solon presents the historical mistake of the *demos*, namely to have kept in power the aristocratic leaders (τούτους) and allowed them his support (ρύματα δόντες); consequently, they had lived in a condition of δουλοσύνη (which had been mentioned in fr. 3.18, 24-5). The plural τούτους would mean the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι of fr. 12.3, and δήμου ἡγεμόνες of frr. 3.7 and 8. Although the *demos* had tasted bitterness and hardness in the past because of their stupidity (the past tenses have to be acknowledged in ll. 3f.), even now the Athenian people do not change their way of dealing with the welfare of the state (ll. 5-6: present tenses) and now again (the last distich has verbs in present tenses) they are wrong in committing themselves to some leader of theirs: the last distich (ll. 7-8), which points to a singular ἀνὴρ, would either be a generalising statement of the Athenians' readiness to be seduced by demagogues, or a more specific allusion to the danger of a tyranny (like that of Peisistratus? the specific reference to him is unsure).

1. εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρά: Hes. *Theog.* 276 λυγρὰ παθοῦσα, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 7.483.4 ἀλλ' οἴκοι λυγρὰ λέλοιπε πάθη, Jul.Aegypt. *Anth.Pal.* 7.577.2 λυγρὰ παθὼν τύμβου μηδ' ὀλίγοιο τύχοι, Leon. *Anth.Pal.* 7.662.5-6 αἰαῖ, λυγρὰ παθοῦσα Περιστέρη, ὡς ἐν ἐτοίμῳ ἀνθρώποις δαίμων θῆκε τὰ δεινότατα, *Orac.Sibyll.* 11.281-2 Geffcken ἐν πολέμοις δέ αὐτὴ λυγρὰ παθοῦσα νεοτρώτων καθύπερθεν φεύξει δειλαίη, *GVI* 1395 (2 cent. A.D.) ἱητὴρ μεθόδου, Ἀσιατικὲ, προστάτα, χαῖρε, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ παθὼν φρεσὶ, πολλὰ δὲ [λυγρὰ, Greg.Naz. *de se ipso* 1005.2 ὦ λυγρὰ καὶ ἄντιτα ἔργα παθοῦσα Ψυχὴ; (cp. also Hom. *Il.* 3.99 ἐπεὶ κακὰ πολλὰ πέπασθε, *Il.* 22.431 αἶνὰ παθοῦσα, *Od.* 23.53 ἐπεὶ κακὰ πολλὰ πέποσθε, Sapph. *PLF* 94.4 δεῖνα πεπ[όνθ]αμεν).

δι' ὑμετέραν κακότητα: the closest parallel both in form and in content is Hom. *Od.* 24.455-7 ὑμετέρη κακότητι, φίλοι, τάδε ἔργα γέγοντο· οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ πείθεσθ', οὐ Μέντορι ποιμένι λαῶν, ὑμετέρους παῖδας καταπαυέμεν ἀφροσυνάων, where the seer Halitherses charges the responsibility of the murder of the suitors to the Ἰθακήσιοι as a whole, who had not paid attention to his warnings and had not restrained the young suitors, their children, from their arrogance: I believe that Solon implicitly keeps the role of Halitherses, who οἶος ὄρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω (l. 452), and had warned the Athenians not to go on protecting their leaders, but they did not pay attention. See also *Il.* 13.108 ἡγεμόνος κακότητι μεθημοσύνησὶ τε λαῶν, Thgn. *IEG* 855 δι' ἡγεμόνων κακότητα.

2. The *Odyssey's* opening speech of Zeus (1.32ff.) has been correctly considered the model for Solon's *Eunomia* (ll. 5-8), where we find the antithetical pair θεοί/(αὐτοί) βροτοί: see ad 3.5 for the other parallels and a discussion of the relevant differences

between Homer's and Solon's stance on the problem of human/divine responsibility. The same antithesis is also operative here, and responsibility lies again with human action.

μὴ θεοῖσιν ... ἐπαμφέρετε: Eur. *IT* 390 ἐς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ, Ar. *Nub.* 1080 ἐς τὸν Δί' ἐπανενεγκεῖν. For later uses of the verb in relation to god or supreme power, cf. Them. paraphr. in Arist. *de anima paraphr.* 5,3.103.10 ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου, οὐκ ἂν λέγοι ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ἐπαναφέρων, Greg. Nyss. *Contra Eunom.* 2.1.185.6 καὶ τῷ τῆς αἰτίας λόγῳ πᾶν τὸ εὕρισκόμενόν τε καὶ κατορθούμενον εἰς τὸν ἀρχηγὸν τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ἐπαναφέρεται, 3.1.131.7 οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ υἱὸν τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως ἢ λίθον ἢ ἀνάστασιν ἢ ποιμένα ἢ φῶς ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἐπαναφέροντες λέγομεν, Greg. Nyss. *In Eccles.* 5.301.11 ὅτι αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν πονηρὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περισπασμόν· ἢ γὰρ ἂν εἰς ἐκείνον ἢ τῶν κακῶν αἰτία ἐπαναφέροιτο, Eust. *ad Il.* 3.878.19 τίνος δὲ ἂν εἴη ὁ κόλαξ ἐκείνος ἀντάξιός, ὅς τῷ τοῦ Κωμικοῦ παιγνίῳ εἰς σπουδὴν ἀπεχρήσατο; καὶ αὐτὸς γάρ που κατ' ἐκείνον εἰς τὸν Δία ἐπαναφέρει τι φαύλης πράξεως αἷτιον.

For the apocope and assimilation, cf. Mimn. 5.2: ἄμπαυσις.

τούτων μοῖραν: Thgn. *IEG* 356 τούτων μοῖρ(α) (in the same metrical position). Linforth ad loc, gives some examples of the appositional genitive: 23.18 μοῖραν θανάτου, Thgn. *IEG* 356 already quoted, 592 ἀμφοτέρων τὸ λάχος.

3. αὐτοὶ ... ηὔξησατε: Sol. 23.5 has ἀεξομένων. The verb had been used in epic only twice and always about divine 'magnification' of humans: cf. Hom. *Od.* 13.359-60 αἶ κεν ἐᾷ ... με ... ἀγελείη αὐτόν τε ζῶειν καὶ μοι φίλον υἱὸν ἀέξῃ and Hes. *Op.* 6 (Zeus) ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει; see also Pind. *Ol.* 8.88: (Zeus) αὐτοὺς τ' ἀέξοι καὶ πόλιν. This is very relevant to the interpretation, in a context where the problem of human responsibility for the events has just been stated: Solon may somehow imply that the Athenians are doing with their leader(s) what usually the gods do; he will be resumed by Thgn. *IEG* 823 μήτέ τιν' αὖξε τύραννον ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, κέρδεσιν εἴκων κτλ. See also Eur. *TGF* 420.1 τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ηὔξημένους, Pl. *Ly.* 206a ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς (*scil.* τοὺς καλοὺς) ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ.

ρύματα: The form in Solon is new, but for the verb with the meaning 'to defend' see Hom. *Il.* 4.138. Hes. *Op.* 536 has ἔρυμα χροός of the body-protection. For other instances of the meaning 'defence', 'protection' see e.g. Aesch. *Supp.* 85, *TrGF* 353.2, Soph. *Aj.* 159, Eur. *Heracl.* 260; Gal. *Ling. seu dict. Hippoc. expl.* 19.136.2 Κ. ρύματα: παρὰ τὸ ρύεσθαι, τὰ βοηθήματα, Hsch. ρ 486.1 Σ. ρῦμα· ... φυλακή, ἀπὸ τοῦ ρύεσθαι, Schol. Soph. *Aj.* 159a <σφαλερὸν ... ρῦμα:> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀσθενῆς φυλακή).

The line was commonly taken to refer to the body-guard given to Peisistratus, a typical feature of the archaic tyrant: cp. Ar. *Eq.* 852ff. where the sausage-seller in his

attempt to connect Cleon with the charge of tyranny (see Edmunds 1987, 15-6) warns Demos of the young men Cleon has around him, implying a tyrant's body-guard; besides Hdt. 1.59.5, Thuc. 6.56.2, 57.1. Both this interpretation and the word itself *ρύματα* have been doubted. Rihll 1989, 279 wrongly overlapped the two meanings which *ρύμα* has: both 'defence' (from the middle *ρύομαι*) and 'what is drawn', therefore arrow or spear (from the active *έρύω*), and considered a problem the fact that in the ancient tradition (Hdt. 1.59.5, Ar. *Ath.Pol.* 14.1) the body-guard Peisistratus had been voted was composed not of archers, but of 'club-bearers', *κορυνηφόροι*. This argument can be fairly dismissed, because the Solonian word has undoubtedly the meaning 'defence', as the Hesiodic *έρυμα* quoted above. Linforth 1919, 207 prefers the reading of Diog.Laert. *ρύσια δόντες* 'giving pledges or hostages', namely putting yourselves in the power of the *οὔτοι*: Solon would have had in mind the *hectemoroi* system which he himself had abolished; he would have employed the figure to describe exactly what the Athenian people must have done in their relations with Peisistratus in analogy to how they were acting in the previous system of the self-enslavement for debt. But Linforth's interpretation assumes references which are not sure: on the problem of the debt-slavery see ad 3.18. For my different interpretation, see *Introd.*

An economic choice is to believe that in the second distich Solon is reflecting on the situation he had depicted in *Eunomia*: after the criticism of the leaders, in our fragment Solon would concentrate on the responsibility of the *demos*, who had driven these leaders to power: the expression *ρύματα δόντες* would simply point to the protection or support offered to the upper ruling class of citizens, and *δουλοσύνη* as the 'almost slavery' of the complete lack in political freedom that the *demos* has been ready to suffer: cf. ad 3.18 and 24-5.

4. *ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην*: Sol. 3.18 *ἦλυθε δουλοσύνην*.

5-6. Solon pointedly contrasts the Athenian resourceful way of behaving in private to their totally opposite public attitude: cf. Eur. *TGF* 886 *μισῶ πολίτην ὅστις ὠφελεῖν πάτρην βραδὺς φανέϊται, μέγала δὲ βλάπτειν ταχύς, καὶ πόριμον αὐτῷ, τῇ πόλει δ' ἀμήχανον*.

5. *ἀλώπεκος ἵχνεσι βαίνει*: 'walks with a fox-tread' — possibly from observations of the characteristics of the fox when hunting?: cf. *Schol. In Aristid.* 160,5.1-2 (*ὥσπερ ἱχνῶν εἶχετο τῶν ἔργων τοῦ πατρὸς*): *ἱχνῶν*, ἀντὶ τοῦ βημάτων. ἔστι δὲ ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν θηρευτικῶν κυνῶν. Solon's line was imitated by Cratinus, *PCG* 135 *ὕμῶν εἷς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπηξ δωροδοκεῖται*.

Masaracchia 1958, 293, and Jedrkiewicz 1989, 327 see here an allusion to the Aesopic myth of the old lion and the fox (147 Hausrath), the lion being Peisistratus, the fox the Athenian people: such a reference seems much too vague to my mind, and unconvincing firstly because in the fable the lion is too old and unable to feed himself and this image would not fit a newly-established and totally powerful tyrant; most importantly, such a parallelism would clearly weaken Solon's message because the fox is not deceived in the fable. Solon's point of reference is rather to the animal's celebrated astuteness and shrewdness in the way of e.g. Archil. *IEG* 185.5-6 ἀλώπηξ κερδαλή... πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον; it had become proverbial already in the sixth century, model for the type of behaviour of Pittacus (see Alc. *PLF* 69), and for other unscrupulous politicians: see Ar. *Vesp.* 1241f., where Philocleon quotes the *skolion*: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλωπεκίζειν, οὐδ' ἀμφοτέροισι γίγνεσθαι φίλον, to point to the perjurer Theoros as a traitor of the ἀγαθοί whom he pretends to join, while he holds the right hand of Cleon and the κακοί (on the problem whether the *skolion* which Philocleon quotes pre-existed to Aristophanes or was an invention of his, cf. Vetta 1983, 129). For ἀλωπεκίζειν 'to deceive in an alluring way' see Babr. 95.64 and Hsch. α 3369 L. ἀλωπεκίζειν· ἀπατᾶν. On the cunning intelligence (*metis*) of the fox, see further Detienne-Vernant 1974, 41-5.

ἵχνεσι βαίνει: For the dative, see Strattis *PCG* 71.2-3 πεντήκοντα ποδῶν ἵχνεσι βαίνετ(ε); more generally for the expression, Hom. *Od.* 2.406=3.30=5.193=7.38 ὁ δ' ἔπειτα μετ' ἵχνια βαῖνε θεοῖο, Meleag. *Anth. Pal.* 12.84.5 βαίνω δ' ἵχνος ἐπ' ἵχνος; later, e.g. Philo, *gigant.* 39.2, *migr. Abrah.* 128.4, *fuga et invent.* 130.1-2, Nonnus, *Dion.* 34.2.

6. For χαῦνος, cf. Sol. 29^b.4 and note there; χαῦνος νόος is the opposite of the Homeric πυκινὰ φρένες; cp. Pind. *Pyth.* 2.61 χαῦνα πραπίδι παλαιμονεῖ κενεά and *Nem.* 8.45 κενεᾶν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῦνον τέλος, Eur. *Supp.* 412-3 ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις, *Andr.* 931 τούσδ' ἐχαύνωσαν λόγους. Frequent in Aristophanic comedy, it creates metaphors politically allusive of how gullible and uncritical the Athenians are, such as that of the χαυνοπολίτης in Ar. *Ach.* 635, who swallows open-mouthed all that is told him (cf. also *Eq.* 1263 ἡ Κεχηναίων πόλις, *scil.* Athens, *Nub.* 875, *Vesp.* 721): see Taillardat 1965, 264-7.

The pattern adjective+verb+νόος is a structural formula of the second hemistich of the pentameter in Theognis (*IEG* 74, 88, 142, 196, 498, 580, 622, 698, 792, 1082d; see also Marc.Arg. *Anth.Pal.* 5.116.2), and ἔνεστι νοῦς will become a common phrase in Euripides (e.g. *Andr.* 667, *Hipp.* 920, *TGF* 212.1).

7-8. For the construction ὁράω ἐς, cf. Hom. *Il.* 10.239 ἐς γενεὴν ὁρώων, Eur. *Rhes.* 114 σὸν βλέποντας ἐς δόρυ, *Supp.* 318 ἐς κράνος βλέψαντα καὶ λόγχης ἀκμήν,

Phoen. 596 ἐς χέρας λεύσσεις ἐμάς (a preposition was apparently regular in such expressions, cp. *Soph. El.* 972 πρὸς τὰ χρηστὰ πᾶς ὁρᾶν, *Eur. El.* 377 πρὸς λόγχην βλέπων, and see Page ad *Med.* 247).

The metonymy 'to look at the glossa of someone' instead of 'to pay attention to someone' not only mimetically hints at the orientation of the eyes of the Athenians while listening to a speech, but also introduces the ἀνὴρ by whom they are attracted as a mere talker (having a mouth, and giving a series of wily speeches), but nothing else — indeed it anticipates and reinforces the consideration of l. 8.

The antithesis between ἔπος and ἔργον became conventional in sophistic rhetoric but is already present in Homer in pairs with ἔπος, βουλαί, μῦθοι: cf. e.g. *Il.* 1.395, 5.879, 9.374, 11.703, 15.234, *Od.* 2.272, 3.99, 4.329, 15.375, *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 117, 199, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 540, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 46 etc. In the Homeric aristocratic society, the pair represented the fundamental qualities a man of value should possess — cf. *Il.* 9.443 μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων, with reference to Achilles' education (instances in the *Iliad* of being good at fighting and in council: Achilles and Agamemnon at 1.258, Agamemnon at 3.179, Diomedes at 9.53f.). See later Democr. VS 68B82 κίβδηλοι καὶ ἀγαθοφανέες οἱ λόγῳ μὲν ἅπαντα, ἔργῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔρδοντες, *Soph. TrGF* 201a <ῶ> γλῶσσ', ἐν οἷσιν ἀνδράσιν τιμὴν ἔχεις, ὅπου λόγοι σθένουσι τῶν ἔργων πλέον, Dem. 9.15 ἀλλ' ἔστιν ... ὅστις ... ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸν ἄγοντ' εἰρήνην ἢ πολεμοῦνθ' ἑαυτῷ σκέψαιτ' ἄν;. See also the notes ad Sol. 29^b.3.

For Solon's criticism of the Athenians' gullibility, cp. Ar. *Eq.* 1115-20 ἀλλ' εὐπαράγωγος εἶ, θωπευόμενός τε χαίρεις κάξαπατώμενος, πρὸς τὸν τε λέγοντ' αἰὲ κέχηνας, said of the Athenian *demos* for becoming the dupes of the demagogues, Eur. *Supp.* 243 (οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες) γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι.

7. αἰμύλου ἀνδρός: Hsch. α 1969 L. αἰμύλος· ὁξὺς ἐν τῷ λέγειν, *Sud. ai* 212 A. Αἰμύλα. καὶ Αἰμύλος, κόλαξ, ἀπατεών, *Etym.Magn.* 35.30 ποικίλον, πυκνόν, πανοῦργον, δολερόν. In favour of the v.l. αἰόλον (*scil.* ἔπος) would be passages with derogatory uses of the adjective as Hes. *Theog.* 511 ποικίλον αἰολόμητιν, ἀμαρτίνοόν τ' Ἐπιμηθέα, Pind. *Nem.* 8.25 μέγιστον δ' αἰόλῳ ψεύδει γέρας ἀντέταται, Aesch. *PV* 661-2 αἰολοστόμους χρησμούς, but the word seems to point more to shifty wiles rather than to a charm of eloquence and persuasion which is needed here — and demagogues/Peisistratus (?) were most probably considered to be clever in speaking rather than quickly changing their statements. Besides, ἀνδρός would be left very vague without a qualifying epithet.

Contrast the praise for the εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ in Pind. *Pyth.* 2.86-8 ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ προφέρει, παρὰ τυραννίδι, χῶπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός,

χῶταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι (also *Pyth.* 1.86 ἀψευδεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἄκμονι χάλκευε γλῶσσαν), and compare Soph. *TrGF* 683 οὐ γάρ ποτ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἀσφαλῆς πόλις ἐν ἧ τὰ μὲν δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα λάγδην πατεῖται, κωτίλος δ' ἀνὴρ λαβὼν πανοῦργα χερσὶ κέντρα κηδεύει πόλιν, Eur. *Or.* 907-13 ὅταν ... ἡδύς τις λόγοις φρονῶν κακῶς πείθῃ τὸ πλῆθος, τῇ πόλει κακὸν μέγα, *Supp.* 412-5 ... ὅστις ἐκχαυνῶν λόγοις πρὸς κέρδος ἴδιον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε στρέφει, τὸ δ' αὐτίχ' ἡδὺς καὶ διδοὺς πολλὴν χάριν ἐσαῦθις ἔβλαψ(ε), *Supp.* 423-5 ἦ δὴ νοσῶδες τοῦτο τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν, ὅταν πονηρὸς ἀξίωμ' ἀνὴρ ἔχῃ γλώσση κατασχὼν δῆμον, οὐδὲν ὦν τὸ πρίν, and *Hec.* 132 ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστής (of Odysseus seen unfavourably as a manipulator of the unsophisticated), 254-5 ἀχάριστον ὑμῶν σπέρμ', ὅσοι δημηγόρους ζηλοῦτε τιμάς; for the description of Peisistratus' charms in speaking (which, however, we cannot be sure that Solon is alluding to here), Simon. *PMG* 607 ἐπόησεν σειρῆνα τὸν Πεισίστρατον, Plut. *Sol.* 29.3 αἰμύλον τι καὶ προσφιλὲς εἶχεν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, and *Per.* 7.1-2 where a comparison is drawn between the two men).

16 G.-P.² (25 W.²)

A much too short fragment containing an explicit reference to male homosexuality (μηρῶν ἰμείρων) and contemporary with the earliest depictions of homosexual courtship on Attic black-figure vases (ca. 560-475): see Dover 1978, 98, 195, Shapiro 1981, 135f., Bremmer 1990, 142. Other poetic references to homosexuality more or less contemporary with Solon are Mimn. 7.9 (where the old man is said to become ἐχθρὸς ... παισίν), and Alcaeus *PLF* 430 (Alcaeus would have sung of a boy) and (possibly) *PLF* 431. See further Vetta 1980, xxxvii-xliv (a very neat assessment of the ancient testimonies and the present evidence of paederotic themes in archaic elegy and lyric), and Percy 1996, 176-81 (with an examination of the laws attributed to Solon on the love of the youths).

Plut. *Amat.* 751e ascribes fr. 16 to a young Solon (νέος ὢν ἔτι καὶ 'σπέρματος πολλοῦ μεστός' ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησί), and considers fr. 24 the result of a more mature age (ὥσπερ ἐκ ζάλης καὶ χειμῶνος τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρώτων ἔν τινι γαλήνῃ τῇ περὶ γάμον καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θέμενος τὸν βίον). Indeed, the two fragments deal with two different aspects of the sensual sphere, δῶρα Ἀφροδίτης and ἔργα Ἀφροδίτης: according to Calame 1992, 16, since Aphrodite's gifts, the ἐρατὰ ἄνθη (beauty, charm, sexual strength) are granted for a short span of time in the bloom of youth, the passing of time fades them and therefore the (also aesthetic) δῶρα Ἀφροδίτης are eventually reduced to the more exclusively sexual dimension of the ἔργα Ἀφροδίτης. However, in fr. 16 Solon appears not to speak about himself, therefore to believe that fr. 16 is by a young Solon, and fr. 24 by a mature/old Solon would mean to follow the usual biographical *fallacia* of the ancient readers.

1. ἔσθ': the conjunction ἔστε is not attested in Homer, but it is already in Hes. *Theog.* 754; cf. later Thgn. *IEG* 959, and Xenoph. 5.4. Also the use of temporal conjunctions with the subjunctive without ἄν is not Homeric, but it is not rare in Attic poetic language (cf. Kühner-Blass 2, 449f. n. 4; Soph. *Aj.* 1183 is an instance with ἔστε), and there is no reason to emend παιδοφιλήσῃ codd. in -σεις (Brunck, Gaisford) or -σει (Boissonade) — in fact, the future ind. can be found after these conjunctions in Homer, but always with ἄν (cf. Kühner-Blass 2, 447 n. 2).

ἥβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄνθεσι: The metaphor of the "flower" of the youth refers in Homer to the full martial strength of a young soldier: see *Il.* 13.484; later on, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 375, Pind. *Pyth.* 4.158, Aesch. *Supp.* 663, (*Ag.* 197-8, *Pers.* 59, 252, *PV* 420), but here, as usually from Hesiod onwards (cf. *Lfgre* s.v. 3a-b), it means the full bloom of the youth (with sexual or aesthetic connotations), as in *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 108 κουρήϊον ἄνθος, Hes. *Theog.* 988 τέρεν ἄνθος ἔχοντ' ἐρικυδέος ἥβης, Tyrt. 7.28 ὄφρ' ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, Mimn. 7.3-4 κρυπταδίη φιλότης

καὶ μείλιχα δῶρα καὶ εὐνή, οἱ ἥβης ἄνθεα γίνεται ἀρπαλέα, and 8.3-4 ἄνθεσιν ἥβης τερπόμεθα; see later e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 1007-8 ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος (cf. also 994 καλὸν ἄνθος ἔχων), 1348 παιδείης ἄνθος ... ἐρατόν, Simon. *IEG* 20.5 ἄνθος ἔχει πολυήρατον ἥβης, Theoc. 30.20 γλυκέρας ἄνθεμον ἄβας; adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.151.1 εἰ τινά που παίδων ἐρατώτατον ἄνθος ἔχοντα; *GVI* 942.1=119.1 *CEG* (5th cent. B.C.) ἄνθος ... ἔβας, 1410.2 (roman period, 2/3 cent. A.D.) ἥβης ... φίλτατον ἄνθος, 1420.2 (1 cent. B.C.) ἄβας καλλίστοις ἄνθεσι, 1501.4 (beginning 3 cent. B.C.) ἥβας ἄνθος etc.

The floral metaphor stands for the boys' beauty. I agree with Roth 1993, that the meaning of the preposition ἐπί with reference to the *erastes* is certainly not temporal. Indeed, differently from the *eromenos*-youth who will always be reminded that the charms of ἥβη are granted temporarily (cf. e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 1303-4 οὐκέτι δηρὸν ἔξεις Κυπρογενοῦς δῶρον ἰοστεφάνου, 1305-6 παιδείας πολυηράτου ἄνθος ὠκύτερον σταδίου, Xen. *Symp.* 8.14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει, Strat. *Anth.Pal.* 12.234 εἰ κάλλει καυχᾶ, γίνωσχ', ὅτι καὶ ῥόδον ἀνθεῖ· ἀλλὰ μαρανθὲν ἄφνω σὺν κοπρίοις ἐρίφη. ἄνθος γὰρ καὶ κάλλος ἴσον χρόνον ἐστὶ λαχόντα· ταῦτα δ' ὁμῇ φθονέων ἐξεμάρανε χρόνος), the *erastes* must be older than the *eromenos* (he cannot be very young, a *pais*) in the etiquette of Greek paederotic love. A causal-local meaning for ἐπί is appropriate, for the *erastes* loves alighting on the single boys-in-bloom, like the bees who πέτονται ἐπ' ἄνθεσιν εἰαρινοῖσιν of Homer *Il.* 2.89. For the etiquette governing the *erastes*, see Pl. *Symp.* 180c-185c, and Cantarella 1992, 18.

παιδοφιλήση: In Solon for the first time; for the ending see above. Cf. Thgn. *IEG* 1318, 1345, (1357), and later e.g. Seleuc. *CA* p. 176, Mel. *Anth.Pal.* 12.137.4, 12.164.2, the adjective in Glauc. *Anth.Pal.* 12.44.4, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.145.1; cp. Strato, *Anth.Pal.* 12.1 εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ παῖδάς τε φιλῶ καὶ παισὶν ὁμιλῶ.

2. μηρῶν ἰμείρων: Though the celebration of the beloved does not often dwell on characteristic and individualised features of his figure, any references of this kind usually deal with the eyes (e.g. Pind. fr. 123, Mel. *Anth.Pal.* 12.109, 110, 113, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 12.130, Strat. *Anth.Pal.* 12.196; Arist. fr. 96 Rose=43 Gigon) or the μηροί (Anac. *PMG* 407 ἀλλὰ πρόπινε ῥαδινοὺς ὦ φίλε μηρούς, Aesch. *TrGF* 135 σέβας δὲ μηρῶν ἄγνὸν οὐκ ἐπηδέσω, ὦ δυσχάριστε τῶν πυκνῶν φιλημάτων (Achilles for Patroclus), *TrGF* **136 μηρῶν τε τῶν σῶν εὐσεβῆς ὁμιλία †καλλίω† (Achilles for Patroclus), Soph. *TrGF* 345 μηροῖς ὑπαίθων τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδα (of Ganymedes), cf. Buffière 1980, 307, and Dover 1978, 70.

γλυκεροῦ στόματος: The pattern appears here for the first time; γλυκερός in Homer (*Il.* 13.637, *Od.* 23.145) and Hesiod (*Theog.* 83-4, 97 γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ

στόματος ῥέει αὐδή=*Hom. Hymn* 25.5) was used in connection with singing and speech, and with no sensual/erotic connotations, see Paschalis 1995, 181-3. For the sensual meaning, see Paul.Sil. *Anth. Pal.* 5.281.6 λάθριον εἶχε κύλιξ πῦρ γλυκερῶν στομάτων, Marc.Argent. 5.128.2 γλυκεροῖς χείλεσι, *GVI* 746.4 (3/4 A.D.) καὶ γλυκεροῦ στόματος ὅπα λιριόεσσαν ἰεῖσα, "Mosch." *Bion. Epit.* 72 τῆνο τὸ Καλλιόπας γλυκερὸν στόμα, Long.Soph. 1.18.1 χεῖλη μὲν ῥόδων ἀπαλώτερα καὶ στόμα κηρίων γλυκύτερον, Nonnus, *Dion.* 35.48 σῶν γλυκερῶν στομάτων.

17 G.-P.² (23 W.²)

This is the fragment where Solon's aristocratic ideals, consequent upon his birth, surface in the most evident way. Paederastic love was a well known component of the aristocratic way of life (cf. fr. 16). As to horses, the connection of horsemanship and rich classes is another fact: as remarked by Arist. *Pol.* 1289b35-8, one of the criteria providing distinction in wealth among the γνώριμοι was ἵπποτροφία, since τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχίαι παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν (see also 1321a5-11; besides Thuc. 6.12.2; Xen. *Hipparch.* 1.9-12, Isae. 5.43, Isoc. 6.55 and 16.33); the family of Philaidai, claiming to descend from Ajax, were given the epithet τετθριπποτρόφος (cf. Hdt. 6.35.1), and the names of many Athenian aristocrats included the root ἵππ- (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 60-7). The second richest class of Solon's system, the ἵππεῖς, were so called because they were expected to serve as cavalry in the army and be able to equip themselves with horses, and the highest class, the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, had to serve also in the same corps (cf. Spence 1993, 180f.). After all, later, in order to reduce the military relevance of the landowners and to limit the power of the aristocrats, both Hippias and the post-Peisistratean democracy adopted at different levels the device of restricting the role of the Athenian cavalry in war actions (cf. Anderson 1961, 128-130); Regarding the passion for hunting with dogs and horses it was a typical sport of well-off people, see e.g. Pl. *Ly.* 205c, 211d-e, and cf. Méautis 1972, 37-9, Lilja 1976, 42, Stupperich 1977, 177.

The themes of the fragment are very traditional, yet the personal mark of Solon's ideology can be seen through a comparison with a close parallel to Solon's fragment: *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 486-9 μέγ' ὄλβιος ὃν τιν' ἐκεῖναι (Persephone and Demeter) προφρονέως φίλωνται ... αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν, a text on the blessed condition of the initiated, whose terminology is also paralleled in fr. 18 (see Introd.). Although the frequency of the *topos* of the *makarismos* (see ad l. 1) does not allow any confidence in a concrete intertextual connection, and in the *Hymn* the agrarian dimension of life is obviously stressed, the parallelism illustrates well how much Solon favours a rather more modern view of wealth than the agrarian surplus of corn with which the author of the *Hymn* and, more generally, the archaic Greek culture were concerned — cp. the common genealogy of Ploutos as the son of Demeter and Iasion, and the passages quoted by Richardson ad *Dem.* 489 and by West ad *Theog.* 969. The result would be to refuse the concept of richness as accumulation of food-stuff or generally of surplus (the idea of the 'house full of ἐσθλά' of *Hom. Hymn* 30.10, which Solon appears to understate while speaking of περιώσια χρήματα in fr. 18.7f.), and to favour a more 'mobile' idea of

wealth, which includes in itself the moment of the enjoyment of it in the social dimension stressed by the references to the παῖδες and the ξένος.

1 ὄλβιος, ὦ: The poetic construction usually labelled *makarismos*, often in the form of ὄλβιος/μάκαρ followed by a clause defining the respect in which someone is happy, is very common in archaic poetry: cf. Hom. *Od.* 11.450, Hes. *Theog.* 954, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 480-2, 486-7 quoted, *Hom. Hymn* 25.4f. and *Hom. Hymn* 30.7-8, Alc. *PMG* 1.37-9, Hippon. *IEG* 43 (=5 Degani) and *117.6 (=°196 Degani), Thgn. *IEG* 934, 1013, 1173, 1375, Pind. *Ol.* 7.10, *Pyth.* 10.22 and fr. 137, Bacchyl. 3.10, Choeril. *PEG* 2.1, Soph. *El.* 160, Eur. *Bacch.* 73, *Cyc.* 495, *TGF* 256, *TGF* 793, *TGF* 910, *TGF* 1057 (this poetic idiom was already in Homer settled enough to be reversed: cf. Hom. *Od.* 1.8 νήπιοι οἷ, κτλ., 3.161 σχέτλιος, ὅς κτλ.). See on μακαρισμός Norden 1913, 99f., Dirichlet 1914, 1967.

παῖδες ... φίλοι: The phrase παῖδες φίλοι is Homeric (*Od.* 19.455='dear sons'), but I do not believe that the meaning here can be the Homeric one ("happy the man who has dear children"), as was maintained by Harrison 1902, 111, Linforth 1919, 176f., and Fränkel 1975, 230. In favour of an erotic interpretation of the distich (see at least Bowra 1938, 74 and de Heer 1969, 33) is the possibility that Solon's παῖδες ... φίλοι=παῖδες καλοί, *amasii* (cf. at least Anac. *PMG* 378.2 οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ <παῖς ἐ>θέλει συνηβᾶν (with Porson's integrations) and Thgn. *IEG* 1369 παιδὸς ἔρως καλὸς μὲν ἔχειν (where παῖς alone=παῖς καλός), and above all Solon's verb παιδοφιλεῖν of fr. 16.1. Besides, Hermias ad Pl. *Phdr.* 231e seems to have understood the fragment in an erotic sense (καλοῦ τοῦ ἐρᾶν μνημονεύει λέγων (Σόλων) and the variant νέοι of Theognis' text point to this direction as well.

φίλοι can be taken (with e.g. Hudson-Williams) as an attribute to παῖδες ("happy is who has beloved boys...), as Lucian's quotation certainly implies, or as a predicative to it ("happy is who likes boys...), as Plato's quotation most probably implies (φίλοι would be=φίλοι εἰσὶ, to be connected not only with παῖδες, but also with the other subjects ἵπποι and κύνες: cf. Landfester 1966, 41 n.4, and Skiadas 1966). I favour the former interpretation, though the latter seems to be supported by "Thgn." *IEG* 1255-6 ὅστις μὴ παῖδάς τε φιλεῖ καὶ μώνυχας ἵππους καὶ κύνας, οὐποτέ οἱ θυμὸς ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ, but the Theognidean distich more probably operated a stretching inside the μεταποίησις of Solon's poem which the Theognidean author made after having quoted it (1253-4): Theognis' ll. 1255-6 would therefore be a good instance of the symposiastic repartee technique, and the Theognidean author of this distich may be 'answering' the *makarismos* of Solon ("happy is who ...") with a more emphatic exclusive statement ("the *only* happy man is who ..."): cf. Vetta 1980, 58f.

μῶνυχες ἵπποι: a common epic formula, see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 5.236, 9.127, 11.708, *Od.* 15.46, Hes. fr. 30.4 μ[ών]υχας ἵππου[ς] (always at the end of the hexameter).

2. ἀγρευταί: the word is used for the first time for dogs, but cf. θηρευταὶ κύνες in Hom. *Il.* 11.325 and 12.41.

ξένος ἀλλοδαπός: Cf. Hom. *Od.* 17.485 ξείνοισιν ... ἀλλοδαποῖσι. Beyond the sense of 'foreign', ξένος already in Homer had acquired the second meaning 'friend of a foreign land/city' (Hsch. ξ 29 L. ξείνος· ὁ ἀπὸ ξένης φίλος), to define the ties of hospitality which made friends of strangers (e.g. *Il.* 17.582ff., *Od.* 19.191ff., 24.262ff.), or celebrated an existing formal bond inherited through one's father (e.g. *Il.* 6.215ff., *Od.* 1.175ff.), in a society where strangers were not always welcomed (e.g. the episode with the Cyclops, *Od.* 9.175f., or *Od.* 21.27 where Heracles kills his host). See further Kakridis 1963, 86-105, Donlan 1981/82, 148-51. Solon's emphasis on the foreign status of the ξένος is probably a hint at the mobility of Attic aristocracy, and the aristocratic 'networks' between individuals beyond a city's boundaries, created by marriage alliances, guest-friendship: cf. Lewis 1996, 27-9.

18 G.-P.² (24 W.²)

The structure of the poem is simple. Solon's starting axiomatic statement introduces the two comparable case-examples of traditional "goods", wealth/gastronomic and erotic pleasures, so as to maintain that they are equal πλοῦτος (ἴσόν τοι πλουτοῦσιν) — an utterly unconventional stretching in the meaning of the word, which, somehow, parallels Solon's use of the term ἀγαθοί in fr. 6 (see ad loc.). Though wealth and physical pleasures look like equalised at the beginning, the different length of their descriptions anticipates which of the two Solon really favours (material possessions which conventionally characterise abundance in wealth occupy two lines of the poem; the enjoyment of food, physical pleasures the next four lines). Then comes Solon's further statement, given in a typically apophthegmatic, nominal phrase in the first hemistich of l. 7: only the latter goods are real ἄφενος.

The inescapability as well as universality of death simply proves the futility of material possessions — but also, one could think, of the pleasures: in Hades you can neither take your money with you, nor enjoy food or love: cp. e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 973-88, Asclep. *Anth.Pal.* 5.85, Strat. *Anth.Pal.* 11.19. The last two couplets were even athetized by Jacoby 1918, 302, who considered them extraneous to Solon's thought, and a later addition rather reflecting Mimnermus' orientation about old age — for a good defence of their authenticity, see already Masaracchia 1958, 312-4.

In fact Solon is careful to avoid the impression that the last statement about death would invalidate his own option of the pleasures, and for this reason, in my opinion, he stresses from the beginning of the poem the contrast between excess of wealth and simplicity in one's acquisitions: the former carries in itself the connotations of effort and endless toil that Solon had already emphasized elsewhere more than once (cp. fr. 1.43ff., 1.71-3, etc.), and, possibly, also implies the idea that such an amount of wealth is not directly enjoyable, differently from the physical pleasures; the latter descends from the ideas of moderation and measure, so dear to him, cp. fr. 5.4-5, and implies the idea of an easier life.

The best parallel for Solon's text is provided by an archaic but not Greek text, the epitaph of Sardanapalus, which according to a testimony would have been translated in Greek verses by some Choerilus, most probably the one of Iasos: *SH* 335.1-5 εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι τοι οὔτις ὄνησις. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας. ταῦτ' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια κεῖνα λείπεται; all three much shorter prose versions of the same epitaph, which are recorded by Ath. 12.530ab-Strab. 14.5.9(672)-Arr. *Anab.* 2.5.2-4=*FGrH* 139F9 included the invitation: ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παῖζε, ὥς τὰλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια or ... ὥς τὰλλα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα οὐκ

ὄντα τούτου ἄξια (the poetic version of Sardanapalus' epitaph was credited with the relevance of a real manifesto, and provoked the 'correction' by Chrysippus, *SH* 338.4-5 εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε, τερπόμενος μύθοισι· φαγόντι σοι οὔτις ὄνησις ... ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσσ' ἔμαθον καὶ ἐφρόντισα καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἔσθλ' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα λέλειπται). Parallels to the message of Sardanapalus are also real epigraphic epitaphs of the imperial age: *GVI* 1978.17-22 (2/3 A.D.) τοῦτ' ... παραινῶ· τῇ ψυχῇ μετάδος καλῶν· ... καὶ τὸν βίον τρυφῇ παρηγόρησον εἰδὼς, ἣν καταβῆς ἐς πῶμα Λήθης, οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπάνω κάτω ποτ' ὄψει ψυχῆς ... ἀποπαθείσης, 2015 (2/3 cent. A.D.) εὐφροσύνη, πόθος, οἶνος, ὕπν[ος ταῦτ' ἐστὶ βροτοῖσι] πλοῦτος· ἀνευφράντων Ταντάλ[ου ἐστὶ βίος], 1905.14ff. (3 A.D.) μηδεὶς δ' ἐν πλούτῳ τυφωθείς [γαῦ]ρα φρονεῖτω, πᾶσι γὰρ εἷς Ἄδης καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἴσον. ἔστιν τις μέγας ὢν ἐν κτήμασιν· οὐ πλέον οὗτος, ταῦτὸ μέτρον γαίης πρὸς τάφον ἐκδέχεται. σπεύδετε, τὴν ψυχὴν εὐφραίνετε πάντοτε, θνη[τοί], ὥς ἡδὺς βίος καὶ μέτρον ἐστὶ ζωῆς. ταῦτα, φίλοι· μετὰ ταῦτα τί γὰρ πλέον; οὐκέτι ταῦτα. στήλλη ταῦτα λαλεῖ καὶ λίθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ.

Considered in itself, with its references to (homosexual-heterosexual) love, to the enjoyment of what lies ready to hand, this poem would seem to produce a kind of *carpe diem* philosophy — the carefree attitude towards life which can be found in *Mimn.* 7 and becomes a *topos* later, see e.g. *Anacreont.* 36.1-16 ὁ Πλοῦτος εἴ γε χρυσοῦ τὸ ζῆν παρεῖχε θνητοῖς, ἐκαρτέρουν φυλάττων, ἔν' ἴασθενεῖν ἐπέλη† (ἂν Θάνατος ἐπέλθῃ: Wakker) λάβῃ τι καὶ παρέλθῃ. εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ τὸ πρίασθαι τὸ ζῆν ἔνεστι θνητοῖς, τί καὶ μάτην στεγάζω; {τί καὶ γόους προπέμπω;} θανεῖν γὰρ εἰ πέπρωται, τί χρυσὸς ὠφελεῖ με; ἐμοὶ γένοιτο πίνειν, πiónτι δ' οἶνον ἡδὺν ἐμοῖς φίλοις συνεῖναι, ἐν δ' ἀπαλαῖσι κοίταις τελεῖν τὰν Ἀφροδίταν, *CEG* 482 (5 cent. B.C.; cf. Sassi 1981) πολλὰ μεθ' ἡλικίας ὁμοήλικος ἡδέα παίσας ἐκ γαίας βλαστῶν γαῖα πάλιν γέγονα· εἰμὶ δὲ Ἀριστοκλῆς Πειραιεύς, παῖς δὲ Μένωνος, *Eur. Supp.* 953-4 σμικρὸν τὸ χρῆμα τοῦ βίου· τοῦτον δὲ χρή ὥς ῥᾶστα καὶ μὴ σὺν πόνοις διεκπερᾶν.

However, to believe that the poem simply is 'an affirmation — even an arrogant one — of the individual, an almost cynic hedonism' (Marzullo 1965, 126) is extremely wrong. Nor have we to read it as a manifesto *ante litteram* of the Hellenistic ideal of the αὐτάρκεια — for which see e.g. *Alph. Anth.Pal.* 9.110 οὐ στέργω βαθυληῖους ἀρούρας, οὐκ ὄλβον πολύχρυσον οἷα Γύγης· αὐτάρκους ἔραμαι βίου, Μακρίνε· τὸ 'μηθὲν' γὰρ 'ἄγαν' ἄγαν με τέρπει, or Crates' *Hymn to Eutelia*, *SH* 361.

In fact, the poem has to be read in the broader context of Solon's constant criticism of the traditional over-evaluation of wealth that was synthesised e.g. in *Alc. PLF* 360.2 χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἷς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος (see ad 6.3-4 for later

instances). In this perspective, frs. 6 and 18 will rather appear to be a pair of attacks on the idea of material wealth, the former focusing on the social idea of ἀρετή, the latter from the individualistic point of view of personal well-being.

Textual clues of this intention can be detected. Solon uses the verb πλουτοῦσιν and the substantive ἄφενος to define his new "goods" in the first hemistichs of l. 1 and of l. 7, and this combination might resume the traditional epic use of this couple of synonyms which define the most blessed human 'happiness': besides Hom. *Il.* 1.171 ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν, see above all Hes. *Theog.* 969-74 Δημήτηρ μὲν Πλοῦτον ἐγείνατο ... ἐσθλόν, ... τῷ δὲ τυχόντι καὶ οὐ κ' ἐς χεῖρας ἵκηται τὸν δὴ ἀφνειὸν ἔθηκε, πολὺν δέ οἱ ὤπασεν ὄλβον, and Hom. *Hymn Dem.* 486-9 μέγ' ὄλβιος ὃν τιν' ἐκεῖναι (Persephone and Demeter) προφρονέως φίλωνται ... αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν. The concept of ἄφενος/πλοῦτος as life's unsurpassed ideal, which surfaces in all these epic passages, is exactly the one that Solon seriously challenges while proposing to call ἄφενος the enjoyment of pleasures: Solon's disapproval for the excess in wealth appears so sharp in this poem, that it could be understood by Stob. 4.33.7 as an instance of σύγκρισις πενίας καὶ πλούτου. Stobaeus' interpretation is certainly wrong, since Solon himself in other fragments is clearly not indifferent to and does not ignore wealth: see e.g. 1.7-8; furthermore, the key word for our understanding of this poem, the adjective περιώσια, exactly points out that Solon's emphasis is once more upon his condemnation of excess and his belief in moderation and simplicity. Solon most probably presents the same belief and aim which can be found in Hes. *Op.* 40-1, where the exclamation νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἴσασιν, ὅσῳ πλεον ἥμισυ παντός, οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειρα is part of an attack against the avidity of the bribed judges.

The poem looks specifically designed for a symposiastic performance. That is obvious from the eulogy of the physical pleasures, but also the warning context about the impartiality of death would easily be much more effective on the audience when compared with the actual warmth or the sensuality of a symposium: indeed, the two situations are often compared, from Alc. *PLF* 38 to Thgn. *IEG* 973-88 cit., from anon. *PMG* 1009 to Asclep. *Anth.Pal.* 5.85 cit. and 12.50, Strat. *Anth.Pal.* 11.19 quoted.

1. ἴσον τοι πλουτοῦσιν: cf. Hom. *Od.* 15.72-3 ἴσόν τοι κακόν ἐσθ', ὅς τ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα νέεσθαι ... καὶ ὅς ... κατερύκει, see also Bacchyl. 1.172f. and Eur. *Supp.* 862f. For the frequent use of τοι in gnomic writings where it forces the general truth upon the consciousness of the individual addressee in the sense of 'do not forget, please', cf. Denniston *Greek Part.*, 543.

1-2. ἄργυρός ... καὶ χρυσός: Silver and gold are often mentioned together as precious components of luxury ornaments or of the most remarkable goods (see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 10.438, 17.52, 18.475, *Od.* 10.35, 45, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 249), and in Thgn. *IEG* 77, 119, adesp. *PMG* 988 they are contrasted with different ethical values. They are also deprecated when moralists praise the simple life: Musonius fr. 20 p. 111.1ff. Hense ἐκ κεραμεῶν ποτηρίων παρόν, ἃ τό τε δίψος σβεννύειν παραπλησίως πέφυκε τοῖς χρυσοῖς, καὶ τὸν ἐγχεόμενον αὐτοῖς οἶνον οὐ λυμαίνεται, ὅσμην δέ γε ἡδίων τῶν χρυσῶν παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἀργυρῶν, Philo, *somn.* 2.61 τί δὲ ἀργυρῶν καὶ χρυσῶν κυλίκων ἄφθονον πλῆθος κατασκευάζεσθαι, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν φρυαττόμενον μέγαρα τῷφον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' αἰώρας φορουμένην κενὴν δόξαν;, ps.-Lucian, *Cyn.* 9 τῶν δὲ χρυσορόφων οἰκιῶν οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον σκεπουσῶν, τῶν δὲ ἐκπωμάτων τῶν ἀργυρῶν οὐκ ὠφελούντων τὸν πότον οὐδὲ τῶν χρυσῶν.

2. γῆς πυροφόρου πεδία: Sol. 1.20 γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον. The adjective is common in Homer with ἀρούρη: *Il.* 12.314 or with πεδίον: *Il.* 21.602, *Od.* 3.495, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 228; see also Thgn. *IEG* 988 πυροφόρῳ ... πεδίῳ, Stesich. *PMG* 222.ii.7 χθόνα πυροφόρον, Simon. *PMG* 591 ἀρούραισι πυροφόροις, Eur. *Bacch.* 706 πέδον ... γῆς, *Phoen.* 644 πεδία ... πυροφόρα, Eur. *Hel.* 1327 πεδία γᾶς, 1485 πεδία καρποφόρα ... γᾶς, Eur. *HF* 620 γῆς ... πέδον, *Supp.* 260 γῆν τὴν τε πυροφόρον θεᾶν, 829 κατὰ ... πέδον γᾶς.

3. ἵπποι θ' ἡμίονοί τε: Another Iliadic phrase (23.260 ἵππους θ' ἡμιόνους τε, 24.350 ἡμιόνους τε καὶ ἵππους~24.362, 24.442 ἵπποισι καὶ ἡμιόνοις, 471 ἵππους ἡμιόνους τε~576=690 ἵππους ἡμιόνους τε), often resumed: Pind. *Ol.* 5.7 ἵπποις ἡμιόνοις τε, Theoc. *Id.* 16.67 πολλῶν ἡμιόνων τε καὶ ἵππων. On the possession of horses as a sign of wealth, cf. ad fr. 17.

μόνα ταῦτα πάρεστι: Hor. *Epist.* 1.12.4 *pauper enim non est, cui rerum suppetit usus.*

Despite Hudson-Williams' approval, τὰ δέοντα of the MSS of Theognis looks like a banalisation of μόνα ταῦτα.

4-5. Eating, drinking and having sex are cited side by side as natural pleasures by Arist. *Eth.Nic.* 1118b8-12, and the pleasures of the table are also central in Epicurus's thought about natural and necessary pleasures, which excluded sex as a natural but not necessary pleasure: fr. 456 Usener. Solon's reference to the πλευραῖς καὶ ποσίν concerns the clothes and the shoes: cp. the parallel of Epicurus, who included dressing among the natural-necessary pleasures.

Solon's lines are usually considered to be the source of Hor. *Epist.* 1.12.5-6 *si ventri bene, si lateri est pedibusque tuis, nil divitiae poterunt regales addere maius*.

4. ἀβρὰ παθεῖν: 'to luxuriate' in eating, drinking, etc.=Thgn. *IEG* 474; see also Archestr. fr. 61.1 ἀβρόδαιτι τραπέζῃ. The idea is similar to πολλὰ ... ἡδέα παίσας of *CEG* 482 quoted or to τέρπν' ἔπαθον 1. 5 of the epitaph of Sardanapalus, ἔσθλ' ἔπαθον of *SH* 338.5 quoted above. For the meaning of the adjective, first attested in Hes. incert. fr. 339 ἀβρὴ παρθένος, see also Verdenius 1962, and Kurke 1992, 93.

Lombardo 1983, 1085-7 remarked that as the concept of the aristocratic luxurious life-style is applied in Solon to simple every-day comforts, it becomes available to a wider range of citizens.

5. παιδὸς τ' ἡδὲ γυναικὸς depends on ἀβρὰ παθεῖν and the whole has to be considered as a periphrastic verb of enjoyment: compare Thgn. *IEG* 1009 τῶν ... κτεάνων εὖ πασχέμεν. Solon puts on the same level homosexual and heterosexual love (like e.g. *Mimn.* 7.9, *Ar. Nub.* 1073).

5-6. ἐπὴν κατὰ ταῦτ' ἀφίκεται ὥρη· σὺν δ' ἥβῃ γίγνεται ἀρμόδια: The emendation of καὶ ταῦτ' in κατὰ ταῦτ', first proposed in Bergk's 4th ed. (1915), and later maintained by Hudson-Williams (1926), seems preferable to the text of the two most recent editions by West and Gentili-Prato, who keep the text of Plutarch's MSS, since I cannot find any satisfactory interpretation for καί. For κατὰ with the connotation of "moving to", see e.g. *Hom. Il.* 1.424 ἔβη κατὰ δαῖτα, and *Sol.* 23.17 κατὰ μέτρον ἵκουτο. The text which certainly appears the easiest, but is also most probably a banalisation, is the one of the MSS of Theognis (and of Stob.) ὅταν δέ κε τῶν(δ'). Indeed, ὥρη often means the fitting time for something, which is indicated by a gen. (e.g. *Od.* 3.334, 11.379, 15.126 etc.); τῶν would be recalling παιδὸς and γυναικὸς.

For l. 6 I accept ὥρη· σὺν ἥβῃ (dat.), because ἥβῃ is the specific term to denote the strength and vigour of youth (van Groningen ad Thgn. 724; *LSJ* s.v. b), namely the ὥρη whose full bloom has strong sexual implications: see ad 16.1, or *Aesch. Pers.* 543-4, where sex is called ἥβης τέρψις. The pentameter, then, intends to complement Solon's previous line, and his thought moves from the general term ὥρη to the more specific ἥβῃ. As for the text of Plutarch's MSS, ἥβῃ· σὺν δ' ὥρη(ι), as far as I could ascertain, σὺν ὥρη (Gentili-Prato) 'combined with charm' appears only in the prose of the imperial period — see *Aristid. Panath.* 23 (p. 16 Lenz), *Philostr. VS* 1.510.8 —, and might therefore be a later banalisation.

6. ἀρμόδια suggests both that there is something desirable to be enjoyed and that if time is wasted the pleasure will be lost. Furthermore, since the basic idea underlying ἥβη is ripeness (see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 5.69), and ripeness may become over-ripeness (cf. Verdenius 1962), Solon completes his idea with a form of the *carpe diem* motif, the warning about the appropriate time for love: 'when one is young, neither too young, nor too old' (the latter idea being alluded in the later mention of death and physical decay: cp. above all Mimn. 9.1 τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν κάλλιστος (qua young), ἐπὴν παραμείβεται ὥρη, οὐδὲ πατὴρ παισὶν τίμιος; besides Alc.Mess. *Anth.Pal.* 12.29 Πρώταρχος καλὸς ἐστί καὶ οὐ θέλει, ἀλλὰ θελήσει ὕστερον· ἢ δ' ὥρη λαμπάδ' ἔχουσα τρέχει, adespp. *Anth.Pal.* 11.51 τῆς ὥρας ἀπόλαυε· παρακμάζει ταχὺ πάντα, and 11.53 τὸ ῥόδον ἀκμάζει βαιὸν χρόνον· ἦν δὲ παρέλθη, ζητῶν εὐρήσεις οὐ ῥόδον, ἀλλὰ βάτον). On the appropriateness of Time for physical pleasure, see also the similar expressions in Pind. fr. 123.1 χρῆν μὲν κατὰ καιρὸν ἐρώτων δρέπεσθαι ... σὺν ἀλικία, Eur. *TGF* 897.9 τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν προλέγω τοῖσι νέοισιν μήποτε φεύγειν, Antiphan. *Anth.Pal.* 10.100.3-5 ὅτ' οὖν χρόνος ὥριος ἡμῖν, πάντα χύδην ἔστω, ψαλμός, ἔρως, προπόσεις. χειμῶν τούντεϋθεν γήρως βαρύς, Phan. *Anth.Pal.* 12.31.6 καιρὸς ἔρωτι φίλος, Philostr. *Ep.* 17 φθονερὸς γὰρ ὁ χρόνος καὶ τὴν ἄνθους ὥραν ἀφανίζει καὶ τὴν κάλλους ἀκμὴν ἀπάγει, Aristaenet. *Ep.* 2.1 δικαία δ' ἂν εἴης ἀπ' αὐτοῦγε τοῦ ἔργου συνεῖναι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τηρεῖν ὁπώραν. τοῖς σοῖς δίδου ὁπωρῶναις τὴν ὥραν τρυγᾶν. μετ' ὀλίγην ἔση γεράνδρυν.

7-8. The lines present a very common *topos*: Pind. *Nem.* 7.19-20 ἀφνεὸς {τε} πενιχρὸς τε θανάτου παρά σᾶμα νέονται, and 30-2 κοινὸν γὰρ ἔρχεται κῦμ' Ἀίδα, πέσε δ' ἀδόκητον ἐν καὶ δοκέοντα· τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται ὧν θεὸς ἀβρὸν αὔξει λόγον τεθνακότων (where immortality – through athletic victory and celebratory song – is described as a value more worthy than wealth), Aesch. *Pers.* 842 τοῖς θανοῦσι πλοῦτος οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ, [Phoc.] 109-10 Derron πλουτῶν μὴ φείδου μέμνησ' ὅτι θνητὸς ὑπάρχεις οὐκ ἔνι εἰς Ἀιδην ὄλβον καὶ χρήματ' ἄγεσθαι, *GVI* 1655.3 (3 B.C.) [εἰ] δ' ἦν ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου αὐτὸ πρίασθαι, [οὐδ]εῖς ἂν πλουτῶν εἰς Ἀίδου κατέβη, Phoen.Col. CA 1.22 ἐγὼ δ' ἐς Ἀιδην οὔτε χρυσὸν οὔθ' ἵππον οὔτ' ἀργυρῆν ἄμαξαν ὠχόμην ἔλκων, Leon. *Anth.Pal.* 7.740 ὁ πρὶν καὶ Γύγη παρισεύμενος ὄλβον, ὁ τὸ πρὶν βουπάμων, ὁ πρὶν πλούσιος αἰπολίοις, ὁ πρὶν – τί πλείω μυθεῖμ' ἔτι; πᾶσι μακαρτός, φεῦ, γαίης ὅσσης ὅσον ἔχει μόριον, Crates, *SH* 355 ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσσ' ἔμαθον καὶ ἐφρόντισα καὶ μετὰ Μουσῶν σέμν' ἐδάην· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια τῦφος ἔμαρψεν, fr.lyr.adesp. CA 37.32f. ὄλβιος ἦν ὁ Μίδας ... ἀλλὰ τίς εἰς Ἀίδα ὀβολοῦ πλεον ἤλυθεν ἔχων;, *GVI* 1245.8-10 (2/3 cent. A.D.) ποῦ στολαί, ποῦ χρυσία, κοσμηθῆσα ὑπὸ πατρός; οἰκτρὸν μὲν τὸ <θ>ανεῖν, πᾶσιν δὲ βροτοῖς ἐπεκλώσθη τοῦτο, φυγεῖν δ' οὐδεὶς θνητὸς ἐὼν δύναται, Pall. *Anth.Pal.*

10.60.1-2 πλουτεῖς. καὶ τί τὸ λοιπόν; ἀπερχόμενος μετὰ σαυτοῦ τὸν πλοῦτον σύρεις εἰς σορὸν ἐλκόμενος;. See also Hor. *Carm.* 2.14.21-4, Prop. 3.5.13, Ov. *Tr.* 5.14.12, Mart. 8.44.9, Sil. 5.265-7, and Lucian *Dial. mort.* 20(10).1.

7. ταῦτ' ἄφενος θνητοῖσι: For other parallels where the importance of the presence of sensuous joys in one's life is emphatically stressed, see e.g. Mimn. 7.2 τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει (*scil.* the pleasures of love), Pind. *Isthm.* 7.40-3 ὅτι τερπνὸν ἐφάμερον διώκων ἑκαλὸς ἔπειμι γῆρας ἔς τε τὸν μόρσιμον αἰῶνα. θνάσκομεν γὰρ ὁμῶς ἅπαντες· δαίμων δ' αἴσιος, Pind. fr. 126 μηδ' ἀμαύρου τέρψιν ἐν βίῳ· πολὺ τοι φέριστον ἀνδρὶ τερπνὸς αἰὼν, Antiph. *PCG* 318 τίς φησὶ τοὺς ἐρῶντας οὐχὶ νοῦν ἔχειν; ... εἰ γὰρ ἀφέλοι τις τοῦ βίου τὰς ἡδονάς, καταλείпет' οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τεθνηκέναι, and more generally Simon. *PMG* 584 τίς γὰρ ἀδονᾶς ἄτερ θνατῶν βίος ποθεινὸς ἢ ποία τυραννίς; τᾶσδ' ἄτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ζηλωτὸς αἰὼν, Soph. *Ant.* 1168-71 πλούτει τε γὰρ κατ' οἶκον, εἰ βούλη, μέγα, καὶ ζῇ τύραννον σχῆμ' ἔχων, ἐὰν δ' ἀπῇ τούτων τὸ χαίρειν, τᾶλλ' ἐγὼ καπνοῦ σκιᾶς οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην ἀνδρὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν.

8. ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδew: *Od.* 10.512 εἰς Ἀΐδew ἰέναι δόμον, 23.322 εἰς Ἀΐδew δόμον ἦλυθεν, *Hom.Hymn Herm.* 572 εἰς Ἀΐδην, Tyrt. 9.38 ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην, Mimn. 8.14 ἔρχεται εἰς Ἀΐδην, Thgn. *IEG* 802 δύσεται εἰς Ἀΐδew. *GVI* 1508.16 (ca. 201) ἵκεο ... εἰς Ἀΐδew.

9-10. The gods of the underworld are conventionally inexorable: *Hom. Il.* 9.158 Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἦδ' ἀδάμαστος, Thgn. *IEG* 1187 οὔτις ἄποινα διδοὺς θάνατον φύγοι οὐδὲ βαρεῖαν δυστυχίην, Aesch. *TrGF* 161 μόνος θεῶν γὰρ Θάνατος οὐ δώρων ἐρᾶ, οὐδ' ἂν τι θύων οὐδ' ἐπισπένδων ἄνοις, οὐδ' ἔστι βωμὸς οὐδὲ παιωνίζεται· μόνου δὲ Πειθῶ δαιμόνων ἀποστατεῖ, *Hymn.Orph.* 87.9 (to Θάνατος) οὔτε γὰρ εὐχαῖσιν πείθη μόνος οὔτε λιταῖσιν.

θάνατον ... βαρείας νούσους ... κακὸν γῆρας: For other examples of the triad: Mimn. 8, Semon. *IEG* 1.11-4, Simon. *IEG* 20.7-8, Pind. fr. 143.9.

βαρείας νούσους: Cf. Thgn. *IEG* 727f., Pind. *Pyth.* 5.63, Soph. *Phil.* 1330 (see also *Trach.* 235), "Simon." *FGE* 986, *GVI* 1713.4 (3 cent. A.D.).

9. ἄποινα διδοῦς: cf. *Hom. Il.* 9.120 ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ... ἄποινα, *Hom.Hymn Aphr.* 210 δίδου ἄποινα.

θάνατον φύγοι: *Hom. Il.* 16.98 θάνατον φύγοι (in the same position)~*Od.* 4.789 and 15.300, Callin. 1.12-3 οὐ γάρ κως θανάτὸν γε φυγεῖν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν ἀνδρ(α), Simon. 139.2 D. θανάτῳ πάντες ὀφειλόμεθα, Simon. *PMG* 520.4-6 ὁ δ'

ἄφυκτος ὁμῶς ἐπικρέμαται θάνατος· κείνου γὰρ ἴσον λάχον μέρος οἳ τ' ἀγαθοὶ ὅστις τε κακός and 524 ὁ δ' αὖ θάνατος κίχε καὶ τὸν φυγόμαχον, Bacchyl. 20.7 φυγῶν θανάτου τ[έλος, Pind. *Nem.* 10.83 θανάτὸν τε φυγῶν καὶ γῆρας ἀπεχθόμενον, Eur. *Ion* 1229 οὐκ ἔστιν θανάτου παρατροπά.

10. κακὸν γῆρας ἐπερχόμενον: For γῆρας with ἔρχεσθαι, see Thgn. *IEG* 1132 ἀργαλέον γῆρας ἐπερχόμενον.

On Solon's more positive attitude towards old age in a different context, see fr. 26.4, 28, where physical decay is somehow overshadowed by the positive element of the increase in wisdom. Here, however, Solon is considering old age as a problem of physical decay (l. 9), in a perspective which, therefore, is not so far from the one he sanctioned by his law according to which the children had to take care of the parents in their old age (θρέπτρα ἀποδιδόναι): *Test.* 454-6 Martina and Gal. *Protr.* 8.2 Wenkeback (cf. Ruschenbusch F104b). As a fact, Galen *Protr.* 8.2f., just after referring to what seems to be a detail of Solon's law about the matter (ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν Ἀθήνησι νομοθέτην, ὅς τὸν μὴ διδάξαντα τέχνην ἐκώλυε πρὸς τοῦ παιδὸς τρέφεσθαι), remembers a definition of old age by Solon which sounds no less gloomy than the one expressed here: πείθεσθαι δὲ καὶ Σόλωνι τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἐνδεικνυμένῳ, «μεμαθηκότας ἐν τοῦ βίου» τέλει γῆρας καθάπερ χαλεπὸν ἐφεδρεῦον[τα] χειμῶνα, δεόμενον οὐχ ὑποδημάτων μόνον καὶ ἐσθῆτος ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκῆσεως ἐπιτηδεΐας καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ πολλοῦ πρὸς χειμῶνα (that this testimony cannot be considered as a clue to another poetic fragment, but to a passage of Solon's laws, Barigazzi 1978, 215-8).

The same attribute for old age can be found e.g. in *Mimn.* 1.1-2, Thgn. *IEG* 728, 1011, and Archil. *IEG* 188.2 (Byl 1976, and Allen 1993, ad 1.1 provide lists of the negative adjectives that accompany γῆρας in the works of Homer, Hesiod and the other early elegists). On the disadvantages of old age, see also Soph. *OC* 1237-8 γῆρας ἄφιλον, ἵνα πρόπαντα κακὰ κακῶν ξυνοικεῖ, Aj. 473-4 αἰσχροὺν γὰρ ἄνδρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρήζειν βίου, κακοῖσιν ὅστις μηδὲν ἐξαλλάσσεται, *TrGF* 556 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλγος οἶον ἢ πολλὴ ζόη, and *TrGF* 949 πάντ' ἐμπέφυκε τῷ μακρῷ γήρᾳ κακά, νοῦς φροῦδος, ἔργ' ἀχρεΐα, φροντίδες κεναί, Eur. *TGF* 575 ὅστις δὲ θνητῶν βούλεται δυσώνυμον εἰς γῆρας ἐλθεῖν, οὐ λογίζεται καλῶς μακρὸς γὰρ αἰὼν μυρίους τίκτει πόνους, *TGF* 637 φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ γῆρας ὥς ἔχει πολλὰς νόσους, *TGF* 805 ὦ γῆρας, οἶον τοῖς ἔχουσιν εἶ κακόν, Antiph. *PCG* 250 πρὸς γάρ τὸ γῆρας ὥσπερ ἐργαστήριον ἅπαντα τάνθρώπεια προσφοιτᾷ κακά; Lys. 24.8 γῆρας καὶ νοῦσοι καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπόμενα κακὰ προσγίγνεται μοι, Men. fr. 644 K.-Th. ὀχληρὸν ὁ

χρόνος ὁ πολὺς. ὦ γῆρας βαρὺ, ὥς οὐδὲν ἀγαθόν, δυσχερῇ δὲ πόλλ' ἔχεις τοῖς
ζῶσι καὶ λυπηρά. πάντες εἰς σὲ δὲ ἐλθεῖν ὅμως εὐχόμεθα καὶ σπουδάζομεν.

19 G.-P.² (14 W.²)

The fragment presents the common *topos* of the laborious unhappiness of the human life (for which, cf. already Hom. *Il.* 17.446-7 οὐ μὲν γάρ τί πού ἐστιν οἷζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς πάντων ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἔπι πνείει τε καὶ ἔρπει) evoking (cf. βροτός, θνητοί) the bliss and lack in troubles of the gods (for which e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 10.21 θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ, and Aesch. *Ag.* 553-4 τίς δὲ πλὴν θεῶν ἅπαντ' ἀπήμων τὸν δι' αἰῶνος χρόνον;): cp. Eur. *TGF* 1075 θνητὸς γὰρ ὢν καὶ θνητὰ πείσεσθαι δόκει· ἢ θεοῦ βίον ζῆν ἀξιοῖς ἄνθρωπος ὢν;. The poem from where this fragment comes was most probably the starting point of the Herodotean *logos* of Solon and Croesus (1.29ff.).

On the *topos*: no mortal is (really) happy in the archaic age, see e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 441 οὐδεὶς γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶ πανόλβιος, Bacchyl. 5.53-5 οὐ γάρ τις ἐπιχθονίων πᾶντα γ' εὐδαίμων ἔφυ; Pind. *Nem.* 7.55-6 τυχεῖν δ' ἐν' ἀδύνατον εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπασαν ἀνελόμενον. On the *topos* 'humans are bound to suffering', Mimn. 8.15-6 οὐδέ τίς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων, ᾧ Ζεὺς μὴ κακὰ πολλὰ διδοῖ, Semon. *IEG* 1.20-2 οὕτω κακῶν ἅπ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μυρίαί βροτοῖσι κῆρες κἀνεπίφραστοι δύαι καὶ πῆματ' ἐστίν, Thgn. *IEG* 167-8 ἄλλ' ἄλλω κακὸν ἐστι, τὸ δ' ἀτρεκές ὀλβιος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ὅποσους ἥελιος καθορᾷ.

For both clichés in tragedy, e.g.: Aesch. *Pers.* 706-8 ἀνθρώπεια δ' ἂν τοι πῆματ' ἂν τύχοι βροτοῖς· πολλὰ ... ἐκ θαλάσσης, πολλὰ δ' ἐκ χέρσου κακὰ γίγνεται θνητοῖς, ὁ μάσσω βίος ἦν ταθῇ πρόσω, Soph. *OT* 1195-6 βροτῶν οὐδέν μακαρίζω, *OC* 1722-3 κακῶν γὰρ δυσάλωτος οὐδεὶς, *TrGF* 680 ... οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φύγοι βροτῶν ποθ', ᾧ καὶ Ζεὺς ἐφορμήσῃ κακά, *TrGF* 681 τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα πάντ' ἀριθμήσας βροτῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντως ὄντιν' εὐρήσεις ἓνα, Eur. *Hipp.* 189-90 πᾶς δ' ὀδυνηρὸς βίος ἀνθρώπων κούκ ἔστι πόνων ἀνάπαυσις, 207 μοχθεῖν δὲ βροτοῖσιν ἀνάγκη, *Ion* 381-3 πολλαί γε πολλοῖς εἰσι συμφοραὶ βροτῶν, μορφαὶ δὲ διαφέρουσιν· ἓνα δ' ἂν εὐτυχῇ μόλις ποτ' ἐξεύροι τις ἀνθρώπων βίον, *Phoen.* 85-7 Ζεῦ, ... χρῆν ... οὐκ ἔαν βροτῶν τὸν αὐτὸν αἰεὶ δυστυχῇ καθεστάναι, *HF* 1314 οὐδεὶς δὲ θνητῶν ταῖς τύχαις ἀκήρατος, *TGF* 45 ὥστ' οὔτις ἀνδρῶν εἰς ἅπαντ' εὐδαιμονεῖ, *TGF* 273.3 κούδεις διὰ τέλους εὐδαιμονεῖ, *TGF* 300 οἴμοι· τί δ' οἴμοι; θνητὰ τοι πεπόνθαμεν, *TGF* 392 εἰ δ' ἄτερ πόνων δοκεῖς ἔσεσθαι, μῶρος εἶ, θνητὸς γεγώς, *TGF* 418 γίγνωσκε τἀνθρώπεια μηδ' ὑπερμέτρως ἄλγει· κακοῖς γὰρ οὐ σὺ πρόσκεισαι μόνη, *TGF* 661.1-5 οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ· ἢ γὰρ πεφυκὼς ἐσθλὸς οὐκ ἔχει βίον, ἢ δυσγενὴς ὢν πλουσίαν ἀροῖ πλάκα. A synthesis of these commonplaces can be found in 'Sotad'. *CA* 6.

1. μάκαρ: For μάκαρ, cf. Hippon. *IEG* 43 (=5 Degani) and *117.6 (=°196 Degani), Mimn. 5.1 with Gentili's note. In this form the attribute has strong religious implications,

and remains mainly connected with the gods, who by antonomasia are the μάκαρες, till the tragedians, whereas for men μακάριος is more often used: cf. de Heer 1969, 52ff.

πονηροί: with the meaning "miserable, full of labour", first in Hes. fr. 248.1, 249 (of Heracles), [Hom.] *Epigr.* 13.20 Markwald=Hes. fr. 302.20 (of ἔργα). Cp. above all Simon. *PMG* 526.3 ἀπήμαντον ἥδ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖςÊ (βροτοῖς), Simon. *PMG* 520.1-4 ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγον μὲν κάρτος, ἄπρακτοι δὲ μεληδόνες, αἰῶνι δ' ἐν παύρῳ πόνος ἀμφὶ πόνῳ, Bacchyl. fr. 13 θνατοῖσι δαίμων ἐπέταξε πόνους ἄλλοισιν ἄλλους.

2. ὅσους θνητοὺς ἡέλιος καθορᾷ: the complete correspondence of toil with the whole span of human life is made more effective by means of the image of the sun, which marks the beginning of life (for which, cf. e.g. Bacchyl. 5.160-2 θνατοῖσι μὴ φῦναι φέριστον μηδ' ἀελίου προσιδεῖν φέγγος). The picture gets even more bitter, because it also implies that a troublesome life is destined to be followed by the absence of light=death. Cp. Thgn. *IEG* 167-8 and 615-6.

20 G.-P.² (16 W.²)

There is one single measure for everything, by which limits and features inherent to everything are established. It is very difficult to grasp the measure of prudence since it is not evident (the measure of human life, fr. 23.17, can be grasped because there are inherent physiological limits: a start, evolution and end of life for all human beings). The measure of prudence is a direct reflection of the noos itself, and Solon reiterated this idea in fr. 5 ἐν μετρίοις τίθεσθε μέγα νόον, by implying that "noos works best within measures", cf. Prier 1976, 165.

Solon's specific concern for the extreme difficulty (though not impossibility) of the intellectual perception, understanding and appreciation of μέτρον γνωμοσύνης can be understood since it is essential to a sensible guide to conduct, and thus can be of benefit to the individual no less than to the polis: if limits are recognised, injustice will be avoided, retribution averted, social cohesion promoted as the communal civic bonds are harmonious (cp. the hymn to Eunomia); more specifically, this μέτρον γνωμοσύνης is also the solution to the problem of insatiable, unrestrained and indiscriminate human acquisitiveness and its regulation: Solon states this view a number of times (1.71, 5.4, 8.3-4).

If we acknowledge that the μέτρον γνωμοσύνης of this fragment and μέτρον σοφίης of fr. 1.51-2 are very close concepts, we may possibly be driven to suppose that 1.51-2 is somehow integrated with the thought of this fragment, and therefore that in the elegy to the Muses Solon was hinting at the revelation of the Muses~Gods as the necessary guide to understand the invisible μέτρον σοφίης/γνωμοσύνης. Theognis echoes Solon in ll. 1171-2 where he says that the gods give to mortals ἀρίστην γνώμην (πρῶτον εἰρημένον) which has πείρατα παντός.

1-2. γνωμοσύνης ... μέτρον: for similar patterns of μέτρον+genitive, cf. ad 1.52. γνωμοσύνη is an absolute hapax in the whole of the surviving literature. Its opposite ἀγνωμοσύνη, with the meaning 'want of sense', 'foolishness', is found in Thgn. *IEG* 895-6 γνώμης δ' οὐδὲν ἄμεινον ... οὐδ' ἀγνωμοσύνης ... ὀδυνηρότερον, Democr. *VS* 68B175 διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην, Hdt. 9.41.4 ἐγένετο ... γνώμη ... Μαρδονίου δὲ ἰσχυροτέρη τε καὶ ἀγνωμονεστέρα καὶ οὐδαμῶς συγγινωσκομένη; with the meaning 'ignorance' in Antiph. *VS* 80B104 ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, ἄγνοια, ἀγνωσία. Ἀντ. δ' ἐπὶ τούτου καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην λέγει, Pl. *Tht.* 199d2 πρῶτον μὲν τό τινας ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ.

1. ἀφανές: Solon uses the same adjective for the gods' mind (fr. 21).

χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι: Hes. fr. 324 χαλεπὸν δὲ νοῆσαι.

2. πάντων πείρατα μοῦνον ἔχει: The word πείρατα entails here the meaning 'boundary, end, limits' which define and determine the coming-into-being or the fullness of each thing, and this is consistent with the use of the word in the epic (e.g. *Il.* 6.143 ὀλέθρου πείραθ' ἵκηαι, 7.102 νίκης πείρατ' ἔχονται ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι). For πείρατα+παντός/πάντων ἔχειν, cf. Hom. *Od.* 23.248 πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ' ἀέθλων, Thgn. *IEG* 1172 πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει, 'Pigres' *IEG* 1.2 πάσης πείρατ' ἔχεις σοφίης.

Solon attributes the control of ends and outcomes to Zeus and the gods in fr. 1 (l. 17 in a general consideration, ll. 63-6 in opposition to men's minds) but here — at least in the text transmitted — he tactfully diverges from the Homeric pattern of *Il.* 7.102 (quoted) or of Archil. *IEG* 111 νίκης δ' ἐν θεοῖσι πείρατα, because the contrast between divine nature (which should determine the πείρατα since it possesses completely the γνωμοσύνη) and the human one (which has to struggle to perceive it) remains implicit (and suggestive): cf. already Bergren 1975, 135-9, 168. In fact, the testimony of Clem. *Strom.* 5.81.1 that Solon γέγραπται ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ may be misleading, since the distich seems much more appropriately said with reference to the ability of the human mind to catch this measure. Clement notoriously quotes from anthologies (without context), so his remark περὶ θεοῦ may well be his own invention. However, in the absence of context nothing certain can be stated, but certainly the other testimony, Theodoretus, *Graec. affect. cur.* 1.73.3 does not imply here any reference to the powerful wisdom of the gods.

21 G.-P.² (17 W.²)

A well-established axiom: Hom. *Od.* 23.81-2 χαλεπὸν σε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων δῆνεα εἴρυσθαι, μάλα περ πολὺῖδριν ἐοῦσαν; Hes. *Op.* 483-4 ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλοῖος Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο, ἀργαλέος δ' ἄνδρεσσι καταθνητοῖσι νοῆσαι, fr. 16.7 ἀλλὰ Διὸς κρυπ[τὸς πέλεται νόος, οὐδέ τις ἀνδρῶν φράσσασθαι δύ[ναται, 43(a) 52 ἀ]λλ' οὐ πως ἦδει Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο, fr. 303 μάντις δ' οὐδ' εἷς ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων ὅστις ἂν εἰδείη Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο, Pind. fr. 61.3-4 οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως τὰ θεῶν βουλευμάτ' ἐρευνάσει βροτέα φρενί, Xenoph. *VS* 21B34 καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές· οὐτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ ... τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος ... τέτυκται; Aesch. *Supp.* 1048-9 Διὸς οὐ παρβατός ἐστὶν μέγала φρὴν ἀπέρατος, 1057-8 τί δὲ μέλλω φρένα Δίαν καθορᾶν, ὅψιν ἄβυσσον; Eur. *IT* 475-6 πάντα γὰρ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐς ἀφανὲς ἔρπει κούδεν οἶδ' οὐδεὶς †κακόν†, *HF* 62 ὥς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποισι τῶν θείων σαφές, *TGF* 947 ἦ πολλὰ καὶ δύσγνωστα βουλεύει θεός, adesp. *TrGF* 168 θεὸς οὐκ ἔχ' ἡλεπτός· εἰ δὲ ἡλεπτός, οὐ θεός etc.

22 G.-P.² (22a W.²)

This distich is preserved by two contradictory testimonies, so that there is no way in which to tell if the lines are praiseworthy, condemnatory, or neutral for the Critias mentioned.

Proclus (in Pl. *Ti.* 20e), who elaborates on the positive testimonies of Plato regarding the family of Critias (*Ti.* 20e, *Chrm.* 157e), which was related to Solon (see ad l. 1), gives us the reading εἰπέμεναι Κριτία ξανθότριχι κτλ. From his testimony, one would assume that the distich was part of a longer elegy where Solon would have spoken in detail about his γένος (Masaracchia 1958, 322), showing that it combined mind-qualities as well as physical beauty: in this context, a word such as ξανθότριξ would stress Critias' beauty. Indeed, ξανθόν was a colour admired in hair (e.g. Long.Soph. 1.17.3 τότε πρῶτον καὶ τὴν κόμην αὐτῆς ἐθαύμασεν ὅτι ξανθή κτλ.; schol. Hom. *Il.* 4.141c.2 θαυμάζεται δὲ παρὰ Λάκωσι λευκὸς χρῶς καὶ ξανθὴ κόμη; Hsch. ξ 7 L. ξανθίζεσθαι· *κοσμεῖσθαι τὰς τρίχας ἢ βάπτεσθαι αὐτάς; Eust. ad Hom. *Il.* 1.680.5 ἔπαινος δὲ κόμης παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τὸ ξανθόν. διὸ καὶ ἡλιώδης κόμη καὶ ἡλιῶσα ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ χρυσέα δέ, καὶ ὁ ταύτην ἔχων χρυσεοκόμας), and even produced artificially (as it can be seen from the numerous vegetal prescriptions which can be found in the medical writers on how to make the hair blond).

This interpretative context for the elegy is not supported by Aristotle, *Rh.* 1375b31, who quotes only the first line as εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι κτλ. among the examples of the use in court of the authority of the poets or other distinguished authorities (on which see the introduction to fr. 3). Solon's verse would have been exploited in the public action brought by Cleophon against Critias Καλλαίσχρου, later one of the Thirty Tyrants, as evidence of the ἀσέλγεια of this Critias, which Cleophon traced back to his homonym ancestor, Critias Δρωπίδου. For the background of the prosecution we are virtually ignorant; however, since Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.15 and 36, *Mem.* 1.2.24), and later Philostratus (*VS* 1.16.502) mention Critias' exile in Thessaly, most likely after the battle of Notium, and during the Trial of the Ten Generals in 406 B.C., modern scholars have supposed that he was banished on the prosecution by Cleophon (Németh 1988, 175, Avery 1963, 166-7, Wade-Gery 1945, 25, 33 and n. 1, Krentz ad Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.15, and 2.3.36, Underhill ad Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.15).

The charge of ἀσέλγεια belonged to the repertoire of the orators (e.g. Dem. 4.9.2, 9.35.5, 10.2.1, 21.1.1, Isae. 8.43.1, Lys. 24.15.1). It was connected with licentious (cf. Hsch. α 39 L. ἀσελγής· ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρος) and brutal behaviour (*Synag.lex.chres.*, in *Anecd.Gr.* I 451 Bekker ἀσελγές, πᾶν τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ βίαιον. καὶ ἀσέλγεια ἢ μετ' ἐπηρεασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία), usually that of a tyrant (Dem. 22.52.2, Plut. *Marc.* 2.5.5, Plut. *Sull.* 13.1.8, Plut. *Arat.* 51.4.4, Plut. *De mul. vir.*

253.C.8; Aristotle, *Ath.Pol.* 36.1.2 uses it of the acts of the Thirty Tyrants: Θηραμένης ἀγανακτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, τῆς μὲν ἀσελγείας αὐτοῖς παρήνει παύσασθαι, μεταδοῦναι δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς βελτίστοις).

πυρρόθριξ would fit better than ξανθόθριξ the context of such an accusation, since red hair and complexion in men and animals could imply a licentious disposition: [Arist.] *Phgn.* 812a.16 οἱ ξανθοὶ εὐψυχοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λέοντας. οἱ πυρροὶ ἄγαν πανοῦργοι· ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς ἀλώπεκας, Ael. *NA* 15.14.12 κύνας γευναίους, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄνω μοι λέλεκται, καὶ πιθήκους λευκοὺς καὶ μελαντάτους ἄλλους· τοὺς γάρ τοι πυρροὺς ὡς γυναιμανεῖς ἐς τὰς πόλεις οὐκ ἄγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποθεν ἐπιπηδήσαντες ἀναιροῦσιν, ὡς μοιχοὺς μεμισηκότες, Long.*Soph.* 1.16.5 οὗτος δὲ καὶ πυρρὸς ὡς ἀλώπηξ καὶ προγένειος ὡς τράγος καὶ λευκὸς ὡς ἐξ ἄστεος γυνή, Adam. *Phgn.* 2.33 πυρρὸν δὲ τὸ σῶμα πᾶν δολεροῦ καὶ πολυτρόπου ἀνδρός ἐστι δεῖγμα, 2.37 μέλαινα κόμη δειλίαν καὶ πολυκέρδειαν ἀγγέλλει, ἡ δὲ ἄγαν ξανθὴ καὶ ὑπόλευκος, ὅποια Σκυθῶν καὶ Κελτῶν, ἀμαθίαν καὶ σκαιότητα καὶ ἀγριότητα ... πυρρότης δὲ ἄκρατος κατὰ τὸ τῆς ροιᾶς ἄνθος οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὰ ἦθη θηριώδη καὶ ἀναίσχυντα καὶ φιλοκερδῆ, Anon. *Phgn.* 25.7 ἄνθρωπος πυρρὸς, ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνή, ὀργίλος καὶ φονικὸς καὶ μετεωρολέσχης ἐστίν.

However, according to the confusing paraphrasis of Anon. in Arist. *Rh.* (=Comm. in Arist. *Graeca* xxi 81.15ff. Rabe), Cleophon's point would have been Critias' alleged effeminacy (cp. Aeschines' accusation against Timarchus that he had misused his body for shameful purposes and activities, see Harris 1995, 102-4 and n. 51). Effeminacy is a plausible implication, though not the prevailing one, of the semantics of ἀσελγής (cf. above all schol. anon. rec. Ar. *Nub.* 678 πάλιν σκώπτει ὁ ποιητὴς ἐνταῦθα ... διότι δὲ ἦν ἀσελγής, θηλυκῶς ὑποφέρει τὸ ὄνομα ... Σωστράτην τινὰ κατακόρως κωμωδεῖ ὡς πάνυ θηλυπρεπῆ ὄντα, and schol. rec. Ar. *Nub.* 684), but never a connotation of πυρρόθριξ, so far as I have been able to check; rather, instead, it is part of the semantics of ξανθόθριξ.


In modern editions of Solon, πυρρότριξ is usually kept in the text by those editors who consider it *lectio difficilior* (after all it is not in the epic, as lastly remarked by Masaracchia 1958, 321), while ξανθότριξ would be its gloss. Nevertheless, on the basis of what survives, we cannot deny that either word might have been used by Solon and both words would have been new. In the epic, ξανθός is mostly used of hair (Hom. *Od.* 13.399 ξανθὰς τρίχας, Hes. fr. 25.5 ξανθοκόμης), and a word such as ξανθότριξ would match Solon's tendency to coin new words out of pre-existing ones (cf. also *Il.* 19.125 φρένα βαθεῖαν — Sol. 29^a.1 βαθύφρων). On the other hand, πυρρότριξ might have been one more example of Solon's new words (the word is not found earlier than Bacchyl. 18.51 πυρσοχαίτης (of Theseus), and Eur. *IA* 225 πυρσότριξ (said of

horses), but the idea of hair-colour of the fire is possibly as early as Sapph. *PLF* 98a6f. ξανθοτέρα<ι>ς ἔχη[τα<ι>ς κόμα<ι>ς δαίδος; see later Xenoph. fr. 18, Hdt 4.108, Ar. *Ran.* 730, Eur. *Cret.* fr. 4.14-5 Cantarella; this hair-colour was possibly not very common in Greece, and is often connected with foreign people (see Maehler ad Bacchyl. loc.cit.). Besides, the lines do seem to be addressed to a boy or a very young man as admonition, and πυρρότριξ could have been used by Solon as a mark of age, since it characterises the colour of the first beard (cf. e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 32, Theoc. *Id.* 6.3, 15.130, Parmen.Byz. (?) CA fr. 8).

At any rate, the choice between the two readings becomes even harder — but at the same time also less relevant and useful for the interpretation — if we consider that ξανθός and πυρρός appear to have been close in meaning, since ξανθός denotes yellow of various shades, frequently with a tinge of red, according to *LSJ* s.v.: cf. Pl. *Ti.* 68b, 68c πυρρὸν ξανθοῦ τε καὶ φαιοῦ κράσει γίγνεται, Arist. *Metaph.* 1054b13, *Mete.* 375a11, [*Color.*] 797b30, Gal. 9.599 ἐγγυτάτω τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ πυρρὸν χρῶμα τῷ ξανθῷ· διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων τῷ τὸ μὲν λευκότερον εἶναι τὸ δὲ στιλπνότερον; besides Hsch. ξ 9 L. ξανθόν· πυρρόν. καλόν. εὖ εἰργασμένον. χλωρόν, π 1310.16 S. πυρσαῖς γέννυσι· ταῖς ξανθαῖς θριξί, *Suda* ξ 10 A. ξανθὸς δὲ ὁ πυρρός.

1. εἰπέμεναι Κριτία ... ἀκούειν: The infinitive with the value of an imperative: Hom. *Il.* 7.373, 14.501-2 εἰπέμεναί μοι, Τρῶες ... πατρὶ ... γοήμεναι. Aristotle has εἰπεῖν μοι, which may have been mistaken for εἰπέμεναι: I suspect that the kind of text given by Aristotle, where μοι would serve as an introduction of the name of Solon, would be of more value for Cleophon's purposes who could, thus, further remark on the worth of Solon as a moral figure in complete contrast with the old and (by analogy to) with the younger Critias: this was a quite usual argumentative point of the orators, cp. e.g. Aeschin. 3.257.4 ὑπολαμβάνετε ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος, οὗ νῦν ἐστηκὼς ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀντιπαρατεταγμένους πρὸς τὴν τούτων ἀσέλγειαν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως εὐεργέτας, Σόλωνα μὲν τὸν καλλίστοις νόμοις κοσμήσαντα τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον καὶ νομοθέτην ἀγαθόν, σωφρόνως, ὥς προσήκον αὐτῷ κτλ. Furthermore, Cleophon could also have used Solon as the image of a democrat and anti-tyrannical leader (e.g. Ar. *Nub.* 1187 refers to Solon as φιλόδημος; see further Hansen 1989, 88 and n. 73) to be juxtaposed to the oligarch Critias, who became one of the “Thirty Tyrants”.

Κριτία: The stemma of the main line of male descent from Dropides I, archon in 645/4 (Cadoux 1948, 90) to Critias IV, the tyrant, would be according to Davies 1971, 322-9 like this:



Dropides II, friend and contemporary of Solon according to Pl. *Ti.* 20e (later authors made the two men brothers), was archon μετὰ Σόλωνα (Philostr. *VS* 1.16.2), seven years after the archonship of (his brother) Critias I. Assuming a sequence of thirty-year generations, Critias II may have been born “by 590 or by 580 in any case, for him to deserve a rebuke for head-strongness before 560” (Davies 1971, 326), which was the year of Solon's death according to Plut. *Sol.* 32.3, Ael. *VH* 8.16 etc. Leaidēs is totally unknown, but his son, Critias III, was a candidate for ostracism in the 480s, and Anacreon's lover (cf. schol. Aesch. *PV* 128a (Ἀνακρέων) ἐπεδήμησε γὰρ τῇ Ἀττικῇ Κριτίου ἐρῶν; Plato, *Chrm.* 157e also reports that ἡ ... πατρώα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος ... ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ... ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ ... εὐδαιμονίᾳ). However, as remarked by Rosenmeyer 1949, 408, the juxtaposition of the names shows that in Plato's eyes the Critias who was loved by Anacreon was the son of Dropides who was a friend of Solon. In other words, Plato telescoped the happenings of the sixth century; Solon, for his purposes, lived just before Anacreon, and Anacreon in turn was active in the early fifth century.

ξανθότριχι: new. Later, Bacchyl. 5.37 of a horse ξανθότριχα, Pind. *Nem.* 9.17 ξανθοκομᾶν Δαναῶν, Arist. *Mir.* 846b.36 ὁ δὲ Κράθις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ξανθότριχας λουομένους, Theoc. 18.1 of Menelaus ξανθότριχι etc.

2. οὐ γὰρ ἀμαρτινόω: litotes, intended both to emphasise Dropides' qualities, and to hint at Critias' limits. On the adjective, see Hom. *Od.* 7.292 οὐ τι νοήματος ἤμβροτεν ἐσθλοῦ, Hes. *Theog.* 511 ἀμαρτίνοόν τ' Ἐπιμηθέα, Aesch. *Supp.* 542-4 φεύγει ἀμαρτίνοος πολλὰ βροτῶν διαμειβομένα φῦλα, Rhian. *CA* 1.1-2 πάντες ἀμαρτίνοοι πελόμεσθα ἄνθρωποι.

πείσεται ἡγεμόνι: Tyrt. 10.19 πεισόμεθ' ἡγεμ[ό-, at the end of a pentameter.

23 G.-P.² (27 W.²)

The testimonies of the elegy — Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 104, Clem.Al. *Strom.* 6.144.3, and Anatolius, *Περὶ δεκάδος*, p. 37 Heiberg, also often quoted in Censorinus, *DN* (see above all ch. 14) — are good evidence of the antiquarian interest that the elegy had excited among its ancient readers. Despite some doubts about the authenticity of the poem raised by 19th century scholars (Porson, Gaisford, Ahrens, Usener), a very early reflection of one thought expressed by Solon in this poem hardly allows suspicions: Hdt. 1.32.2 ascribes to Solon, in his conversation with Croesus, the phrase: "I set the boundary of human life at seventy years" (cf. also Diog.Laert. 1.55). Herodotus, as well as Diogenes Laertius, could not refer to fr. 26, where Solon expresses the wish personally to die at the age of eighty (in opposition to Mimn. 11, who had wished to die at sixty), and, therefore, they had to acknowledge Solon's statement of seventy years as the "mature" age to die in fr. 23.18. Besides, Aristotle's reference to the "poets" μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν (*Pol.* 1335b32f.: see ad l. 13) certainly involves Solon (and might even be a generalising plural for Solon's poem).

The structure of the poem is very careful. Every *hebdomas* gets a distich, with the exception of the seventh and the eighth, concentrated in two lines. This very regular and linear structure of the poem, as correctly remarked by Steinhagen 1966=1972, 276-7, is intended to be the formal mirror of Solon's idea of life as a regular succession of stages, functional to each other and ruled by an internal μέτρον, the principle of order and unity expressly evoked at l. 17.

The *hebdomades* 1-4 are concerned with the physical growth. The 5th *hebdomas* deals with a passage-event, the marriage, that has both physical (sexual) and social relevance. The 6th *hebdomas* meaningfully emphasises the full maturity of human νόος "in every aspect", a culmination furthered on in the seventh and the eighth *hebdomas*. This structure implies in all probability some literary polemic with the lyric perspective about life, and above all complements Solon's 'reply' to Mimnermus in fr. 26. As was already emphasised by Römisch 1933, 67-9, and Steinhagen cit., 269f., the idea of life divided in the positive phase of the bloom of physical and sexual powers in youth, as opposed to the pure negativity of their decline in old age, which can be found in Mimnermus, Alcman, Alcaeus, Anacreon, Simonides, is effectively challenged by Solon's presentation of the maturity and old age as the years of the progressive acquisition of the νόος, something like a new start after the progressive acquisition of full physical maturity in the first four *hebdomades* (see also Siegmann 1970).

However, the intentions of the poem were not limited to the dimension of contemporary controversy. After all, as was well shown by Schadewaldt 1933=1960, the complaint about the perspective or the coming of physical decline was typical of the lyric

poetry: the Homeric poems had not acknowledged anything like this fear, but considered the faults of youth (lack in intellectual ability) no less than the lack in strength as a feature of old age, and old Nestor (*Il.* 4.310-25) could be proud of his skills in decision-making and eloquence (βουλή and μῦθοι) as merits of his age, in a way that does not appear to be very far from Solon's consideration in *Il.* 11-3. Was Solon simply looking back to the epic considerations of some balance between faults and merits of every age?

I agree with Falkner 1995, that the poem's numerical approach of the human life with its chronological quantification is embedded in a set of social and political values. At the same time, Solon's idea is possibly to propose to his audience a piece of didactic poetry that is by far shorter and less ambitious, but somehow parallel to the periodic division of the year in function of the agricultural activities by Hesiod in the *Works&Days*.

In this perspective the emphasis on the νόος may have not only been intended to point to a biological parameter that would make old age more tolerable than it was for Mimnermus (and for other lyric poets, not to mention Solon himself, in a different context: fr. 18.10). The growth of the νόος was also most important in order to define the prime of the citizens' ability to decide well in the political assemblies, or the idea of personal responsibility in family law and in criminal law.

Certainly, as already noted by Falkner 1995, 166, Solon's transitional years do not coincide with those of political or military life, nor are they usually described in terms of these institutional structures ("military training begins somewhere in the third *hebdomas*, which is described simply as a time of physical growth, eligibility for political office begins in the fifth *hebdomas*, which is defined here as a time for marriage"): avoiding specific social allusions makes the periodicity of man's life more generic and so more persuasive than focusing only on man's dimension as individual citizen. However, the very definition of νόος in *Il.* 11-2 provides, in my opinion, a most probable internal indication for the civic-political function of Solon's poem.

The maturity of "thinking", which culminates Solon's description of human maturity, is specified as the stage when someone is no longer willing (οὐδ' ... ἔθ' ... ἐθέλει) to do ἀπάλαμνα ἔργα. Differently from the Homeric and Hesiodic meaning 'shiftless' or 'helpless' (*Il.* 5.597, *Op.* 20; later e.g. Alc. *PLF* 360 ὥς γὰρ δήποτ' Ἀριστόδαμον φαῖσ' οὐκ ἀπάλαμνον ἐν Σπάρτῃ λόγον εἶπην, χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἰς πέλετ' ἔσλος οὐδὲ τίμιος, Simon. *PMG* 542.33-6 [ἔμοιγε ἔξαρκεῖ ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾗ] μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος εἰδὼς γ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ, Pind. *Ol.* 1.59 ἔχει (Tantalus) δ' ἀπάλαμνον βίον τοῦτον ἐμπεδόμοχθον), in several of its archaic and classical occurrences ἀπάλαμνος appears to define wicked or inconsiderately foolish actions, which people do either because they are morally δειλοί (cf. Thgn. *IEG* 279-84 εἰκὸς τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρα κακῶς τὰ δίκαια νομίζειν, ... δειλῷ γάρ τ' ἀπάλαμνα βροτῷ πάρα πόλλ' ἀνελέσθαι παρ ποδός; Pind. *Ol.* 2.57-9 θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ'

αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες ποινὰς ἔτεισαν — τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ ἀλιτρά κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ), or because they do not control their mind, when drunk or too young (cf. Thgn. *IEG* 479-81 ὅς δ' ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ πόσιος μέτρον, οὐκέτι κείνος τῆς αὐτοῦ γλώσσης καρτερὸς οὐδὲ νόου, μυθεῖται δ' ἀπάλαμνα ... αἰδεῖται δ' ἔρδων οὐδέν ὅταν μεθύῃ, τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν σώφρων, τότε νήπιος; Callim. fr. inc. 737 νέος οὐκ ἀπάλαμνος). The last meaning is evidently the one which better fits Solon's context: Solon's definition of the maturity of the νόος may really have implied the issue of determining at what age a citizen can be considered fully responsible for his actions.

The organisation in *hebdomades* is an abstract model to divide into periods the human life, and most probably Solon uses it to avoid the traditional terms of νέος, παῖς, κοῦρος etc., and the fluctuation in meaning which was inherent in their traditional use (it is significant that as early as the 3rd cent. B.C. Aristophanes of Byzantium felt the need to publish a collection of the λέξεις denoting the various stages of life in men and animals: *Περὶ ὀνομασίας ἡλικιῶν*). Solon never uses any of them in this poem, with the exception of ἀνὴρ, ll. 8, 9, 11, which, at any rate, does not have a technical meaning. Cp. the comparatively lower need for abstraction in the *Περὶ Ἑβδομάδων* (5 West=VIII p. 636 Littré): even though he keeps the division in *hebdomades*, and most probably after Solon's model (see below), the Hippocratic author refrains from getting rid of traditional terms, and divides the life of man into seven ages each with its name παιδίον, παῖς, μειράκιον, νεάνισκος, ἀνὴρ, πρεσβύτης, γέρων (that these terms were traditional can be inferred from the presence of a more or less equivalent denomination in a seven-fold division of human life in the schol. vet. in Aesch. *Sept.* 665a βρέφος, παῖς, μειράκιον, νεανίσκος, ἀνὴρ, γηραῖος, πρεσβύτης).

The abstract and exact quantitative model may have suited Solon's taste for numerical quantification, which can be inferred from several laws of his and was most probably intended to limit the abuses typical of the discretionary power of the judges (cf. Falkner 1995, 157-9). Looking through the list of Solon's laws in Plutarch (*Sol.* 20-4), we notice an overwhelming preference for the number "three", wherever numerical details are specified, which does not reflect objective market values and does not involve different and practical needs: the husband of an heiress has to make love to his wife at least three times a month; the bride could not have more than three dowry dresses; slander was punished with the fine of three drachmas to be paid to the defamed; women were not allowed to walk outside wearing more than three clothes, and the deceased could not be buried with more than three dresses; a dog that bites has to be put on a leash three cubits long.

"Three" is a well known 'magical' number for the Greeks, no less than "seven" (cf. e.g. Usener 1903). In the laws as well as in fr. 23, Solon would have profited from the conventionality deriving from the cultural relevance of the numbers: the mentality that

leads Solon to prescribe "a three cubits leash" instead of "a leash not too long" is consistent with Solon's division of human life in periods founded on two numbers seven and ten, which had also a no less anthropological value as 'magic' numbers, and most probably had been anthropologically connected with transitional moments of human life already before Solon. Cp. for instance the Athenian practice of giving the name to the new-borns on the seventh or tenth day after their birth, a rite that merged into the *δρομιάμφιον ἡμαρ/ἀμφιδρόμια*, namely the rite of taking new-born children round the family hearth on the seventh or the tenth day after birth (Arist. *Hist.an.* 588a7f., schol. Ar. *Lys.* 757a, Harp. ε 2 K. *ἐβδομευομένου*, Hsch. α 3995 and δ 2400 L.). The division of life into ten phases, destined to a wide fortune in the modern world, does not appear to be attested in the ancient world until late, in a poem anthologised in the 6th cent. A.D. (*Poetae Lat. min.* IV.217, p. 257f. Baehrens), cf. Zacher 1891.

In the case of fr. 23, at any rate, it is certain that Solon exploited also the wide-spread beliefs that this or that number would have been dominating all things — a belief that was the premise of the theory (mainly Pythagorean) that numbers are the principles of intelligibility of all things: cf. Philol. VS 44B4, Arist. *Metaph.* 987b11f. and b28f., Aristox. fr. 23 Wehrli. The magical properties of number "seven" are found from early times (see lastly Vogel 1966, 173ff.): the seventh was for instance mentioned as Apollo's day in Hes. *Op.* 771 (Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 717d attests a title *ἐβδομαγενής*, cf. also Aesch. *Sept.* 800-1 *ἐβδομαγέτας ἄναξ Ἀπόλλων*; Apolline festivals were most often celebrated on the seventh: see West ad Hes. *Op.* 770), and the seventh is one of the three days of the month that Hesiod calls "holy" (*Op.* 770). The Pythagoreans stressed the relevance of both numbers seven and ten: for the former, see at least Hippon VS 38A16 and Philolaus VS 44A12 (a Hellenistic or post-Hellenistic treatise *Περὶ ἐβδομάδος* was also ascribed to the Pythagorean Prorus of Cyrene: VS 44A6); for the Pythagorean seven and the *τετρακτύς*, besides Arist. *Metaph.* 986a8ff., see above all Philolaus VS 44A13 and 16, B11, and Archytas, to whom a treatise *Περὶ τῆς δεκάδος* was ascribed (VS 47B5).

The numerology of the physicians provides the best parallels to Solon's framework of the human life. The theory of the "seven" was very popular in the analysis of the critical days (e.g. for the author of the *Προγνωστικόν*), but the main medical writers who contributed to the idea of the "seven" as ruling the whole human life, from the embryo to the growth of the body, are the "Hippocratic" authors of *Περὶ σαρκῶν* (dated to the end of the 5th cent. according to Deichgräber 1935, 27 n.4, 30, 54, Diller 1936, 377: in ch. 19 also "ten" takes part in the calculation of the critical days, and it has to do with tens of *hebdomades*), and of *Περὶ ἐβδομάδων*, the long tract which in the twelve initial chapters establishes an analogy between human physiology and the patterns of the whole universe based on arithmology of the "seven" (re-edited with a comm. by West

1971, who believes it belongs to the 5th cent.; Mansfeld 1971, thinks it goes back to the Hellenistic period).

An important point of contact between Solon and these "Hippocratic" tracts most probably was, in the 6th cent., the Pythagorean physician Alcmaeon, who coincides with Solon in saying that the production of the sperm starts ἐν τοῖς ἔτεσι τοῖς δις ἑπτὰ τετελεσμένοις (VS 24A15), cp. Solon's l. 4 ἥβης ... σήματα γιγνομένης in the boys who are fourteen years old (for another possible point of contact between Alcmaeon and Solon, cf. ad fr. 3.17). For the Pythagorean Hippon (second half of the 5th cent.) the child is mature to be born when it is seven months old, and, as well as for Solon, the child loses his first teeth when he is seven years old, whereas puberty starts at the age of fourteen (VS 38A16). Post-"Hippocratic" hebdomadal divisions of the human life, which also include the ten-fold framework of Solon, were accomplished by Diocles (5th cent. B.C.) and Straton (4th cent B.C.), whose theories are known to us thanks to Macrobius (ad Cic. *Somn.* 1.6.65-76) and to the *Theologumena arithmeticae* by Nicomachus of Gerasa, partially known to us in the pseudo-iamblichean tract with the same title (pp. 64-6 De Falco): the human embryo is mature after seven months, the seventh hour after birth is crucial for death or survival of the new-born, and their eyes are able to follow the light after 7x2 days, etc.; they have their milk teeth after seven months etc.; children are beginning to get their permanent teeth when they are seven years old, etc.; puberty and sexual maturity starts at 7x2 years, the first traces of beard and the fulfilment of the growth take place during the third *hebdomas*, etc.; at 7x5 years the humans reach the maximum of the physical strength, and decline starts during the eighth *hebdomas*; full intellectual maturity and perfection coincides with the age of 49; the span of human life is completed at the end of the tenth *hebdomas*: *cum vero decas, qui et perfectissimus numerus est, perfecto numero, id est ἑπτάδι, iungitur ut aut decies septeni aut septies deni computentur anni, haec a physicis creditur meta vivendi* (Macr. 1.6.76). For a more detailed synopsis of the post-"Hippocratic" hebdomadal framework of the human life, cf. Mansfeld 1971, 156ff.; see also Vincentelli 1990. More generally on the divisions of human life, Boll 1913=1950, 171-224, Eyben 1973, 150-90.

1. Παῖς μὲν ἄνηβος ἐὼν ἔτι νήπιος: ἄνηβος new, not in Homer and Hesiod. The traditional epic phrase is παῖς νήπιος (cf. Hom. *Il.* 22.484=24.726 παῖς δ' ἔτι νήπιος, *Od.* 19.530 παῖς ... ἔην ἔτι νήπιος, 21.95 παῖς δ' ἔτι νήπιος ἦα), where νήπιος refers to the intellectual immaturity of the παῖς (cf. *Hom. Hymn Herm.* 163f.; the opposition between being νήπιος and νοεῖν or being εἰδώς was already common in Homer and Hesiod: cf. e.g. *Il.* 9.440, *Od.* 9.442, *Op.* 40, 456). Solon adds ἄνηβος to specify the physical immaturity (cf. Römisch 1933, 65), and to stress the pure negativity of the age of childhood as the age of the "not yet". However, ἄνηβος might also be for

Solon a modern legal term, as we can infer from its presence in the Gortyna law inscription (early 5th cent.): *Inscr.Cret.* 4.72 col. XI.19 Guarducci: the law prescribes that a woman or a person below the age of puberty cannot adopt — probably implying that adoption was allowed before the adopter was adult, but after the age of puberty: cf. Guarducci ad loc., and Willetts 1967, 79. The word also appears in a later fragmentary inscription from Axos, *Inscr.Cret.* 2.V 25.A.7 Guarducci which may have had a legal concern as well (see Guarducci ad loc.).

1-2. ἔρκος ὀδόντων ἐκβάλλει: The connection of the verb with "teeth" was probably idiomatic (cf. Hippoc. *Hebd.* 5.3 West ὀδόντων ἐκβολῆς, Eur. *Cyc.* 644 καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐκβαλεῖν), and ἔρκος ὀδόντων was a very common Homeric formula for the end of the line: *Il.* 4.350, 9.409, 14.83, *Od.* 1.64, 3.230, 5.22, 10.328, 19.492, 21.168, 23.70. The use of such an epic traditional phrase may seem to be disproportionate for a physiological event destined to happen in the life of every human, but several other hints in the first lines of the poem (cf. ad *Il.* 3 and 4) lead us to believe that resorting to typical Homeric phrases is the way Solon transforms the landmarks of human life into heroic events checked by the divine control.

In the Athenian society the age of seven years was certainly an important event, as well as the loss of the first teeth which used to be the sign of that age: cf. Ar. *Ran.* 417 ὅς ἐπτέτης ὢν οὐκ ἔφυσε φράτερας, where "members of the phratría", as remarked by the schol., is a pun παρὰ προσδοκίαν for φραστήρας "the signal-teeth" of the age of seven, when an Athenian child, if entitled by his parentage to full citizenship, was enrolled in one of the ancient Athenian tribal divisions, the phratríai (on the much debated details of presentation of children to phratríes and the procedures of admission see Labarbe 1953, Roussel 1976, Cole 1984, Golden 1985; generally on the phratríes, Guarducci 1973).

3. τοὺς δ' ἑτέρους: For fourteen years as the age of puberty see Hippoc. V, p. 700 Littré, Arist. *Hist.anim.* 5.544b26f., 7.581a 11ff., Gal. VI p. 387, XVII, 637 and 792 Kühn.

ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἔπτ' ἐνιαυτούς: the idea that gods watch over the accomplishment of a span of time is a specific instance of the broader concept that gods or Zeus or, seldom, a more abstract θεός, are the ultimate inspectors of the τέλος of every event (see ad 1.17). The latter concept was very common in Homer — see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 18.8 (gods), 74-5 (Zeus), 116~22.366 (Zeus and the gods), and *Od.* 8.570 τὰ δέ κεν θεὸς ἢ τελέσειεν, ἢ κ' ἀτέλεστ' εἶη). On the other hand, the former idea is only paralleled in Homer by the formula τρίτον ἡμᾶρ ... τέλεσ' Ἡώς: *Od.*

5.390=9.76=10.144, where, by the way, the subject is, obviously, the god 'professionally' in charge of starting the day.

Looking for divine control as a validation for the hebdomadal landmarks described by Solon as the framework of human life is consistent with the more explicit seeking for divine validation that can be found at the beginning of both the other poems of Solon which are most concerned with paraenetic/didactic points of view (see Introd. to fr. 3). For the more general intention of Solon to raise his age landmarks to the sublime level which divine intervention and epic language can provide, see ad l. 2 and l. 4.

4. ἐκφαίνει σήματα: A common Homeric expression: *Il.* 2.308 ἐφάνη μέγα σῆμα; see also 2.353 σήματα φαίνων~4.381, 9.236, *Od.* 21.413, *Hymn.Hom.* 7.46. In Homer, at any rate, the expression was specialised for the portentous σήματα sent by gods to humans, as was acknowledged by the ancients (cf. schol. ad *Il.* 2.308), and the same specialisation is kept by Hes. fr. 141.25-8 σήματα φαίνων Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς ... Διόθεν τέρας ἦεν. Solon probably used such a phrase intentionally to stress again the divine control on the landmarks of his framework of the human life and to elevate them into the level of 'heroic' events.

ἥβης γιγνομένης: Among the main signs mentioned by the physicians on the coming of puberty there was the development of the genital organs: Hippoc. *Epidem.* 6.4.21 (=V p. 312 Littré), Heraclit. *VS* 22A18, Arist. *Hist.anim.* 5.544b23-25 and 7.581a25-27 etc. Cp. Archil. *IEG* 196a.50 ἥβης ἐπήλυσιν (the meaning is debated: arrival of puberty, Slings ad loc.; "bewitching, spell, charm" of youth, Burzacchini 1973-74; approaching of the youthful "sexual strength=penis, Casanova 1976, 20).

Labarbe 1957, 67 says that since the adolescence was a bit different among certain individuals, Greeks had to keep a limit superior to fourteen years, when determining at what age a young Athenian could be considered to have reached this stage. Such an age-class exists in the laws of Gortyn, where the adolescent who has just completed his sixteen years is called ἥβίων. This idea of ἥβη as legal puberty can be met with again in classical Athens, where it starts at the sixteenth completed year: the orators (Isae. 8.31, 10.12, Dem. 46.20, 24) often mention a law-regulation according to which one should necessarily be an adolescent for two years "ἐπὶ διετές ἥβῆσαι" before being able to enjoy one's family rights.

5. ἀεξομένων ... γυίων: Hes. *Theog.* 492-3 μένος καὶ φαίδιμα γυῖα ἠϋξετο (of the new-born Zeus). For the third *hebdomas* as the age of the full growth, see Hippoc. *Hebd.* 5.5-6 West νεηνίσκος δὲ ἄχρις αὐξήσιος ὅλου τοῦ σώματος ἐς τὰ τετράκις ἑπτὰ.

6. *λαχνοῦται*: the verb is only here and in *Strat. Anth.Pal.* 12.178.1-3 ἐξεφλέγην, ὅτε Θεῦδις ἐλάμπετο παισὶν ἐν ἄλλοις ... τοῦνεκ' ἔτι φλέγομαι καὶ νῦν, ὅτε νυκτὶ λαχνοῦται (same position in a pentameter). For the first beard as a symptom of the coming of puberty, cf. *Hom. Od.* 11.319 πρίν ... ἰούλους ἀνθῆσαι πυκάσαι τε γένυς εὐανθείϊ λάχνη and 18.269 παῖδα γενειήσαντα, [*Hes.*] *Sc.* 167 μελάνθησαν δὲ γένεια, *Pind. Ol.* 1.67-9 ὅτε ... λάχναι νιν μέλαν γένειον ἔρεφον, *Aesch. Sept.* 664 οὔτ' ἐφηβήσαντά πω, οὔτ' ἐν γενείου ξυλλογῇ τριχώματος, *Eur. Phoen.* 63 γένυς ... σκιάζεται, *Callim. Lav.Pall.* 75-6 ἄρτι γένεια περκάζων.

χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης: the expression is ambiguous. The verbs ἀμείβειν or ἀλλάττειν with χρώς as object usually mean to "change" the colour of the "skin": see e.g. *Aesch. Pers.* 316-7, *Eur. Med.* 1168, *Men. Epit.* 887. Is this change positively considered by Solon as an "acquisition" of the beard, metaphorically called ἄνθος (so *DGE* 2.187 s.v. ἀμείβω; cp. *Lucr.* 5.888-9 *tum demum puerili aevo florente iuventas occipit et molli vestit lanugine malas*), or is it described negatively as a loss? The latter interpretation seems preferable, taking into consideration that this is the meaning implied in two parallels of Solon's *χροιῆς ἄνθος*, *Aesch. PV* 22-3 σταθευτὸς δ' ἡλίου φοίβη φλογὶ χροιάς ἀμείψεις ἄνθος (cp. *adesp. TrGF* 161 χροῖαν δὲ τὴν σὴν ἥλιος λάμπων φλογὶ αἰγυπτιώσει: see West 1979, 134), and *adesp. Anth.Pal.* 12.39 ἐσβέσθη Νίκανδρος, ἀπέπτατο πᾶν ἀπὸ χροιῆς ἄνθος, καὶ χαρίτων λοιπὸν ἔτ' οὐδ' ὄνομα. The metaphor "flower" of the skin=beard is not common at all in early literature (the only instance I know before Solon is *Hom. Od.* 11.320 πυκάσαι τε γένυς εὐανθείϊ λάχνη quoted above — later see *Callim. Hec.* fr. 45 Hollis, *Herod.* 1.52, *Antip.* (Thess.?) *Anth.Pal.* 6.29.1f.), whereas ἄνθος is a very common metaphor for the bloom of the beauty in early youth, and in this latter meaning it is often exploited in contexts where its end is considered (in a negative, nostalgic way), as a value that is lost: besides *Sol.* 16.1 ἥβης ἐρατοῖσιν ἐπ' ἄνθεσι, cf. the passages quoted ad loc.

After all, remarking the coincidence of the start of the beard and end of the bloom of youth would be consistent with Solon's statement in fr. 18.5-6 on ἥβη as the opportune time for love, and with Solon's personal concern with paederastic love, since the arrival of the beard/growth of hair were commonly considered to mark the end of a boy's attraction for the *erastes* (cf. *Thgn. IEG* 1327-8 ὦ παῖ, ἕως ἄν ἔχῃς λείαν γένυν, οὔποτε σ' αἰνῶν παύσομαι, and Vetta 1980, ad loc.; Straton's passage quoted above is somehow a hyperbole): see the rich collection of passages in Halperin 1990, 88, 90, 181, and nn. 4, 5, 6, Tarán 1985). "Ἄνθος χροιῆς might mean, or hint at the "softness" of the skin, and ἀμειβομένης be a euphemism for "to loose" — the beard makes the cheeks prickly, and deprives them of their previous smoothness.

7. *πᾶς τις*: here for the first time: cf. Thgn. *IEG* 22, 621, Hdt. 1.196.30, 2.177.6, 3.79.7, 6.80.1, Pind. *Isth.* 1.49, Aesch. *Ag.* 791, 1205, 1651, *Supp.* 489, 972, 1004, Eur. *TGF* 326.6, 689.3, 1080.2 etc.

ἐν ἐβδομάδ' ἐστὶν ἄριστος: this is the text proposed by Sylburg with a small intervention on the *ἐβδομάδε(σ)σιν/ἐβδόμασιν ἄριστος* which is found in three of four testimonies. This reading is evidently wrong (see the singular *τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ* at the beginning of the line), but most probably it arose from an original text like the one reconstructed by Sylburg (*ἐβδομάδ' ἐστὶν ἄριστος* > *ἐβδομάδε(σ)σιν ἄριστος* is a quite easy corruption), and certainly not from an original text with *μέγ'*: the text of Clement's single cod., *ἐβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος*, accepted both by West and Gentili-Prato, may rather be an ancient attempt to restore the concordance with the singular *τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ* relying on the text of l. 13 — as is shown by the variant of the second hemistich of l. 16, Clement of Alexandria appears to depend on a different branch of the transmission than the other three testimonies. Sylburg's restoration also appears to me to be preferable, because it avoids the lengthening of the -ι of *ἐβδομάδι* before μ, which is plausible as a Homerism (as remarked by Gentili-Prato ad loc.), but would be very rarely attested in elegiac poetry.

7-8. For the extension accusative, see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 8.116=11.469, 24.17 *ἄριστος ... εἶδος τε δέμας τε*.

8. *σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετῆς*: for the shape of the line, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 1178 *πεῖραν ἔχοις ἀρετῆς*, *GVI* 335.2 (4 cent. A.D.) *πᾶσαν ἔχ[ουσ' ἀρετήν]*. However, in Theognis the verb has the common meaning "to have", while in Solon it means "to consider", which in accordance with Solon's emphasis on the intellectual aspects of the human ages shows his scepticism on the common view (*ἄνδρες*) that the physical strength of maturity is really the *ἀρετή*. For the plural *σήματα* ("poetic" plural for singular) predicative of singular *ἰσχύν*, *ἦν* κτλ., see parallels in [Hes.] *Sc.* 312-3 and Eur. *Hipp.* 11.

9. The line probably has its formal model in Hes. *Op.* 616 *τότ' ἔπειτ' ἀρότου μεμνημένος εἶναι ὠραίου*, 641 *ἔργων μεμνημένος εἶναι ὠραίων πάντων*. For the idea of 'right time' for marriage see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 15.126 *ἐς γάμου ὥρην*, Hdt. 6.61.5 *γαμέει δέ [δή] μιν ἐς γάμου ὥρην ἀπικομένην*, Aesch. *TrGF* 55 *ὠραίου γάμου*, Eur. *Hel.* 12 *ἐς ἥβην ἦλθεν ὠραίαν γάμων*, *TGF* 804.2 *οὐκέθ' ὠραῖος γαμεῖ*, Hdt. 1.196.3-4 *ὥς ἂν αἱ παρθένοι γινοίατο γάμων ὠραῖαι*. For the specific idea that around thirty was the right age for a man to marry, cf. e.g. Hes. *Op.* 695-7 *ὠραῖος δὲ γυναῖκα τεδὸν ποτὶ οἶκον ἄγεσθαι, μήτε τριηκόντων ἑτέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπων*

μήτ' ἐπιθεὶς μάλα πολλά· γάμος δέ τοι ὥριος οὗτος, Pl. *Resp.* 460e, *Leg.* 721b-d, 772e, 785b etc.

ὥριον: in the right time, to be interpreted as a nominal verb=ὥριόν ἐστι (*pace* Römisch 1933, 62, who maintained that ὥριον would be better connected with ἄνδρα, and the distich has to be interpreted as an imperative infinitive: "in the fifth period, a mature man must think of marriage"). The form of the adjective is the same as in Hom. *Od.* 9.131 ὥρια πάντα; Theognis says ὠραῖος (1199, 1275, 1289).

10. παίδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενεήν: The closest parallel is *Hom. Hymn Aphr.* 104 ποίει δ' εἰσοπίσω θαλερὸν γόνον (the prayer of Anchises to Aphrodite, asking for military glory and flourishing progeny). In Sol. 1.32 ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω, ἐξοπίσω is used for the generations following one's children, as well as in other archaic parallels with analogous adverbs: Hom. *Il.* 20.308 καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται, Tyrt. 9.30 καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω (see also Soph. *Phil.* 1104). Aristotle, *Pol.* 1335b25-40 about the age limits within which a man should beget children, says that they would have to coincide with the διανοίας ἀκμή, and comments that αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν.

On the generally spread belief in antiquity that the purpose of marriage was procreation see Brown 1984, 40-1, and n. 16.

11. For this period, cf. Pl. *Ep.* 3.316c ἐν ἡλικία δὲ ὄντος μέση τε καὶ καθεστηκυία, ὧν δὴ παντάπασιν χρεία τοῖς νοῦν καὶ σμικρὸν κεκτημένοις, μέλλουσιν περὶ τοσοῦτων ὅσα ἦν τότε τὰ σὰ βουλευέσθαι, σοῦ δὲ ὄντος μὲν σφόδρα νέου, πολλῆς δὲ ἀπειρίας οὔσης περὶ σὲ τούτων ὧν ἔμπειρον ἔδει γεγονέναι, καὶ σφόδρα ἀγνώτος ἐμοί, and Cic. *Cato Maior* 33 *gravitas iam constantis aetatis*.

καταρτύεται: The word occurs here for the first time. The simple ἀρτύω was commonly referred to mental activities (βουλή, δόλος, ψεύδεια) already in Homer (see *LfgrE* s.v.), but the use of the composite, an almost *terminus technicus* for breaking and taming horses (cf. also κατάρτυσις, and see Soph. *Ant.* 477-8, Plut. *Mor.* 38d and Plut. *Them.* 2.7), or metaphorically of human beings (Eur. *TGF* 821.5, Philostr. *VA* 5.33, 7.23; cf. also Aesch. *Eum.* 473 for Orestes), anticipates the specific aspect of 'steadiness' that Solon ascribes to the maturity of the νόος: see l. 12. For the same figurative meaning implied in Solon, cf. Pl. *Leg.* 808d5 ὁ δὲ παῖς ... ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην.

12. οὐδ' ... ὁμῶς ... ἐθέλει: people of the sixth *hebdomas* are no more 'ready' (cf. ad 3.27) to do the 'inconsiderate' things of the young people, 'analogously' to the acquisition of the 'discipline' of the νόος (the *v.l.* ὁμῶς 'nevertheless' states some kind of evidently absurd opposition between l. 11 and 12).

ἔρδειν ... ἔργα: Hom. *Od.* 2.236 ἔρδειν ἔργα βίαια κακορραφίησι νόοιο, Tyrt. 8.27 ἔρδων δ' ὄβριμα ἔργα διδασκέσθω πολεμίζειν (these parallels leave no doubt about rejecting Clement's reading οὐδ' ἐσιδεῖν).

The scholia in Ar. *Ach.* 330 say that the verb begins with aspiration, and many Homeric MSS do write ἔρδ-. Theognis has aspiration at 178, 1086, 1096 (τοῦθ' ἔρδειν), and 1180 (μηθ' ἔρδειν); therefore van Groningen ad Thgn. 105 suggests writing ἔρδ- consistently, even though Chantraine, *Gramm.hom.* 1.187f. argues that the aspiration owes its existence to the Alexandrians' wish to distinguish ἔρξα (from ἔρδειν) from ἔρξα (from ἐέργειν). Contrast Sol. 1.67, 69, 29b.7.

ἀπάλαμν(α): See Introd. On the use of the word in archaic lyric see also Gentili 1984, 89f.

13. μέγ' ἄριστος: The adverbial μέγα commonly qualifies an epithet, from Homer (μέγ' ἄριστος 9x) to the tragedy: see Bissinger 1966, 256f. and Johansen-Whittle ad Aesch. *Supp.* 141.

νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν: Hes. fr. 239.3 γλῶσσάν τε νόον τε, 150.14 τῶν μέν τε νόος [γλ]ώσσης καθ[ύπ]ερθεν. Maturity in reasoning and in eloquence counterbalances as a symptom of intellectual maturity the ἰσχύς as symptom of physical maturity in l. 8: the parallelism of two ἀκμαί is emphasised by the repetition of the verse-ending (ll. 7 and 13) and of the word ἀρετή (ll. 8 and 16: but see ad l. 16).

While quoting the poets μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδόμασι τὴν ἡλικίαν Aristotle, *Pol.* 1335b32f. cit., agrees with them that τῆς διανοίας ἀκμή is reached περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν.

15. ἐνάτη: an epic word: cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.313, 327, Hes. *Op.* 772.

μαλακώτερα: "too soft for". The word is not found in this sense in Homeric or early elegiac poetry; but a parallel in the sense of being 'soft', not energetic, is furnished by Thuc. 2.18.3 δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν.

16. πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη: μεγάλη ἀρετή is attested elsewhere in archaic Greek, with the meaning of moral-intellectual virtue (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 24.193, Thgn. *IEG* 1074), and almost all modern interpreters appear to interpret πρὸς μεγ. ἀρ. as "in respect to the great virtue-deeds" *tout court*. Differently, at least,

Schadewaldt 1933=1960, 41: "weaker in comparison with the full virtue, great achievement".

Certainly *πρὸς* limitative, 'in respect to', can an be connected with *μαλακός* (cf. e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.2 *πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακούς*), but I prefer the comparative value already proposed by Schadewaldt (see on it Kühner-Gerth, 1, 520f.). Indeed in my opinion *πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν* resumes in a nominal form the adjectival *μέγ' ἄριστος* of l. 13, as well as *γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη* resume *νοῦν καὶ γλῶσσαν*. The meaning would be: "in comparison to the full virtue/great achievement" (*πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν*) reached in the sixth *hebdomas* and kept in full in the seventh and the eighth, the eloquence and wisdom (*γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη*) of the ninth are weaker — the ninth and tenth *hebdomas* are the age of the "no more enough *σοφίη*", as the first had been the age of the "not-yet-enough *νοῦς* and *ἰσχύς*".

γλῶσσά τε καὶ σοφίη is usually and correctly preferred by the modern editors to the variant of Clement, *σῶμά τε καὶ δύναμις* — physical strength can hardly be relevant for the ninth *hebdomas*, above all since Solon stopped making reference to it from the fourth *hebdomas* onwards. As for the synonymy *νοῦς/σοφίη*, it is clearly not at all a full equalisation, and Solon distinguishes the wisdom reached through experience (*σοφίη*) from the natural gift of 'intelligence' (*νοῦς*).

Analogously *ἀρετή* l. 8 was the more traditional physical "strength", which had most often been identified in ancient epic with martial value; in l. 16 the word is used in its broader meaning, to include the civic virtues of eloquence and wisdom, and the martial meaning seems forgotten, since Solon takes care to remark the fainting of the intellectual powers, but is silent (or seems uninterested in) about the expiration of the physical strength; in a similar way, he uses the word *ἥβη* from the very first line, but he never mentions the word *γῆρας* — a word for which Solon showed no less hatred than other lyric contemporaries of his in the different, symposiastic context of fr. 18.10 (cf. Preisshofen 1977, 84f.). Cp. Diocles and Straton, who by contrast, specified the start of the decline of the physical strength between the sixth and the seventh *hebdomas*: see Introd.

17. *τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο*: The typical Solonian thought — that the end of life is also its full accomplishment according to its natural measure (see Introd., and ad fr. 20), also reflected in Macrobius (quoted above): *meta vivendi ... vitae humanae perfectum spatium terminatur* — is expressed through a pretty traditional language. Cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1114 *τὸν βίον τελεῖν*, GVI 441.1 (2/3 cent. A.D.) *τέρμα βίου τελέσας*, and, on the last phrase, Hom. *Il.* 11.225 *ἥβης ... ἵκετο μέτρον* (~*Od.* 4.668, 11.317, 18.217, 19.532, *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 166), Hes. *Op.* 132 *ἥβης μέτρον ἵκοιτο*, 438 *ἥβης μέτρον ἔχοντε*, 720 *κατὰ μέτρον ἰούσης*, fr. 205.2 *ἥβης ... ἵκετο μέτρον*.

18. ἄωρος appears only once in Hom. *Od.* 12.89 πόδες ἄωροι. Soon later it becomes a technical term for the deceased before their natural time: Hdt. 2.79.3, *Scol. PMG* 884.4; *CEG* 154.2 (5th cent.), being the first instance of a long series of epitaphs, for which see Griessmair 1966 and Vérilhac 1978-82.

μοῖραν ἔχου θανάτου: Sol. 26.4 μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου, and note there, *GVI* 414.3 (2/3 cent. A.D. [μ]οῖραν ἔχων θανάτ[ου]. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 13.602 μοῖρα κακὴ θανάτοιο (second hemistich), *Od.* 2.100=3.238=24.135 μοῖρ' ὅλοῃ κατέλῃσι ... θανάτοιο, 17.326 μοῖρα λάβεν ... θανάτοιο, *Hom. Hymn Aphr.* 269 μοῖρα παρεστήκη θανάτοιο, Hes. fr. 35.4 θανάτοιο ... λάβε μοῖρα, Thgn. *IEG* 820 μοῖρα λάβοι θανάτου, second half of pentameter, as in [Arist.] *Pepl.* 29.2 Bergk' μοῖραν ἔχων θανάτου.

Death is mentioned with an expression that tries to make this event smoother, and stressing its natural necessity invites to a conscious acceptance of it: see lastly Burzacchini 1995, 77.

24 G.-P.² (26 W.²)

A positive presentation of elements of the sympotic pleasure, whose etiquette Sol. in fr. 3.9f. had been defending. Plutarch clearly misunderstands the context of the lines in one of his three quotations of the fragment (*Amat.* 5.571e): see on this Masaracchia 1958, 327-8, and the notes of the Introd. to fr. 16. A close parallel to Solon's fragment is Anac. *IEG* 2 κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέω οἶνοποτάζων ... Μουσέων τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης συμμίσγων ἐρατῆς μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης.

1-2. Κυπρογενοῦς ... Διονύσου ... Μουσέων: The same triad is found in Bacchyl. fr. 20B, Eur. *Bacch.* 402-16, *Anacreont.* 4 (iii).11-21, Posidipp. *Anth.Pal.* 5.134, Marc.Arg. *Anth.Pal.* 10.18, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 5.135.3.

The motif coupling wine with love has a long history (see, generally, Privitera 1970, 91ff., and Giangrande 1968, 127f.: see also e.g. Anac. *PMG* 357, Panyassis, *PEG* 17.3 (who states that the second round of drinks was dedicated to Aphrodite and Dionysus), Eur. *Cyc.* 69-72, Pl. *Symp.* 177e, *Anacreont.* 5.12-5, 6, 38.2-6, 44, *Hymn.Orph.* 42, 55.7, 57.3-4: see Dodds ad Eur. *Bacch.* 402-16 for iconography and cult. For the association of Dionysus with the Muses e.g. *Anacreont.* 50, Nicaenetus. *Anth.Pal.* 13.29, Hedyl. ap. Athen. 11.472f and 11.473a (= *Hell.Ep.* 1853-56, 1857-62 Gow-Page), Antip.Sid. *Anth.Pal.* 7.27.9f., 'Diog.Laert.' *Anth.Pal.* 7.104; For Dionysus-Μουσαγέτης in Naxos, see Nilsson 1906, 306, n. 2. Aphrodite is together with the Muses in *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 189-96, *Anacreont.* 19, and for her connection with poetry, Pl. *Symp.* 196e, Callim. *Anth.Pal.* 12.150, Nic. *SH* 566, Bion fr. 3 and 9 Gow.

For the form Διονύσου with omicron, *Od.* 11.325 is the only example in Homer, who elsewhere has Διώνυσος, but it occurs x4 in the *Hymns*.

1. ἔργα ... Κυπρογενοῦς: For the periphrasis, cf. Hom. *Il.* 5.429, Hes. *Op.* 521, fr. 124.2, *Hom.Hymn Aphr.* 1, 6, 9, 21, Thgn. *IEG* 1308, Crit. 4.18, Aesch. *Supp.* 1037, Theoc. *Epigr.* 4.4, and cf. Gow ad Theoc. 14.62 with further references.

For the goddess' epithet Κυπρογενής (in its various forms) see e.g. *Hom.Hymn* 10.1, Hes. *Theog.* 199, Sapph. *PLF* 22.16, 134, Alc. *PLF* 296b.1 and 380, Stesich. *PMGF* S104.6, Thgn. *IEG* 1323, 1386, Pind. *Ol.* 10.105, *Pyth.* 4.216, Panyas. *PEG* 17.3, adesp. *PMG* 949, etc.

2. ἃ τίθησ' ... εὐφροσύνας: Accompaniment of the feasting and drinking in Homer (Latacz 1966, 163f.), the purely pleasant sympotic εὐφροσύνη is the embodiment of the aristocratic life-style and of the symposiastic ideals of good order, on which cf. Sol. 3.9-10 and note there; see Oranje 1984, 105.

25 G.-P.² (29 W.²)

The fragment does not fit any *incipit* of the metres used by Solon. Modern editors usually consider it to be the last part of a hexameter, and this presentation is certainly correct, but the fact that the fragment itself is a 'paroemiac' must not be understated. The presence of the phrase, complete in itself in this form, may suggest that Solon acknowledged it as the "quotation" of a pre-existing proverb, since, beyond the name, this metrical structure was a very common shape of Greek proverbs, and both [Pl.] *Just.* 374a and its scholiast (our only testimony for Solon's authorship) state that Solon was quoting the proverb. This fact should not, in my opinion, let us doubt the authenticity of the fragment as Solon's: Solon will have inserted the proverb in a hexameter of his in a way analogous to Hesiod's, who appears to have inserted previous proverbs with their original metre in the most sapient-gnomic section of *Works & Days* (383-828), in order to gain a 'gnomic' aura, as has been acknowledged by various modern scholars: cf. Porter 1951, 31-2, Hoekstra 1957, 212ff., Sbardella 1995.

Solon's resorting to the Hesiodic practice of marking off gnomic-proverbial phrases by conserving their original paroemiac form may also be intended as an allusion to Hesiod as the precedent for the selection of the poetic themes Solon would be possibly dealing with in this fragment (and was certainly dealing in most of his poetry). Hesiod was concerned with "thoughtful" and didactic themes of poetry, and had stated that the Muses ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι (*Theog.* 27-8) "they say" (namely inspire) both "truth" (wise theological or ethical subjects, as the ones Hesiod chose to treat) and "lies" (the fictional myths that have no connection with the past or present 'realities' about gods or social principles, the pertinent subjects for the devoted to the truth author of *Theogony* and *Works & Days*); after all, as Kannicht 1996, 204-6 emphasised about the Elegy to the Muses, Solon avoids to ask them for inspiration about the themes Homer and the Homeric ἀοιδοί had been asking for, but invokes their help for some guide about ethical themes of Hesiodic flavour, such as "righteous wealth", good δόξα and so on.

In my opinion, Solon sets himself in the wake of Hesiod who had previously rejected the 'fictional' poetry unrelated to the present, and would allude to his being in his wake also by using a form of direct reference to the paroemiographic tradition, as Hesiod himself had used as a vehicle for a markedly gnomic content of a section of the *Works & Days*.

Although the nature of Solon's criticism cannot be established with certainty because of the very scanty information we have, his statement that the poets speak many falsehoods can be understood from the agonistic context of early poetry, which produced multiple accounts of a single story, alternative versions of myth and demanded reworking

on one's predecessors, improvement, and explicit comparison with one's rivals. Cp. how the poet of the *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus* (I) claims as false the other accounts of Dionysus' birth, in ll. 1-6 οἱ μὲν ..., οἱ δ(ὲ) ... φάσ', οἱ δ' ..., οἱ δέ ... , ἄλλοι ... ψευδόμενοι (see Vetta 1983, xlviii; on the competitive context of early poetry, see Gentili 1984, 204-5 and n. 5, Griffith 1990; for evidence of early poetic competitions: Hom. *Il.* 2.594-600, Hes. *Op.* 26, 650-7, *Certamen* p. 228.64ff. A., *Hom. Hymn Aphr.* 19-20 etc. Already the *Odyssey* may be seen as suggesting a relationship between the poet and the liar by the affinity of the figure of the narrating Odysseus with the poet-bard (see further on this Pratt 1993, 55-94). For other critiques of the traditional poetry which will culminate in the fifth century philosophy, see Ford 1981, 351-68, and Pratt 1993, 131-56.

In such a context the ability to deceive and lie, namely to invent and shape fiction, becomes particularly desirable and essential, and is entailed in the artist's own *techne*, *sophia*. Such view of poetry as a product of the human intellect and imagination would be coherent with the idea of poetry that Solon expresses in *Salamis* (l. 2) and in his poetic address to Mimnermus (see the Introd. to fr. 26).

Solon's interest for poetry as a 'critic' is depicted by Plutarch's anecdote (*Sol.* 29.7) about his attending Thespis' performance and complaining afterwards about the 'lies' performed, like a good Platonist *ante litteram* (cp. Plato's opinions on drama in the third book of the *Republic*) — cf. also Diog.Laert. 1.59 Θέσπιν ἐκώλυσε τραγωδίας διδάσκειν, ὡς ἀνωφελῇ τὴν ψευδολογίαν. We cannot decide on the historicity of the tradition of Solon's controversy with Thespis (there is a serious but not inhibiting chronological difficulty: cf. Patzer 1962, 25 and Kolleritsch 1968, 4 n. 14), but Plutarch links it closely with Peisistratus' histrionics in the market place, and therefore the main purpose of the anecdote seems to illustrate vividly Peisistratus' own tricks: in this case Plutarch's Solon would be criticising the mimetic form of the presentation, more than its contents (cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 272f.) — much too modern a perspective for the real Solon.

ψεύδονται: The verb denotes only the objective falsity of what is said, and in Greek there is no word-difference for unintentional *pseudea* ('fiction' or 'partial information') and intentional ones ('lies'), cf. e.g. Pl. *Hp.mi.* 370e ἃ μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ψεύδεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαίνεται ψευδόμενος ἀλλ' ἄκων, διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν τὴν τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἀναγκασθεὶς καταμεῖναι καὶ βοηθῆσαι· ἃ δὲ ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, ἐκὼν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς, Plut. *Quom. aud. poet.* 2.16a-d where poets are said to produce both unintentional and intentional *pseudea* (τὰ μὲν ἐκόντες, τὰ δ' ἄκοντες); see Pratt 1993, 56, with bibliography ad loc. For early examples of unintentional saying what is not objectively true, see Hom. *Il.* 10.534=*Od.* 4.140.

26 G.-P.² (20 W.²)

This fragment presents itself expressly as a correction of Mimnermus' fr. 11, inside what the testimony of Diog.Laert. 1.60 calls a "critical reply" to Mimnermus' thought and poetry about the shortness of the life-span and the bitterness of old age. Solon's fr. 27 (according to the testimonies), possibly fr. 28 and, in a less direct way, fr. 23 may also be part of Solon's criticism. This wide range of Solon's concern with Mimnermus' thought makes it unnecessary to consider any biographical conjecture on a concrete meeting and a specific occasion for this fragment — for instance, according to Szádeczky-Kardoss 1942, 80f., and Steffen 1955=1973, Solon would have written these lines during his visit to Ionia, in the imminence of the sixtieth birthday of Mimnermus, and would have advised him to avert the bad omen.

Solon asks (or, better, imagines to ask) Mimnermus (or, better, someone who had recited some lines of Mimnermus) to bring about a μεταποίησις, namely one of the "alterations" which in the 'tit for tat' repartees of the symposia (a practice well documented to us by the Theognidean corpus and Aristophanes' *Wasps*: cf. Vetta 1980, XXIXf., and Bowie 1997) was customarily brought about by a X speaker on the utterance of a previous Y speaker. More precisely, instead of doing a μεταποίησις himself of the text by another, in the way we know from the Theognidean corpus, Solon asks Mimnermus (namely the real author of the lines, or a reciter of them, see ad l. 1) to bring about a παλινωδία, and such an inclusion of the interlocutor in the text makes clear the agonistic character of Solon's intentions, though his poetry does not yet involve the practice of the agonistic couplets that features in the Theognidean corpus (see ad 17.1).

1. εἴ μοι ... πείσεαι: Cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.207 αἶ κε πίθηαι, 7.28 εἴ μοί τι πίθοιο, *Od.* 20.381 ἄλλ' εἴ μοί τί πίθοιο, Semon. *IEG* 1.22 εἰ δ' ἐμοὶ πιθοίατο. The conditional emphasises the good will that Mimnermus has to show in order to allow Solon's criticism to be fruitful, as is well posed by Tuomi 1986, 10. Πείσεαι is better for the sense to be taken as subjunctive aorist rather than indicative future (see below about κἄν). On short-vowel subjunctives, see Chantraine, *Gramm.hom.* 1.454f. with examples from Homer (e.g. *Od.* 1.270, 13.336).

κἄν νῦν ἔτι: "if (perhaps, ἄν) now still"—"even if eventually now (after previously refusing)", proposed by Hermann ap. Vigerus 1834, 922, or "were it only for this once", by Hudson-Williams (cf. Kühner-Gerth 1, 245). It is, however, also possible that Solon meant to be ironical or sarcastic towards Mimnermus who was almost certainly dead when Solon wrote this, so the meaning of the line is 'if you could, please, even now that you are dead, change this...'.

If, on the contrary, we accept καὶ νῦν, (the reading proposed by Thiersch, and lastly accepted by West and Tuomi 1986, 20-5) and πείσεαι as a future indicative we have to assume that Solon had already asked and managed to get other changes from Mimnermus in the past.

ἔξελε τοῦτο: on the verb, see Pl. *Resp.* 3.394b μάθανε ... ὅτι ταύτης αὐῖ ἐναντία γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ῥήσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα καταλείπη. The neuter (implying either ἔπος: cf. West 1974, 181f., or the single word ἐξηκονταέτη: cf. Tuomi 1986, 19) is better than the masculine τοῦτον, implying στίχον.

2. μηδὲ μέγαιρ': Hom. *Od.* 3.55 κλῦθι ... μηδὲ μεγέρης (the verbal form is at the end of the line 8 of 9x in Homer and the *Hymns*).

ὅτι σεῦ λῶον ἐπεφρασάμην: λῶον adverb (Florens Christianus (Chrestien), Boissonade) is much better than λῶον' (στίχον) Ziegler, since Homer and Hesiod use only the neuter λῶιον; one could also accept the neuter here with τοῦτο (ἔπος). The reading of the MSS, σεῦ τοῖον (σ' εὔ τοῖον Allen 1934, 238) cannot be accepted, in spite of the defence of Tuomi 1986, 14-9. According to Tuomi τοῖον is a pronoun which anticipates the epithet of l. 3, and the whole line would be a parenthetical invitation to Mimnermus not "to envy me=Solon because I found out such a name for you", but we would expect that Solon's invitation would concern the change in Mimnermus' verse, not the new name, and at any rate the syntax would be exceptionally hard, with καὶ μεταποίησον resuming the main thought of the fragment and being something like a parenthesis inside the parenthesis.

ἐπεφρασάμην: cf. Thgn. *IEG* 430 and 706 τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο. The verb is always middle in Homer and Hesiod.

3. μεταποίησον: new. Cf. Sol. 2.2 ὥδην ... θέμενος (=ποιούμενος). μεταποιεῖν in the sense of 'change', 'alter substituting one word with another' appears sometimes in contexts of creative adaptations ([Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 110B8) but much more frequently to define grammatical interventions on other people's texts (e.g. Gal. *De diff. resp.* 7.834.10 and *In epidem. comm.* 17b.93.11; the term also was technical in the scholiastic tradition: see Erbse's ed. of the schol. to *Iliad*, vol. 6, p. 406f.).

The archaic poet's vocation and art were conventionally thought to stem from the gods and to be sustained by the gods. It is in Solon that we find the first use of the very verb ποιεῖν for the activity of the poets in this address to Mimnermus (as stressed by Ford 1981, 300ff., ποιεῖν in Homer and Hesiod is always applied to technical arts in the sense of "fabricate" but never to poetry because poetry has had the status of a religious

function, it was a matter of divine inspiration not τέχνη; see also Dover 1997, 184-5): the new use of the word implies a new profane evaluation of poetry, where the art of 'singing' becomes more or less human 'making'/'composing', and shows the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman with a more analytical/rational view towards the process of poetic composition as technical making (see Gentili 1971, 60ff., and 1984, 67 and notes, and also above, ad fr. 2.2). It is most probably not a matter of chance, if this new profane approach surfaces in this context, because Solon's request to Mimnermus to 'change' what he had written would be otherwise more or less blasphemous, if Solon had reaffirmed here the principle of the divine provenance of poetry — compare the different attitude that Solon has in other poems, like the proemium of fr. 1, where he traditionally involves the Muses and places his message under divine approval and protection, and later on, ll. 51-2, speaks of the profession of the poet piously in connection with the Olympian Muses.

Λιγυαστάδης: (ν)α(ι)γιασταδης(-δὶ) codd., emended by Bergk to Λιγυαστάδης and by Diels 1902, 481-2 to Λιγυαστάδης, with reference to the entry of *Suda* (μ 1077) on Mimnermus, which, after stating that Mimnermus was son of some Λιγυρτυάδης adds: ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Λιγυαστάδης διὰ τὸ ἐμμελὲς καὶ λιγύ. The name of the father as reported by *Suda* has a foreign, Anatolian flavour (compare the Asiatic names Hyrtios son of Gyrtios and Hyrtakos of Homer, already quoted by Allen ad Mimn., p. 16 n. 31), and Solon's seeming patronymic might involve a joke between the adjective λιγύς and the name of the father, as if Solon were mocking the obscure (not Hellenic ?) origin of Mimnermus (on such mocking polysyllabic words with patronymic endings see Diels 1902, 482, who compares Ar. *Ran.* 841).

As to λιγύς, it was often used in archaic poetry with reference to a pleasant singing voice or to the sound of an instrument (see Kaimio 1977, 42ff.); for testimonies of Mimnermus' *aulos*-playing which recalls the strong association of the early elegy with musical accompaniment, see Allen cit., pp. 16-17, and cp. also the qualification used by Corinna for the poetess Myrtis, *PMG* 664.2 λιγουράν Μουρτίδ(α). In the light of this evidence, I am quite sceptical about the negative interpretation of the adjective, advanced by Tuomi 1986, 12-4, according to whom Solon would criticise the excessive musicality of Mimnermus' style, or his excessive relying on the musical accompaniment.

ὦδε δ' ᾄειδε: Hom. *Od.* 8.83, 367, 521 ταῦτ' ἄρ' ... ᾄειδε. In early poetry ἀείδειν was the basic verb to denote the performance of the epic poet, and was also used by poets of all genres as an 'ennobled' term for their activity: cf. e.g. Archil. *IEG* 117, Alc. *PMG* 14a, 28, Sapph. *PLF* 160, Thgn. *IEG* 4, 533, 943, Corinn. *PMG* 655.I.2).

4. Solon's reference line was Mimn. 11.2 ἐξηκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου.

ὀγδωκονταέτη: Hom. *Il.* 2.568, 652 ὀγδῶκοντα. The adjectival formation is paralleled in epitaphic inscriptions: *CEG* 176 (5th cent. B.C.) πεντεκαιεκοσέτης (first half of a pentameter)~*GVI* 1233.6 (2/1 B.C.).

μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου: Cf. Sol. 23.18 and note there; Hom. *Il.* 11.451 τέλος θανάτοιο κιχήμενον, *Il.* 17.478, 672, 22.303, 436 θάνατος καὶ μοῖρα κιχάνει (also *Od.* 3.238 μοῖρ' ὅλοῃ κατέλῃσι ... θανάτοιο), but Mimnermus' second hemistich reflects an idiomatic half pentameter of the elegiac poetry: Callin. 1.15 μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου, Tyrtr. 5.5 μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου, Thgn. *IEG* 340 μοῖρα κίχη θανάτου, *CEG* 77.2 (ca. 500-475?) θανάτο δὲ ἐνθάδε μοῖρ' ἔχιχε, "Simon." *FGE* 995 μοῖρ' ἔκιχεν θανάτου. See on the verb Ruijgh and van Krimper 1969, 113ff.

κίχοι: Phot. *Lex.* p. 341 N. κιγχάνειν τὸ ἐπεξιέναι οὕτως Σόλων, *Suda* κ 1586 A. κιγχάνειν: τὸ ἐπεξιέναι οἱ περὶ Σόλωνα.

27 G.-P.² (21 W.²)

Some of Solon's laws aimed at limiting funerary ostentation and the luxury of the funeral rites, which according to Dem.Phil. 135 Wehrli would have become more and more expensive by Solon's time. Cf. Ampolo 1984, 93, Engels 1998.

In one of his laws, according to Plut. *Sol.* 21.6, Solon ἀμυχὰς δὲ κοπτομένων καὶ τὸ θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα καὶ τὸ κωκύειν ἄλλον ἐν ταφᾷς ἐτέρων ἀφείλεν. Our fragment may have hinted at what the κωκυτός during the πρόθεσις ought to be in the opinion of Solon the lawgiver: it had to be limited to the φίλοι of the dead.

Solon's position appears to mediate between the praxis of the epic heroes and of the Greeks of his time to mourn the deceased in scenic and immoderate ways at the funerals, often hiring mourners (according with the primitive belief that the spirits of the dead demand mourning as their due) and the opposite wish not to be mourned and lamented.

As for the first attitude, resorting to professional mourners (the Carian women were the most famous) remained a common practice throughout the centuries: see Ar. *Ran.* 1302-3, Pl. *Leg.* 7.800d-e (besides Hsch. κ 824 L. s.v. Καρῖναι, Phot. *Lex.* p. 314 N., s.v. Καρικῇ μούσῃ), and the presence of non-kin at the lamentation for a deceased is attested as early as *Il.* 18.339, where Trojan women were compelled to mourn for Patroclus, or in *Il.* 24.720f., where professional ἀοιδοί intervene in Hector's funeral; cf. Alexiou 1974, 10-4.

As for the second attitude, apart from Hom. *Il.* 19.216-37, instances are Archil. *IEG* 13.9-10 ἀλλὰ τάχιστα τλήτε, γυναικεῖον πένθος ἀπωσάμενοι, Semon. *IEG* 2 τοῦ μὲν θανόντος οὐκ ἂν ἐνθυμοίμεθα, εἴ τι φρονοῖμεν, πλείον ἡμέρης μιῆς, Bacchyl. fr. 12 τί γὰρ ἐλαφρόν ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἄπρακτ' ὀδυρόμενον δονεῖν καρδίαν;, Pl. *Resp.* 386-8, Philet. *CA* 11 ἐκ θυμοῦ κλαῦσαί με τὰ μέτρια, καί τι προσηνὲς εἰπεῖν, μεμνησθαί τ' οὐκέτ' ἐόντος ὁμῶς, Posidipp. *SH* 705.21 μηδέ τις οὖν χεύαι δάκρυον (on which, cf. Lloyd-Jones 1963=1990, 184-5), Euph. *CA* 21 τῷ καὶ μέτρια μὲν τις ἐπὶ φθιμένῳ ἀκάχοιτο, μέτρια καὶ κλαύσειεν· ἐπεὶ καὶ πάμπαν ἄδακρυν Μοῖραι ἐσικχήναντο (if one retains, as proposed by van Groningen ἐσημήναντο given by Stobaeus' cod. S, then this would appear to be another case of almost complete denial of mourning), [Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102d and *de Hom.* 2.189. An instance of complete denial of the opportunity of mourning is provided by Sapph. *PLF* 150 οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἐν μοισοπόλων τοίκῃ θρῆνον ἔμμεν· οὐ κ' ἄμμι τάδε πρόποι (according to the testimony the advice was addressed by Sappho to her daughter —compare the φίλοι for whose lamentation Solon wishes after his death); see also Enn. fr. var. 17 Vahlen (which Cic. *Tusc.* 1.117 and *Cato maior* 20.73 preferred to Solon's position) *nemo me lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu faxit. Cur? volito vivos per ora virum*, where denial of funerary honours and trust in the immortality of the glory are closely connected — possibly in the

path of Sappho, if Sappho's strong denial was really as rare in antiquity as our evidence allows us to believe.

Therefore several parallels exist for Solon's wish for moderation (and Sappho's possibly pre-existed to him), but Solon's personal contribution may be detected in the mention of the φίλοι. In my opinion, this fragment possibly furthers the challenge which Solon sets, in a positive qua social perspective, against the anti-social and negative views on the end of human life maintained by Mimnermus, according to whom old age unavoidably makes everyone isolated and despised even by one's children: οὐδὲ πατὴρ παισὶν τίμιος οὔτε φίλος, fr. 9.2; see also fr. 1.6. Cp. the law of Solon on the assistance offered to the parents by the son, for which see ad 18.10.

The distress, the grief of the friends is not only the context for lamenting his death. It is also a formal affirmation of the aristocratic ideology of *philotes* that binds the φίλοι ἐταῖροι together, already present in the Homeric tradition of the mourning for the dead heroes (*Il.* 18.232ff., 19.4ff.), and, in a larger sense, too, in lyric (Callin. 1.18-9, Tyrt. 9.27-8). Here in Solon this social function of grief is applied to civic death and to the ideology of the *polis*, and the attempt by Stupperich 1977, 200-5 to date back to Solon's laws the beginning of the Athenian use of the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος for the fallen in the war is perhaps a bit too speculative, but appears to me to be not improbable at all. As a fact, Solon is said to have authorised a common festival of the dead, the *Genesia*, which transformed the formerly private matter of reverence for deceased family members into a public concern, see Jacoby 1944, and Brook Manville 1990, 148-9. Solon would also have received the first public burial in Athenian history, according to Plut. *Sol.* 32, Ael. *VH* 8.16.

1. μηδέ ... θάνατος μόλοι: For verbal similarities, cf. Aesch. *TrGF* 255.1 ὦ θάνατε παιών, μή μ' ἀτιμάσης μολεῖν, Soph. *Aj.* 854 ὦ θάνατε θάνατε, νῦν μ' ἐπίσκεψαι μολών, *Phil.* 797 ὦ θάνατε θάνατε, ... οὐ δύνη μολεῖν ποτε, adesp. *TrGF* 369a ὦ θάνατε παιάν, <~?> ἱατρὸς μόλοις.

ἄκλαυτος: ἄκλαυστος codd. which appears to be a late form, never certain before Alc. Mess. *Anth.Pal.* 7.247 (though it is attested in the Louvre papyrus of Alcman fr. 1.39; see also Soph. *TrGF* ** 1133, 56.1]κλαυστη[).

The lack of lamentation (e.g. Aesch. *Cho.* 433 ἀνοίμωκτον, *Eum.* 565 ὦλετ' ἄκλαυτος αἴστος) was almost as bad as the lack of proper burial, and the two things are often linked together: see e.g. Hom. *Il.* 22.386 κεῖται ... ἄκλαυτος ἄθαπτος, *Od.* 11.72 μή μ' ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ... καταλείπειν, Soph. *Ant.* 29 ἐὰν δ' ἄκλαυτον, ἄταφον (see also *Ant.* 847 φίλων ἄκλαυτος), *El.* 867 οὔτε του τάφου ἀντιάσας οὔτε γόων, *OC* 1708 οὐδὲ πένθος ἔλιπ' ἄκλαυτον, Eur. *Andr.* 1159-60 κομίζομέν νῖν σοι κατοιμῶξαι γόοις κλαῦσαί τε, ... γῆς τε κοσμήσαι τάφῳ, *Hec.* 30 ἄκλαυτος

ἄταφος, *GVI* 715.5 (1/2 A.D.) οὐκ ἄκλαυτον ἔχων τάφον; for the dishonour done to Agamemnon regarding his funerary rights Aesch. *Ag.* 1541-50, *Cho.* 8, 511.

1-2. φίλοισι καλλείπομι ... ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς: the closest parallel is Aesch. *Pers.* 674 ὦ πολύκλαυτε φίλοισι θανών; cf. also Hom. *Il.* 2.39 θήσειν ... ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε, *Il.* 5.156-7 πατέρι δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρὰ λείπ(ε), *Od.* 1.242-4 οἶχετ' ... ἐμοὶ δ' ὀδύνας τε γόους τε κάλλιπεν· οὐδ' ἔτι κεῖνον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω κτλ., *Od.* 5.83=157 δάκρυσι καὶ στοναχῇσι καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἐρέχθων, *Od.* 11.279 τῷ δ' ἄλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσσω, *Od.* 14.39 ἄλγεά τε στοναχάς τε, Stesich. *PMG* 232.3 κήδεα δὲ στοναχάς τ' Ἀίδας ἔλαχε, Soph. *Aj.* 972-3 ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ λιπὼν ἀνίας καὶ γόους διοίχεται, *GVI* 77.1-2 (5 cent. B.C.) ὅς μάλα πολλο[ῖς] ἀστοῖς καὶ ξείνοις δῶκε θανὸν ἀνίαν, 1913.5-6 (beginning of 3rd cent. B.C.) πολλὰ δὲ δοῦσα [ἄ]λγεα κ[αὶ] στεναχάς θνήσκεις μελέοισι γονεῦσιν, 1121.4 (2/1 B.C.?) ἔλιπον δάκρυα καὶ στοναχάς, 762.5 (1 B.C.) στοναχάς καὶ δάκρυα λείπει, 1122.1 (first half of first cent. B.C.) πένθεα καὶ στοναχάς λείπω,

28 G.-P.² (18 W.²)

Solon develops a positive attitude towards the process of human ageing regarding it as a period of continuing ability for learning: cp. fr. 23.15-6, where he acknowledged both the weakness and the abilities of the ninth *hebdomad*. In fact, the qualification κακὸν γῆρας of fr. 18.10 is in contrast with this view, but this contrast is due to the realistic acknowledgement of the proximity of old age and death and of the 'social problem of old age' in fr. 18 (see there ad l. 10), and besides to the different generic context (the concern of fr. 18 is mostly erotic, and the idea of physical decay unavoidably matters much more in it; on Solon's manipulation of the ideas of γῆρας and ἥβη according to different contexts, see the brilliant analysis of Falkner 1995, 163f., 168 and n.43).

The association of prudence and wisdom with old people was a commonplace already in Homer (for instance the most senior were privileged by their years to intervene in moments of perplexity as wise counsellors: besides the Iliadic Nestor, see e.g. *Od.* 2.15 Aegyptius, 2.157 Halitherses, 7.155, 11.342 Echeneus, 24.52 Nestor again, *Hes. Theog.* 233 Nereus). However, Solon is more specifically engaged in representing old age as a worthy part of the human life against the background of erotic lyric poets who denigrate γῆρας, Mimnermus in particular, who had also said that mental powers fail in old age: see 1.4-7 τὸ δ' ἀργαλέον ... γῆρας ... βλάπτει δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχυθέν.

The debate was not going to finish in the age of the lyrics: the fame of Solon's line was to become great later (see parallels ad l. 1, and in Tosi 1991, 175, n. 385), but the opposite opinion on the wisdom of old age surfaces no less often: cf. e.g. *Hdt.* 3.134.3-4. αὐξομένῳ γὰρ τῷ σώματι συναύξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες, γηράσκοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται, *Soph. Ant.* 681-2 ἡμῖν μὲν, εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλέμμεθα, λέγειν φρονούντως ὧν λέγεις δοκεῖς πέρι, *TrGF* 949 πάντ' ἐμπέφυκε τῷ μακρῷ γήρα κακά, νοῦς φροῦδος, ἔργ' ἀχρεῖα, φροντίδες κεναί, *Eur. TGF* 25.2-4 γέροντες οὐδέν ἐσμεν ἄλλο πλὴν ψόφος καὶ σχῆμ', ὀνείρων δ' ἔρπομεν μιμήματα· νοῦς δ' οὐκ ἔνεστιν, οἴόμεσθα δ' εὖ φρονεῖν, *TGF* 509 τί δ' ἄλλο; φωνὴ καὶ σκιὰ γέρων ἀνὴρ. *Pl. Resp.* 7.536d expressly quotes Solon, stating that his view was mistaken: Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον ὥς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦπτον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι, and *Pl. Euthd.* 272c will ridicule the γεροντοδιδάσκαλος (cf. also *Lach.* 201a-c, *Ar. Nub.* 129-30, 854-5, and Theophrastus' ὀψιμαθής).

γηράσκω ... αἰεὶ ... διδασκόμενος: *Aesch. PV* 981 ἀλλ' ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ' ὁ γηράσκων χρόνος, (a possible reworking of Solon's line), *Ag.* 1621-2 τὸ γῆρας ...

διδάσκειν, *Soph. OC* 7-8 χρόνος ξυνὼν μακρὸς διδάσκει, *TrGF* 260.1-2 ἀλλὰ τῷ γήρᾳ φιλεῖ χῶ νοῦς ὁμαρτεῖν καὶ τὸ βουλεύειν ἃ δεῖ, *TrGF* 664 γήρας διδάσκει πάντα καὶ χρόνου τριβή (whereas when you are young *TrGF* *694 νέος πέφυκας· πολλὰ καὶ μαθεῖν σε δεῖ καὶ πόλλ' ἀκοῦσαι καὶ διδάσκεσθαι μακρά), *Eur. Phoen.* 528-30 οὐχ ἅπαντα τῷ γήρᾳ κακά, ... πρόσσεστιν· ἀλλ' ἡμπειρία ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον, *Hipp.* 252 πολλὰ διδάσκει μ' ὁ πολὺς βίος, *Supp.* 419 ὁ γὰρ χρόνος μάθησιν ἀντὶ τοῦ τάχους κρείσσω δίδωσι, *TGF* 291.2-3 γνῶμαι δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν γεραιτέρων· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος δίδαγμα ποικιλώτατον, *TGF* 508.2 βουλαὶ δ' ἔχουσι τῶν γεραιτέρων κράτος, *TGF* 619 τὸ γήρας ... τῶν νεωτέρων φρενῶν σοφώτερον πέφυκε κάσφαλέστερον, ἐμπειρία τε τῆς ἀπειρίας κρατεῖ, *Men. Georg.* fr. 5 Sandbach ὁ δὲ χρόνος τί μ' εἰδέναι ποεῖ πλέον.

29-29^b G.-P.² (32-34 W.²)

In contrast to the early poems written before the archonship (in elegiacs), which are more concerned with attacking the greed of the rich, Solon's later poems, in tetrameters (addressed to an unknown Phocus) and in iambs are mostly written in justification of his reforms, and, in the case of the tetrameters to Phocus, against the complaints of the party which had favoured Solon's political rise, but, after the reforms when he did not accept the autocracy of a *tyrannis* in Athens, thought that he did not go far enough to further its interests.

Indeed, according to Plutarch, *Sol.* 14.6 Solon had the possibility of becoming a tyrant in Athens, and even a Delphic oracle had guaranteed him success in this attempt: ἦσο μέσῃν κατὰ νῆα, κυβερνητήριον ἔργον εὐθύνων· πολλοί τοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπίκουροι (cf. Thgn. *IEG* 39-40, where εὐθυντήρ unambiguously refers to an autocratic seizure of power).

The modern meaning of tyranny, and the best established modern views about this idea may lead us to believe that the apology of Solon about his refusal had too much of an obvious concern. First of all, in Solon's time the term did not have the connotations of power imposed with force through an unlawful putsch, which the term was going to have in Athens after the Peisistratid experience (see ad ll. 2-3), and the list of the 'Seven Sages' included two tyrants: Periander of Corinth and Thrasibulus of Miletus. Besides, the idea that tyranny is something desirable, because of the wealth and the power it implies, appears to be by far the common opinion in the 6th century. According to Plut. *Sol.* 14.8 Solon himself, while speaking to his φίλοι (=his supporters before the legislation?), would have admitted καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον, οὐκ ἔχειν δ' ἀπόβασιν. Analogously the son of the tyrant Periander is told by the father in Hdt. 3.53.4 that τυραννὶς χρῆμα σφαλερόν, πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐρασταί εἰσι, and the carpenter Charon, the *persona loquens* of Archil. *IEG* 19 (quoted below ad l. 4-5) has to defend his critical stance against what appears to be the common positive valuation of tyranny — a positive valuation which occurs in a straight form in Archil. *IEG* 23.19-21 ν]ῦν εἶλες αἰχμῇ κα[ὶ μέγ' ἐ]ξήρ(ω) κ[λ]έος. κείνης ἄνασσε καὶ τ[υραν]νίην ἔχε· π[ο]λ[λοῖ]σ[ί] θ]η[ν ζ]ηλωτὸς ἀ[νθρ]ώπων ἔσεαι (Archilochus' fragment is an especially interesting passage, because the invitation to seize the power as a tyrant may have included more or less the same reasons maintained by Solon's critics, and rejected by Solon in our fragment; for an attempt at identification of the two characters, cf. Strauss Clay 1986).

Only the later Athenian ideology of the 5th and 4th centuries still stresses sometimes the inherent pleasures (cf. Soph. *Ant.* 1168-9 and *OT* 380, Eur. *Alc.* 286, *TGF* 332.7), but more often the dangers of autocracy, or its anomaly and variance with a legitimate

rule: see e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 11.52f. τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρῳ {σὺν} ὀλβῷ τεθαλότα, μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων, evidently very important in connection with Solon's own concern to be "in the middle", Eur. *TGF* 172 οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἄρχειν οὔτε χρῆν εἶναι νόμον τύραννον εἶναι· μωρία δὲ καὶ θέλειν ὅς τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν μόνος, *TGF* 605 τὸ δ' ἔσχατον δὴ τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς τυραννίς, οὐχ εὖροις ἂν ἀθλιώτερον. φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανεῖν χρεῶν, πλείστος φόβος πρόσεστι μὴ δράσωσί τι, *TGF* 850 ἢ γὰρ τυραννὶς πάντοθεν τοξεύεται δεινοῖς ἔρωσιν, ἧς φυλακτέον πέρι, Xen. *Hier.* 1.9-12, 7.11, Isoc. *Ep.* 6.12; instead the life of a private citizen is commonly preferable (e.g. Eur. *Ion* 625-8), and the feeling that the lot of the ordinary persons is more secure and less precarious than that of the one with an extraordinary power gains prevalence in Greek tragedy (e.g. Eur. *Med.* 122f.). QUOTE CATENACCI

As for the identity of the ex-supporters/present opponents Solon was facing after his reforms, according to the Aristotelic interpretation (*Ath.Pol.* 12.3), followed by most modern scholars (see above all Masaracchia 1958, 342, Adkins 1972a, 12-21 or Rhodes ad *Ath.Pol.* 12.3), the κακοί of fr. 29^b.9 were the poor, in whose favour Solon would have been supposed to pass the land-ἰσομοιρία, namely the redistribution of the land of the ἐσθλοί, the noble-rich class. This reconstruction has been recently challenged. On the improbability of a project of distribution of the lands of the rich class in favour of the poor in the age of the archaic tyrannies, see Brandt 1989, Rosivach 1992. The supporters of Solon who had the expectation of ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὀλβον εὐρήσειν πολύν, fr. 29^b.2, may not be/or only be the poor class (in this case Solon's expression would certainly overstate their expectation: cf. Ferrara 1964, 120; Rosivach 1992, and compare Bacchyl. 1.172-4 ἴσον ὃ τ' ἀφνεὸς ἰμείρει μεγάλων ὃ τε μείων παυροτέρων), but also a part of the nobles (the Alcmeonids, for instance) who relied on the temporary alliance of the poor to become more powerful (on the *tyrannoi* being the product of internal aristocratic *stasis*, and the expressions of the interests of a single aristocratic faction against another, often exploiting the support of the middle-low classes of farmers and traders, see, above all, Ellis-Stanton 1968, Stinton 1976, Stahl 1987, 77-106, Cawkwell 1995), or a group of non-aristocrats (κακοί) who had become wealthy, and wanted to get from Solon χθονὸς πατρίδος ἰσομοιρίην with the aristocrats (ἐσθλοί) (ll. 8-9) in order to make sure of a fuller participation in political power (on the effect of Solon's political reforms that shifted the qualification for public office from the criteria of birth plus wealth to the single criterion of wealth, *but* the social categories were still defined in terms of agricultural produce, cf. Rosivach 1992, 156).

Solon, and similarly Archilochus, were two poets of the archaic age who used, besides elegiacs, other types of available metre, namely trochaic tetrameter, iambic trimeter, epodes (for Solon's composing of epodes we have the testimony of Diog.Laert.

1.61, West 1982, 43 n. 38). However, Archilochus' and Solon's use of the tetrameters is different.

Dover 1964, examines the form, contents and ethos of Archilochus' elegiacs and iambs, and concludes that there are no grounds for believing that Archilochus regarded them as different genres: in fact, Archilochus may have used the word *iambos* with reference to all forms of poetry which he composed, their common characteristic being not their metre or language, but the type of occasion for which they were composed, their social context. Similarly, Maas 1962, 54f. maintains that the rhythm seems to have been neutral in respect of ethos in the poetry of Archilochus, the Lesbians, and later of Pindar and Bacchylides: a similar metre is used in poems of entirely different character and vice versa.

Solon appears to cut some distinction, namely to use the elegiacs for themes with paraenetic-didactic (either ethical or political-programmatic) purposes, while his extant tetrameter verses are closely tied to his position as an individual looking back on the past. The similarities in the subject-matter of the three fragments addressed to Phocus seem to indicate that they belonged to the same poem or the same kind of poetry, and their tone is different from that of the elegiacs. Scholars have already noticed that the self-referential quality of Solon's narration with the predominance of first person singular verbs in past tenses (features also found in the long trimeter poem) focuses on Solon's past actions (as was stressed for instance by Havelock 1978, 252) and, consequently, on his own present isolation inside Athens. I would add the almost absolute absence of Homeric references, epithets and words, together with the frequent use for the first time of new words (βαθύφρων, ἰσομοιρία, and βουλήεις, being an absolute *hapax*) or, at any rate, of expressions that are known to us only from Athenian comedy (ἄσκὸς ... δεδάρθαι, ἐπιτετρῖφθαι): it would be too mechanical to suppose that this un-Homeric tone is simply due to the unsuitability of Homeric phrases to the different metre. Indeed, all these features may be clues to a less high and official level for Solon's tetrameters than the public — political or ethical — programs sung in the elegiacs.

I do not think that Solon used the tetrameters for a 'serious' political self-propaganda (West 1974, 32), as he had used the elegiacs. In the tetrameters as well as in the long trimeter poem regarding his legislation he does not convey precise programmatic information as he would have had if to substantiate any kind of political self-support (Tsagarakis 1977, 51). Solon's almost complete isolation may imply a new critical and detached attitude. Even though our knowledge of his work is one-sided, the fragments to Phocus show that Solon by displaying traditional terms of praise and blame, and other devices common in blame poetry, such as playing with the *persona loquens* (on which see already Anhalt 1993, 105) aims at ridiculing his critics, more than at self-justifying or self-defending.

As a matter of fact (lastly noticed by Stoessl 1987, 122) Solon is the first, known to us, who imported the trochaic and the iambic metre in Athens from the Ionia of Archilochus. In my opinion, Solon may have anticipated the trend of fifth century drama to exploit the ethos of the different metres to convey different connotations. Aristotle in his *Poet.* 1449a21, 1459b37, *Rh.* 1408b36 (and later on, Dion.Hal. *Comp.* 17.5) called the tetrameter the most satiric and suitable metre for dance, the 'lowest' one even in comparison with the iambic trimeter which was more suited to speech (1448b31, 1459a12); on the other side, hexameter, the most solemn and less colloquial metre, was the most elevated (1459b31-60a1). Solon would be intending to invert the hostility of his old supporters no less than of his old enemies into his own self-praise by discrediting his old supporters-new opponents and by revealing their corruptness (Will 1958, 303, Anhalt 1993, 105). Solon's use of the tetrameters could be explained in these terms. Tetrameters should be ideal for his satiric attack, in a symposiastic context, against his opponents, as distinguished from elegiacs, reserved for the highest didactic-political themes (it is well known that the ancients, till late antiquity, appear not to have a clearly-cut distinction between hexametric and elegiac poetry, both being defined as ἔπη); also the references to food in the iambic fr. 32-4 may indicate another similar but even more disengaged trend.

West usefully hinted at possible echoes of Solon's words from the tetrametra in several passages of Plutarch's *Solon*, but I think that in most cases the thoughts and phrasing more probably are Plutarch's reconstructions: for the prudence that is required in this case, see Martina 1972, on the attempt by den Boer 1966 to extract a Solonian fragment from Plutarch, *Sol.* 14.8. However, I am inclined to believe that at least *Sol.* 15.1=test. 59 G.-P.=fr. 33a W.: συγχέας ἀπαντάπασι καὶ ταραξέας τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γένηται — vel γένωμαι — τοῦ καταστήναι πάλιν may allow us to think of the structure of a verse; furthermore, the content would fit Solon's trend to use medical language for describing the conditions of the state as a sick body: cf. ad 3.17.

29 G.-P.² (33 W.²)

1-2. γῆς ... πατρίδος: a formulaic phrase which frequently occurs in Homer and Hesiod, but always in the different word order πατρίς γαῖα (or πάτριδος αἵης), with the only exception of the anastrophe γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος (*Il.* 13.696, 15.335, *Od.* 10.49). The use is furthered by Ap.Rhod. who has λιποῦσα ἄπο πατρίδα γαῖαν 3.1136, but γαίης ἀπὸ πατρίδος 1.535, and the only parallels for the word order γαῖα πατρίς come from later language: Eur. *Supp.* 1037 ἐς γῆν πατρίδα, *HF* 620 γῆς πατρίδος (also *Alc.* 169 ἐν γῇ πατρώα, *El.* 1315, *IT* 1066 etc.). Solon resumes the distinct word order of the epic tradition, but in doing so he manages to juxtapose the two

words emphatically to τυραννίς and express the two ideas that are polar opposites for him: (public interests of) fatherland and (private interests of a party, satisfied by) tyranny.

However, besides the patriotic feelings (for which cf. also fr. 4), Solon had a strong concern for the pragmatic 'economical' values of γῆ (πατρίς), which for him is equivalent to life itself since it can provide the means of living — the land is called twice πυροφόρος by Solon, and see Hes. *Op.* 31f.

The relationship between acceptance of tyranny and saving the land is explained in 29^b.7-9 (for the formal similarity connecting the two passages, see ad loc.).

2-3. τυραννίδος: the term τυραννίς is first found in Archil. *IEG* 19 (in whose age the word τύραννος was thought to have been first introduced into Greece: cf. Hippias Eleus *VS* 86B9), τύραννος in Semon. *IEG* 7.69, Alc. *PLF* 348, τυραννίη in Archil. *IEG* 23.20, and Xenoph. 3.2. A later tradition considered Gyges (mentioned in Archil. *IEG* 19 cit.) to be the first *tyrannos* (from Euph. 177 van Gron. to *Etym.Magn.* 771.54 G.), and τυραννίη certainly denotes an eastern monarch in Xenoph. 3.2 cit. At any rate, at least Alcaeus' passage, concerned with Pittacus' seizure of power, proves that as early as the beginning of the 6th century, the term was exploited in Greece also for some kind of supreme rulers inside the city-states (of the kind described by Archil. *IEG* 115; cf. Gallavotti 1949). Besides, other passages both in Herodotus and in the tragedians of the 5th century show that the terms *tyrannos* and *basileus* were almost interchangeable, and with no sure derogatory implication for *tyrannos* (as is particularly stressed by Hegy 1965, and Parker 1998). Only in 5th century Athens, presumably in the early years of the century, when ostracism was introduced, tyranny ceased to be a feasible constitutional option, and the term more and more became a metaphor for the political abuse of the bad autocrat as opposed to the good *basileus* (see for instance Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12) — in Aristotle (*Pol.* 1285a) we even see an attempt at distinguishing between the Greek tyranny of Pittacus, being lawful, temporary, and elective, and the barbarian tyrannies of the Asiatic despotism (cf. Romer 1982; more broadly Lanza 1977).

τυραννίδος καὶ βίας ἀμειλίχου: Solon's passages (here and in 29^b.7) are the first to connect *tyrannis* with βία, but we cannot be at all sure whether any derogatory connotation affected Solon's use of the term, or not. More probably Solon refused to enter this office not because he believed it to be itself a form of rule intrinsically abusive and violent (in that case τυραννίς and βία would be something like an endiadys — this interpretation is most common yet anachronistic) — but because his being the *tyrannos* of one of the two political sides would have provoked his own use of βία as well as the βία of the side he would have favoured against the other (cf. Andrewes 1982, 390f., Raaflaub 1993, 73, Salmon 1997, 68f., who also adds as a reason the specific Athenian experience of Cylon's attempt and its aftermath).

3. οὐ καθηψάμην μιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος: In Homer καθάπτομαι is used of the effort made to engage someone in speech for an important reason— cf. *Il.* 1.582, 15.127, *Od.* 2.240, 3.345, 10.70, and see Kirk ad *Il.* 1.582. Here for the first time with the meaning 'lay hold of', as also later with reference to material objects. In my opinion Solon focuses on the tyranny as an object in order to stress that the physical contact with it provokes *miasma*.

μιάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος: The usual association of καταισχύνω with γένος from Homer (e.g. *Od.* 24.508) to Aristophanes (*Av.* 1451) was a fundamental aristocratic belief (see also the simple αἰσχύνω: *Il.* 6.209, *Tyrt.* 6.9). Solon opts for a different phrase, replacing γένος with a word, κλέος, which refers to his personal self (it is remarkable that the word γένος never appears in the extant verses of Solon in any connection with Solon himself). Later parallels for Solon's phrase are Eur. *Hel.* 845 τὸ Τρωϊκὸν γὰρ οὐ καταισχυνῶ κλέος, 999-1000 καὶ κλέος τοῦμοῦ πατρός οὐκ ἄν μιάναιμ(ι), Joseph, *BJ* 6.187.4 μὴ καταισχύναι τὸ σφέτερον κλέος, Plut. *De gen.* 582e4 οὐ καταισχύνων τὸ μέγα Πυθαγόρου κλέος, Opp. *H.* 2.641 οὐδ' ἥσχυναν ἐὼν κλέος οὐδὲ θανόντες.

According to several scholars of our century, from Wilamowitz onwards (see lastly Pellizer 1981, Vox 1983b, 310, Vox 1984, 73 and 76f.), Solon believes that he has disgraced his κλέος by not becoming a tyrant, but this association is not paralleled, and would be justifiable only if it was reflecting the thought and the criticism of the opponents — as, indeed, it often happens in the tetrametra to Phocis. However, this cannot be the case here, since the passage reflects Solon's perspective (see ἐφεισάμην and βίας ἀμειλίχου).

I interpret the syntax in a different way: no pause has to be implied after the verb καθηψάμην, and no comma ought to be printed after it (as in West's edition), and the negative οὐ should be connected not only with the verb that follows it, but also with the participles (as is fairly possible: cf. Shorey 1911). The meaning of the lines is that by avoiding to seize the power Solon avoided to pollute his κλέος, and gained the universal favour (l. 4f.), so fulfilling his wish to πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν (fr. 1.3-4). Indeed, the verb μιαίνω, whose original meaning in epic was material pollution (Hom. *Il.* 16.795-96, 23.732) and evoked afterwards more or less clearly a stain of blood (Aesch. *Ag.* 209, *Eum.* 281, Soph. *OC* 1373-74, Eur. *Hipp.* 317), was often accompanied by a reference to the hands that have accomplished the 'dirty' action (e.g. Eur. *El.* 322, *HF* 1324, *Or.* 517, 1563, *IT* 946, 1047, 1226f., Antiph. *caed.Her.* 82.3), and therefore the connection of the participle of such a verb with οὐ καθάπτομαι would be most probably effective: Solon would have felt the pollution of his reputation and the disgrace of his name if he had become tyrant, if he had

dared to ἄπτεσθαι τυραννίδος, and not because he did not. Cf. on this Catenacci 1996, 183ff., who compares Solon's attitude with Theognis 894 regarding the Cypselidae and notes that Solon anticipates Pind. *Pyth.* 11.56f. where he who has refrained himself from the *hybris* of a *tyrannis* leading a moderate life, dies γλυκυτάτᾳ γενεᾷ εὐώνυμον κτεάνων κρατίσταν χάριν πορών (also 244 n. 10 with full bibliography on the legislation against tyranny).

4. οὐδὲν αἰδεῖσθαι: Cairns 1993, 166-67, makes two interesting points on the usage of the verb by Solon. The verb is used here for the first time with a conditional clause related to past conduct, but also with a reference to the present and future, because Solon confidently expects a greater glory to come exactly because of this behaviour of his and despite the present criticism. Such an attitude by Solon, which opposes conventional conceptions of the honourable and relies on his personal alternative sense, is never found in the characters of the Homeric epic.

4-5. νικήσειν δοκέω ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους: For verbal similarities cf. Pl. *Symp.* 179a οἱ τοιοῦτοι νικῶεν ἂν ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους, 213e νικῶντα ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

The βία of the *tyrannos* (l. 2) against the defeated party reflects the behaviour of the winner in the Homeric duels, who has the life or even the body of the antagonist at his own complete mercy. Solon's phrase of ll. 4-5 remoulds boasts of Homeric duellers before the fight (cf. e.g. *Il.* 7.192 δοκέω νικησέμεν Ἑκτορα δῖον: Ajax on the outcome of his duel with Hector), and the switch in the meaning of the verb (here 'to win' ethically, 'to turn out to be superior') possibly implies some answer by Solon to the discontent of his ex-supporters, who would have blamed his softness towards the opposite, defeated but not oppressed party: in fact he did not intend to win a duel, but to impose the superiority of his opinion. Compare Solon's wish to conquest everyone's approval with the conquest of everybody's ζῆλος, which was the result traditionally connected with the seizure of autocratic power, as reflected in Archil. *IEG* 23.19-21 cit. ad ll. 2-3.

Loroux 1988, 119 hypothesised that this line would be opposing poetic-agonistic victories as the one of Hesiod, *Op.* 657 ὕμνῳ νικήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ' ὠτῶεντα, but I do not see any hint in this direction.

29^a G.-P.² (33 W.²)

1. βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνὴρ: βαθύφρων first in Solon. Later, Pind. *Nem.* 7.1 Μοιρᾶν βαθυφρόνων (cp. also *Nem.* 4.8 φρενὸς βαθείας, *Nem.* 3.53 βαθυμῆτα,

and Aesch. *Cho.* 651 βυσσόφρων, *Supp.* 407 δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος, with Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc). Treu 1955, 114 remarked that the Homeric πολύφρων is here changed to an epithet that shows the depth in space of the human soul, and Snell 1955, 37 observed that Solon's expression anticipates the ideas of Heraclitus about the 'depth' of the human mind.

βουλήεις: *hapax*.

2. ἐσθλά: For ἐσθλά 'good things, gifts', cf. e.g. Hes. *Op.* 116, 119, *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 225 θεοὶ δέ τοι ἐσθλά πόροιεν, Thgn. *IEG* 4. Here the reference is to the tyranny itself, according to Fränkel 1960, 67 and n.3 who quotes Hdt. 3.53.4 μὴ δῶς τὰ σεωυτοῦ ἀγαθὰ ἄλλοισι (*scil.* the *tyrannis* which Periander possessed). On the thought that to accept the smaller share when the situation allows a position of force is "unmanly" or "mean": Eur. *Phoen.* 504-10 and 524-5, Pl. *Grg.* 483a-c and *Resp.* 344a-c can be added.

θεοῦ διδόντος: Hom. *Od.* 1.390 Διὸς γε διδόντος. Δίδωμι is commonly used of the lot appointed by the gods for man, e.g.: Sol. 1.69 θεὸς ... δίδωσι, Aesch. *Pers.* 294, *Sept.* 719, *Eum.* 392-3, Soph. *Phil.* 1316-7, Eur. *Hipp.* 1434 θεῶν διδόντων.

I would not rule out that the expression implies also a reference to the Delphic oracle quoted by Plutarch, promising Solon success in gaining supreme power over the parties (cf. *Introd.*). The acceptance of the gift by Solon would have created a bond of obligation, since reciprocity lies in the ethos of the gift-giving and receiving, and Solon would not have been able to repay such a gift. Besides, the unwise acceptance of it would have been the prime factor for his destruction: cf. Hes. *Op.* 83-9 about Epimetheus' unwise acceptance of Pandora as a gift from the gods, though Prometheus had warned him μή ποτε δῶρον δέξασθαι παρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου, ἀλλ' ἀποπέμπειν, but Epimetheus δεξάμενος, ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ', ἐνόησεν; see also Pl. *Resp.* 619b-c where tyranny appeals to the one who makes his choice of life ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας).

3. περιβαλὼν δ' ἄγραν: Hdt. 1.141.2 λαβεῖν ἀμφίβληστρον καὶ περιβαλεῖν τε πλῆθος πολλὸν τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ ἐξαιρῦσαι, and later Arr. *Ind.* 29.11.6 τούτοις (*scil.* the fish) περιβάλλοντες τὰ δίκτυα αἰρέουσι. A description that illustrates the technical procedure of the kind of fishing alluded to by Solon is in Philo, *De agric.* 24.1 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ ἀλιευόμενοι δίκτυα καθιᾶσιν ἔστιν ὅτε μήκιστα πολλὴν ἐν κύκλῳ περιβαλλόμενοι θάλατταν, ἵν' ὥς πλείστους ἐντὸς ληφθέντας ἀρκύων οἷα τειχήρεις γεγονότας ἰχθύας συλλάβωσι.

ἀγασθείς: Cf. Hsch. α 345 L. ἀγασθείς· θαυμασθείς. Instead of ἀγασθείς codd. Lobeck ad Soph. *Aj.* 309 and Ziegler (addenda et corrigenda in his edition of Plut.

Vit. 4.2, p.9) proposed ἀασθείς (~ ἀτυχθείς Reiske). But for ἄγαμαι *absolutum*, cf. Hom. *Od.* 18.71 ὑπερφιάλως ἀγάσαντο. As for the meaning in Homer the verb always implies a 'shock' in front of something that exceeds the boundaries of the normal or usual (cf. *Lfgre* s.v., B), and specifically in the *Odyssey*, the use of the verb connects admiration and fear (see ad 18.71: the suitors in front of a bold speech of Iros) or fear and respect: in front of his extraordinary catch Solon does not know how to deal with it, as well as Odysseus in front of Nausicaa (6.168-9): ὥς σέ, γύναι, ἄγαμαί τε τέθηπά τε δείδιά τ' αἰνῶς γούνων ἄψασθαι· χαλεπὸν δέ με πένθος ἰκάνει.

3-4. οὐκ ἐπέσπασεν ... μέγα δίκτυον: The closest parallel is Theoc. 1.40 μέγα δίκτυον ... ἔλκει where the old fisherman gets tired by the effort he makes to drag a μέγα net. It is possible that this very idea of weight is aimed at Solon by his opponents: the net and its catch were too much for him and thus he fails to 'net' the catch. Ἐπισπάω is new in the meaning of 'dragging the nets'. In this context we find more commonly verbs as ἀνασπάω (which Xylander proposed for Solon's text), the simple σπάω (cf. schol. in Ar. *Vesp.* 175 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσπασεν· παρὰ τὴν παροιμίαν εἶρηκε τὸ οὐκ ἔσπασεν ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἐπέτυχεν ... ἄγκιστρον μετὰ σχοίνου καὶ μὴ ἐπιτυγχανόντων ἰχθύος τινός) or ἔλκω. However, ἐπέσπασεν is given in SC and A (*supra scriptum*), and should be kept, both as a *lectio difficilior*, and above all as an adaptation of the technical term to fit better Solon's context: Solon would have had, in his critics' word, to pull the net not ἀνά "upwards" (the obvious gesture for a fisherman), but ἐπί "towards", namely "in favour" of his own profit (and of the profit of his supporters). As noted by Silk 1974, 192 'the rhythmic stretching-over and pulling-back on δίκτυον mimes the hauling in of the net'.

There are other passages from Greek Literature where *tyrannis* is likened to a net and the tyrant to a fisherman, closest in time to Solon is Hdt. 1.62, cf. Catenacci 1996, 201f., and Vox 1984, 97 who correctly believes that this fishing metaphor for *tyrannis* was a well established item of the ancient political jargon. On the links between the ideas of freedom and democracy with fish in classical Athens, see lastly Davidson 1997, esp. 278-308.

4. ἀμαρτή: Cf. Hsch. α 3456 L. ἀμαρτῇ· ὁμοῦ. For the form of this Homeric adverb, ἀμαρτῇ was solely supported by Aristachus (see Schol. b² *Il.* 5.656, II 89.20 E. ὁ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχος τὸ ἀμαρτῇ χωρὶς τοῦ ἱ γράφει καὶ ὀξύνει), but it has to be considered an archaic trait in comparison with ἀμαρτῇ or ἀμαρτῆ of the Hom. MSS, which were favoured by several other ancient grammarians: cf. Wackernagel 1922=1955, 132 n. 1.

φρενῶν ἀποσφαλείς: Aesch. *PV* 472 ἀποσφαλείς φρενῶν. The verb is always

absolute before Solon, but its use in connection with the genitive will become common in ionico-attic: cf. Hdt. 6.5.1, Aesch. *Pers.* 392, Pl. *Leg.* 950b etc.

5-6. ἤθελον γάρ κεν κρατήσας πλοῦτον ... λαβών ... τυραννεύσας:
The MSS have ἤθελε(ν): the imperfect with κεν constitutes an hypothetical period where the first part is implied from the preceding verses. I think that both readings can keep the irony of the text and give the same result — the opponents get discredited in either way; however there is a difference: with ἤθελε(ν), the speech of the opponents ends at l. 4 (Solon would appropriate the feelings of his critics and the ironic sense of the lines would run like this 'if he had not lost his nerve and common sense he would have been willing to become *tyrannos* even for one day and to be flayed to make a wineskin afterwards'); with ἤθελον the end is at l. 7; the context of Plutarch strongly suggests the second (ταῦτα ... λέγοντας). Another strong argument in favour of ἤθελον is γάρ, which links ll. 5-7 very closely to the preceding sentence. That makes it very unlikely that the "quotation" ended with l. 4.

The verb τυραννεύω is first used here and in Alc. *PLF* 75.13 (see O' Neil 1986). The linking of wealth and tyranny is traditional, both in Solon's critical-derogatory perspective and in a positive view: something like this last *topos* that regards autocratic power and supreme wealth as desirable goods (cf. the passages in the *Introd.*) is rejected here by Solon's connection of one day's tyranny with painful death and extinction of one's family — it is as if ll. 5-6 were 'quoting' the words and the 'topic' perspective expressed by the ex-supporters of Solon; l. 7 would provide Solon's real thought and answer to them.

The negative view on the tyrant's life (and wealth) is first attested by Archil. *IEG* 19 οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει, οὐδ' εἶλέ πώ με ζῆλος, οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι ... μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος κτλ.

A parallel formally very close to Solon is the adesp. epigram *Anth.Pal.* 11.3, where the supposedly positive wish for the wealth and power of a tyrant is later changed to a denial of the idea of becoming a tyrant: Ἦθελον ἂν πλουτεῖν, ὥς πλούσιος ἦν ποτε Κροῖσος, καὶ βασιλεὺς εἶναι τῆς μεγάλης Ἀσίης· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐμβλέψω Νικάνορα τὸν σοροπηγὸν καὶ γνῶ, πρὸς τί ποιεῖ ταῦτα τὰ γλωσσόκομα, ἀκτὴν που πᾶσας καὶ ταῖς κοτύλαις ὑποβρέξας τὴν Ἀσίην πωλῶ πρὸς μύρα καὶ στεφάνους. Cataudella 1928, 252 thinks that this epigram reproduces the tone and the expression of Archil. 19W., but in my opinion it is much more evidently connected with that of Solon, where the seeming wish for tyranny is, subsequently, pointedly refused and can be a precious testimony of the diffusion of Solon's poetry in a sympotic context even in late antiquity (cf. also Maced. *Anth.Pal.* 11.58 Ἦθελον οὐ χρυσὸν τε καὶ ἄσπεα μυρία γαίης οὐδ', ὅσα τὰς Θήβας εἶπεν Ὀμηρος ἔχειν, κτλ.).

For the accumulation of participles, which creates a powerful stylistic effect in the argumentation of the enemies, and seemingly reverses the values of 29.3 for a while (cf. above), see Sol. 1.44-6, 30.8-15, Hom. *Il.* 22.68, Tyrt. 7.21-6; Römisch 1933, 47f., Weber 1955, 41f., Fränkel 1955, 75f.

6. *μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν*: the Pythagorean philosophers were thought to be favourable of the idea of being "tyrant even for one day" rather than living a long subdued life in Iambl. *VP* 260.6 *τυραννίδος ὀρέγεσθαι παρακαλοῦντας κρεῖττον εἶναι φάσκειν γενέσθαι μίαν ἡμέραν ταῦρον ἢ πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα βοῦν* (but the *topos* — in this form ? — will be one of the traditional charges against the Pythagorean view of life, for which see e.g. Arist. *frr.* 190-205 Rose³=155-77 Gigon. As a fact, the political concerns of Pythagoras and of the Pythagoreans in Croton were certainly often interpreted as aiming to seize a tyranny: cf. Theopomp. *FGrH* 115F73 and Posidon. *fr.* 253.113f. Kidd ap. *Ath.* 5.213e, Diog.Laert. 8.46 (also 8.39), App. *Mith.* 28; see Burkert 1972, 118f. Regarding the *topos* of asking the fate for one single day more, cf. Lucian *Catapl.* 8.11 οὐ πολὺν χρόνον, ὦ Μοῖρα, αἰτῶ· μίαν με ἔασον μέναι τήνδε ἡμέραν, ἄχρι ἂν τι ἐπισκήψω τῇ γυναικὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων κτλ.

7. *ἄσκός ὕστερον δεδάρθαι*: Cf. Diogenian. 1.84=*Paroemiogr.* 2.14.1f. *ἄσκον δαίρεις· ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνοήτως σφόδρα τι ποιούντων· ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβολικῶς αἰκιζομένων τινάς*. It is not possible to ascertain whether the proverb with this meaning derived from this passage of Solon or pre-existed, but its old proverbial aura is confirmed by its history as a common jest in classical Athens: Ar. *Nub.* 442 *ρίγων ἄσκον δείρειν*, *Eq.* 370 *δερῶ σε θύλακον κλοπῆς*, Pl. *Euthd.* 285cd *ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλωνται δέρειν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἴ μοι ἢ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἄσκον τελευτήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἢ τοῦ Μαρσύου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετήν*. I do not rule out that the passage could imply a hint at a specific kind of punishment envisaged by Solon for himself: see Hdt. 7.26.3 *ὁ τοῦ Σιληνοῦ Μαρσύεω ἄσμός* (being the punishment of Marsyas), and especially Alc. *PLF* 296a8 *μᾶλλον] κ' ἄξιός 'Αντιλέοντ[ος ὅδ'] ἧς ἀπυδέρθην* (with Maas' integrations); for this passage of Alcaeus, see Maas 1956, 200; for its connection with Solon, Lloyd-Jones 1975=1990, 55.

κάπιτετρίφθαι γένος: The phrase alludes to ancient laws, which for several crimes condemned the guilty person as well as his family (see e.g. *IG* 11.1296.6-8 *ἐξώλη εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος καὶ οἴκησιν τὴν ἐκείνου*, Andoc. *Myst.* 98, Antiph. *caed.Her.* 11, Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 111). See above all, Isoc. *Phil.* 108 *εὐροίμεν ἂν οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς διεφθαρμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἠφανισμένον*, which may imply a belief in something like a prosecution of the tyrants' families. At any rate, we have a certain testimony (Arist. *Ath.Pol.* 16.10) about a law

applying the ἀτιμία for both the individual who would have attempted to become tyrant and his family — a number of scholars ascribed this law to Solon himself: F37a Ruschenbusch. See for the whole matter Bourriot 1976, 2, 309-326.

Ἐπιτρίβω is another Aristophanic word, that reinforces the mocking tone of the line; also the perfect tense of δεδάρθαι and ἐπιτετρῖφθαι, which describes an eternal and absolute state (cf. Linforth 1919, ad loc.), makes more paradoxical the readiness of the speaker to die in such a way after a single day of tyranny.

29^b G.-P.² (34 W.²)

1. οἱ δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇσιν ἦλθον· ἐλπίδ' κτλ.: οἱ δέ most probably should have introduced the intention of the ex-supporters of Solon as opposed to the (previously expressed) pacific plans of Solon himself, as we see in ll. 4 and 6f.

The closest parallel is Eur. *HF* 588-91 πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἄναξ ἔχει, οἳ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας, a passage that appears to have had Solon as its model, as it describes an autocratic power supported by "poor" in a situation where some nobles became poor, and may be read as the one described in fr. 6.1 (though the meaning of the fragment may have been different, cf. ad loc.). See also Pl. *Resp.* 344a, according to whom ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο τυραννίς, ἣ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τ' ἀλλότρια καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὅσια καὶ ἴδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην.

Modern scholars usually compare this line of Solon with fr. 3.13, but it is not sure that our line refers to the same rapacious people. However ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ of 3.13~ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇσιν certainly points to this direction. In fr. 3.13 Solon was speaking of the arrogant and rapacious behaviour of the aristocratic faction(s); is he here alluding to the (aristocratic ?) faction from which he had gained some support, but which after the legislation had showed its real intentions? In this case the verbal allusion would imply Solon's bitter awareness that his ex-supporters were no less lacking in interest for the good of the state than the other aristocratic factions which he had been blaming in fr. 3. If so, the ex-supporters who were in favour of Solon's tyranny appear to share the features of selfish greed and indifference for the good of the people, which were sometimes referred by Homer and Hesiod to the king (for the δημοβόρος βασιλεύς see *Il.* 1.231, and Hes. *Op.* 260-4), and later ascribed to the *tyrannos* at least by Alc. *PLF* 70 (see Fileni 1983).

It is difficult to decide between the two possible interpretations of the beginning monosyllable: demonstrative, οἱ δ' (Richards 1893, 212, and West), or relative, οἳ

δ'=τοῦτοι οἱ (Gentili-Prato), but I think that the first is preferable, since it creates an *asyndeton explicativum*.

There are good reasons to doubt about the reading ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσιν ἦλθον. Indeed, the ending -αῖσι is never consistently or surely attested by the Homeric MSS, apart from *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 368 θυσίαισι, where it may be considered an aeolic feature: cf. Richardson ad loc., Ruijgh 1957, 15-7; Wathelet 1970, 243-50, Bowie 1981, 114-5. In the Attic poetry of the 5th century, the ending is common in passages of choral lyric, but it cannot be considered an Atticism, because the Attic common endings are $\bar{\alpha}\sigma\iota(\nu)$, $\eta\sigma\iota(\nu)$, or sometimes $\bar{\alpha}\sigma\iota(\nu)$, $\eta\sigma\iota(\nu)$, while -αῖσι never appears in the inscriptions until the end of the century, though it became later a frequent poetical trait (cf. Threutte 1996, 2, 98-100). I do not find plausible the presence of this single (homerizing) aeolism in the language of Solon, in front of -ησι in fr. 1.37, 3.5 and 10, and I think that an original ἀρπαγῆσιν (so West) was later banalized in ἀρπαγαῖσιν (lastly accepted by Gentili-Prato). I still have some doubt about the presence of this very dative, because both ἐφ' ἀρπαγᾶς is idiomatic (see e.g. Dindorf, Stephanus, *TLG* s.v.), and ἐπί+accus. would better fit the movement verb ἔρχεσθαι, and the emendation of ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖς ἦλθον in ἐφ' ἀρπαγῇ συνῆλθον, proposed by Richards 1893 cit. and independently by Ziegler 1928, 507 does not clear up my doubt. If a more radical intervention than West's is needed, in my opinion that ought to be ἐφ' ἀρπαγὰς συνῆλθον (cp. fr. 30.1-2 ξυνήγαγον δῆμον).

3. Thought of Solon's ex-supporters, who had interpreted Solon's sweetness as a deceptive tool of the bad ruler who at the end was going to impose his (and his partisans') τραχύτης, as really does the αἰμύλος ἀνὴρ in Solon 15.7, whose γλῶσσα and ἔπη diverge from his real practice-aims (τὸ γιγνόμενον): cf. the note ad loc. The opponents were stupid (see l. 4), because they had not understood that Solon's aim as a lawgiver was to impersonate the role of *eunomia* of fr. 3.31f., that is to say, permanently τραχέα λειαίνειν (3.34).

κωτίλλοντα λείωσ: κωτίλλω, a non-Homeric word, is first attested in Hes. *Op.* 373-4 μηδὲ γυνή σε νόον πυγοστόλος ἔξαπατάτω αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα, where the verb has already the derogatory meaning of chattering with insincere pleasantries that appears in Solon and in Thgn. *IEG* 363 εὖ κώτιλλε τὸν ἐχθρόν, 851 ὅς τὸν ἐταῖρον μαλθακὰ κωτίλλων ἔξαπατᾶν ἐθέλει — the verb can also simply mean chattering, as first in Phoc. 14.2 ἡδέα κωτίλλοντα καθήμενον οἰνοποτάζειν, and in Thgn. *IEG* 488, 816; see later *GVI* 1512.1 (first half of 2 cent. B.C.) αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα τεοὺς γενέτας ἀτιτάλλες.

ἐκφανεῖν νόον: Thgn. *IEG* 967 ἐκφαίνει ἦθος.

4. χαῦνα ... ἐφράσαντο: the adjective is not attested before Solon, and Alc. *PLF* 359 ἐκ δὲ παίδων χαύνωις (χαύνοις cod. A) φρένας. Its later frequent occurrences in Attic writers allow us to suppose that it became a colloquialism. Cf. Sol. 15.6 σύμπασιν δ' ὑμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος and note there.

5. λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρώσι: λοξός is another non-Homeric word which became common for angry or hostile glances, as a synonym of the Homeric ὑπόδρα ἰδών: besides the isolated phrasing of Tyrt. 8.2 οὐπω Ζεὺς αὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει and Thgn. *IEG* 535f. δουλείη κεφαλὴ ... καὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει (that may mean a less markedly hostile glance: cf. Prato ad loc), see Anac. *PMG* 417.2 λοξὸν ὄμμασι βλέπουσα, [Theoc.] *Id.* 20.13 ὄμμασι λοξὰ βλέποισα, Callim. *Aet.* fr. 1.37-8 ἴδον ὄθμαιται ... μὴ λοξῶ, and *Hec.* fr. 72 Hollis ἡ δὲ πελιδνωθεῖσα καὶ ὄμμασι λοξὸν ὑποδράξ ὀσσομένη, Ar.Rhod. 2.664-5 ὄμματα δέ σφιν λοξὰ παραστρωφῶνται and 4.475-6 λοξῶ ἴδεν οἶον ἔρεξαν ὄμματι ... ἔργον Ἑρινύς, Damag. *Anth.Pal.* 95.3-4 ὄμμα βαλόντες λοξόν, Antip.Thess. *Anth.Pal.* 7.531.6 δερκομένα λοξαῖς ... κόραις, adesp. *Anth.Pal.* 7.546.4=*FGE* 1255 λοξοῖς ὄμμασι etc.: see the rich collection of late instances by Massimilla on Callim. *Aet.* fr. 1.38 (with the additions by Magnelli 1997, 451).

For the pleonasm ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρώσι, besides [Theoc.] 20.13 quoted, cf. Sol. 31.2-3, Hom. *Il.* 3.28, 169, Bacchyl. 19.19, Aesch. *Pers.* 81, *Supp.* 716, *Eum.* 34, *PV* 679 etc.

πάντες ὥστε δήιον: For the use of ὥς τε, ὥς εἴ τε in Homer and elsewhere in lyric poets, see Denniston, *Greek Part.* 522. Vox 1984, 150-1 contrasts Solon's status here to Odysseus' who in the *Od.* 10.38-9 is πᾶσι φίλος ... ἀνθρώποις.

6. εἴπα: a statement of political coherence, which, in my opinion, l. 3 (see ad loc.) intended to strengthen.

οὐ χρεών: an absolute accusative, adverbial and parenthetical, as e.g. in Thuc. 3.40.4 ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεών ἄρχοιτε. As Vox 1984, 149 well remarks, Solon is here opposing —as being not compulsory— the principle of personal friendship and political partnership with someone as being quite exclusive and involving the enmity against the enemies of this someone (for which see Introd. to fr. 9). He is also opposing the general code of reciprocating one's enemies (as well as one's friends, see fr. 1.5).

σὺν θεοῖσιν: it will become a stereotyped expression in order to avoid human *hybris* and, consequently, divine punishment for boasting of one's success (e.g. Pind. *Isthm.* 4.4, Aesch. *Ag.* 961f., Eur. *Med.* 915, *Tro.* 867, Ar. *Ran.* 1199), but here the phrase still opposes the 'declared' plans whose coherence with the willingness of the gods had been a strong point of Solon's self-presentation in his programmatic poems (see

Introd. to fr. 3) and the "other" possible results which were not 'declared' in the programmatic poems and were not enjoying divine favour. A strikingly close parallel for the opposition divinely supported (useful)/μάψ (harmful) is Hes. *Theog.* 871-2 οἳ γε μὲν ἐκ θεόφιν γενεήν, θνητοῖς μέγ' ὄνειαρ. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι μάψ αὖραι ἐπιπνείουσι θάλασσαν· ... πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, where the winds created by the gods are opposed to "the other" unruly-occasional winds, which do a lot of damages to men.

7-8. οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος ἀνδάνει βία: Archil. *IEG* 19.3 ... οὐκ ἐρέω τυραννίδος, Pind. *Pyth.* 11.52-3 μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων. Richards 1891, 178 emends to ἥνδανεν in accordance with ἔερδον which is correct from a syntactic point of view. However, as Masaracchia 1958, 344 notes, the present form ἀνδάνει would emphasise the permanent character of Solon's rejection of tyranny.

Note the ring composition of the opposition between the ideas of tyranny/βία and of fatherland that connects these line to 29^a.

7. μάτην: another non-Homeric or Hesiodic word (for the Homeric-Hesiodic μάψ, αὖτως), first attested in *Hom.Hymn Dem.* 308. Cf. Thgn. *IEG* 523.

8. βία τι [ρέζ]ειν: 'Cleobulina' *IEG* 2.2 βία ρέξαι.

8-9. πιείρας χθονός: the phrase is not found before [Orph.] *Lith.* 702 καὶ χθόνα πίειραν, πάντων τροφόν κτλ., but cf. the Homeric πίειρα ἄρουρα and πίονες ἀγροί. Notice the enjambment with πατρίδος which can be found in fr. 29.1-2 (see ad loc). Earth was always a propagandistic reference-point dear to a prospective tyrant, see the instances gathered by Catenacci 1996, 227 n. 158.

9. κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοῦς: On the identity of the two factions of the ἐσθλοί and of the κακοί, see Introd.

ἰσομοιρίαν: new, but see Hom. *Il.* 15.209 ἰσόμορον. The term appears again in Emp. VS 31A72 and in the Pythagorean philosophy (cf. Diog.Laert. 8.26), as well as in philosophers and medical writers: cf. e.g. Arist. [*Mund.*] 396b35 and Gal. *temper.* 1.527.2 564.4 and 573.9, *alim. facult.* 698.10. On Alcmaeon's analogous idea of ἰσονομία between the opposite elements as necessary for the health of the body, see ad 3.17; on the difference between Solon's *eunomia* and the ideal of *isonomia*, see ad 3.32-9. On the fortune of the political and medical-philosophical idea of ἰσονομία and ἰσομοιρία, cf. Mau-Schmidt 1964, and Triebel-Schubert 1984.

°40 G.-P.² (31 W.²)

The invocation to Zeus was a common theme of the archaic προοίμια, from Terpander (*PMG* 698 Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχά, πάντων ἀγήτωρ, Ζεῦ σοὶ πέμπω ταύταν ὕμνων ἀρχάν) to Alcman (*PMG* 29 ἐγὼν δ' αἰέσομαι ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχομένα) to Pindar (*Nem.* 2.1-3 ὅθεν περ καὶ Ὀμηρίδαι ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων τὰ πόλλ' αἰδοὶ ἄρχονται, Διὸς ἐκ προοιμίου, καὶ ὅδ' ἀνὴρ, κτλ., *Nem.* 5.25f. αἱ δὲ (=the Muses) πρῶτιστον μὲν ὕμνησαν Διὸς ἀρχόμεναι ... Θέτιν, κτλ.). In the proem of the *Works and Days*, the poet begins the poem by inviting the Muses to celebrate their father Zeus (ll. 1-2), and thereafter the Muses celebrate Zeus' power in a short hymn (ll. 3-8), so the reference to the addressee and the real beginning of the work must wait until ll. 9-10. In *Theogony* the song by the Muses (ll. 43-51) mentioned the gods born from Earth and Heaven first, and secondly Zeus and his superiority among the gods, while l. 48 reaffirmed as a general truth that the Muses sing of Zeus first and last (ἀρχόμεναί θ' ὕμνευσι θεαὶ ἡγήγουσαί τ' αἰοιδῆς). In an analogous way, in the 'Homeric' *Hymn to Dionysus* (i) a reference to Zeus led the author (or an interpolator) to insert a full farewell to Zeus (ll. 17-9 οἱ δὲ σ' αἰδοὶ ἄδομεν ἀρχόμενοι λήγοντές τ', οὐδέ πη ἔστι σεῖ' ἐπιληθόμενῳ ἱερῆς μεμνήσθαι αἰοιδῆς), which is curiously in contrast with the pertinent farewell to Dionysus which immediately follows (20f.): see Fantuzzi, *Theocritus and the Demythologising of Poetry*, forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference *Matrices of Genre Authors, Canons, and Society* (Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington 13-18/8/1996).

1. εὐχόμεσθα Διὶ ... βασιλῆϊ: For the verb, Hom. *Il.* 7.194 εὐχεσθε Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι, *Il.* 7.200 οἱ δ' εὐχοντο Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι, *Theb. PEG* 3.3 εὐκτο Διὶ βασιλῆϊ, Hes. *Op.* 465 εὐχεσθαι δὲ Διί. For the second hemistich, see Hes. *Op.* 69 Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι (at the end of the hexameter).

The epithet βασιλεύς is never used of Zeus in Homer either attributively or predicatively, and is typically Hesiodic. Besides *Theog.* 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεὺς where "the phrase resembles a formulaic title, but is not used as such; there is a strong predicative sense Zeus, now that he was king of the gods" (West ad loc.), Hesiod often uses βασιλεύς for the kingship in heaven (*Theog.* 486, 897, 923, *Op.* 668, fr. 308); on Zeus *basileus* in Homer and Hesiod, cf. Drews 1983, 104-107, and further, Wackernagel 1916, 210; for the epigraphic evidence Cook 1914-40, (Index I, s.v. Zeus' Epithets). Other instances of the epithet together with the name of Zeus are *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 358, *Cypr. PEG* 9.3, *Theb. PEG* 3.3 cit., Alc. *PLF* 296.3=387, 308.3-4; later, Thgn. *IEG* 1120 (also 285-6, 376, 1346), Emp. *VS* 31B128.2, Pind. *Nem.* 5.35, *Isthm.* 8.18, *Ol.*

7.34, Corinn. *PMG* 654, col.iii.13, Aesch. *Pers.* 532=Ag. 355, where Fraenkel ad loc. suggests that the invocation had become idiomatic in spoken Attic, Soph. *Trach.* 127-8, Ar. *Nub.* 2, 153, *Vesp.* 625, Av. 223, *Ran.* 1278, *Plut.* 1095, *FGE* 1565, *FGE* 1828, [Orph.] fr. 21a.7 K.~168.5, [Orph.] fr. incert. 339 K., etc.

The verbal form might be simply considered a first person emphatic plural for singular, but here more probably includes the audience in the poet's self-reference, as well as in the proem of *Odyssey*, where after ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε in l. 1 we find l. 10 εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, see S. West, ad loc. (Engl. ed. 1988). The subjunctive to express resolve has some kind of proemial specialisation, and can be found in Hes. *Theog.* 1, 36, *Hom.Hymn Ap.* 1, *Hom.Hymn* 25.1 (see further Aratus, *Phaen.* 1 and Theoc. 17.1-2).

2. θεσμοῖς τοῖσδε ... ὀπάσσαι: Cf. Sol. 30.18 θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῷ ... ἔγραψα.

τύχην ... καὶ κῦδος ὀπάσσαι: Besides Sol. 11.5 χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι, cf. above all fr. 1.2-4.

Scholars seem to have missed that this line about the success of Solon's laws appears to ask in the same terms and in the same order for what Solon himself had prayed in the proem of his longest elegy (ὄλβος~τύχη ἀγαθή, δόξα ἀγαθή~κῦδος). If we also take into consideration the strong tradition of the phrase κῦδος ὀπάζειν, along with the fact that traditionally, too, the provider of this κῦδος had always been Zeus (cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.141, 12.255, 15.327, 16.730, 17.251, 17.566, 21.570, *Od.* 15.320, 19.161, Hes. *Theog.* 438; Ar. *Eq.* 200 etc.), and compare it with the thoughtful unconventionality of the invocation to the Muses in fr. 1 (see note to fr. 1.2), we may suppose that this line is more probably a patchwork imitation of Solon's text, than a variation by Solon himself.

Around the second half of the seventh century public writing recorded laws in prose (the earlier ones on stone found so far, dated roughly to 650-600 B.C. — *Sel. of Greek Hist. Inscr.* 2 Meiggs-Lewis — come from Dreros, Crete), and Solon certainly left an extensive prose-written code for Athens ca. 600. Plut. *Sol.* 3.5 testifies that Solon had used the hexametric-epic style poetry for his θεσμοί, before passing to prose. The information is not at all secure. Plutarch himself has doubts about it (ἐνιοι δέ φασιν κτλ.), and seems to follow a source which did not have Solon's poems but had found the verses that Plutarch cites in other sources (as Solon's poems were recited by memory still in Plato's time, Plutarch would hardly have presented the fragment in such a suspicious way, if he could read other lines of text in his source, cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli ad loc.). Hermippus, who in the sixth book of his *Περὶ Νομοθετῶν* (in Ath. 13.619b=fr. 88 Wehrli) ascribed to Charondas a similar habit of writing laws in verse, may have been Plutarch's source.

Loraux 1988, 116-117, seems to believe in the authenticity of these lines ascribed to Solon and finds a parallel with what Tyrteaus had done for the non-written *rhetra* of Lycurgus. According to her, Solon used the epic language of Homer and Hesiod to gain for his legislation the superior authority of the inspired epic poetry.

It is true that on archaic laws in verse there existed a conspicuous tradition; besides Hermippus, also Diodorus testifies that Charondas' Laws were written in hexameters and sung in the symposia, and Thales too was considered to have put in verse the principles and issues of the Constitution of Lycurgus (on the relation between verse and laws, see Thomas 1995, 63-4, and n.15, Piccirilli 1981, and, more generally on the *topoi* connected with the archaic lawgivers, Szegedy-Maszak 1978). But this very tradition might have facilitated the apocryphal attribution of these lines to Solon, and both the relevant topic elements, and the imitative character of l. 2 do not favour the assumption of their authenticity.

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